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Abstract

A Subcontinent’s Sunni Schism presents the first-ever history of the 150-year religiopolitical rivalry between the Deobandis and the Barelvis—arguably the most important
schism in the “Muslim world,” and certainly the most significant within Sunni Islam.
More recently, that rivalry has often been expressed by means of bullets and bombs,
especially in Pakistan. But beyond the headline-grabbing violence of the DeobandiBarelvi schism lies the story of a century-and-a-half-long religious antagonism: at first
over converts, later for competing visions of the political future, then for a place within
a new “Islamic” polity—for dominance within its political structure. For Deobandis,
the rivalry was defined by their struggle to propagate a “pure” Islam, as opposed to the
Barelvi deviation (plus an unmitigated hatred of the British presence in India); for
Barelvis, their right to speak for the “Sunni majority” was what defined the battle—a
privilege that the Deobandis had long sought to usurp. Running constant throughout
the rivalry’s history, too, were the two schools’ separate visions of a glorious future
Islamic epoch, of a truly Islamic state—or, perhaps more precisely, their differences on
the subject of how to get there. Of course, the rivalry did not develop in a vacuum; its
participants were shaped, inspired, and manipulated by a host of outside influences, the
strongest of which, perhaps, was the modern, “total” state.
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PREFACE

The words of Nehru, in reference to relations between “Englishmen and Indians,” might
just as well be applied today to those between “the West” and “the Muslim world”:
“What a great gulf divided the two…and how they distrusted and disliked each other!
But more than the distrust and the dislike was the ignorance of each other, and, because of this,
each side was a little afraid of the other and was constantly on its guard in the other’s
presence. To each, the other appeared as a sour-looking, unamiable creature, and
neither realized that there was decency and kindliness behind the mask.” On another
occasion, the Pandit remarked, “An average Englishman, if he were frank, would
probably confess that he knows some quite decent Indians but they are exceptions and
as a whole Indians are a detestable crowd. The average Indian would admit that some
Englishmen whom he knows are admirable, but, apart from these few, the English are
an overbearing, brutal, and thoroughly bad lot. Curious how each person judges of the
other race, not from the individual with whom he has come in contact, but from others
about whom he knows very little or nothing at all.” Apart from any academic
aspiration, then, it is my hope that the telling of the story of the Deobandi-Barelvi
rivalry, its long transformation, and its ripples within the politics of pre-Partition India,
independent Pakistan, and beyond might in some small measure peel away another layer
of that “ignorance”—Nehru’s “great gulf”—yet separating hundreds of millions of
Muslims in the East from hundreds of millions of non-Muslims in the West.

W. KESLER JACKSON
New Delhi,
28 April 2012/6 Jumada II 1433
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Note on Dates, Names, and Transcription

Dates are generally presented through Chapter 3 of this work according to both the
Gregorian and the Hijri calendars, respectively, separated by a forward slash symbol (/).
Thus, 1857/1273 refers to the Gregorian year 1857 AD, or the Hijri year 1273 AH.
The “old” AD signification has been retained (instead of the “new” CE) to add emphasis
to both calendars’ religious underpinnings. Where only the Gregorian year is
employed, the acronym “AD” is used to so signify. Hijri dates are meant as a reference
and are only approximations. From Chapter 4 onwards—chronologically, with the
establishment of the Pakistani state—the Hijri references are dropped and only the
Gregorian system is used.
When introducing proper nouns, where possible I have chosen to use spellings
either already in common use or preferred by the person, institution, or organization in
question (as shown, for example, on their official websites or in their own
correspondence, etc.). The name “Muhammad,” however, has been spelled consistently
throughout to avoid confusion. Titles and descriptives, often lumped with names (as if
they are part of the name) in Western and Islamic literature have been written, with a
few exceptions, in transliterated format to distinguish them from the actual name. Thus
“Sayyid Ahmad Khan of Raebareli” has been rendered “sәyyid Ahmad Khan of Raebareli,”
sәyyid being a title denoting descent from the Prophet.
The system of transcription in this dissertation is, generally speaking, purely
phonetic. However, since more than one Urdu letter may correspond to a single Roman
one, a number of modifications have been made, essentially along the lines of the system
devised by Mumtaz Ahmad in his Urdu Newspaper Reader (Kensington, MD: Dunwoody
x

Press, 1985), who himself more or less followed the system created by Muhammad AbdAl-Rahman Barker in the 1960s/1380s. All Urdu words are transcribed into Roman
letters and/or symbols, except for proper nouns, and written in italics.
The reader may refer to the following chart for the Urdu equivalent of all Roman
letters or symbols.
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INTRODUCTION
When twenty-one-year-old Muhammad Siddiq, a village-born Deobandi from what
is now called Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and a recent Lashkar-e-Jhangvi recruit, waded
through the crowd of Barelvis celebrating the Prophet’s birthday (mwlyd) at Nishtar
Park on 6 April 2006/7 Rabi I 1427, attendees could not have known that the young
man was concealing a jacket packed with two pounds of explosives and three thousand
ball bearings underneath his coat. Just as the gathering’s leaders closed the mәGryb
prayer, human bomb Muhammad Siddiq detonated in an act of destructive suicide,
jointly claiming the lives of scores of celebrants (including the entire leadership of a
Barelvi militant organization called the Sunni Tehrik) and injuring hundreds more.
The attack signaled the opening of a new chapter of violence in the long-standing
rivalry between the Deobandi and Barelvi schools of Sunni thought. How it had come
to this—how a theological debate that had once been carried out via books, public
debates, and juridical rulings now routinely made use of bullets and bombs—is one of
the chief subjects of this study. But beyond the headline-grabbing violence of the
Deobandi-Barelvi schism also lies the story of a century-and-a-half-long religious
antagonism: at first over converts, later for competing visions of the political future,
then for a place within a new “Islamic” polity—for dominance within its political
structure. For Deobandis, the rivalry was defined by their struggle to propagate a
“pure” Islam, as opposed to the Barelvi deviation; for Barelvis, their right to speak for
the “Sunni majority” was what defined the battle—a privilege that the Deobandis had
long sought to usurp. Running constant throughout the rivalry’s history, too, were the
two schools’ separate visions of a glorious future Islamic epoch, of a truly Islamic
1

state—or, perhaps more precisely, their differences on the subject of how to get there
(and who should lead the charge). Of course, the rivalry did not develop in a vacuum; its
participants were shaped, inspired, and manipulated by a host of outside influences, the
strongest of which, perhaps, was the modern, “total” state.
Though the Nishtar Park bombing of April 2006/Rabi I 1427 is only one of
hundreds of similar attacks—most far smaller, some of comparable scale—to stain the
now bullet- and bomb-ridden history of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, the enmity
between these two schools of Sunni Islam was, as aforementioned, not always
characterized in such a blood-stained manner. In fact, Nishtar-esque murderous
outbursts are a rather recent animal, wreaking havoc on the unity of Muslims (and
especially their religious leadership) within Pakistan in particular, with similarly
divisive results in India, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and within South Asian Muslim
communities across North America, the British Isles and continental Europe, East
Africa, South Africa, and beyond—indeed, wherever the rivalry has spread in recent
decades.
Despite the Deobandi-Barelvi schism’s pivotal role in the politics of South Asia
(indeed, as this work argues, the central part it played in pre-Partition independence
politics in India and the literal shaping of the political structure of Pakistan), both
schools are relatively unknown in the West (even among academics) and their rivalry
one with another remains mostly unexamined. Barbara Metcalf’s Islamic Revival in
British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (1982/1402) is the only full-length, scholarly,
published work dealing specifically and primarily with the Deoband school, drawing
heavily from sources in Urdu and Persian. (The 2010/1431 doctoral dissertation of one
of her students, Najeeb A. Jan—“The Metacolonial State: Pakistan, The Deoband
2

‘Ulama and the Biopolitics of Islam” [University of Michigan]—might be included
here, too.) The Deobandis are given serious consideration in Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi’s
short The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan (1963/1383), too. In Devotional
Islam and Politics in British India (1996/1417), Usha Sanyal devotes half a chapter to the
Deoband school of Islam. M. Reza Pirbhai’s Reconsidering Islam in a South Asian Context
(2009/1430) devotes a small but detailed section on the Deobandis, and Stephen Cohen
devotes approximately four pages in The Idea of Pakistan (2004/1425) to the group.
Pirbhai’s and Cohen’s treatment—devoting a few lines to a few pages—seems to be the
norm, if the Deobandis happen to be mentioned at all. But Metcalf’s survey, already
almost thirty years old, ends with the turn of the twentieth century/late thirteenth
century (and concentrates mostly on doctrinal developments and the establishment of
the actual dar ul’alwm at Deoband), while Faruqi’s, almost fifty years old, is somewhat
brief (148 pages) and fails to cover any period after Partition. Sanyal’s work likewise
deals only with early Deobandi thought and organization, scarcely reaching beyond
1900/1318, while Pirbhai and most others, too, examine only the group’s founding
years. Of the aforementioned, only Cohen focuses on more recent times, but the
mention is brief (and almost entirely within the context of fundamentalist violence and
terrorism, like most other works that mention modern-day Deobandism); the same
might be said about most any other serious academic work in which the Deobandis are
momentarily featured. In other words, no serious scholarly study (of significant length)
on the Deobandis beyond 1947/1366 (or, more accurately, beyond the 1920s/1340s
with the death of Mahmud Hasan) has been published. Apart from the obvious sixty- to
ninety-year omission in the research, such a gap is especially yawning since
Deobandism has continued to grow and to spread far beyond its qәSbәħ beginnings in
3

the rural upper Doab. Besides, the period after 1920/1338 would witness a surge of
Indian and later Pakistani nationalism—a critical phase in the formation of the current
political framework on the subcontinent, and one in which the Deobandis played a
highly significant role (generally in opposition to Partition, then within the Pakistani
state as a champion of an Islamic order as interpreted by the Deobandi scholars).
Considering the school’s relevance to current world events, too, particularly in Pakistan
and Afghanistan (including its entrenchment among the Pathan people of the northwest frontier), the need for scholarship on the Deobandis, post-1920/1338, seems
greater than ever.
If the subject of the Deoband school of Sunni Islam suffers from a lack of scholarly
attention, then its rival out of Bareilly has fared far worse in this regard, despite the
latter’s significant numerical superiority. The only academic study of note on the
movement is Sanyal’s Devotional Islam, which, like Metcalf’s, draws heavily on Urduand Persian-language sources. But even this work is more of a biographical one,
focused on the movement’s guiding light, Ahmad Riza Khan, rather than on the Barelvis
as a whole. In any case, the book stops around 1921/1339, the year of Ahmad Riza’s
death, leaving the next ninety years nebulous (Sanyal would follow up, in 2006/1427,
with another completely biographical book: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi: In the Path of the
Prophet, in essence a condensed version of Devotional Islam). True, other works have
devoted a few pages specifically to Riza’s movement out of Bareilly (including Metcalf’s
Islamic Revival), but, like its Deobandi counterpart, the school suffers from a distinct lack
of scholarly notice from around 1920/1338 to the present. Such a void in South Asian
history is unfortunate, especially since the Barelvi school claims a large majority of
South Asian Muslims—making it likely the largest Muslim sect in the world. (It should be
4

pointed out that Barelvis don’t consider themselves as belonging to a sect at all; they
are, simply, “Sunni,” like “most Muslims” around the world; it is the Deobandis, in their
view, who form a breakaway sect). In addition, the Barelvi school, which has been
known as a primarily rural movement as opposed to the allegedly urban Deobandis has,
over the past half-century, “extended to towns and cities,” according to Hamza Alavi,1 a
highly significant development (especially within the context of Pakistani politics) that
has never, to the author’s knowledge, been studied by scholars. On yet another note,
the Barelvi school has always been viewed as just another Muslim revivalist movement
of the late nineteenth/late thirteenth century, of which there were several. But the very
term “revivalist” may not be accurate at all in describing the Barelvis, since, unlike the
Deobandis and other Muslim reform movements of the period, Ahmad Riza Khan and
the ‘alәma associated with him were not organizing anything new—not initiating any
“revival” per se. On the contrary, their actions were a defense of the conventional in the
face of what they viewed as a radical challenge. Tradition-wise, they upheld the status
quo and viewed only religious innovation (byd’at) as abhorrent—and to them, the
Deobandis were in the business of byd’at. (This is ironic, since the Deobandis view much
Barelvi practice in the same light.) While Deobandi leaders like Muhammad Qasim and
Mahmud Hasan were introducing what might arguably have been deemed “new”
concepts into Islamic practice (Qasim and Hasan, of course, would have characterized
such “new” concepts as those originally upheld and practiced by the Prophet and his
companions but subsequently forgotten, ignored, abandoned, or erroneously replaced by
the majority of South Asian Muslims), Ahmad Riza Khan crusaded to protect the old.
The Barelvis, then, held that their version of Islam—the “true,” “Sunni” version—had
existed all along; it did not take the career of Ahmad Riza Khan to resurrect it (though
5

it may very well have required the man’s life’s work to preserve it, a sentiment echoed
by some of his supporters); this was the Barelvi line of thought. It may be argued, then,
that Ahmad Riza Khan was neither a reformer nor the founder of any movement, but
rather a defender of what was, a protector of existing Sufi and pir tradition, an antireformer (or, as he would have seen it, simply anti-byd’at) who happened to be a
charismatic teacher. (Barelvis admire him most for his intense love and respect for the
Prophet; most of the Barelvis’ grievances against the Deobandis stem from the latters’
perceived disrespect towards Muhammad.) In a sense, then, the great majority of South
Asian Muslims were “Barelvi” long before the designation existed. In any case, after
1920/1338 (and with the rise of Indian, then Pakistani, nationalism), it seems the
Barelvis by and large favored Partition and an independent South Asian Muslim
homeland.
But it is the dynamic between the Barelvi and Deobandi sects of Sunni Islam in South
Asia, so the thesis of this project goes, that played a critical role in the debate over the
partition of India, the creation of a separate Muslim state (Pakistan), and the (continued)
shaping of the political order in Pakistan (and even surrounding states, particularly
Afghanistan). From the early days (during the lifetimes of their founding figures), the
two schools forced South Asian Muslims to examine their own religious practice, to
scrutinize their own theologies, and to identify with one or the other (there were other
schools of thought, too, of course, but the vast majority of South Asian Muslims
gravitated toward one or the other category, either formally or informally). During the
run-up to Partition, the schools often could be differentiated purely by political position,
as the Pakistan debate added fuel to the rivalry and acted as a venue for various scholars
to descredit and otherwise defame their religious nemeses. It is unlikely Jinnah would
6

have gained the support he needed in the final years before the birth of Pakistan without
the Deobandi-Barelvi schism’s divisive power, preventing as it did any sort of joint
Deobandi-Barelvi action (despite Deobandi attempts to win Barelvis over to their
“side”). Barelvi pirs and scholars (and a few Deobandi rebels, too) were instrumental in
the Muslim League’s meagre “victory” in the Northwest Frontier, where loss might
have spelled an abrupt end to the Pakistan dream. In Pakistan, it was the Deobandi and
Barelvi parties (along with, at times, the Deobandi-inspired Jama’at-e-Islami, as well as
some other Deobandi or Barelvi groups) who led the charge for an Islamic constitution,
often spearheading the Opposition. Here again, though, it was the divisiveness that the
rivalry engendered—and the subsequent inability of either party to combine in any sort
of sustained joint political action—that prevented the “religious parties” from ever
dominating Pakistani politics. With the militarization that followed the breakaway of
Bangladesh, the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the rush of
millions of Afghan refugees into Pakistan, the flood of Saudi and American cash along
Pakistan’s western border, the continued struggle for Kashmir (and the ISID’s covert
machinations in the region), Zia’s “Islamization,” the emergence of the Taliban, and the
U.S. Government’s own invasion of Afghanistan—all combined with the politicization
of Deobandi and Barelvi parties like the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and the Jamiat Ulema-ePakistan, among others—the rivalry took on an entirely new character. Eventually this
led to seemingly constant violence, with attacks increasing in regularity and scale. All
the while, the rivalry spread across the globe through the sizable South Asian diaspora,
transforming, almost, into a microcosmal battleground for the soul of Islam between
“fundamentalist” revivalists and “fundamentalist” preservers. Despite this, and despite
the fact that the combined population of these sects numbers in the hundreds of
7

millions, an academic study of any significant length dealing with the Deobandi-Barelvi
rivalry has never been published by a Western academician as far as this writer is aware.
The author submits this work as the first, hoping that its premises might be examined,
built upon, corrected, and expanded in order to increase understanding of this highly
important phenomenon in the Muslim world and beyond.
Chapter 1, “Historical Background: Islam in South Asia to the Mid-Nineteenth
Century,” looks backwards—to the early days of Islam, tracking developments
especially pertinent to the rise of Deobandism and Barelvism all the way to
1860s/1270s-1280s India. Some of these developments include the precursor rivalries
and power contestations through which the Deobandi and Barelvi schools can trace
their ideological genealogy (like the tug-of-war between the court scholars and the Sufi
mystics, or the schism that developed between court scholars and “other-worldly”
scholars, to borrow a term from Robinson). In other words, the chapter attempts to
ground the Deobandi and Barelvi positions (especially those of the political variety)
within a historical context. Along the way, questions like, “What does the ideal Islamic
state (and ruler) look like?” and, “What is the role of the ‘alәma and the Sufi shix within
the state apparatus?” are posited and, hopefully, answered, if briefly. Most of the
information presented here is not new, but it has never, to the author’s knowledge, been
arranged within the context of the Deoband-Barelvi rivalry in so comprehensive a
fashion. The focus of Chapter 2, “Genesis of a Rivalry: The Deobandi and Barelvi
Schools, 1866-1921/1283-1340,” is the founding epoch of the two schools of thought—
first the Deobandi school (1866/1283) and then the Barelvi response, running into the
mid-1920s/late 1330s. The ground for most of this information has been broken by
previous scholars, though its presentation as specifically focused on the Deobandi8

Barelvi rivalry (not simply on one or the other) may be a first, as, too, might be the
chapter’s more overtly political concentration.
Chapter 3, “A Muslim Homeland: The Rivalry in Pre-Partition Politics, 19211947/1339-1366,” attempts to shed light on the rivalry between the two schools within
the pre-Partition politics of British India, from the 1920s/1340s right up to Partition in
1947/1366. Here, perhaps, some new ground has been broken, as most every Western
or scholarly work on either school tends to peter out by the early twenties AD. The
chapter documents the rise and fall of the Khilafat Movement, the role of the Jami’at
Ulema-e-Hind, the political divisions that developed within the Deoband school, the
organization of the All-India Sunni Conference, the relationship between the Deobandi
religious leadership and the Indian National Congress, the rise of the All-India Muslim
League and its co-opting of the Barelvis (plus an influential Deobandi faction), and the
jockeying for position of various Barelvi and Deobandi leaders as the prospect of
Pakistan loomed. Then, in “A New Islamic State: The Rivalry in Pakistani Politics,
1947-1977/1366-1397,” the focus shifts almost entirely to the political rivalry as it
pertains to the first several decades of Pakistan's existence (for most of this period, this
included present-day Bangladesh). Both schools formed political parties during this era
that operated within the structure of the Pakistani state (and even, especially in the
beginning, within other, more overtly political parties). These organizations (most
prominentaly the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan) at times
worked “together” toward a common cause (though typically employing a form of
cooperation this writer terms “separate unity”)—like the institution of an “Islamic”
constitution, the struggle against the Ahmadis, or wars with India over Kashmir—but
typically stood at odds with one another, competing for constituents, their votes, and
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the patronage and power that came with them. Perhaps the most important aspect of
the rivalry during this period was the way in which it prevented the two major Sunni
sects in the country from ever mounting a truly united assault against the forces of
secularism and socialism.
The great transformation of the rivalry (initiated partly via its politicization within
the context of pre-Partition independence politics and post-Partition Pakistani party
politics, and partly thanks to its confrontation with the modern, total state) took its
most significant turn during the period that followed, covered in Chapter 5:
“Islamization and War: Militarization of the Rivalry, 1977-2001/1397-1422.” The
chapter focuses on the political rivalry during the years of “Islamization” under Zia ulHaq and afterwards. This period, this work argues, is vital to understanding the
Deobandi-Barelvi schism’s metamorphosis from juridical rulings and religious tracts to
suicide bombers and assassinations. With an “Islamic Revolution” in Iran (and the antiShi’a militancy it fostered in Pakistan), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
intervention of the American and Saudi (and Pakistani) governments (among others) in
the conflict, the participation of mostly Deobandi jyhәdis in the “war against
communism,” the US- and petro-dollar-funded (via relatively new fiat currency systems)
mushrooming of mәdarys in South Asia, the institution of a new “Islamic” order in
Pakistan, the rise of the Deobandism-inspired “Taliban,” the rapid spread of both
schools’ ideology to other centers across the world, and the coming of the so-called
“War on Terror”—all of this taken together had a profound effect upon the dynamic in
question. Finally, chapter 6 (“Epilogue”)—truly an epilogue in both scope and
brevity—attempts to bring the historical narrative, as far as is possible in a few short
pages, up to the present day.
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And so we return to the Nishtar Park bombing of April 2006/Rabi I 1427, and the
mega-attacks that have followed. Such is the situation as of the time of this writing,
even as Western governments’ armies occupy Afghanistan and drop bombs from drones
in Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa,
and as intelligence agencies from around the world (and from Pakistan itself) meddle in
Pakistan’s (and Afghanistan’s) internal affairs for information and covert action
purposes. U.S. Government troops, together with a smattering of others, occupy
Muslim lands where the rivalry is well known among locals and highly influential both
today and historically—yet scarcely understood by the relatively small group of
American policymakers in Washington deciding the fate of billions of dollars in military
expeditures and foreign aid, not to mention military and strategic policy in the region.
And far from South and Central Asia—in Durban and London, in Chicago and Kuala
Lumpur, in Singapore and Dar es Salaam, in Houston and Cairo and Johannesburg—the
rivalry increasingly divides Muslims, continually forcing a reevaluation of belief and
practice, and, in essence, drawing battle lines for a near-inevitable, future Islamic
struggle for the very spirit of the faith.
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1 - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: The ‘alym, the Sufi shix, and the
“Muslim” State in South Asia

The ‘alәma are the successors of the Prophet.
ABU DAWUD SULAYMAN, 9TH CENTURY A.D.2

Just after noon on 24 January 2010/8 Safar 1431, a three-day conference—dubbed
the “Biswa Ijtema,” or “Global Meeting”—came to an end outside of Dhaka, Bangladesh.
The banks of the Turag river had provided the backdrop to the event, attended by
anywhere from two to five million devotees (under the watchful eye of almost twenty
thousand security personnel), including Bangladesh President Muhammad Zillur
Rahman, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and leader of the political opposition Khaleda
Zia, among many other high-profile participants. The pilgrims that made up the
massive crowd had come from all over the world (from France and Palestine, from the
United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia, from Algeria and Iraq, and more), descending upon
the town of Tongi to offer prayers, hear sermons and the recitation of the Qur’an and
hәdis (translated into Chinese, Tamil, Arabic, English, Bangla, and other languages),
and to partake of the edification of brotherhood, at night sleeping in the cold fog of
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winter under makeshift tents or the bare sky. There was even a mass, dowry-free
wedding, featuring one hundred forty couples. Due to space constraints, thousands took
part in the proceedings upon nearby rooftops or along surrounding roads. The
gathering was organized annually by a proselytizing Deobandi group called the
Tablighi Jama’at (tәbliGi jәma’at, “Assembly of Proselytization”)—and the only Muslim
gathering on the planet bigger was the hәj to Mecca itself.3 Meanwhile, Barelvis
branded the Tablighi Jama’at, with its missionary efforts and mega-conferences, “an
effective instrument” used by “the enemies of Islam” to “prevent the emergence of a true
Islamic movement in Europe and elsewhere in the world.”4
Two-and-a-half-weeks earlier, in the north-central Indian city (and traditional
Barelvi stronghold) of Moradabad, some one hundred miles east of Delhi on the banks
of the Ramganga, a sizable conference of “Sunni” religious leaders—under the ageis of
the All-India Ulema Mashaikh Board, or AIUMB—issued a formal demand to the
Indian government. Deobandi usurpers, they claimed, had stealthily taken control of
“more than one lakh [100,000] madrassas, dargahs, graveyards and other historical
monuments.” sәyyid Muhammad Ashraf Kichowchhwi, a mwlana and the general
secretary of the AIUMB, described the Deobandis as a “13% miniscule, manipulative
minority,” that had “hijacked” the state’s minority bodies (like the Central Haj
Committee and the Urdu Academy, to name just two) both in Uttar Pradesh and within
the central government of India. “Since [the Deobandis] do not have faith in patron
saints of ‘dargah’ or ‘mazar’ and have condemned the practice, logically they must not
be considered for management of Ajmer Sharif or Deva Sharif [two of the most
important Muslim shrine centers in India],” he argued, pointing out that the Barelvi
religious leadership, on the other hand, spoke for “80%” of India’s Muslims. AIUMB
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secretary Babar Ashraf explained the power of the Deobandis and their ilk as emanating
from the financial support of Wahhabi states like Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, an unnamed
Deobandi cleric interviewed by the Times of India responded by speculating that the
Barelvi conference “could [have] been just a pressure tactic to influence
the…government.”5
A few days after the Moradabad conference, a West Point military academy report
published by one Imtiaz ‘Ali argued that Karachi, Pakistan might be transforming into a
“Taliban safe haven,” and linked a number of Deobandi seminaries, by name, not only to
the Taliban but to several anti-Shi’a, anti-Barelvi militant outfits as well.6
The next month armed Deobandis attacked (mostly Barelvi) mwlyd processions in
Faisalabad and Dera Ismail Khan, Pakistan, “causing death, injuries and mayhem”; a
Deobandi preacher at a Faisalabad mosque was subsequently arrested for “inciting
people to violence,” prompting observers to wonder if a “cure” to the country’s sectarian
ills might best be focused on the “steady diet of dogmatic preaching” that “is to be found
wherever such violence occurs.”7
Two months before the attacks, the UK-based Guardian published an article
entitled, “Here, everyone is a minority,” highlighting (among other things) South Asian
immigration to Britain and concentrating on the so-called “Muslim city” of Leicester.
One of the dominant images painted in the article presented a ten-year-old Deobandi
mәsjyd, packed every Friday with over five hundred people, facing a one-hundred-yearold Edwardian church with a congregation numbering only thirty. The Guardian piece
also underscored, however, the divided nature of the immigrant population, separated
by ethnic, linguistic, as well as religious barriers. The author, Andrew Brown, asked his
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readers, “[Is] this…city a model for our future? Or is it proof that mass immigration
brings unmanageable strains?”8
A few weeks after the Guardian piece, a joint American and Pakistani raid
(conducted by the states’ respective intelligence agencies) captured top Taliban leader
mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Karachi, though the elusive, Deobandi-trained mullah
Muhammad Omar remained yet out of reach—while Barelvis vacillated between
animosity for the mostly Deobandi Taliban movement and hatred for the Pakistani
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) and the American Central Intelligence
Agency and military.9
The above exercise merely provides a snapshot, of course—restricted to a couple
months’ time, randomly selected—of the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic as it plays out
across the world within religious, social, and political spheres. What is this apparent
Deobandi-Barelvi schism, and how has it become so centrally connected to such broadly
unrelated phenomena as the world’s second-largest Muslim gathering (in Bangladesh),
the largest missionary organization of any faith on the planet in the Tablighi Jama’at (a
position disputed by the Barelvis’ own Dawat-e-Islami), minority disputes over
government influence in north-central India, reports issued by West Point researchers
in the United States, “Muslim” immigration to Britain, outbreaks of sectarian violence in
Pakistan, and the machinations of intelligence agencies vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban
movement? To answer this interrogative, it may be necessary to go back to the
beginning, to the days of the Prophet Muhammad, and trace the development of the
ideologies and belief systems and political philosophies, as far as is possible, that would
eventually coalesce and emerge into the separate schools now classified as
“Deobandism” and “Barelvism.” Along the way, perhaps, the reader might gain an
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improved understanding not only of the tangled roots of the past from which these
schools’ draw inspiration and sustenance, but also of their separate visions for a future,
glorious Islamic order.

Medina: the First Islamic State.
The beginnings of an overtly political Islam can be traced all the way back to the
days of the Prophet Muhammad and the Emigration (hyjrәt; 622 AD/1 AH) to
Medina.10 Before this watershed, Muhammad had been, simply, a “messenger”
(piGәmbәr) of God; each revelation (later to become a chapter [swrәt] of the Qur’an)
that he received was memorized and recited both by him and his followers as part of
their religious ritual. The Meccan revelations, too—usually significantly shorter than
their subsequent Medinan counterparts—tended to possess a more “spiritual” (as
opposed to temporal) nature, communicating ideas about the greatness of God, warning
of God’s judgments, expressing the significance of showing gratitude, conveying the
importance of charity, and underscoring Muhammad’s calling as a messenger of Allah.
These early revelations seemed to avoid, for the most part, the mundane or the worldly
(though there is a subtle undercurrent of hostility against the wealthy merchants of
Mecca, many of whom belonged to clans opposed to Muhammad’s own Hashimite clan
and its allies).11
But after Meccan opposition drove the Muslims from the holy city and into the
desert, Muhammad and his followers became, for the first time, a community set apart.
From this point forward, Islam denoted not just a religious philosophy but also an
identifiable, explicitly political phenomenon. Indeed, the Prophet assumed the role not
only of spiritual leader but political ruler as well (not to mention political arbiter
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between the various Medinan tribes)—and the change was reflected in the swrәts
received in the Muslims’ new oasis center. Here, the Prophet’s revelations became
longer and dealt with a much wider range of everyday community issues. Within six
months of his arrival, Muhammad was sending out “expeditions” to plunder Meccan
caravans (though their first successful raid didn’t come for another year) and make
alliances with nearby nomadic tribes—both overtly political moves. And within the
first five years (though probably around the time of his arrival in the oasis), Muhammad
had drawn up a “Constitution of Medina,” outlining a political alliance between the eight
Arab clans of the town (each of whom had pledged to embrace Islam) plus the
muhajyrwn, or “emigrants,” that Muhammad had led out of Mecca; the Jews and pagans
(i.e. all of the non-Muslims) were allotted allied status vis-à-vis the “main” community.
Meanwhile, as a political leader, Muhammad continued to govern his own clan of
émigrés, order raids (taking his one-fifth when they returned successful), make alliances,
and position himself politically within Medina, all the while acting as a judge of sorts
between the various Medinan groups when necessary. The political structure of Arab
society in Muhammad’s time did not befit a single despot, thus the Prophet’s use of such
indirect means of control, at least during the initial Medina years, is hardly surprising.
Indeed, one mid-nineteenth/mid-thirteenth century commentator described the political
system of the Arabs during this period thus:

The representative of the common ancestor of each tribe possessed a
natural authority over it; but, having no support from any external power
he could only carry his measures by means of the heads of subordinate
divisions, who depended, in their turn, on their influence with the
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members of the family of which they represented the progenitor. The
whole government was therefore conducted by persuasion and there was no
interference with personal independence unless it directly affected the general
interest. [Italics added.]12

As time passed and Muhammad, based in Medina, consolidated power, this “persuasive”
form of government evolved into something more coercive, setting the stage for the
even more top-down system established by his successors and, eventually, the “Islamic”
states that would emerge later. Muhammad’s flight from Mecca to Medina plus his
early years in the oasis might therefore justifiably be described as a transitional
period—from the almost wholly “persuasive Islam” of the Meccan era to the more
coercive version of the faith (including coercion via the threat of violent reprisal against
members of the community and military action against enemies) that later developed in
Medina. It was to this later, more compulsion-based (at least as it compared to the early
Meccan period) epoch that future Muslim scholars would look for the ultimate example
of righteous Islamic government. Both the Deobandis and the Barelvis would draw
inspiration from Muhammad’s example as a political leader, and from the ideal Islamic
state that he instituted in what had once been the minor desert town of Yathrib.
After a Muslim victory over far superior Meccan forces at Badr (624/2)—during yet
another raid—the political prestige of Muhammad skyrocketed. Several assassinations
(in which he may or may not have had personal involvement) quickly ridded him of
critics and political opponents, to boot. He oversaw a siege against one of the Jewish
tribes (mostly goldsmiths and armor-makers) of the oasis before expelling them
completely from the area. The concept of jyhad (or holy “struggle,” strictly against non18

Muslims) developed, too, perhaps as a way for the various tribes to continue their
traditional raids while simultaneously preserving the peace of the Muslim community at
large (ummәt). The Muslims survived a close call against the Meccans at Uhud (625/3)
before driving a second Medinan Jewish tribe (keepers of palm orchards) away. A third
major engagement against Meccan forces—the Battle of the Trench (627/5)—saw the
Muslims victorious, and was followed by the murder of all of the men of the remaining
Jewish tribe in the oasis (and the sale of the tribe’s women and children into slavery) for
alleged conspiracy with the enemy. Each of these overtly political actions eventually led
to the Prophet’s emergence as unchallenged leader in Medina. He was, in effect, both
spiritual and political head of an oasis state. Meanwhile, the task of building alliances
with nomadic tribes continued.
By 628/6, Mecca was no longer in a position to destroy Muhammad or his
followers; indeed, the city’s leaders signed a treaty with the Prophet allowing for
Muslims to make pilgrimage there the following year. Truly, Muhammad’s political
power had grown tremendously in the mere six years since the great merchants of his
hometown had more or less driven him out of their midst. Meanwhile, the Muslims had
captured a Jewish oasis (named Khaybar), significant in that its inhabitants were
allowed to remain as long as they paid tribute to the Muslim state; the seeds of an
Islamic empire had been planted.13 By 629/8, Muhammad’s forces had taken Mecca
with minimal bloodshed. Subsequently, Muhammad’s gentle treatment of his erstwhile
enemies quickly won many of them over. Following a victory over a group of tribes
east of Mecca soon afterwards, Muhammad’s polity and its martial forces were
recognized as more than a match for any other tribe or group of tribes in all of Arabia;
deputations from many of these tribes now traveled to Medina to formally ally with the
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Muslims. One condition underlying each alliance: the acceptance of Islam. For the first
time that anyone could remember, the feuding Arabian tribes of the vast desert
peninsula were more or less united under a single banner (indeed, one scholar described
the political situation of Arabia at this time as “pax Islamica”).14 Toward the end of his
life, Muhammad led a major expedition (comprising tens of thousands of men) outside of
Arabia into Syria, where he contracted treaties with Jewish and Christian communities,
laying the groundwork for the later Islamic empire’s “dhimmi” (źymi) system. The
expedition opened the door, too, to external conquest, taken up with a vengeance by the
Prophet’s successors, and made additionally possible by the recent collapse of the
Persian Empire and the sheer “exhaustion” of Byzantium.15
Even examining these earliest early years of Islam, it is possible to identify the roots
of both the scholarly ‘alәma (“jurist-theologians,” to use the descriptive of M. Ahmad;
singular: ‘alym) and the Sufi mәshayx (“elders,” “leaders,” or “great men”; singular: shix),
both of which, in different forms, would play a central role within the development of
the Deobandi and Barelvi schools and within the progression of their mutual rivalry. As
mentioned previously, though the Prophet recited the Qur’an as revealed to him by
God, the Prophet’s Companions became known as qurra, “reciters of the Qur’an”
(singular: qari), too (as revealed to them by the Prophet). Some modern-day scholars
trace the beginnings of the ‘alәma to the qurra of Medina, though a distinct class of
Muslim scholars appears not to have been identifiable until the period of hәdis-collection
and Qur’anic law codification (c. eighth-tenth centuries/second-fourth centuries).16
More certainty about historicity is expressed by the various Sufi orders, each of which
traces its spiritual genealogy—their “initiatic chains,” or sylsәla—all the way back to the
Prophet himself. Of course, no one in Muhammad’s day was likely thinking about
20

documentation for the benefit of establishing historical legitimacy in the eyes of future
scholars, and as a result such “hard proof” is lacking. Still, for Sufis, their particular
brand of religious practice “begins…in a real and important sense with the origins of
Islam itself.”17 Each of the major orders in South Asia, whose ranks include both
leading Deobandis and prominent Barelvis, can name each and every link in the chain,
stretching back one-and-a-half millennia to Muhammad’s Arabia. The Prophet,
according to Sufi doctrine, is the founder of the Sufi orders—not any other individual.
(For example, the Naqshbandis identify their sylsәla as having been introduced during
the hyjrәt, when Muhammad evidently initiated Abu Bakr while they were hiding in a
cave from Meccan enemies). In a sense, then, all Sufism is revivalist, as the initiatory
pledge necessary to gain admittance to a Sufi order becomes a key to “gain access,” to
quote Algar, to the “’auspicious age’ which it is the purpose of the Sufi to relive.”18
Upon the death of Muhammad in 632/11, his Companions at once selected a
successor and “deputy” (xәlifәħ, or “caliph”): Abu Bakr. What is remarkable is that,
according to tradition, this reorganization took place more or less unanimously (despite
some initial rumblings in ‘Ali’s favor) and immediately—even before the Prophet’s body
had been laid in the earth. This episode in the history of Islam has been interpreted by
many of the ‘alәma as demonstrating the religiously obligatory nature of the caliphate
(xylafәt), an institution so important that the Companions “preferred it [this obligation]
over the burial of the Holy Prophet” [italics added]. This act, strengthened as it was by
the consensus of the Companions, thus became “a permanent source of [shәri’at],” in the
words of one prominent Pakistani mufti.19 The selection of Abu Bakr as caliph is
considered a textbook example of how a board of responsible, intellectual people (әhәl
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әlhәl w әl’aqәd)—typically ‘alәma, of course—possess the responsibility (and power) to

appoint the next viceroy of the Prophet.
Over the next three decades alone (the period of the “Rashidun” [rashydin], or the
four “rightly-guided” caliphs after Muhammad; 632-661/11-40), the new Muslim polity
spread rapidly, annexing territory from the Arabian peninsula in the south to what is
today Turkey and the Caucasus in the north, from northern Africa and southwestern
Europe in the west to Persia and much of Central Asia in the east. The ‘alәma and
Muslim historians, even of the early twenty-first/mid-fifteenth century, write of these
conquests as glorious affairs, the crowning achievement of an era of greatness since
unrivaled. As one Muslim commentator has described this phenomenon, “Muslims
[throughout the ages] could not forget the memory of their early triumphs” (italics
added).20 This period and (perhaps especially) those that followed after it illuminate
several key ideas connected to the present work—including that of the ideal Muslim
ruler, the role of the ‘alym as well as the Sufi shix vis-à-vis such a ruler, and the religiopolitical vision of the ‘alәma for the future. Identifying and understanding these
historical roots is vital to comprehending the long-standing rift between the religious
schools born of Deoband and Bareilly, including their more modern-day manifestations
within the political framework of pre-Partition India and post-Partition Pakistan. Both
schools are driven in large part by visions of the distant past and, shaped by that past, of
Islamic revival and a more glorious future.
From the Rashidun period to the present, Muslim rulers (and the scholars and Sufis
inhabitating their realms—some as legitimators, others as contestors of legitimacy)
constantly harked back to the original Muslim empire established by Muhammad and
expanded by his first four “rightly-guided” deputies. Here, then, lies the key to
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establishing righteousness upon the earth—a true Islamic state ruled by a legitimate
caliph of the Prophet. As a reputable Muslim scholar in Pakistan has pointed out,
taking his inspiration from this early period, the ideal ruler within an Islamic order
must (a) always strive to act according to God’s will, (b) respect the ‘alәma and the
mәshayx, (c) ensure the fair treatment of the people by his subordinate officers, (d) show
equal justice to both “high and low,” (e) snuff out immorality, (f) encourage commerce,
(g) show charity to the poor, and (h) handle the financial affairs of the realm such that
surplus money might be allotted to deserving charities, scholars, divines, and artists.21
Perhaps the verse of eighteenth-century/twelfth-century Urdu poet Mirza Ahmad Rafi
Sauda describes this ideal well, too. The following comes from Sauda’s ain-e-dawri
(“Rules of Good Governance”):

Once a beggar, we are told, to a king did pray:
“I would like to say something, if you heed my say.
Of good and wise governance this is the foremost rule
That a ruler should be kind to the destitutes.
When a king delivers justice from his regal seat,
Both the great and the small he should with even hand treat.
Only to such advice should he lend his ear,
Which contributes to the public welfare.
He should treat his subjects as tender blooms and buds,
And like a vernal cloud his gentle shade spread,
His kindness with even course flows for one and all,
His grace, on boss and worker, in equal measure falls.
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How tragic that the men considered God’s vice-regents,
Should be unacquainted with the rules of governance!
[Italics added.]22

Sauda’s verse is pertinent on a number of levels, though his obvious emphasis on justice,
equity, and mercy, common themes for great rulers within Muslim historiography (even
those considered brutal, piratical, or bloodthirsty by, for example, Western standards),
is perhaps the most relevant here. The final lines of the poem indicate, of course, that
Muslim observers recognized that the ideal not infrequently remained just that—an
ideal, all-too-often unrealized in the temporal world.
Hand-in-hand with the ideal Muslim ruler is the ideal Muslim state. In the words of
leading (Deobandi) Islamic juridical scholar Muhammad Taqi Usmani, Islam is “a
complete way of life” dealing with “political, economic, and social problems,” not just
“theological issues.” The ‘alәma point both to Qur’anic injunctions concerning such
earthly matters as loans, business, mortgages, contracts, penal law, marriage, war,
peace, international relations, politics, and inheritance, as well as to interpretations
related to these and other issues gleaned from the sunnәt, as proof that the domain of
Islam extends beyond the wholly spiritual to the day-to-day mundane details of mortal
life.23 For Muhammad, as Watt reminds us, religion was a “total response” to the “total
situation” confronting him in seventh-century/first-century Arabia; it thus extended
beyond the realm of the intellectual or the strictly spiritual or the “religious.” “[I]t is
impossible,” Watt concluded, “for any occidental to distinguish within [Muhammad’s]
achievement between what is religious and what is non-religious or secular.”24
Returning to the question of an Islamic socio-political framework, then, it is not enough
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to enjoy the freedom to carry out Islamic ritual, worship, and study within a given
geographical area—not enough to possess the autonomy to live one’s religion as one
pleases without the interference of the state. This individualist, more libertarian
outlook, both the Deobandi and Barelvi religious scholars agree, simply will not suffice.
Islam, as a “complete way of life,” must be established within the apparatus—indeed, as
the very bedrock—of the State.25 Since the days of the Messenger, one scholar has
explained, it was “the possession of power” that “was seen to be essential to upholding the
shari’a…” [italics added].26 Perhaps it is unfortunate that something akin to a more
classical liberal approach rarely, if ever, seems to have been considered, for once shәri’at
is to be established via the guns of government—and the threat of violence, whether
implicit or explicit, by which government fundamentally operates—the question of
who’s version of shәri’at is to be applied becomes especially critical. This phenomenon
was to embed itself centrally at the heart of the Deobandi-Barelvi dispute.

Muslim Footholds in South Asia.
In South Asia, contact with Islam seems to have first been initiated by Arab
merchants, plying their trade along the coasts of what are today southern Pakistan,
western India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives (though several abortive Muslim raids had
penetrated the subcontinent as far as Multan within the first half-century of the Islamic
era, too). Eventually considerable-sized Muslim settlements developed in many of the
trading ports ringing the Indian Ocean. Here Islam spread more or less non-coercively,
as local populations (and, at times, local rulers) adopted the foreign traders’ faith as their
own. Muslim merchants journeyed far beyond India, too, regularly conducting
commercial activity up and down the Southeast Asian coast, in China, and even in
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Korea. In fact, the Muslim merchants of Korea would play what might be considered a
decisive role in the spread of Islam in South Asia. For it was here that, upon the deaths
of a number of these merchants, the Korean king commissioned a group of Persian ships
to convey the deceased trader’s wives and children to Iraq so that this husbandless and
fatherless collection might be reunited with its coreligionists. The convoy experienced
little trouble sailing south from Korea, past China, Vietnam, Cambodia, around the
Southeast Asian peninsula and into the Indian Ocean, past Ceylon and up the western
Indian coast. But as the widows and their families were sailing on the waters south of
Sindh, they were attacked—either by pirates or the naval forces of the local Brahmin
king; historians aren’t certain which. Immediately upon hearing the news, the Muslim
viceroy in Iraq requested that the Sindhi ruler intervene, but he refused. In fact,
according to Muslim sources, the women, children, and shipmen in question were even
at that moment being held prisoner—not by pirates, but by the wily ruler himself.
(Other historians point to the Brahman king’s stated reason for non-compliance with
Arab demands: namely, that the city wherein the Arab ships had been seized lay outside
of his jurisdiction).
The Iraqi viceroy’s response was to send the young Muhammad bin Qasim at the
head of a mighty army into the subcontinent, and by 712/93 the conquest of Sindh,
briefly attempted before bin Qasim (but never successfully), was complete. The move
not only opened up increased trade with the rest of India, clearing the sea lanes for Arab
merchants, but it also convinced many of west India’s rulers that friendship and
commerce with the new conquerors was prudent. The aforementioned development of
Muslim communities up and down western India’s coastline mostly occurred after the
Sindhi conquest of Muhammad bin Qasim.
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The description of Muhammad bin Qasim handed down by history (or “through
Muslim eyes,” as contemporary descriptions of the man, his victories, and his rule are
inevitably garnered from Muslim pen) is an interesting one—and relevant to the topic
of this work. Far from being painted as a tyrannical invader who conquered town and
city only to rule and reign as plundering despot, Muhammad bin Qasim is described as
just, tolerant, and kind (even, however reluctantly, by at least one prominent
nineteenth-century/thirteenth-century British writer, who characterized him as
“prudent and conciliatory”).27 Muslim historians insist that he preserved Buddhist and
Hindu places of worship and that he went out of his way to show respect to Brahmins.
“His main mission was to punish a willful aggressor [the erstwhile ruler of Sindh],” not
forcefully convert a country. In fact, his policy vis-à-vis his vanquished foes was one of
forgiveness and “friendship for all.” He even authored a proclamation that one Pakistani
historian has dubbed “the Charter of Liberty of Brahmanabad,” in which, among other
things, he declared freedom of worship for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Perhaps
most interestingly, he raised the status of Buddhists and Hindus so that they stood on
equal footing with Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians “in the true spirit of Islam.” This
was an ideal type, a true Muslim conqueror: one whose arrival was veritably forced by
political expediency—by justice, even—and whose conquest, though swift and militarily
inspiring, was nevertheless followed by merciful rule (including a strong tendency
toward forgiveness), equity, tolerance, patronage of the arts, and strong central
administration. The ideal ruler broke the bonds of evil or inherently unjust local
tradition and custom, too; in Sindh, Muslim rule brought with it the breakdown of “the
coercive caste-ridden alien rule of the Brahman dynasty.”28 Muhammad bin Qasim
becomes for us the first example of the Muslim ideal ruler type in South Asian history.
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Such a portrayal is certainly not universally accepted, of course, but most Muslim
historians—and thus most Deobandi and Barelvi scholars—seem to paint bin Qasim in
such strokes.29
Sizable “Muslim” forces arriving from the outside wouldn’t make an appearance in
the subcontinent again until the late tenth century AD, amidst the “age-old” IndoTurkic rivalry of Hindustan’s northwestern frontier.30 Muslim historians insist that the
aggressors were the Indian states, more or less confederate, to the east (or, at the very
least, that they [the Indians] fell behind on promised tribute payments); it seems,
however, that the conflict was focused, as ever, on land (eastern Afghanistan) and that
each side aggressed upon the other. After a series of attacks, the conflict between
Ghazni, ruled by the Turk Sabuktigin, and the Indian states came to a head in 988/378.
It was in that year that the Indian Jaipal, said to have been leading a host culled
from the various north Indian states and numbering one hundred thousand, marched on
Ghazni. The Ghaznavids were growing too strong, and Sabuktigin (who had “started
vigorously to expand his dominions”)31 had already conducted several raids as far as
Lamghan and Multan; in fact, these very raids had precipitated the alliance of “Hindu”
kingdoms against the Ghaznavid threat, an alliance that would only grow with time.
Now Jaipal was bent on putting the Turks in their place. Meanwhile, from the walls of
Ghazni, the teenaged son of Sabuktigin, Mahmud, likely watched the oncoming horde
with not a little trepidation. And so the battle commenced, and a furious clash it was,
but Sabuktigin prevailed, crushing the aspirations of his Indian rivals and extending the
Turkic king’s domain to Peshawar. Evidently he could have taken more, but
Sabuktigin, ever a noble Muslim ruler, was forgiving and interested in peace above all—
and thus he agreed to the terms aforementioned, trusting in Jaipal to honor them and
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thereby assure the survival of his (Jaipal’s) kingdom. But the Hindu rajәħ, we are told,
continued his machinations against Ghazni in spite of the latter’s good faith. Young
Mahmud, a witness to this history—the battles against the invading Indians, their
perceived intrigues and scheming—almost certainly made mental preparation to
prevent a similar set of circumstances when his own time came to inherit his father’s
kingdom.32
That time came in 997/387. Upon ascending the throne of Ghazni, Mahmud vowed
to keep the Indian kingdoms in check through consistent and calculated aggression that
would keep them too busy at home to execute any sort of westward invasion. In
1001/391, he faced Jaipal in battle again; Jaipal’s loss was so humiliating that the Indian
king took his own life by fiery self-immolation. By 1008/398, Mahmud had defeated a
second confederacy of Indian states—this one led by Jaipal’s son—in a battle at
Peshawar. Much of the Punjab fell into Mahmud’s hands as a result, and a Ghaznavid
governor was installed at Lahore. By the time of his death in 1030/421, Mahmud had
conquered cities and states across northern India (typically leaving them in the hands of
Hindu vassals) as far east as Somnath (1024/415), and raided forts, towns, and Hindu
temples enough to fill his treasury. After all of these expeditions into the plains,
however, the son of Sabuktigin really only incorporated the Punjab into his empire.
Despite his reputation among many western historians as a raider and plunderer,
Mahmud of Ghazni is described by Muslim histories as not only a military genius, but a
just ruler as well. Writes Qureshi, “He was neither a mere robber nor a bloodthirsty
tyrant, as some modern writers have called him, and shed no blood except in the
exigencies of war.”33 It had been the Indian states that had aggressed first, and often—
and when they had lost and agreed to pay indemnities, they had defaulted. Mahmud
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had thus done what was necessary to prevent further Indian incursions against his
dominions. The Hindu temples he destroyed, though many, were not those of his own
Hindu subjects (which he preserved). Mahmud is, in fact, credited with considerable
broadmindedness, evident in his apparent attempt “to reconcile the Hindus and
integrate them under his government and polity.” This last he accomplished by
recruiting Hindus into his civil administration (even in Ghazni, where a few rose to
considerable heights), incorporating Hindu divisions into his army, and even minting
coins depicting local mythical figures and Sanskrit script.34 And as a patron of the arts
and scholarship, his “reputation has remained undiminished throughout the ages”;35 it
was under his sponsorship that polymath Abu Rayhan Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Biruni
(considered by some as the father of Indology, geodesy, and anthropology) labored, and
Hakim Abul Qasim Ferdowsi Tusi wrote the epic Shahnama under his patronage.
Mahmud of Ghazni thus joins Muhammad bin Qasim as an ideal Muslim ruler within
the South Asian context. Eighteenth-century/twelfth-century political philosopher and
revivalist Shah Waliullah (on whom more later) would describe Mahmud as the greatest
Islamic ruler after the original Muslim caliphate (and point out that his victories—all
fought for with the express aim of propagating Islam—were in part a result of his
sharing a horoscope with the Prophet).36 “[I]n Afghanistan he is regarded as a
philosopher prince, the conqueror of infidels,” writes one British historian, while “in
India he has left a bitter legacy for his violent conquests.”37
Several other Ghanzavids might also be included in this category, including Ibrahim
(r. 1059-1099/451-492), whose peace settlement with the Seljuks to the west made
possible further conquest east into Hindu India, and his son Masud (r. 1099-1115/492-
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509). The rule of Ibrahim and Masud, Muslim historians insist, facilitated an impressive
flowering of culture in Lahore.
Throughout the Ghaznavid period, the relationship between the rulers and the
‘alәma remained close, a political feature that was more or less inherited by the
Ghaznavids as quasi-successors of the Samanids. These Muslim scholars not only
advised their political masters on matters of shәri’at, but also were active as impeders of
Shi’a (and particularly Ism’aili) influence.38 Maintaining Sunni orthodoxy through the
guns of government was the rule, thus it makes sense that the ‘alәma were concentrated
in Ghazna and, later, in Lahore—the seats of political power in the realm. M. Ahmad
singles out shix Ism’ail Bukhari (d. 1056 AD), based in Lahore, and Safiuddin Kazuruni
(d. 1007 AD), who established himself farther south, in Uchch, as particularly
noteworthy ‘alәma of the age. Bukhari pioneered the study of hәdis in South Asia—a
theme that later reformers, like Shah Waliullah and the Deobandi fathers, would
adopt—in addition to his missionary efforts; Kazaruni, a generation earlier, had likewise
proselytized for the faith in the subcontinent.
Indeed, perhaps the most important dynamic then being established in the
northwestern region of the Indian subcontinent was not military (i.e. the Ghaznavid
conquests) or scholarly (i.e. the efforts of the ‘alәma), but centered on Sufi proselytizing.
Since as early as the eighth/first century, when Muhammad bin Qasim invaded Sindh,
Sufi missionaries had been penetrating the subcontinent—and by the time of the
Ghaznavids, many had been established in northwestern Hindustan (and further south,
along the western coast) for many years.39 To borrow from Robinson, “Sufis were the
prime agents in the long process of slowly drawing people [east of the Hindu Kush] of a
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myriad local religious traditions into an Islamic milieu” (italics added).40 M. Ahmad
described the genesis of Sufism as follows:

Some of the ‘ulema’ who preferred to dedicate themselves to the
missionary work of Islam or devote themselves exclusively to rigorous
spiritual self-discipline were called by the names of sufiya, awliya,
mashaykh and pir. In order to preach Islam among the people at large,
they adopted the ‘mass contact’ technique and developed for this purpose
a separate ‘code of ethics’ and a body of ‘doctrines’ based on the esoteric
interpretations of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. In contrast with the ahl alShar’iah [People of the Law], they are known as the ahl al-Tariqah
[People of the Way]. In fact what the mighty Muslim rulers could not
achieve by the sword, these sufis achieved with love and tolerance. They
were miraculously successful in pushing the frontiers of Islam to the
farthest extent through peaceful conversion.41

Thus while the approach of the ‘alәma to things political was to exert direct influence on
policy-makers as members of the political class and components of the sultan’s court,
the Sufis, generally speaking, adopted what could be considered in modern parlance a
more libertarian method—one that relied on persuasion, preaching, long-suffering,
selfless service, and personal example to effect change, without direct systematic
recourse to the levers of the State (though such recourse was taken indirectly at times).
The ‘alәma were the guardians of Islamic law—and it was through the law, enforced by
a just Muslim ruler within the domains of an Islamic state, that righteousness could be
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established upon the earth. The Sufi saints, on the other hand, while sharing the goal of
establishing righteousness, sought its realization by “acting as a common source of
inspiration both to the rulers as well as the ruled.” Indeed, some scholars have argued
that Sufi influence resulted generally in a more “passive” subject population, less
disposed to unrest and rebellion. But their sway did not flow downward only; the Sufis
regularly, through advice-giving and sermons, are reported to have curbed the tyranny
of those less just rulers whose actions towards the common people might have required
attention.42
It should be noted that Sufi and ‘alym are not by any means mutually exclusive
terms (indeed, one scholar has called them “complementary,” while obviously
“nonetheless distinct”).43 In fact, many of the greatest ‘alәma were and are members of
at least one Sufi order, and often several. At times, and particularly in the
contemporary news media in the context of South Asian (especially Pakistani) Islam and
politics, the term “Sufi” is presented as being almost synonymous with “Barelvi” (a term
far less employed), while the Deobandis are considered part of an ‘alәma movement.
Such views are entirely erroneous, however, and may be attributed to the Deoband
school’s reputation as a “puritanical” institution (and a slight, gradual trend since its
founding towards a greater emphasis on scholarship), opposed to the assumed historical
Sufistic tendency to adopt local, possibly unorthodox ideas and practice—commonly
associated with the Barelvis. For the Sufi preachers’ missions of conversion by
persuasion “meant accommodating local needs and customs,” explained Robinson; such
“accommodation” meant
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incorporating worship of trees, or fish, or crocodiles, or cults relating to
St George or Khwaja Khidr, into local sufi piety. It meant tolerating a
range of ritual practices: the lighting of candles, the smearing of sandal
paste, the tying of a piece of cloth to a shrine to remind a saint of a
request.44

This sort of “accretion” has indeed been the target of much Deobandi criticism, but one
must realize that there exists a wide spectrum of Sufistic thought and practice, from the
highly esoteric to the more orthodox; the Naqshbandiyya, for example, would probably
fall into this latter category. In any case, even within a single order, great variation in
practice and even doctrine has historically existed. Another potential source of this
misunderstanding may lie in what Sanyal observed as “one of the ways the Ahl-e-Sunnat
[i.e. Barelvi] movement has changed in the course of the twentieth century,” namely
“the leadership’s increased emphasis on the role of Sufism.”45 Simultaneously, a deemphasis on Sufism as a central tenet of religious practice occurred among the
Deobandis, whose focus slowly shifted towards the study of traditional Islamic sources
and shәri’at. In the northwest frontier area, for example, where Deobandism quickly
gained a major foothold, Haroon has pointed out that “accounts of religious pedagogy in
the region” from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century AD “all note madrasas
aimed at imparting a formal Quranic education. The centrality of tariqa [țәriqәt, or the
Sufi “way”]…began to diminish.”46
The fact of the matter is that both the Barelvi and Deobandi founder figures held
membership in multiple Sufi orders while simultaneously having attained the scholarly
rank of ‘alym. (Indeed, the Naqshbandi order has itself been dubbed by some as “one of
34

ulema.”)47 “Sufis are the dignity of Deobandism,” one of the school’s adherents, a local
dignitary in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’s Mansehra district, informed the writer, “and [the]
faith would be incomplete” without the belief that Sufis represent those closest to God,
“the most perfect” of all people.48 The mistaken scholar-Sufi binary characterizing the
two schools’s relation to each other may also be attributed to the fact that while the
Deobandis revere the Sufis and continue to be initiated into their spiritual lines (albeit
less and less), they believe that the “route to Allah” is discovered through emulation of
the Prophet’s life—in other words, living according to the shәri’at (what Robinson calls
“this-wordly piety”). The Barelvis, on the other hand, place added faith in țәriqәt—“the
Sufi route to Allah”49—which, in the words of one Deobandi, “cross[es] the boundaries”
which “Allah has set for his creatures” (and thereby approaches Robinson’s “otherworldly piety”).50 The “Sufi route to Allah” involves the suggestion that the
intercession of a pir for man with God could have efficacy, an approach still clinging to
life in some Deobandi circles but very much alive within Barelvism. Thus only in
approach to Sufism and the Sufi orders, then, do the two schools differ. Sufism itself
plays a major role in both Barelvism and Deobandism. Still, perhaps in this admittedly
blurred dichotomy—between the ‘alәma and the Sufis—can be observed, however
faintly, one of the historical roots of what would become the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry.
Taken alone this would, in light of what has been written above, constitute a gross
oversimplification. But the difference in approach towards both religious orthodoxy and
the exertion of political influence that at least partly defined these two groups certainly
merits recognition as a significant thread in the fabric of modern-day Deobandi-Barelvi
dynamics.
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Ghazni was burned to the ground in 1150/545 by a new power in Central Asia: that
of the Afghan Ghurids. And though the Ghurids would suffer a setback of their own at
the hands of the Seljuks, yet another group—the Oghuz Turks—finally drove the
Ghaznavids from their capital. They found refuge in Lahore, where their dynasty
continued. Meanwhile, the Ghurids, now recovered from their previous setbacks, took
Ghazni, Multan, and Uch (1175/571) under their leader Muhammad bin Sam, and made
an abortive attempt at conquering India through Gujarat in 1178/574. Though the
latter failed, another expedition was launched following the more well-worn path to the
north; in 1179/575 Muhammad bin Sam took Peshawar, in 1181/577 Sialkot fell, in
1186/582 he seized Lahore (thus effectively ending the Ghaznavid dynasty), and by
1191/587 he had taken Bhatinda, threatening Ajmer and, ultimately, Delhi. In
response, the Hindu rulers of those two citadel cities joined forces and marched on
Bhatinda, where a temporary victory could not shield them from their fate; both Ajmer
and Delhi fell to Muhammad the next year (1192/588). But the Afghan conqueror
wasn’t finished. Within a handful of years, Muhammad bin Sam had added Varanasi
and Kannauj to his empire, while one of his generals (Muhammad bin Bakhtyar Khalji)
conquered Bihar and Bengal. For the first time, “Muslim” rule extended across
northern India, and further expansion was only prevented by troubles in Central Asia.
He and his successors were known to “favour the ulema, by being generous to them and
paying attention to their words” (and by “bestowing on them large amounts of money”),
according to one Muslim chronicler.51 Simply “paying attention” to the ‘alәma was
requisite for the ideal ruler; in the modern era, in Pakistan, the perceived discounting of
both Deobandi and Barelvi scholars was one of very few things that might cause the
‘alәma to temporarily shelve their own dispute and oppose this or that regime as “un36

Islamic” or “anti-Islam.” On the other hand, political rulers that were wise enough to
meet with the ‘alәma and consider their point-of-view, to give them a voice—even if
their advice might be ultimately decided against—tended to meet with the scholars’
approbation (at which point the Deobandi and Barelvi religious leadership could return
to jockeying for power between themselves).
The Ghurids, like previous dynasties, patronized the ‘alәma with plunder gained
through the administration of their empire and the conquest of new lands. As political
rulers are wont to do, the Ghurids discriminated between the various schools of Muslim
thought, identifying and financially supporting this or that ‘alym, much to the chagrin of
those excluded (one of the many dangers of state patronage). In the end, the Shafi
leanings of the early Ghurids gave way to the Hanafi majority of Afghanistan (the
empire’s base of control) and the Ghurid soldiery that would go on to conquer India,
with great consequence for South Asian Islam.52 Muhammad of Ghur himself was
“reputed to be a mild and benevolent man,” the Muslim historian tells us, and “a good
general and a just ruler.”53 Like Muhammad bin Qasim and Mahmud of Ghazni, the
example of Muhammad of Ghur is celebrated today by millions of Muslims. The
Ghurid conqueror is considered a hero, possessing many attributes of the ideal Islamic
ruler type, despite the nature of his conquests (as “invasions”; after all, as Wood notes, it
was a “combination of brutality and high civilization” that characterized “medieval
Islam”).54

Delhi Sultanate.
A former slave of Muhammad of Ghur, Qutbuddin Aibak, became the first sultan of
Delhi in 1206/603, ushering in a new era in the history of the subcontinent: that of
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sustained “Muslim” rule over vast Indian territory. Under the Mamluks (12061290/603-689), the Delhi Sultanate expanded across much of north India. Their
successors, the Turko-Afghan Khaljis (1290-1320/689-720), extended the sultan’s
domains into central India while simultaneously holding back Mongol would-be
invaders—one of the few polities successful in this regard. The next dynasty (the
Tughluqs, 1320-1414/720-817, of Turkic origin), after some initial military success,
including the extension of the sultanate to its territorial height (almost conquering all of
the subcontinent under Muhammad bin Tughluq [r. 1325-1351/725-752]), ultimately
experienced a series of crippling setbacks. These obstacles included the loss of much
territory and, devastatingly, the invasion of Timur the Lame in 1398/801—an event
that resulted in the eight-day plundering of Delhi and the massacre of an estimated one
hundred thousand of the sultan’s subjects. Within a decade-and-a-half, the Tughluqs
had been replaced by the Sayyids (1414-1451/817-855), whose short rule ended with
the abdication of the last Sayyid sultan to a new dynasty: that of the Lodis (14511526/855-933). The Lodis, ethnic Pathans, held the throne for three quarters of a
century, finally falling to a new power in South Asia—the Mughals—in 1526/933.
One might generally say, as Qureshi does, that the Delhi sultans “adhered to the
legal conception of the position of the sultan which was common throughout the
Muslim world.”55 And though, as Metcalf and Metcalf (and others) assert, “it
is…misleading to speak of this era as the period of ‘Muslim’ rule,” since other, “nonMuslim” Indian states were organized and behaved in much the same way (Hardy
describes the Delhi sultanate as, for example, merely “pious policemen”—the sultans—
collaborating with “pious lawyers”—the ‘alәma), the fact remains that the period has for
centuries been regarded by Muslim scholars as distinctly Muslim, complete with several
38

ideal or at least near-ideal rulers (with a few rotten eggs thrown in).56 Gohar writes, for
example, that Ghiyasuddin Tughluq (r. 1320-1325/720-725) “reigned for five years
with justice and equity, restoring order and peace,” and that his son, too (Muhammad
bin Tughluq), though his rule would be marked by several major mistakes and
disappointments, nevertheless was “himself highly learned” and “greatly respected the
‘alәma” (though the same cannot be said about his position vis-à-vis the Sufi shixs); this
sultan’s setbacks are often glossed over as the result of natural impulsivity (and even
bad luck), despite his being pious and highly intelligent.57 On the other hand, Alauddin
Khilji (r. 1296-1316) saw his role as sultan as “separate from [shәri’at] and religious
tradition,” urging a sort of church-and-state separation that a few Pakistani leaders have
attempted to advocate, with mixed results. To Alauddin, shәri’at was the domain of
judges and muftis; as sultan he should be more concerned with “grain, cloth and basic
necessities for the people…”58 This dichotomy might justifiably be compared to the
competition, seven centuries later, between the religious parties on the one hand and
Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto’s PPP (especially during that organization’s early period) on the
other. At its heart, the issue was the role of government: was it to implement shәri’at
(which would, many of the ‘alәma argued, bring about prosperity and equity on its
own)? Or was it to act as a sort of paternal provider of temporal welfare (with the
scholars and muftis operating within their own sphere)? This is not to suggest that the
‘alәma themselves were not somewhat divided on this issue (they were, then as now), but
rather to underscore the long tradition of political rulers who have attempted the
construction of a wall between their own earthly responsibilities and those supposedly
more otherworldly tasks of the ‘alәma.
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Like all good Muslim rulers, the Delhi sultans, often at the behest of their advising
‘alәma, typically sought legitimacy for their rule from the generally accepted caliph of
the Muslim world. For the early sultans, this meant applying for recognition from the
Abbasids in Baghdad. And even after the Mongols sacked that great city on 10
February 1258/7 Safar 656, and had the last Abbasid caliph wrapped in a carpet and
trampled to death by horses, the sultans in Delhi continued to more or less recognize
the dynasty for another four decades. One or two sultans later claimed that they were
caliphs (albeit only within their own domains), but this didn’t last long. Muhammad bin
Tughluq was convinced, perhaps by the ‘alәma counseling him, that recognition from
the reigning caliph was necessary to make his rule legitimate; this time application was
made to Cairo, from where the “shadow caliphate,” a line drawn from an Abbasid
survivor installed by the Mamluk Sultanate, sent Muhammad bin Tughluq a diploma in
1344/744. Feroz Shah received one, too, as did the breakaway Bahmani Sultanate in the
Deccan (though this last is debated). The Sayyids and Lodis also recognized the caliph
(at least on their coinage), and the former, as their name indicates, additionally claimed
to be descendants of the Prophet. All of this was consistent with the Muslim notion of
“singleness and political unity” defining the pan-Islamic world (a concept that
“resonate[s] among some Muslims even now,” says one modern Muslim writer; this is
certainly true of the two schools about which this work is concerned).59 Though the
reality on the ground might have reflected anything but a politically unified polity,
religious legitimization was important if the ruler wanted to exercise the “right” to such
plunder as land taxes. Such was the importance of the ‘alәma stamp of approval.
Official state positions for the ‘alәma during the Delhi Sultanate era were plentiful
and prominent. Throughout this period, religious affairs fell under the Sәdәr ul-Sudwr,
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head of the Religious Affairs Department. Under the Sәdәr ul-Sudwr fell the shix ulyslam, an ‘alym responsible for handling state patronage of Sufis and other Muslim
divines. The position of qazi-e-mәmalyk—Chief Judge—was probably the most powerful
next to the Sәdәr ul-Sudwr; indeed, often both offices were combined in one individual.
The Chief Judge appointed all other judges in the realm (effectively making him the
head of the Justice Department), and additionally appointed ymams to lead prayers in all
mosques. To these highly significant responsibilities must be added the Department of
hysba—in essence, a Department of the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of
Vice. This morals-enforcement agency of government was, more or less completely, a
creature of the ‘alәma, and though its practical strength fluctuated over time, it often
enjoyed real power (as, ironically, during the reign of Alauddin, whose supposed
separation-of-church-and-state philosophy was evidently more separation-of-churchand-sultan, granting the scholars free reign without intereference from the political
ruler). Thus there was ample room within the political structure of the Delhi Sultanate
for the ‘alәma to make their influence felt. “[E]ven when they could not influence a
sultan,” A. Ahmad informs us, their place within the state apparatus ensured that “they
could not easily be influenced by him.”60 In addition to their political role, the juristtheologians with the title mufti also acted as issuers of fәtawa, or juridical rulings, and
studied, analyzed, and wrote about the Qur’an, hәdis, and Islamic law (fyqħ).
One might generally say that the ‘alәma “occupied a position of great prestige”
under the Mamluks, reaching a peak in authority under Bahram Shah (r. 12401242/637-639) thanks in part to matrimonial ties to the sultan’s house. This was
followed by a quieter influence during the latter half of the dynasty’s rule, though the
‘alәma continued to enjoy a close personal relationship with the sultan. Their authority
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waned some during the short Khalji period, only to pick up again under the house of
Tughluq (especially during Feroz Shah’s reign: 1351-1388/751-790). Unfortunately for
the scholars, this coincided with the aforementioned decline of the Delhi Sultanate’s
power, specifically towards the end of the Tughluq period and throughout the Sayyid
period. This would change with the arrival on the scene of the Lodis, under whom the
Delhi Sultanate would experience somewhat of a resurgence—and the power of the
‘alәma, too, despite Sikander Lodi’s personal distaste for the scholars’ orthodoxy.61
Such authority often set the ‘alәma at odds with the Sufis. Indeed, it was not
uncommon for the court scholars to accuse the Muslim mystics of committing the great
sin of innovation (byd’at)—adding to or changing pure Islam as revealed to and by the
Prophet. This is the central accusation leveled by the Deobandis at the Barelvis.
Typically such an accusation would be made through the levers of the state, with formal
charges written up against an individual Sufi, resulting in a trial before a panel of ‘alәma
and Sufis. Sufis were dragged before such juries on a variety of charges—from listening
to music to adultery—though as often as not the verdict was decided in the Sufis’ favor
(and, sometimes, to the injury of the ‘alym from whence the charge originated).62 By
prohibiting an act by means of state-enforced legislation or mandate, a scholar’s nemesis
might be destroyed or otherwise marginalized. This mechanism was simply another
means by which the ‘alәma-Sufi rivalry played out.
A related phenomenon of this period was the establishment and proliferation of the
xanәqaħ, or Sufi shrine center—especially, during this period, of the Chishti and
Surawardy orders.63 From the thirteenth/seventh century, the Sufi shixs, or pirs (a term
prevalent in South Asia; in much of the rest of the Muslim world “pirs” are known as
walis—“friends of God”) had begun establishing themselves in many of the Islamic
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kingdoms, centered around such xanәqaħs. Though these saints and their followers
considered God the omnipotent ruler of all, Allah was, for all intents and purposes,
“inaccessible to the common man.” And so God had spoken through prophets. The last
and greatest of these had been Muhammad, through whom the Qur’an had been
revealed for the benefit of humankind. But there were to be no more prophets after
Muhammad; the final great revelation for the world had been communicated. What,
then, of the rest of humanity—all of the billions born after Muhammad, who would
never have the benefit of a prophet to guide them? The pirs and their disciples had an
answer. Rather than leave His creatures with naught but the words of the Qur’an, as
sacred and perfect as they were, Allah in his mercy continued to provide living “guides
and guardians,” “friends of God” whose role was to maintain “the smooth operation of
the entire world” and continue to impart blessings to humanity. These pirs, all sәyyids
(descendents of the Prophet), could trace their authority back to an “original saint” (the
quțb, meaning “pole” or “axis”; one of these, for example, was the great Abdul Qadir alGilani [d. 1166/561] of Baghdad, “founder” of the Qadiri order), and from thence to
Muhammad himself; thus by virtue of their place in the spiritual chain (sylsәla) and by
blood the pirs were to be vehicles of blessing to humankind. In northern Hindustan
(mostly in the northwest, in modern-day Pakistan) and neighboring Central Asia, the
xanәqaħs came to wield significant political as well as spiritual power in the region
round about. Oftentimes a tribal chief or other leader would approach the pir on behalf
of his entire group and submit to conversion through a ceremony of allegiance (bi’at).
Each year, the bond between pir and those communities tied to him would be bolstered
when he undertook a circuit of his spiritual domain, collecting donations for the
maintenance of the shrine center. In return, the pir was to act as a mediator between his
43

followers and God. It was through him that the surrounding communities were blessed;
their supplications to him were made in turn by him to the quțb, and by the quțb to the
Prophet Muhammad—who himself enjoyed direct access to God. Even after the pir had
been taken by death, his tomb continued to pour out blessings upon those tied to the
xanәqaħ, and worshippers of God made pilgrimages there to ask for help and pray for
guidance. In the meantime, his hereditary successor, or sajjada-nishin (in essence, as
Ewing points out, a “hereditary pir”), continued to act as the regional spiritual mediator
and maintainer of the shrine.64
Many a Sufi shix made temporal claims, too—to territorial wylayәt; that is, the pir
asserted authority (i.e. spiritual authority, though this often translated, of course, into
political authority) over a given area. A constant (though often subtle) struggle, about
which Digby has written much, was thus waged between the sultan and the Sufi shix for
control and dominance. Indeed, the contest had to be subtle, for many believed that the
very temporal survival of the empire, or at least of the territory over which the shix
claimed wylayәt, depended on the Sufi shix’s personal attendance, well-being, and
blessing. His words could, it was believed, literally bring a curse upon the land.
Prosperity (and even the enthronement of kings) might be attributed to his very
presence or promise, and natural calamity, foreign invasion, the impoverishment of a
city, the death of an emperor, or even the fall of a dynasty to his departure or spoken
words. The sultans endeavored to patronize the Sufis, and were largely successful vis-àvis those of lesser status (the greater mәshayx could not, by virtue of their claims, accept
official patronage); this fell under the purview of the aforementioned shix ul-yslam,
whose duty was to keep the Sufis in check through the distribution of state-garnished
plunder and other material favors. Much that was involved in this patronage betrayed
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what was, perhaps, its true purpose—emphasizing, as it did, the supremacy of the
sultan’s authority over that of the Sufi shix. Land grants and religious endowments
from the state ensured the shix’s political support as an influencer of opinion (and even
as a military recruiter in times of civil strife).65 Sufis who refused the sultan’s largesse
were considered potential threats to the sultan’s authority (and their xanәqaħs potential
hotbeds of political rebellion). Thus we are told by one Pakistani historian that
Ghiyasuddin Tughluq, for example, was “fearful of the reach and influence of
Nizamuddin,”66 the most prominent Sufi (Chishti) shix of the time (perhaps Tughluq had
it right; some Muslim scholars later ascribed that sovereign’s untimely death—by
collapsing pavilion—to a pronouncement of this Sufi shix, thereby illustrating the Sufis’
perceived power over temporal affairs).67 Such suspicion was not entirely unfounded, as
from time to time, both during the Delhi Sultanate period and afterwards, a Sufi shix
would be involved in a political conspiracy against the sultan himself. Often the family
of a shix and that of the powerful Muslim landlord (zәmindar) class would join forces
through marriage, thereby further buoying the pir’s power and influence.68 Even under
the Mughals, emperors from Jahangir to Aurengzeb continued to employ the mostly
effective “payoff” tactic, granting these regionally influencial divines cash, lands, and
imperial authority, all in an attempt to influence the politically powerful pirs—and keep
them in line; the pirs had a history, after all, of organizing revolts against the emperor
(like the Pathan pir Roshan’s anti-Akbarian rebellion).69 Thus the supreme temporal
ruler and this host of lesser spiritual ones played a delicate game for political control.70
During this long period of predominantly “Muslim” rule in north Hindustan, the
‘alәma generally provided religious legitimization to the Muslim ruler, whether or not
the ruler in question actually strove for piety. Often dependent upon the state for their
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livelihood—indeed, as a class of veritable spiritual courtesans—the ‘alәma remained
generally loyal to the sultan under whom they lived. For his part, the sultan—even if
he generally favored the Sufis over the ‘alәma whenever the two found themselves at
odds—respected the scholars as a means of consolidating his own power over the
Muslim elite and the army, over whom the ‘alәma held much sway.71 Despite numerous
rebellions, on numerous grounds, against kings and rulers from Morocco to Bengal,
“there is hardly any example available,” writes Mushir Haq, “of the uprising of the
‘alәma against the ruler on the ground of his irreligious activities.”72 No, the religious
scholars tended to need the court—and the plunder it gathered by threat of violence
from its subjects—too much to raise a fracas over issues of religious legitimacy. “In
Muslim history the [‘alәma] generally remained loyal to the throne so long as the ruler
professed to be a Muslim,” wrote M. Ahmad, “irrespective of the quality of his
administration.”73 Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that the majority of the ‘alәma
were associated in some way with state (with “the court, the ruling elite and the
administration”).74 As long as the ruler acted in conformity with Islamic law, the ‘alәma,
according to Ahmad, “did not bother whether he was a despot or a tyrant or an unjust
ruler.”75 When questions of justice (i.e. tyranny and/or despotism) threatened the unity
of the ummәt, the latter (unity) took precedence; indeed, Muhammad himself had
exemplified this principle when he developed the concept of jyhad to preserve internal
unity among the Muslim tribes while still allowing for conquest and expansion
externally. In short, if the ruler was a Muslim, that ruler could typically count on the
‘alәma to support him, minor religious disagreements notwithstanding, for the sake of
union. It is easy to see, then, how a “pattern of dependence on princes,” as Metcalf
characterized it, naturally developed between the religious scholars and the court. This
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being a general rule, there were, of course, several notable exceptions. Indeed, some of
the most eminent ‘alәma in history were imprisoned or tortured for their opposition to
the ruler of the day. (Several foundational scholars of fyqħ—Abu Hanifa [d. 767 AD],
Malik ibn Anas [d. 795 AD], Ahmed ibn Hanbal [d. 855 AD]—fall into this category.)
By and large, however, the ‘alәma “were content with official careers” within the
political structure of the state.76
One result of this scholarly dependence on the court (apart from the Sufi-scholar
rivalry, aforementioned) was the development of a distinction between “other-worldly”
scholars (‘alәma-e-axyrәt, or those devoted to study for study’s sake, or for the sake of
the glory of God, with an eye towards the afterlife) and “worldly” scholars (‘alәma-edunia, i.e. those “professional” ‘alyms who “preferred a worldly career”).77 Both the
Sufi/‘alәma and the ‘alәma-e-axyrәt/‘alәma-e-dunia dynamics are relevant to the
Deobandi-Barelvi phenomenon that would emerge centuries later. This will, it is hoped,
become more obvious as the reader proceeds. At times, both schools have accused
members of the other of getting mired in “worldly” affairs unfit for the truly pious ‘alym
or shix. Ahmad Riza Khan, the “founder” of Barelvism, would himself level such an
accusation at the Deobandis, of whose anti-British machinations (including critical
involvement in the Khilafat Movement) he strongly disapproved. Meanwhile,
Deobandis have sought to defend their leaders as righteous men caught up in the
expediency of politics for the greater good, even as the Barelvi leaders mingled and
sided with the secular Aligarhists or even the British themselves (many Deobandis still
believe that Ahmad Riza was a British agent). These events and themes will be
presented at greater length in subsequent chapters.
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Some scholars give the South Asian ‘alәma credit for enjoying “unchallengable
authority” when it came to interpreting shәri’at (and therefore the “formulation of the
policies of the realm”). One South Asian historian noted that “[no] ruler could ever
defy the shari’ah, or enforce any law that was repugnant to the shari’ah”; in addition, the
‘alәma “had always resisted the attempts of rulers to deprive them of their legislative
veto power.”78 Though this is probably an exaggeration, it nevertheless underscores
the important political role played by the Islamic jurist-theologians within the “Muslim”
Indian state. The religious scholars more or less maintained this position into the early
Mughal period (indeed, some of the ‘alәma from the Lodi dynasty were kept on by the
new Central Asian dynasty).
But such status wasn’t to last.

The Mughal State.
The first Mughal ruler, Babur, defeated the last Delhi Sultan in 1526/932, ushering
in the last major era of “Muslim” rule. But it wasn’t until Babur’s grandson, Akbar,
consolidated power as the third Mughal emperor that the dynasty truly established
itself as a durable polity with staying power on the subcontinent. And it was under
Akbar that the position of the ‘alәma was to change substantially, and not in the
scholars’ favor. It should be remembered, however, that for the first phase of Akbar’s
long reign, the ‘alәma, ironically, may have enjoyed more power than ever before.
Indeed, the young shaħәnshaħ likely started out as an orthodox Muslim, and he appears
to have shown great (even exceptional) respect for the religious scholars in his court.
“For some time,” Al-Badauni recorded, “the Emperor had so great faith in [his Sәdәr ulSudwr] as a religious leader that he would bring him his shoes and place them before
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his feet,” before listening to the ‘alym expound upon the life and teachings of
Muhammad. This particular scholar, Abdul Nabi, had earlier “abandoned” the Sufi
traditions of his fathers for the “rule of the traditionalists,” demonstrating, again, the
dichotomy between the two. It is noteworthy that Akbar would appoint such a man as
his Sәdәr ul-Sudwr, seemingly bespeaking a traditionalist bent of his own. The
traditionalist-Sufi schism, though certainly not an exact Deobandi-Barelvi match,
nevertheless reveals the early rumblings of both schools’ emergences. In any case, the
appointment of Abdul Nabi came in 1565/972, when the Mughal ruler was still in his
early twenties; he was yet to develop the religious positions for which he would be long
remembered. Surely Abdul Nabi did not foresee the transformation that would occur,
especially considering that, for a time, this venerable scholar was considered “so
powerful” that “never was there in the reign of any monarch” a Sәdәr ul-Sudwr his
political equal.79
Whatever Abdul Nabi’s own qualities (whether personal and academic), however,
over time Akbar developed a severe disenchantment for what he considered the
“arrogance, petty-mindedness, intolerance and mutual rivalries” of the ‘alyms at court.80
Badauni concurred, describing them as “time-serving muftis and stirrers up of strife.”
Akbar appears to have both lost patience with their wrangling over the meaning of
Islamic law and felt tied down by the seemingly constant reliance on their juridical
opinions. “Why do you not free me from dependence on these mullahs?” he reportedly
entreated one prominent advisor. And “at last,” Badauni lamented, “owing to the
disagreements of [Abdul Nabi] and all the other ill-dispositioned [‘alәma] the
Emperor’s opinion of him changed completely.” The situation inspired the historian to
compose the couplet,
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All those who see for pride
Of place are fools,
Aye, those who style
Themselves the ‘alәma.

Subsequently the ‘alәma were commanded to gather together, many “against their will,”
and “forcibly seized and compelled” to attest to an imperial decree “affirming the
religious supremacy of the Emperor”—including “his superiority to all ecclesiastical
dignitaries.” Both Akbar’s Sәdәr ul-Sudwr and his shix ul-yslam were so disgraced that
they followed the assembly and attestation with long pilgrimages to Mecca. One notso-impartial turn-of-the-twentieth-century German academic would characterize the
display as part and parcel to the emperor’s more general “struggle against the most
destructive power in his kingdom, against the Mohammedan priesthood.”81 The juristtheologians would never regain the prestige and influence they had once enjoyed within
the state apparatus.
Some Muslim historians have attempted to explain the politico-religious aberration
that was the Akbarian period by blaming it on the emperor’s upbringing. He had, after
all, spent his childhood in Kabul in the care of an uncle, where, we are informed, “no
religious teaching was arranged for him.” After assuming the title of badshaħ as a young
teenager and then, at eighteen, finally taking the reigns of power, he spent much of his
early reign on military expeditions. He was thus “deprived of knowledge and a religious
education.” Others have asserted that Akbar’s turn from orthodox Islam was politically
motivated—meant to shore up Hindu (especially Rajput) support against his chief
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political rivals, the (Muslim) Pathans.82 Whether or not there is merit to these
arguments, one phenomenon that was at the center of the emperor’s spiritual
transformation was his deep personal admiration for the more mystical strains of the
faith (and, eventually, even for the divines of other faiths). What he saw as the narrowmindedness of the court scholars had sowed doubt in his mind, at least as it pertained to
their traditionalist, orthodox path; he allegedly “would pass entire nights sitting out of
doors on a stone,” so tormented was he about his ‘alәma dilemma. Not so with the pirs.
With “regularity,” he made “yearly” pilgrimages to the graves of Muslim saints—and in
battle, he would vow to make a pilgrimage to a certain shrine if victory could be
achieved.83 The great emperor was said to have once walked two hundred miles, from
Fatehpur Sikhri to Ajmer, as a show of gratitude towards a pir for the birth of his son
Selim (later the emperor Jahangir). It was during Akbar’s reign, too, that Baqibillah (d.
1603 AD), who is credited with introducing the Naqshbandi Sufi order into India,
arrived on the subcontinent, eventually initiating several of the emperor’s military
leaders and courtiers into the order.84
Among the “great” Mughal rulers, Akbar’s reign was thus marked by a sharp
decline in the influence of the ‘alәma—and his son and successor, Jahangir, inherited the
political structure that Akbar had built (one in which the scholars played little direct
role). Unwittingly, perhaps, Akbar’s downgrading of the scholars’ importance in favor
of Sufi pirs and others naturally exacerbated the rivalry between the two, as the
demoting of any previous recipient of government preference is wont to do. Though
Jahangir was not particularly religious personally, his reign did allow for some
scholarly influence on the state, albeit indirectly—a phenomenon that had all but
vanished under his father. The influence of Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624 AD), for example,
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may have been particularly significant. It should be noted that Sirhindi, a disciple of
Baqibillah, is perhaps most accurately described as a Naqshbandi Sufi (though he’d
received training in the Suhrawardy, Qadiri, and Chishti paths as well) first, and as an
‘alym second, well-known in his day for his opposition to the “peace above all” policy of
Akbar. The author of hundreds of letters, many of them written to the Mughal ruler,
Sirhindi is often credited with almost single-handedly steering South Asian Islam back
into orthodoxy, thereby “saving” it from falling victim to the syncretistic milieu of
Indian religious philosophy. It is through the Sirhindi line (the “Mujaddidi” branch,
which subsequently spread from South Asia into Central Asia and the Middle East) of
the Naqshbandi order, established partly in opposition to Akbar’s religious policies,85
that such future South Asian Muslim luminaries as Shah Waliullah, sәyyid Ahmad of
Raebareli, ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi, and virtually all of the founding fathers of Deobandism
(as well as many Barelvi guiding lights), trace their spiritual lineages. It might be
argued that the tradition that he established (or at least shored up) of scholarly
opposition to a regime’s perceived unorthodoxy continues to run strong as of the time
of this writing, especially as far as the Deobandis are concerned within the political
context of Pakistan. In any case, Ahmad Sirhindi’s efforts did not save him from prison,
where Jahangir eventually threw him; the scholar-Sufi died shortly after his release.
But in the day-to-day affairs of state, such influence was mild—and informal, in any
case. Still, after the Akbar aberration, the Mughal state under Jahangir regained much
of the “Islamic character” that it had once enjoyed—restoring, for example, the kәlymәħ
to Mughal coinage (which Akbar had erased), and reinstituting the hyjrәt-based
calendar.86
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Even under Shah Jahan, Jahangir’s more religious son, the scholars “did not have
any say in the policies of administration”; the emperor’s relationship with the most
eminent ‘alym of the time, one Abdul Hakim Sialkoti, was merely “one of distant
patronage” (though, admittedly, he did have the man weighed in gold, and he did
patronize the scholar’s literary talents).87 Still, modern Muslim historians tend to see
Shah Jahan as a great ruler, for many of the usual reasons. He was pious—a practicing
Muslim who observed fasts and regularly said prayers. He was a man who patronized
the arts, particularly architecture; under him the Red Fort and jam’y mәsjyd in Delhi and
the Taj Mahal in Agra were all built, and the Agra Fort reconstructed. He governed
“firmly,” leaving a legacy of “magnificence, justice, and prosperity,” to quote one Muslim
scholar. He looked upon his subjects with a paternal eye, a contemporary chronicler
informs us, ever striving for the welfare of peasants and ridding the land of criminals via
harsh punishment. He successfully quelled rebellions, expanded the empire into much
of the Deccan, and played the crusader in punishing the newly arrived Portuguese for
their alleged Christian “depredations” against the local populace.88 “It can be fairly
said,” a Pakistani scholar writes, “that [Shah Jahan] surpassed all the Mughal rulers in
organization and public works and in protecting the life and home of the peasants and in
suppressing profiteers, exploiters and tyrants.”89 Shah Jahan thus joins the ranks of the
ideal Muslim rulers in the context of South Asia—and for centuries the magnificent
structures he left behind would (and continue to?) whisper to the ‘alәma and others
yearning for a return to Islamic political and cultural greatness.
Shah Jahan’s successor, Aurengzeb, is similarly looked to as an ideal type, despite
the disparagement heaped upon his memory by western observers and historians over
the centuries. Under this emperor, almost the entire subcontinent—indeed, more
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territory than in any other South Asian regime from “the dawn of history to the rise of
British power” (to quote Sarkar)—fell under the Mughal banner. Muslim historians
insist that he “never shed unnecessary blood,” but was actually a model of piousness,
administrative acumen (a trait dominating the first half of his rule), and military
competence (a trait headlining the second half of his rule). He is described as having
lived an austere private life (differentiating himself thereby from his predecessor
Mughals, especially his father), as a “staunch” Muslim of the Sunni persuasion who
endeavored to govern as befitted a true Muslim ruler.90 He successfully fought off
pirates from Southeast Asia, settled eastern Bengal (Bang; this policy would have major
historical consequences in coming centuries), and heroically battled (though ultimately
without success) against the infidel Hindu Marathas. He went from “assured
administrator” in the pomp of Delhi to “embattled old man” in the military camp of the
Deccan, gradually assuming the role of “ascetic and sage, spending long hours in
prayers, fasting, and copying the Holy Qu’ran.” Where many in the west see Aurengzeb
as a battle-hardened symbol of intolerance (even incompetence), many Muslim
historians insist he was “both a most able statesman and a subtle character” more than
worthy of ideal Muslim ruler status.91
Even though the door for the ‘alәma to enjoy some limited role within government
had re-opened slightly under Jahangir and Shah Jahan after the Akbarian low, it wasn’t
until the reign of Aurengzeb, in the words of H. Khan “the most orthodox of the
emperors,”92 that the jurist-theologians somewhat regained their “traditional” political
role as a sort of Islamic council approving or rejecting policy based upon its compliance
with shәri’at. Still, this role was greatly curtailed by the emperor, upon whom the
scholars enjoyed virtually no control nor significant sway. “No doubt [Aurengzeb]
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made use of the [‘alәma],” A. Ahmad writes, “but there is no evidence that he ever
allowed them to make use of him even in the slightest degree.”93 Upon gaining the
throne after defeating his rivals (including his much more religiously open-minded older
brother), Aurengzeb—typically regarded as the last of the “great” Mughals (though his
son Bahadur Shah probably deserves a place, too)—instituted a program of Islamization,
attempting to rule strictly within the confines of Islamic law. This included the
appointment of censors to keep public morals in check (in particular to restrain
prostitution, drinking, and gambling), the abolition of non-shәri’at-approved taxes, and
even the forbidding of music at his court. One would assume the ‘alәma would have
played a prominent role in this effort, but the emperor appears to have set at the task
through the secular hierarchy of the state rather than through the religious scholars or
the mosques. Things become a little clearer, perhaps, when one realizes that
Aurengzeb’s Islamization included, as a major component, the re-introduction of
jyziәħ—the traditional tax on non-Muslims; though apologists of this tax are quick to
point out that the Mughal ruler’s sole purpose in this regard was “to allow non-Muslims
to buy exemption from military service,” those non-Muslims forced by threat of violence
to turn over a portion of their property to the state might have regarded it in a different
light.94 Regardless, it is easy to see why the institution and enforcement of the jyziәħ
required the participation not of the scholars but of provincial and local officers of the
state. The ‘alәma under Aurengzeb were used by him, and not vice-versa; when he
needed his brothers dead, for example, the ‘alәma, “ever ready to oblige,” helped lend the
murders religious sanctification. And though the fәtawa-e-әlәmgiri, a collection of
Islamic juridical statements with which the ‘alәma obviously played a vital role, was
compiled under his patronage and by his order, the work bears his stamp as much as any
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scholar’s; it was, in the words of one South Asian academic, “the theoretic crystallization
of Aurengzeb’s theocratic policies.”95 Still, the emperor seemed to possess a great
respect for the religious scholars, even if he didn’t accord them much in the way of
political power; whenever the ‘alәma compiling the fәtawa-e-әlәmgiri entered his court,
for example, Aurengzeb is reported to have arisen as a show of esteem.96
But with Aurengzeb’s death and the subsequent decline of the “Muslim” empire in
India (particularly following the short reign of his son, Bahadur Shah), new threats to
the faith began to emerge in the sub-continent. Indeed, the 1700s/1100s were a
watershed for Islam in South Asia. The crisis was interpreted both politically and
spiritually. To the west, the newly emergent Sikh state threatened Mughal dominance,
and to the south the Hindu Marathas were eating away at one-time Mughal territory at
an alarming rate. All the while, pesky foreigners whose significance was not yet
understood (in particular the French and the British) were beginning to make waves in
the south and east. In addition, the ever-widening political vacuum of the once-mighty
Mughal Empire was filling up with the fragmented polities of a multitude of “Muslim”
states (independent in all but name, and sometimes that, too), threatening the unity of
the ummәt. As a result, a revivalist spirit began to manifest itself, based at first, perhaps
predictably, in the waning old center of Delhi. Here the religious scholars, especially
influenced by the Naqshbandi Sufi order, attempted to standardize correct religious
practice and belief (for the ruling and religious elite, it should be noted) and reassert (or
at least re-emphasize) the proper relationship, as they saw it, between the ‘alәma and the
Muslim ruler. By the early eighteenth/twelfth century, Sunni scholar ‘Abd ur-Rahim
(d. 1718 AD) had established a mәdrәsәħ in Delhi, the Madrasa-e-Rahimiyya, that would
eventually play a vital role in India’s Muslim revivalist wave. This wave, in turn, would
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spread to other Muslim lands, and provide a source to which later revivalists across the
Islamic world could turn for guidance and inspiration. “Thus,” Weismann notes, “as
political decay was faster and deeper in South Asia than in other parts of the Muslim
world during the past several centuries, it was here that ideas of religious revival and
reform were first conceived. When other Muslim countries followed suit, their men of
religion could draw on the already available reformist ideas of their Indian
counterparts.”97 Let us look, then, at the sources, as far as can be ascertained, of
Weismann’s “ideas of religious revival and reform”—in particular those which the
Deobandi and Barelvi schools claim as intellectual and spirital forbears.

The Waliullahi School.
What made ‘Abd ur-Rahim’s Delhi mәdrәsәħ unique, among other things, was its
focus on original sources. To return to the original purity of the first generation of
Muslims—and to avoid the pernicious dangers of accretion—knowledge by the ‘alәma
of the Qur’an and the sunnәt was absolutely essential. ‘Abd ur-Rahim particularly
emphasized the study of the latter. Between the Qur’an and the hәdis, one could find the
answers to life’s questions, great and small. Such renewal—for renewal was what it
was, a striving to restore Islam to its initial spiritual (and, subsequently, political)
glory—was nothing new; the faith had gone through periods of decline and renewal
before. “Islam was always…being re-discovered after being neglected,” one twentieth/fourteenth-century Muslim commentator opined. “…The sense of déjà-vu which
permeates Muslim society is not so much a reliving as the recreating of the past.”98
Such a recreation was necessary, ‘Abd ur-Rahim insisted, if the Muslims of India hoped
to witness a restoration of Muslim power. The problems facing the ummәt were internal
57

ones, and the answer, as always, lay in the revelation of the Qur’an and the personal
example and teachings of Muhammad. It was precisely because Muslims had looked
elsewhere for answers—to the pagan traditions of their neighbors, to legalisms, to the
false philosophies of men—that Indian Muslims found themselves in their present
situation in the first place. Deobandi scholars would later point to the establishment of
the Madrasa-e-Rahimiyya as a major stepping-stone toward the “religious emancipation
of Muslim India” (as well as the “breeding ground” of heroic mujahydin like Syed Ahmad
and his followers, on whom more later).99
Foremost among the revivalist ‘alәma in Delhi to be found at the Madrasa-eRahimiyya was Shah Waliullah (d. 1762 AD), ‘Abd ur-Rahim’s son. Waliullah seems to
have imbibed an appreciation for original sources both from his father as well as from
his studies in Medina, a hub for hәdis-research at the time.100 But in order to study the
original sources, Shah Waliullah contended, one must be able to read and understand
them. To this end, he bravely translated the Qur’an into the lingua franca of the time—
Persian—despite the outcry of many of his fellow scholars. His sons would follow in his
footsteps in this regard, translating the revelations into Urdu. This emphasis on
original sources (called mәnqwlat, or the transmitted [or traditional] disciplines) was
important, for it would serve later as a major dividing line between Barelvis and
Deobandis. Generally speaking, there are two types of Islamic learning to be imbibed at
a Muslim seminary. First, there is the aforementioned mәnqulat, including
commentaries (tәfsir) on the Qur’an, the apostolic traditions (hәdis), and jurisprudence
(fyqħ). Second, there is the mәqwlat, or the rational disciplines. These include
instruction in grammar, logic, philosophy, rhetoric, mathematics, and astronomy. Shah
Waliullah considered this second type of Islamic learning (mәqwlat) potentially
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confusing for students and instead emphasized the first (particularly the Qur’an and the
hәdis, as previously mentioned). The Deobandis would follow suit, while the Barelvis
would lean toward the mәqwlat (plus fyqħ), just as their spiritual predecessors
(particularly the Khairabadi-Badayuni Group, about which more later) had before them.
For his emphasis on and elaboration upon the idea that the Qur’an, hәdis, and shәri’at
were to be the definitive guides to Islamic practice and the attaining of knowledge, Shah
Waliullah is regarded as the “spiritual and methodological successor” of Ahmad
Sirhindi; both helped establish a means by which Sufism could be reconciled with a
scholarly stress on the mәnqwlat (and fyqħ).101 To Shah Waliullah, mәqwlat could never
be anything more than a means by which to “provide rational proof” to “strengthen
faith” in what one would learn studying the far more important mәnqwlat. As such, he
did not advocate scrapping mәqwlat altogether, but merely using it as a tool in the far
more valuable study of mәnqwlat. (He evidently hoped, too, that this synthesis might
unite Muslims in the face of the Maratha onslaught; it wouldn’t be the last time
scholarly revivalism failed in an attempt to unify Muslim “schools” in the face of
common danger—indeed, to some this may be the story of the Deobandi-Barelvi
rivalry.)102
Perhaps more importantly, Shah Waliullah propagated several powerful ideas vis-àvis the ‘alәma and government. To more fully appreciate the context of Shah
Waliullah’s ideas in this regard, however, one must understand the history that the
revered ‘alym lived through. When Shah Waliullah was born, the empire of the
Mughals, Aurengzeb at its head, was still vast and militarily mighty. But before he was
even three years old—and in the final days of the emperor’s life—Mughal armies were
already suffering humiliating defeats in the wake of the Maratha wave. Over the next
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several decades, the losses—both military and territorial—continued to pile up.
Throughout his teens, too, Shah Waliullah would have watched anxiously as various
claimants for the throne plotted, killed, and wrangled for power. Then, when he was
thirty-four, Maratha forces finally reached the Mughal capital—and plundered it. Just
two years later, in 1739/1152, the Persian conquistador Nadir Shah sacked the city, too,
dealing what might be considered the deathblow to the once-hegemonic political entity
founded by Babur over two centuries before. Henceforth if the Mughal “empire”
extended beyond the city of Delhi itself, it did so in name only. “Not an earthen lamp is
there where once did chandeliers glow,” lamented one eighteenth/twelfth-century Urdu
poet on the desolation of once-mighty Delhi.103 To add insult to injury, in 1748/1161
the founder of the new Afghan dynasty, Ahmad Shah Abdali, raided Delhi, too.
(Significantly for this narrative, Ahmad Shah later convinced a group of Ahmad
Sirhindi’s descendants to relocate to Kabul, from where they firmly established the
Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi line in Afghanistan, enjoyed official patronage, and were granted
land in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat, and Kohistan. The sylsәla was able to gain
something like pre-eminence among the Pathans of what is today southern Afghanistan
and northwestern Pakistan, setting the stage for that people’s easy acceptance of
Waliullahi revivalism and, later, Deobandism).104
It is easy to see, then, why at least one scholar has dubbed Shah Waliullah the
“Thinker of Crisis.”105 At the very least, it places his political ideas in historical context.
As shapers of Waliullah’s political philosophy should be added his time on pilgrimage to
Mecca, where he likely mixed with such Muslim revolutionaries as Abdul Wahhab and,
Deobandi historians insist, he “was inspired by a vision to replace the imperialist and
corrupt administration [of “European imperialism” and “oriental rulers” alike] by
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establishing a government based on principles of equality and justice.”106 For Shah
Waliullah, the man who had seen the rapid and violent fall of a once-vast empire, two
caliphates existed in the world. There was, first, the “outer caliphate” (xylafәt al-zahyr),
ruled by a caliph or, under less ideal circumstances, a sultan or some other Muslim
leader. Its purpose was practical: to maintain social order in the physical world.
Second, there was the “inner caliphate” (xylafәt al-batin). This far more critical realm
was presided over, crucially, by the ‘alәma. It was the task of these religious scholars to
ensure that the sons of Adam and daughters of Eve conducted their lives “in harmony
with God’s created nature.” Political decay didn’t occur in a vacuum; no, it was a direct
result of corruption on the part of the guardian ‘alәma. Spiritual decay led to political
decay. It followed, then, that in order to witness a return of “Muslim” political power in
the physical world, the ‘alәma must lead the charge. After all, it must have been the
scholars’ “neglect in performing their duties properly” that had brought about the
decline in the “Muslim” political position in the first place. Shah Waliullah would
identify some of these areas of neglect, pointing his finger at (among other alleged
scholarly follies) opportunism, claiming a monopoly on truth, unjustified severity,
misplaced intellectualism, and disunity.107
Little did he know, surely, that he was to be the “grandfather” of a whole host of
revivalist Islamic movements that would crisscross the subcontinent and, eventually,
much of the world, though he did consider himself “a champion of political Islam.”108
Notes one Muslim historian: “…Shah Walyullah appeared as the saviour of Muslim
culture and religion,” “a great reformer of law, morals and politics” who “paved the way
for the great Jihad movement against the Sikhs and later against the British rule.”109
His ideas on the role of the ‘alәma in the purification of the ummәt (including the
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preservation of Islamic knowledge in times of crisis and the impartation of that
knowledge within the community of the learned), the restoration of Muslim political
greatness, and the maintenance of the Islamic state would be seized later by the
Deobandis, not to mention a whole host of other movements. The dar ul’alwm at
Deoband would later claim to be the “inheritor” of the “rich legacy” of Shah
Waliullah;110 its scholars would even interpret the time of his birth—almost exactly one
century after the advent of the British on the subcontinent—as a token signifying that
his life was to be dedicated to “the purpose of opposing [the British].”111
The great man’s spiritual successor was his son, Shah Abdul Aziz (d. 1824 AD),
who, together with his brothers, studied, taught, and preached in Delhi, enlarging the
Waliullahi school and serving students from all over India and Central Asia. In the
tradition of their father and grandfather, Shah Abdul Aziz and his brothers stressed the
study of hәdis, and their translation of the Qur’an into Urdu has already been mentioned.
But perhaps Shah Abdul Aziz’s greatest tool for disseminating knowledge and judgment
based on shәri’at was through the many fәtawa that he authored. The translation of the
Qur’an into Urdu and, especially, the issuance of fәtawa in answer to the queries of the
faithful marked a turning point in the relationship of the ‘alәma with the people.
Heretofore the norm had been for juridical decisions to be issued within the context of
the court (i.e. by a mufti for the benefit of a qazi, and all within the framework of the
state, thereby excluding many issues of everyday concern for the masses), or at least to
be asked, answered, and circulated among the learned; even Shah Waliullah had acted
according to this standard. With Shah Abdul Aziz at the head of the Waliullahi school,
however, scholarly knowledge and interest gained, in the words of Metcalf, a “more
popular focus”—a perhaps not surprising development given the political and social
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changes then taking place in India. The new British power was then engaged in what
appeared to be a relentless swallowing up of “vast stretches of the Indian countryside.”
In 1803/1218, Delhi fell in all but name when the British replaced the Marathas as
protectors of the Mughal emperor. Over time, these aliens took over the government
(and land revenues) and the courts, seemed to favor a rising Hindu business community
over the old Muslim elite, allegedly wiped out the revenue-free grants enjoyed by
Muslim religious institutions in Bengal, and disbanded local armies so that they might
be replaced by British-trained forces. In the midst of such upheaval, Muslims of all
classes appear to have increasingly turned in on themselves as a community—and the
fәtwa provided a means for preserving cultural identity and living religion in the
absence of the state apparatus. Of course, by using fәtawa in such a way, the ‘alәma had
assumed the role of popular guide. This was somewhat new, and it was perhaps Shah
Abdul Aziz’s most lasting legacy.112 Shah Abdul Aziz also inherited and further
developed Shah Waliullah’s hostility towards the British, allegedly claiming that the
foreigners would not be satisfied in merely “taking” the Muslim’s “world, but[would]
also seize [their] religion” (italics added).113
Muhammad Ishaq (d. 1846 AD), Shah Abdul Aziz’s grandson (from a daughter) and
a master of hәdis, oversaw a continued spread of Waliullah’s reform movement before
relocating permanently to the Hijaz in the early 1840s/late 1250s.114 Before his
departure, however, he instituted, according to ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi, the agenda he had
inherited from Shah Abdul Aziz. The general plan, evidently tracing back to Shah
Waliullah, might be broken down (as Faruqi does) into two main parts: first, it called for
the strict adherence of the ummәt to the Hanafi school of Islamic law (necessitating, of
course, a core social and political role for the‘alәma). Second, it proposed an alliance,
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however ambiguously defined, with the sultans of Ottoman Turkey. The first aspect of
Muhammad Ishaq’s agenda dealt with the role and power of the ‘alәma in South Asian
Muslim society. The second carried implicitly anti-British (and pan-Islamic) meaning.
Even the great man’s departure to the Hijaz, often depicted as a simple emigration to
Islam’s “Holy Land,” was actually an attempt to establish contact with the Ottoman
authorities; indeed, it was in Turkey that Muhammad Ishaq died in 1846/1262.115
But he left behind a remarkable circle of students—a core group whose actions
would shape the destinies of millions of Muslims across South Asia. This group
included Ishaq’s successor, Abdul-Ghani Naqshbandi (d. 1878 AD), sәyyid Nazir
Muhaddis of Delhi (d. 1902 AD), Imdadullah (d. 1899 AD), and sәyyid Ahmad Khan of
Raebareli (d. 1831 AD). Along with this core group, Muhammad Ishaq’s associate and
friend, Mamluk ‘Ali, would also play a pivotal role in coming events. Indeed, Mamluk
‘Ali had been left as the chairman of a four-person committee, organized by Muhammad
Ishaq, to continue the propagation of his aforementioned agenda. It was in following
Mamluk ‘Ali’s example, too, that the man’s distant nephew, one Muhammad Qasim
Nanautawi, journeyed to Delhi to pursue his education. In Delhi, Muhammad Qasim
befriended a fellow pupil, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, and together they studied under both
Abdul-Ghani Naqshbandi and Mamluk ‘Ali, among others. Under the latter they would
adopt Muhammad Ishaq’s two-pronged program as their own and eventually
institutionalize much of it within the school they would found in Deoband.116 They
would also become xәlifәħ of Imdadullah (indeed, many among the dar ul’alwm’s
founding generation would count themselves his disciples), who himself had been
Mamluk ‘Ali’s student, and who had similarly imbibed Muhammad Ishaq’s agenda
therefrom.117
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Another defining movement should be mentioned here: that of sәyyid Ahmad Khan
of Raebareli. Ahmad Khan, who was at least in part, as mentioned above, a product of
the Waliullahi school, chose military jyhad as his method of cleansing the subcontinent
(in contrast to Shah Abdul Aziz’s gradualist emphasis on teaching, the dissemination of
knowledge, and right practice; Deobandis insist, however, that Shah Abdul Aziz not
only supported sәyyid Ahmad, but personally encouraged and inspired him in his efforts
as well). After years imbibing the teachings of scholars and shixs in Delhi, gathering
followers across northern India, and learning and teaching in Arabia, sәyyid Ahmad set
up a base of operations on India’s northwestern frontier with around a thousand fighters
drawn from his tens of thousands of disciples.118 From here, he launched an ultimately
unsuccessful jyhad against the Sikh state of Ranjit Singh. Today Deobandi historians
are quick to point out that sәyyid Ahmad’s targeting of the Sikh polity in the Punjab was
motivated first and foremost not by an animosity to the adherents of the faith of Guru
Nanak at all; no, it was an anti-British move. Their contention is that Ranjit Singh had
only been made “governor of the Punjab” with the consent of the British—and that his
government had gone on to steal Muslim land, kill Muslim scholars, and rape Muslim
women. This was why sәyyid Ahmad had chosen to throw his jyhadis against the Sikh
state first—wholly motivated by a determination to “take steps against the British.”119
Ahmad’s exploits—first as a student under the Waliullah family, then as a
cavalryman in the band of Amir Khan, then as a Sufi shix (with both Waliullah’s fiery
grandson Muhammad Ismail [d. 1831 AD] and Abdul Aziz’s son-in-law Abdul Hayy
[d. 1828 AD] acknowledging him as their pir), then as a pan-Indian missionary, then as
a haji, and finally as a jyhad-waging mujahyd—are well-known. What may be less
recognized is that sәyyid Ahmad’s activist movement continued through his successor in
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jyhad, Nasiruddin Dihlawi (and others; see endnote after next paragraph), who would
later initiate Imdadullah into his Sufi order. Thus it was through this Sufi line (sәyyid
Ahmad—Nasiruddin—Imdadullah) that the two most prominent founders of the
Deoband school, Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad, themselves traced their
spiritual lineages.120 In addition, several of the dar ul’alwm’s founding figures boasted
relatives who had fought with sәyyid Ahmad on the frontier.121 Over the last centuryand-a-half, prominent Deobandis have continued to invoke the memory of sәyyid Ahmad
(for one especially obvious example, see pp. 408-409). In addition to this first
“genealogical” line to the Deobandis, sәyyid Ahmad was able to establish, during his time
in the northwest, a second line: through the very powerful Akhund of Swat, Abdul
Ghaffur. The latter took to the Waliullahi emphasis on mәnqwlat and extra-dәrgaħ
religious practice and generally helped spread the great Delhi ‘alym’s revivalist ideas
among his people, where they were warmly received. Thus sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli,
thanks in large part to his association with Akhund Ghaffur, was able to lay the
groundwork for the future dominance of the Deobandi school of thought among the
Pathans (especially among the eastern tribes) of northwestern Pakistan and, later,
southern Afghanistan.122
sәyyid Ahmad’s headquarters in the northwest were at Sittana (about three miles
northwest of present-day Haripur in Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province—and
now completely covered by the Indus-fed waters of the great Tarbela Dam). After his
death in battle in 1831/1246, two of his disciples (who’d survived because they’d been
sent to Kashmir on a diplomatic mission) continued the Sittana-based jyhad movement
to destroy the unbelievers and establish a true Islamic state. The first of these disciples
was Qasim Panipati, who went on to fuel the idea that sәyyid Ahmad had not, in fact,
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perished—but had been preserved by God and would return; this inspired many of his
followers (particularly in Patna, an erstwhile base on the plains) to make the long
journey to Sittana, where Qasim Panipati was engaged in organizing a regrouped
military force. The second disciple was none other than Nasiruddin, mentioned
previously as sәyyid Ahmad’s successor (and through whom the Deobandi fathers trace
their spiritual lineages); instead of remaining at Sittana, he traveled back to the plains
and in 1835/1250 led another force against the Sikhs. This force was waylaid for six
years in Sindh, however, only to answer a call by the Afghans for assistance in their
struggle against the British; about fifty survived the fighting—and these were all
executed by the puppet king installed by the British in Afghanistan, Shuja Shah.
Meanwhile, a council of sorts in Patna, initially led by one Shah Muhammad Husain,
continued to run operations from the plains, recruiting fighters and clandestinely
sending supplies and cash for the camp at Sittana. For decades, the Sittana group (or
“Hindustani Fanatics,” as they were known by some of the locals and the British; the
latter also simply referred to them, erroneously, as “Wahhabis”), with assistance from
the Patna group, continued to wage war from the frontier. The movement would later
play a prominent role in the British debacle at Ambeyla Pass and be linked to various
assassinations and assassination attempts.123 The legacy of sәyyid Ahmad within the
context of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry should not be sidenoted, as it injected into
Deobandism’s very roots the active spirit of jyhad and initiated a tradition of militarism
based in the subcontinent’s Pathan northwest.
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The Farangi Mahalis and the Khairabadi-Badayuni Group.
Around the same time Shah Waliullah was active in Delhi, another movement was
taking root to the east, in Lucknow (the capital of Awadh, an ascendant successor state
to the Mughal polity). Here the ‘alәma of Farangi Mahal, under the leadership of Abdul
‘Ali (respectfully known as bәhәr ul’alwm, or “Ocean of Knowledge”), similarly strove to
preserve religious learning in an era of waning patronage, at the same time mirroring
their Delhi contemporaries’ efforts at emphasizing the proper relationship between the
religious scholars and the temporal ruler. A crucial difference in the Farangi Mahalis’
approach, however, was their emphasis, not on mәnqwlat, but on mәqwlat; indeed, Shah
Abdul Aziz would criticize the Farangi Mahalis for their perceived ignorance when it
came to the Qur’an and hәdis, alleging that their time was misguidedly engaged instead
in the study of such free-thinking philosophers as Ibn ‘Arabi and al-Razi.124 The
mәqwlat emphasis was especially marked in the Farangi Mahalis’ creation of the dәrs-enyžami, a standardized curriculum that underscored the rational disciplines (in order to
prepare students to be administrators within the state apparatus, argues Robinson). An
important ‘alym named Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi (d. 1861 AD) later adopted the Farangi
Mahali emphasis on mәqwlat, as opposed to Shah Waliullah’s emphasis on the original
sources like the Qur’an or hәdis. (The Deobandis would later adopt the Farangi Mahali
dәrs-e-nyžami, too, but would greatly augment its hәdis offerings.) And perhaps no other
family in northern India, apart from the Farangi Mahalis, had a greater impact on the
spread of this emphasis than the Khairabadis.125 A third family, that of the Badayunis,
might justly be combined with the latter and more accurately be identified as the
Khairabadi-Badayuni Group. By the second half of the 1800s/1200s the KhairabadiBadayuni Group had distanced itself significantly from the Delhi scholars, thus laying
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the groundwork for the future Barelvi-Deobandi schism.126 While Shah Waliullah’s
espousal of mәnqwlat would be taken up later by the Deobandis, then, the Barelvis’
emphasis, following the example of the Lucknow scholars and the Khairabadi-Badayuni
Group, fell upon the mәqwlat. (In truth, these emphases, highlighted significantly by
modern scholars, may have been less important than the more base rivalry between
different scholar-groups over power and influence, certainly not an uncommon
phenomenon within the domains of both academia and theology. In any case, the split
and subsequent coalescence around these two groups set the stage for the more
pronounced Deobandi-Barelvi schism of the next generation.)
Both of these phenomena—the establishment of the Waliullahi School in Delhi and
the Farangi Mahalis in Lucknow (then that of the Khairabadi-Badayuni Group offshoot
from the latter)—not only signaled a type of regenerative effort, but also bore witness of
the role the religious leadership, and particularly the ‘alәma, potentially could play even
without the patronage of princes, kings, and emperors. It should be noted that there yet
remained a few enclaves of Muslim power on the subcontinent where religious scholars
might obtain direct patronage, like the courts at Awadh, Rampur, and Kabul. And while
opportunities for employment in the courts on the plains would mostly shrivel up by the
mid-nineteenth century AD, the mәdrәsәħ-trained qazis among the Pathans of the
northwest continued to find patronage within the Afghan state into the twentieth.127
While the ‘alәma in the cities, near the seats of fading power, strove for renewal, the
landed Sufi pirs, based around the shrines, also asserted themselves politically; for them
the struggle was against local leaders who no longer enjoyed the protection of the
fading Mughal empire. This rise in local political power and influence naturally
propped up their own religious authority as spiritual guides. Picking up where their
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predecessors from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries AD had left off, these Sufi
mәshayx grasped political power as soon as it became available in the absence of imperial
authority. The religious scholarship in the cities and towns thus occurred at the same
time as the renewal of the political power of the pirs rurally. In the northwest, for
example, among the Pathan tribes of what is today southern Afghanistan and
northwestern Pakistan, the pirs became especially powerful. Among the western
Pathans, the pirs continued to be used, by virtue of their socio-religious (not to mention
political) position on the regional level, within the framework of the Afghan state; and
in a sort of feudal arrangement, the Kabul court even paid some of the pirs among the
eastern Pathans (technically located outside of the geographical boundaries of the king’s
practical, temporal authority) in exchange for their contribution of fighting men when
called upon. Throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth, and some of the twentieth
centuries AD, pirs were used by the Afghan state for a wide variety of purposes, from
mobilizing opposition to Chinese incursions into Turkestan in the 1700s/1100s and
establishing a standardized legal code for the country in the 1800s/1200s to creating
and enforcing law at the local level and recording births, marriages, and deaths as
official registrars. In the 1830s/1240s-1250s, for example, Afghan ruler Dost
Muhammad called upon Abdul Ghaffur (later famously known as the previously
mentioned Akhund of Swat) to help recruit soldiers to fight in his war against the Sikhs
of the Punjab. In this the latter was successful and was, in turn, granted large tracts of
land. But by the late 1840s/mid-1260s the Akhund of Swat had established his own
independent Islamic state in the Swat valley, propping up his chosen әmir (Akbar Shah,
who had acted as a secretary to sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli) for almost a decade before,
upon the әmir’s passing, he personally took over command.128 And though, by the early
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twentieth century AD, the Afghan state from the west had begun to significantly
encroach upon these local religious leaders’ political sway (especially during the reign of
Abdur Rehman [r. 1879-1901 AD], when Afghanistan experienced a major increase in
centralization and bureaucratization), not to mention the ever-encroaching British from
the east, the pirs continued to weild considerable power.129
It is perhaps easy to see, then, how Barelvism, born of a Khairabadi-Badayuni
tradition less focused on the puritan revivalist study of the Qur’an and hәdis, would
(generally speaking) eventually envelop the more syncretist Sufi pirs of South Asia (with
rare, Akhund of Swat-esque exceptions, of course), too, in opposition to the orthodox,
mәnqwlat-focused Deobandis.

Shi’a Inroads in South Asia.
Another look at Awadh is warranted here. Like Bengal, Awadh was de facto
independent by the early eighteenth century AD. Though most of its Muslims, like the
Farangi Mahalis, were Sunni, its rulers were not—they adhered, rather, to Shi’a Islam
(as did Bengal’s, for a time). Throughout the century in question, Shi’a ‘alәma from
what is now Iran and Iraq migrated to Awadh, fleeing the instability then rocking
Central Asia and the Middle East. Safavid Iran—where the government had been their
patron, lavishing a monetary endowment upon the ‘alәma and enforcing sectarian
favoritism by the barrel of the gun—had fallen, and uncertainty plagued many Shi’a
scholars in Iraq’s shrine cities, too. The result for Awadh, where Shi’a Islam was the
state religion, was what one scholar has described as a “constant influx” of Shi’a ‘alәma
to the court and the region at large.130 The Awadhi state would decline rapidly by the
end of the century, but the influence of the Shi’ism that it helped more firmly establish
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in South Asia would live on, with major consequences. In the context of the DeobandiBarelvi rivalry, the presence of a significant population of Shi’a on the subcontinent
always gave the two schools a “bigger fish to fry,” so to speak; Deobandi thinkers from
Muhammad Qasim to Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi and Barelvi guiding lights like Ahmad Riza
Khan and Naimuddin Moradabadi saved their sharpest barbs, perhaps, for this
particular sect (one might argue that this specific designation should be attributed not
to the Shi’a but rather to the Ahmadis, but that is another discussion). The presence of
millions of Shi’a contributed, too (after the Iranian Revolution of 1979/1399), to the
organization of militant (mostly Deobandi) anti-Shi’a outfits—groups that would
subsequently set their sights on Barelvis, too.

The ‘alәma, the mәshayx, and 1857/1273.
The half-century following the Company takeover of Delhi witnessed the rapid
consolidation of British power on the subcontinent and the fall of the last mighty
indigenous kingdoms to these foreign invaders. The Marathas fell in 1818/1233, Sindh
was taken in 1843/1259, and by 1849/1265 even the Sikh kingdom in the Punjab had
fallen under the Company’s banner. With these victories came a decreased need to rely
on local alliances—with the result that the British absorbed some of this territory, too,
sometimes in violation of treaty arrangements. The British annexation of Awadh in
1856/1272 was a particularly grievous act in the eyes of many Indians. One
contemporary Muslim witness remembered, for example, that this move on the part of
the Company “was a cause of dissatisfaction to everybody, and gave rise to a general
conviction that the Honorable East India Company had violated treaties” (though this
particular commentator did not believe the Awadh annexation was itself a root cause of
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the following year’s “revolt”).131 The annexation would have been especially difficult to
swallow for Muslims, since Awadh’s government, as mentioned previously, was a
Muslim one. One third of the Bengal army—among whom the 1857/1273 uprising
fiercely manifested itself—actually hailed from Awadh. Such dominance, augmented by
what were seen as flagrant violations of the Company’s legal obligations, “loosed,” in the
words of Stein, “a deepening anxiety at the core of Indian civil society.”132 These
military and political triumphs were coupled with what many Hindustanis regarded as
British arrogance, as missionaries, administrators, traders, and soldiers seemed to be
attempting to make Englishmen out of Indians. There was also an undercurrent of
resentment among both the Indian peasantry and the alienated landed gentry over the
new British system’s perceived facilitation of the “unmitigated usury” of a new class of
moneylenders (dubbed bәndia ka raj, or “rule of moneylender-traders”).133 Indeed,
almost a century later Jawaharlal Nehru would trace the very “beginnings of the new
Hindu-Muslim problem” to the loss of land and position in Bengal by the Muslim
landed gentry to a mostly Hindu monied and business class in the years after Company
rule had been established there.134 Similarly, Faruqi blamed the “uneven and
unbalanced development” of Hindu and Muslim middle classes, beginning in Bengal (i.e.
the growth of a Hindu middle class concurrent with “the absence of the growth” of a
Muslim one).135 Perhaps the verse of renowned Urdu poet Mir Taqi Mir, writing in the
1700s AD, could have applied equally in the minds of many Muslims a century later:
“men of means and money have joined the beggars’ fold.”136 Thus there was room by
1857/1273 for discontent on all sides—but, the argument could be made, especially
from within the Muslim camp.
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The conflict came to a head in 1857/1273, when many of the sepoys—the backbone
of British power on the subcontinent—revolted, followed by a general civil uprising
that spread to much of India (though mostly in the north) and lasted into 1858/1274.
For a time the revolt looked like it would succeed—and the British would be pushed out
of India forever. In the end (and after the loss of much life), the “Mutiny” was
unsuccessful, thanks in large part to the Company’s local allies. After the uprising (or,
according to Indian nationalists, India’s “first war of independence”) was over, both the
British and their Indian subordinates began looking for answers. One result of the
failed rebellion was that the Mughal line was finally severed, its last emperor, an old
man, shipped off to a Burmese prison, and his sons murdered. Another was that
Company rule in India ended, as the responsibility for the administration of the
subcontinent was shifted directly to the Crown. (In many ways East India Company
rule had been indirectly administered by the Crown, too—a point all too often
forgotten—but now the Company had been removed from the political landscape
altogether.)
The Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry is in part characterized by a contest over the memory
of 1857-1858/1273-1274. Both schools lay claim to having played a major—even
leading—role in the uprising, despite the haziness of the historical evidence or the
misgivings of Western scholars. Historians from both traditions proudly proclaim that
“the historic revolt of 1857 was led by the ‘alәma,” though they argue over which ‘alәma
played leading roles.137 The Barelvis single out “their” political and spiritual
“forefathers,” particularly Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi, Fazl-e-Rasul Badayuni, and even Riza
‘Ali, as heroes of the period (and, in the case of Khairabadi, as the leader and chief
instigator of the revolt itself). Meanwhile, the Deobandis celebrate the alleged actions
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of those whom they consider their political and spiritual forebears, especially Imdadullah
(though Barelvis, significantly, today claim that he was “one of ours,” and that it was his
two students who went astray), Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, and Muhammad Qasim
Nanautawi. The idea that a jyhad had been proclaimed against the British by the
spiritual leaders of South Asia’s Muslim community held sway for some time after the
Mutiny had been suppressed (and still does, among both Barelvi and Deobandi
historians), especially in the weeks and months immediately following the fighting.
Both traditions, however, consider the same fәtwa to mark the beginning of the
1857/1273 “war of independence”: that of Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi.
But there was another fәtwa, issued a half-century earlier, that is likewise important
in this regard, and it is here that we must begin. Indeed, some scholars have identified
the seeds of 1857/1273 in this 1803/1218 fәtwa issued by Shah Abdul Aziz, in which
Shah Waliullah’s son characterizes north India as no longer dar ul-yslam:

In this city [Delhi] the Imam al-Muslimin wields no authority. The real
power rests with Christian officers. There is no check on them, and the
promulgation of the commands of [disbelievers] means that in
administration and justice, in matters of law and order, in the domain of
trade, finance, and collection of revenues—everywhere the [disbelievers]
are in power. Yes, there are certain Islamic rituals, e.g. Friday and Id
prayers, әzan [the call to prayer] and cow slaughter, with which they
brook no interference, but the very root of all these rituals is of no value
to them. They demolish mosques without the least hesitation, and no
Muslim or any źymi [“dhimmi”] can enter into the city or its suburbs but
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with their permission. It is in their own interests if they do not object to
the travelers and traders to visit the city. On the other hand,
distinguished persons like Shuja ul-Mulk and Vilayati Begum cannot
dare visit the city without their permission. From here to Calcutta, the
Christians are in complete control. There is no doubt that in
principalities like Hyderabad, Rampur, Lucknow, etc., they have left the
administration in the hands of the local authorities, but it is because they
have accepted their lordship and submitted to their authority…138

Faruqi describes this fәtwa as “a landmark in the history of India in general and in
that of Muslim India in particular. It amounted to a call to religiously conscientious
Muslims to mobilize themselves, in the absence of any powerful Muslim warlord, under
popular leadership and rise in defiance of the foreign power.”139 Deobandi historians of
today likewise place great emphasis on this particular juridical pronouncement,
attributing many later movements (from sәyyid Ahmad’s “Balakot Movement” and the
1857/1273 Mutiny to the Silk Letters Conspiracy and the anti-British independence
movement in general) to Shah Abdul Aziz’s fәtawa.140 But later scholars have argued
that a stance like Faruqi’s erroneously places the fәtwa’s initiative too decidedly at Shah
Abdul Aziz’s feet. In reality, they contend, the learned ‘alym was merely responding to a
question, in the manner of a mufti, not making a statement originating with himself.
Others disagree for a different reason: that the fәtawa being issued during this period
were actually “ambiguous” when it came to India’s political status; their purpose was to
help people live righteous lives despite the less-than-ideal circumstances then extant on
the subcontinent, and thus Shah Abdul Aziz’s 1803/1218 fәtwa must be read in context.
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Moreover, if he had been calling for war, would he not have identified a neighboring
Muslim state from which jyhad should be launched (or a Muslim ruler to whom the
faithful might swear political allegiance), as Muslim law required? A third argument
posits that Shah Abdul Aziz’s fәtwa was actually written so that Muslims, many of
whom were suffering in terms of livelihood, could gain in that sphere, for many of the
economic restrictions by which the ummәt was expected to abide within a condition of
dar ul-yslam (prohibitions related to employment, interest earnings, and slavery, for
example) were lifted within dar ul-hәrb.141
Whatever the ‘alym’s intentions, the fәtwa makes evident that, at least for Shah
Abdul Aziz—one of the most powerful and influential of the ‘alәma in the world at the
time—the British presence was more than just a serious concern; it was to be regarded
as a call to action. The fәtwa is especially thick with expressions lamenting the loss of
Muslim political power—indeed, on almost every line; though Shah Abdul Aziz
acknowledges Muslim freedom to carry out worship and ritual, political “control” has
been wrested from the faithful in every meaningful respect. Political power was the
issue. Though the fәtwa may not be Faruqi’s “watershed,” it certainly merits attention
as a gauge, so to speak, on the attitude of arguably the most influential ‘alym
(particularly in terms of the movements he inspired) in Indian history. Perhaps most
importantly, many Muslim historians (and especially those of the Deoband school) trace
the beginning of India’s “freedom struggle” directly to the 1803/1218 Azizi fәtwa (and,
consequently, interpret the jyhad of sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli almost thirty years before
the Mutiny as the first attempt to execute Shah Abdul Aziz’s edict).142 Other Muslimled uprisings (of the Faraizis in Bengal in 1804/1219, by the soldiers at Vellore in
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1806/1221, of the Faraizis again throughout the 1830s and 40s AD) were similarly
interpreted.143
Company employee (and later Sir) Sayyid Ahmad Khan, in his 1860/1276 essay The
Causes of the Indian Revolt, rejected the notion that a call for jyhad had played any serious
role in the uprising of 1857/1273, even resurrecting the memory of the famous mujahyd
Muhammad Ismail (the grandson of Shah Waliullah and the chief lieutenant of sәyyid
Ahmad of Raebareli). Sir Sayyid’s argument was that when Muhammad Ismail had
called for volunteers to wage jyhad, it hadn’t been to fight the Christian foreigners from
the British Isles—no, it had been to destroy the Sikh state in the Punjab. (Many
Barelvis go one step further, insisting that, far from being anti-British mujahydin, sәyyid
Ahmad of Raebareli and Muhammad Ismail were actually working for the British; the
same accusation is directed later towards both Rashid Ahmad and Muhammad Qasim,
who “from the start” actually “fought for the British” as agents of the Empire).144 If
jyhad against the British-led government hadn’t been lawful then, Sir Sayyid posited,
why would it suddenly be so now? Later Deobandi historians, however, would
themselves insist that this was not the case—that, in fact, Shah Abdul Aziz himself had
requested that sәyyid Ahmad join forces with ‘Ali Khan (who had allied with Maharaja
Jaswant Rao) to fight against the British. It was only six years later, after ‘Ali Khan’s
plans to come to an agreement with the British were uncovered, that sәyyid Ahmad split
with the bandit chief. His subsequent jyhad against the Sikhs should not be
disassociated with the struggle against the British either, for, we are informed, the Sikh
state was itself “an ally of British imperialism.”145 Whatever the truth of the matter, Sir
Sayyid’s 1860/1276 tract confirms that, at least after the revolt had already begun,
“certain wicked persons” used the call to jyhad to rile up “ignorant people”—with the
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result that “large numbers” answered. In other words, jyhad actually did motivate a
significant number in northern India to war against the Company, even if it hadn’t been
one of the initial causes of the revolt (and even if Sir Sayyid himself was loathe to admit
it). Deobandi historians claim that a quarter of all those killed by Company forces
during the course of the revolt were ‘alәma (the figure given is 51,200)—and that five
hundred ‘alәma were hanged in Delhi alone.146
Even in the face of these debates over the role of a fәtwa calling for jyhad in the
Revolt of 1857/1273, the Barelvis unstintingly point to the fәtwa of Fazl-e-Haq
Khairabadi (as do the Deobandis, though for different reasons) as the uprising’s true
commencement. Fazl-e-Haq allegedly played the leading role in the issuance of this
fәtwa calling for jyhad against the British. Almost three dozen Islamic scholars and
Sufis in Delhi affixed their names to this famous ruling, including several of the
Deobandi founding fathers (hence its importance to them). Almost a century later,
during the 1940s/1360s—at the height of pre-Partition nationalist politics in India—
many within the Barelvi leadership began to publicly trace “their” role in the
independence movement to the fәtwa of Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi (“Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi
was [a Barelvi],” one ‘alym of the Barelvis’ largest Indian mәdrәsәħ informed the author,
handling a copy of Fazl-e-Haq’s famous autobiography baGi hyndwstan, required reading
for hundreds of the school’s students). There are multiple problems with this, not least
of which lies in the fact that Fazl-e-Haq was, at the time, in the employ of the British
(the East India Company) and, reportedly, “had hardly any sympathy for the freedom
fighters.”147 In any case, Barelvi recollection of Fazl-e-Haq’s judgment clearly
illustrates the movement’s preferred political pedigree, whatever its historical accuracy.
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Intellectually and philosophically, however, Fazl-e-Haq should certainly be
considered a forefather of the Barelvi movement, for several reasons. First, he was
perhaps the strongest critic of the “Wahhabis” during his lifetime (sometimes applying
the term to men whom the Deobandis revere as their intellectual and spiritual forbears),
a role Barelvis would later see themselves as assuming (and often they, too, would label
Deobandis “Wahhabis”). Second, he had famously written much against the idea of
ymkan-e-nažir (the possibility that God could create, if He so wished, another prophet
equal to Muhammad; his own position he called ymtina’-e-nažir : “the impossibility of an
equal”), in opposition, again, to scholars that Deobandis would later consider their own
religious forefathers (specifically Muhammad Ismail). Decades later, when the debate
heated up once again, Fazl-e-Haq’s ideas were taken up and given voice by Ahmad Riza
Khan’s father. Ahmad Riza was in turn influenced by his father as he, too, adopted more
or less the same position on the matter.148 After the quelling of the “Mutiny,” Fazl-eHaq Khairabadi was arrested by the British, put on trial (famously) in Lucknow, and
sent to prison on the Andaman Islands, where he died.
It should be noted that while many Western, Barelvi, and even some Deobandi
scholars credit Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi as the chief instigator of the fәtwa against the
British in 1857/1273, others point to Deobandi predecessor Shah Abdul Qadir
Ludhianvi, who had been serving as Shahi Imam of the Punjab since 1800/1215.
According to these voices, it was the venerable mwlana out of Ludhiana who was
actually the first to issue a fәtwa in 1857/1273 against the Company Bahadur.149 And
Shah Abdul Qadir Ludhianvi was no stranger when it came to anti-British
machinations, either; he’d previously been involved in efforts to rid Afghanistan of the
British presence, and several past Afghan rulers could be counted as his personal
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disciples. To this day, his descendants insist that he not only issued a juridical ruling
against the British before Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi, but actually led the fighting in and
around Ludhiana against the European menace, successfully driving the foreigners out
of the city and holding it for a considerable period. An engraving on the side of the
mosque in old Ludhiana, erected in the 1890s/1310s, bears an inscription celebrating
his deeds, including, among other things, the following: “He led the forces in the
Punjab for the freedom movement in 1857. British troops were forced out from
Ludhiana. He is remembered as one of the greatest freedom fighters.” His successor’s
successor’s successor: Habib-ur Rehman Ludhianvi, one of the most renowned Deobandi
“freedom fighters” in the years leading up to independence (about whom more later).150
Alongside the towering figure of Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi, Barelvis remember Fazl-eRasul Badayuni—and even Barelvi founder Ahmad Riza Khan’s own grandfather, Riza
‘Ali Khan, is spoken of in terms of 1857/1273 and its aftermath. According to one
story, told by Zafaruddin Bihari, despite the “atrocities” being perpetrated by the British
in the aftermath of the “Mutiny,” unlike so many others Riza ‘Ali refused to abandon his
home for “the village”; the same applied to his daily routine, which involved prayer five
times a day at the local mәsjyd. Bihari notes that one day several Englishmen showed up
at the mosque with the intent to “beat up” (pyTna) any Muslims they found there.
When they looked inside, peering “this way and that,” they saw nothing but an empty
room, despite the fact that Riza ‘Ali was there, engaged in prayer, at the same time.
God had thus made Ahmad Raza Khan’s grandfather invisible to his would-be
attackers.151 Sanyal attributes accounts such as this one to Barelvis’ attempts to
establish both Riza ‘Ali’s piety as well as his “distance from the British;”152 indeed, the
story paints Riza ‘Ali as the latter’s “fierce opponent.”153 Incidentally, Riza ‘Ali was also
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a “fierce opponent” of sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli and, especially, his disciple Muhammad
Ismail, and even urged one of his own disciples, Muhammad ‘Ali Khan, to write a book
disputing Ismail’s teachings, which Muhammad ‘Ali did—certainly a precursor to the
Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry.154
Meanwhile, the Deobandis celebrate the alleged exploits of Rashid Ahmad Gangohi
and Muhammad Qasim Nanotwi, among others. According to Deobandi historians,
both of these ‘alәma affixed their names to Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi’s 1857/1273 fәtwa
calling for jyhad against the British, as well as an 1856/1272 pronouncement (signed by
the “remaining ‘alәma,” i.e. those who had not been killed or chased away by the British
or their stooges) that had called for “steps” to be taken against the East India Company.
According to the Deobandi narrative, some of the ‘alәma at the 1856/1272 meeting had
voiced concern about the plausibility of success; after all, their numbers were so small
compared to the might of the British. It was at this juncture that young Muhammad
Qasim is reported to have leapt up and asked, “Are our numbers smaller than that of the
heroes [Gażi] of Badr?” He had thus invoked the 1,200-year-old memory of a key
battle—a crucial turning point for the early Muslims, in fact—in which the Prophet’s
forces had bested a far greater army; this victory over a numerical superiority had
reversed the fortune of the Muslims. Upon hearing Muhammad Qasim’s words, “the
fire of martyrdom was lit in the hearts” of the wavering ‘alәma and it was agreed that a
jyhad against the British should indeed be declared.155 This was accomplished the next
year. Two other names were also included among these ‘alәma: the Deobandi-revered
Hafiz Zaman (of whom it was written, “From martyrdom he was made great”; killed in
battle, his corpse was reportedly carried by Muhammad Qasim to a nearby mosque,
where the latter read from the Qur’an over his fallen comrade’s body)156 and J’afar
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Thanisri.157 What happened later, at Shamli and Thana Bhawan (north of Delhi and not
far from Deoband), is shrouded in uncertainty, though the Deobandis insist that their
aforementioned forefathers became veterans in the freedom fight there against the
British. They have even given the struggle it’s own name: the War of Shamli Field.158
Thana Bhawan today is non-descript among the highway towns around
Muzaffarnagar and Saharanpur. Its single main street is crowded and lined with foodsellers peddling biryani or curried vegetables as a seemingly endless stream of rickety
buses, three-wheeled autos, and bicycle rickshaws pass by. On either side, the old town
is mostly hidden within a maze of narrow alleyways, and beyond this cultivated fields,
punctuated by tall trees, stretch as far as the eye can see. It was here that Imdadullah
and his disciples, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi and Muhammad Qasim Nanotwi, relocated,
fleeing Delhi around August 1857/Dhu’l Hijja 1273. Allen speculates that this move
may have been motivated by “doubts about Delhi’s religious status as a seat of [jyhad],”
as well as a waning faith in the ability of the city to withstand the British onslaught.159
In any case, it was in Thana Bhawan that Imdadullah (upon winning over a powerful
local landlord named Inayat ‘Ali) established, briefly, an independent government, after
a council of local ‘alәma had elected him әmir ul-mwmynin (“Commander of the
Faithful”). Rashid Ahmad was appointed a qazi within the new village-sized
“independent Islamic regime,” settling several cases according to shәri’at during his
brief tenure.160 Muhammad Qasim, who evidently played a crucial role during the
aforementioned council in having jyhad against the British declared, was appointed a
military commander (and some say, too, that despite his being the youngest, it was
Nanautawi who eventually emerged as the “real leader” of the group).161 Deobandi
historians insist that Imdadullah had to be convinced by others to take up this position
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of “worldly guidance,” in particular by Rashid Ahmad and Muhammad Qasim, who not
only acted within their appointed positions but also as assistants to Imdadullah in the
everyday affairs of the village-state.162 Meanwhile, the Thana Bhawan group retained
contact with the Delhi rebels via a go-between named Rahmatullah Kairanawi.163
The seeming concerns of these Deobandi founding fathers about the Delhi rebels
proved accurate; by mid-September/late Muharram, the old Mughal capital was
burning, retaken by the British. Around the same time, the British (actually a force of
Afghans and Sikhs led by Muzaffarnagar’s British Collector and Magistrate, a Mr.
Edwards) attempted to take Thana Bhawan, but were repelled after incurring both
human and material losses (at least one source dates the “outbreak of the Thana Bhawan
rising” to the end of August/early Muharram).164 This initial attack having failed,
Edwards’ force turned to nearby Shamli, which he occupied and left in control of about a
dozen of his soldiers. When he returned to Shamli later, he found that the Thana
Bhawan fighters (described by Deobandi historians as “a Muslim army” led by
Imdadullah himself)165 had “stormed the government buildings” in the town, and killed
all of the troopers Edwards had left to defend it.166 And so the Collector attacked
Thana Bhawan, to which more than a thousand fighting men had flocked, a second
time—but once again he was driven back, with heavy losses. Along their retreat back to
Muzaffarnagar, Imdadullah’s men (it is supposed) continued to harass Edwards’ party,
and a number of his Muslim soldiers deserted. Finally the desperate Magistrate ordered
his men to turn around and charge directly at the Thana Bhawan “insurgents.” The
ploy worked; the sudden charge scattered Imdadullah’s soldiers and resulted in the
deaths of many of them (one British witness attested that there were “a hundred” Thana
Bhawan dead). Afterwards, Imdadullah (for whom an arrest warrant had been issued)167
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and Rahmatullah made their way out of India for the safety of Mecca, while Rashid
Ahmad and Muhammad Qasim went into hiding. Later, Rashid Ahmad would be
imprisoned briefly as a suspected rebel, but eventually released for want of evidence.168
The Thana Bhawan state and the War at Shamli Field were, to Deobandis, “the last
great attempt…to establish an Islamic government [in a long line of attempts, from
antiquity] to 1857.” Afterwards, the English, victorious and thirsty for retribution,
hunted down many of the country’s ‘alәma.169
Scholars like Metcalf argue that the account of these Deobadani fathers’
revolutionary struggles at Thana Bhawan—including their setting up of an independent
government, their appointments to position, and their battles against the British—are
likely a fabrication borne of excitement surrounding “the nationalist movement after
World War I.” As evidence, Metcalf argues that such accounts of these figures’
involvement in actual fighting didn’t appear until after 1920/1338; before that, she
points out, Deobandis were arguing the opposite—namely, that while Rashid Ahmad had
been imprisoned, he had also been set free, and Muhammad Qasim had never been
arrested at all, both evidence that they had not in fact taken part in the 1857/1273
fighting. Pre-1920/1338 biographies actually argue that those accusing these men of
involvement in the “Mutiny” were simply the enemies of the Deobandi movement
attempting to stain the reputation of the school and its mission.170 Of course, both
positions need to be taken in historical context. The position that the individuals in
question did not participate in the rebellion may be attributed to the fact that, in the
decades immediately following the quashing of the uprising, many in India were bent on
proving they had not taken part so as to avoid prison, the confiscation of property,
death, or exile. Later, especially after the First World War, such threats had become
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obsolete. Even Metcalf admits that “[i]t is possible that the nationalist accounts are
correct, and that some of the ‘ulama did play an important role in the Thanah Bhawan
disorders.”171 Indeed, Assistant Magistrate H. D. Robertson, a witness of and
participant in the violence in the Thana Bhawan area, like many British officials firmly
believed the revolt had been instigated by Muslims as an overtly political act. “Such
investigations as it was possible to make,” Robertson wrote not two years after the
Rebellion commenced, “…proved that the Mahomedans in this tract were throughout
the instigators to revolt.” According to Robertson, the Muslims recruited Hindus who
were in debt to moneylenders, who “ swelled their ranks, rendering the rising
universal…”172
To this day, Deobandis and Barelvis from Karachi, Pakistan to Azamgarh, India and
beyond debate the historicity of the 1857/1273 exploits of such figures as Fazl-e-Haq
Khairabadi, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Fazl-e Rasul Badayuni, Imdadullah, Riza ‘Ali
Khan, and Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi.
*
The decline (indeed, fall) of “Muslim” political power was only one—and perhaps
not the most significant—test facing South Asian Islam in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries AD. For it was during this period that several “new” strains of the
religion began making waves among the Muslims of the subcontinent. Such strains
might be classified generally into two principle groups: (1) the purifiers—reformists,
often erroneously lumped together and labeled “Wahhabis,” who blamed political
Islam’s decline on the corruption of the ummәt, especially in the subcontinent, in part via
the accretion of pagan ritual and philosophy and other false traditions, and (2) the
modernists—apologetics who sought to reinterpret Islam in light of “modern” (Western)
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science and philosophy. The latter, one might safely assume, appeared as a direct result
of British rule in Hindustan, as mostly British-educated, upper-class Indian Muslims
suddenly found themselves questioning certain aspects (or at least traditional
interpretations) of their faith. This second category is perhaps best represented by Sir
Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Anglo-Oriental Muslim University at Aligarh and the cadre of
Muslim modernists/secularists that it produced. Eventually the Deobandis, it appears,
would be considered by a majority of South Asia’s Muslims as falling within the first
category, despite the inaccuracy of the term “Wahhabi” as applied to them.
And rising from this milieu, this diversity of opinion and wide spectrum of
interpretation, would come the “torch-bearer” (Pakistani scholar Mujeeb Ahmad’s
term)173 of the aforementioned majority, crusading against both the Deobandis’ alleged
“Wahhabism” (not to mention that of actual, bona fide Wahhabis) and Aligarh’s
blasphemous modernism: Ahmad Raza Khan, “founder” of the Barelvi movement.
But first, a school would be founded at Deoband.
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2 - GENESIS OF A RIVALRY:
The Beginnings of the Deobandi and Barelvi Schools (1866-1921)

I’ll tell you, it is easy to pursue asceticism, and live the life of a recluse for years, and
enjoy its ecstacy. It is easy to opt for the study of voluminous books for years, and
demonstrate the power of deep knowledge. …I’ll tell you, it is difficult to submit before
God and, with devotion and piety, render selfless service to His Creations, always
nursing within the heart the desire for people’s wellbeing; that is to say, to have a
passionate and restless heart that sometimes takes you to the mosque, that sometimes
takes you to a study circle, that sometimes takes you to the pulpit to preach and caution
people—[and] that sometimes also takes you to the political platform, for the greater
well-being of your community and for upholding the truth.
SAYYID MUHAMMAD MIAN, IN әSIRAN-E-MALTA1

In the months and years after the violence of 1857/1273, the Muslim communities
of South Asia were generally considered enemies of the British, a sentiment perhaps best
expressed by Henry Rawlinson in 1875/1292; Muslim enmity in India was, he said, a
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“seething, fermenting, festering mass.”2 The irony is that Rawlinson’s “festering mass”
of hostility—the Muslims of India—not seventy-five years later would be referred to
often by British civil servants as “loyal people” (i.e. loyal to the British) whose friendship
was to be nurtured and whose allegiance must be maintained.3 Bamfield Fuller,
Lietenant-Governor of newly created East Bengal, even described the Muslim
community as the government’s “favorite wife.”4 By then it was the Hindu, represented
(at least in the eyes of many Britishers) by the Congress, who had become entrenched as
the Empire’s enemy. And it wasn’t just in the eyes of the British government that this
transformation had come about; Abul Kalam Azad speaks of the early twentieth century
AD revolutionary movements in India, too, as “all…actively anti-Muslim. They saw
that the British Government was using the Muslims against India’s political struggle
and the Muslims were playing the Government’s game… The revolutionaries felt that
the Muslims were an obstacle to the attainment of Indian freedom and must, like other
obstacles, be removed.” Abul Kalam Azad blamed at least a portion of this resentment
upon the fact that the government had “imported” a number of Muslim political officers
from the United Provinces to man the police’s Intelligence Branch, evidently out of a
mistrust of Hindu officers after the partition of Bengal; this highly unpopular move had
provoked what he described as an “awakening among the Hindus,” and illustrates
clearly the relational shift that had by then occurred vis-à-vis the Muslim-British
paradigm.5 One prominent Indian nationalist, writing in 1917/1335, put it more
succinctly: “The British wished for and tried to create an Ulster among the
Mohammedans of India.”6 Times had certainly changed from the days of Thana
Bhawan.
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In any case, the period under consideration in this chapter covers the transitional
era described above, from Rawlinson’s perceived “seething, fermenting, festering mass”
to Fuller’s allegedly “favorite wife.” It was within the context of these macrophenomena—of the “Muslim” search for a place in the new British order as well as the
perceived British policy substitution of enmity for India’s Muslims for enmity for the
rising Hindu—that the Deobandi school (grounded in Waliullahi thought) was founded
and developed, and the Barelvi counter-reformation (a continuation of the KhairabadiBadayuni tradition) launched.

A School is Founded: the Birth of “Deobandism.”
After the short-lived founding of the village-sized Islamic state at Thana Bhawan,
Imdadullah escaped by quickly emigrating to the Hijaz, where he lived out the rest of
his days (though his connection to the narrative at hand is not quite ended)—but
Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad stayed behind. The former, erstwhile military
commander of Thana Bhawan’s anti-Company forces, for whom an arrest warrant had
been issued,7 evaded British capture, hiding as a refugee about eighty miles north of
Delhi in a picturesque qәSbәħ named Deoband. The town was a natural hiding place, as
the one-time rebel enjoyed not only several family connections in the area but also had
spent time in Deoband as a student; later he married into a family native to the town,
too.8 It was likely during this period that Muhammad Qasim became familiar with the
new (i.e. immediately post-Munity) venture of his cousin, Mahtab ‘Ali,9 and two other
Deoband residents (‘Abid Husain and Nihal Ahmad): the founding of a small school
(mәktәb), connected to a local mosque. At least Mahtab ‘Ali had run a school before; in
fact, it had been to Mahtab ‘Ali’s (previous) “primary school” that the young
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Muhammad Qasim, before studying in Saharanpur and eventually Delhi, had carried out
a portion of his own religious instruction,10 mostly in Arabic.11 Regarded as “among
Deoband’s most distinguished teachers,”12 Mahtab ‘Ali had studied himself at Delhi
College with the likes of Mamluk ‘Ali and Sadr al-Din Azardah (leading poet, Arabic
specialist, and, at the time, the longest serving member of Delhi’s judiciary).13 In any
case, Mahtab ‘Ali’s new school met in “small and dark rooms” and was of the traditional
type: a simple appendage of the mәsjyd, operating under the guidance of informal
teachers to whom students, usually with some kinship connection to the teacher or the
mosque, would come for temporary instruction.14 According to one Deobandi historian,
Mahtab ‘Ali and his companions had entertained ideas related to the further
development and expansion of the little mәdrәsәħ, but such thoughts had been “limited
to their hearts and their tongues.”15 It would take the efforts of another to bring them
to life—and vastly transcend them.
It is unclear just when Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi took a personal interest in the
school, but it seems likely that, beyond preventing his own imprisonment by the now
seemingly invincible British, he would have been most concerned with carrying on the
struggle based upon the original aims imbibed by him from his teachers, in particular
from Imdadullah and, earlier, Mamluk ‘Ali. The same was almost certainly true for
Rashid Ahmad, who, though he languished for a period in a British prison as a suspected
rebel, must have counted the days until he could resume the fight, though in a
necessarily adapted form. But Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad couldn’t do it
alone; they needed the help of others not explicitly connected to the rebellion of
1857/1273. For years after the Mutiny, the ‘alym from Nanauta, whose name was
included among those of other known mutineers on official government lists, had
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“passed through thousands of temporary resting places” in an attempt to escape capture
by the British.16 But after a general amnesty was announced by Governor-General
Canning (January 1859/Jumada II 1275) for all who had taken a part in the 1857/1273
revolt,17 Muhammad Qasim felt free enough to travel between Nanauta and Deoband
out in the open, expressing passionately the need for a new kind of religious seminary.
He would have to found it through others—individuals not on the British radar—
because he suspected that British plainclothes police monitored his movements, even
after the amnesty. Indeed, Muhammad Qasim feared that if he were to found the school
himself, the government would persecute it relentlessly. No, he would need
intermediaries. Thus it was that, at some point in the decade after the Mutiny,
Muhammad Qasim, by now a highly respected religious figure, approached the tiny,
traditional school’s three founders.18
His vision was simple, grand—and highly unusual. Nothing like it had ever been
done before on the subcontinent. But Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi was adamant; this
would, with time, be the fulfillment of his original purposes. It would bring to fruition
the legacy of his teachers, Imdadullah and Mamluk ‘Ali, who had themselves imbibed
“the program” (Faruqi’s term) from Muhammad Ishaq, sәyyid Ahmad and Muhammad
Ismail, and Shah Abdul Aziz—the latter, of course, having succeeded his father, Shah
Waliullah himself. What was Muhammad Qasim’s grand vision? To the 21st-century
AD mind it seems anything but revolutionary, but within the context of his time and
place, of local tradition and South Asian Islamic custom, it represented a radical
departure.
Muhammad Qasim proposed that the small, mosque-connected school be moved into
a large new building, that it be independent of the mәsjyd entirely, that it stand on its
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own as an autonomous institution beholden to no government, no rich guiding patron,
no princely court; he would later write, somewhat unambiguously, that the
“participation of government and the wealthy is harmful.”19 Its teachers were to be
professionals, and regular, who were to be equal (in the sense that all of their opinions
were to be valued and weighed). It was to be run, true to Waliullahi principles, by a
mәjlys-e-shwra (or advisory council)—not according to the dictates of one man or a
single clique. It should have classrooms set apart for the teaching of specific subjects,
and it should have a large, central library. It should have a fixed curriculum, including a
fixed course of study and yearly examinations; this latter was important, for it
established a system of meritocracy. In short, the proposed institution should be not
only independent, and not only far larger than any other Islamic institution of learning
in southern Asia, but it should be organizationally based on, of all things, the British
model (to which the Deobandi founders had been exposed in multiple forms, whether at
Delhi College, or in observing Christian missionary organizations, or as employees
themselves within the British government apparatus).
From such an institution, the ummәt in South Asia (and beyond) might be preserved,
the greatness—both spiritual and political—of the Muslims might be restored, and the
Waliullahi vision might be spread far and wide as the school developed a growing
network of affiliated institutions. Indeed, the school should represent, in the words of
its official twentieth-century/fourteenth-century historian, “the greatest religious
achievement of the Muslims in [the modern] period,” preserving “the lamp of the
prophetic knowledge…in spite of the gusts of a contrary wind.”20 “A fundamental
orientation of [Shah Waliullah’s] work,” one scholar has written, “…had been the hope
that Muslim political leadership would be restored, with the [‘alәma] carrying on their
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collective role of teaching and advising the ruler of the state”; later ‘alәma were indebted
to Shah Waliullah “for a manifold legacy” that included “a sense of their importance as
leaders.”21 According to Muhammad Qasim’s vision, Deoband was to be the center of a
vast network of mәdarys (and indeed, almost from the outset of the school’s founding,
Muhammad Qasim was anxiously engaged in founding or inspiring the founding of
several other, affiliated institutions).22 The dar ul’alwm would thereby be able to realize
the original aims of its founders and their spiritual predecessors, including Mamluk ‘Ali,
Muhammad Ishaq, and Shah Abdul Aziz. (Thus, as Faruqi concludes, Deobandism’s
anti-British roots trace to the very foundation of the institution, in harmony, so the
Deobandis assert, with the Waliullahi tradition).23 M. Ahmad agrees, describing the
establishment of the dar ul’alwm at Deoband as “founded on the ideals of Shah
Walyullah” and thus “destined to play a prominent part in the political struggle of the
Indians against the British rule.”24 Faruqi describes this phenomenon in the following
words:

The part played by the Darul-Ulum in religious, social and political life of
the Indian Muslims can be legitimately interpreted in terms of the aims and
objectives that lay behind the actions of its founders during the days of the
Rebellion. Shamli and Deoband are, as a matter of fact, the two sides of one and
the same picture. The difference lies only in weapons. Now the sword and
spear were replaced by the pen and the tongue. There, at Shamli, in order
to secure political independence and freedom for religion and culture, resort was
made to violence; here at Deoband a start was made to achieve the same
goal through peaceful means. There, for the cause of religio-political
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freedom individuals were used; here for that purpose individuals were to
be produced. The roads, though diverging from each other, led towards
the same destination.25 [Italics added.]

It should be noted that, at least in the beginning, such black-and-white characterizations
(i.e. freedom through violent means at Shamli versus freedom through peaceful means at
Deoband) were likely not so clear. Still, in the early years some mockingly referred to
the school as the mәdrәsәħ-e-hәrbiyәħ (or “military school,” a pun on the institution’s
common name, the mәdrәsәħ-e-‘arәbiyәħ) on account of its unique physical education
curriculum, which included military-like drills and exercises.26 Perhaps Muhammad
Qasim and Rashid Ahmad still harbored some lingering hope that a cadre of soldiers
might be developed with the power to oust the British. Even so, within a few years such
martial displays had been more or less dropped from the curriculum entirely, and
viewed from within the context of Muhammad Qasim’s other pronouncements around
this time, it appears that the drilling was genuinely introduced as a form of physical
education after all. Such echoes of the transitory Islamic state at Thana Bhawan also
included a shәri’at court set up by Muhammad Qasim, through which was settled a wide
range of community disputes. The one-time military commander himself served as qazi
in the court, and for a time the official government court of Deoband tehsil “had a real
rival in it.” Though the court, like the army-esque drills, would fade with time, its
establishment further underscored “the spirit of non-cooperation” that the school’s
guiding lights had displayed in the years leading up to its inception.27
Earlier in this work, the two-pronged agenda passed on by Muhammad Ishaq to his
disciples, and in particular Mamluk ‘Ali and his committee-of-four, was mentioned.
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This, the Deobandi fathers insisted, was the Waliullahi vision. Indeed, over a century
after the founding of the institution, in 1978/1398, the dar ul’alwm’s vice-chancellor,
Muhammad Tayyib, would confirm the perpetuation of these original aims, identifying
two key issues addressed by the Shah Waliullahi program and dealt with via the school:
(1) the preservation of Muslim faith and practice and (2) the deliverance of India from
the foreign yoke.28 Muhammad Tayyib’s two-pronged mission statement for the school
more or less mirrors that of Muhammad Ishaq’s charge to Mamluk ‘Ali, passed on to
Imdadullah, Rashid Ahmad, and Muhammad Qasim, and built into the core philosophy
of the dar ul’alwm at Deoband. The school’s official history likewise frames the
institutional mission of the dar ul’alwm within the context of these early visions and this
“original” agenda, writing that the school “has been a dauntless standard-bearer of
Islamic life, calling people to ymam Abu Hanifa’s mәslәk [the first of Muhammad Ishaq’s
two-part program], the preacher of the thought of Shah Waliullah of Delhi, the
commentator of Shah Abdul Aziz’s knowledge, and the greatest trustee of mwlana
Muhammad Isma’il shәhid’s sentiments of liberty [the second of Muhammad Ishaq’s
two-part program].”29
The Deobandi argument that the two-pronged “Waliullahi” mission was largely
fulfilled—first via the institution, its graduates’ influence, and the subsequent network
of affiliated schools, and second through its leadership’s role in the independence
movement—is a strong one. The first half of the program was in a sense carried out via
the school’s adoption and adaptation of the Farangi Mahali-inspired dәrs-e-nyžami
curriculum, which contained both mәnqwlat (which, as previously mentioned, was the
specialty of the Delhi scholars, including the Waliullahi line) and mәqwlat (the special
domain of the Lucknow scholars and the aforementioned Khairabadi-Badayuni Group).
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The Deobandis, true to their Waliullahi leanings, placed far more emphasis on hәdisstudy, however, substituting the one text of hәdis selections in the traditional
curriculum with all six authoritative collections, in their entirety, in their own version.
Indeed, hәdis was considered “the crowning subject” to be studied at the institution—
and only the best and the brightest were encouraged to pursue it.30 The other, more
political prong of the agenda was met through a series of anti-British political schemes
spearheaded by university leaders, and by the heavy involvement generally of the
school’s teachers, administrators, and students in the pre-Partition politics of
independence in India, which shall be addressed later in this work.
Some historians and other scholarly commentators, perhaps within the context of a
post-“nine eleven” world, have seen in the founding of the school and the projection of
its mission a layer of foreboding. Allen writes ominously, for example: “The end result
[of the establishment of the school at Deoband] was a seismic shift in the Sunni Islam
of South Asia, which became increasingly conservative and introverted, less tolerant,
and far more inclined to look for political leadership to the madrassah and the
madrassah-trained political leader committed to the cause of leading the umma back to
the true path.”31 But however it’s founding has been interpreted, it is clear that, even for
Allen, the event represented more than the construction of a new kind of Muslim
school; it was the birth of a paradigm-shifting movement—or, rather, the continuation
of said movement via much more effective means. Faruqi, M. Ahmad, even the school’s
detractors (like Allen), and others thus see in the school’s founding—and by means of its
operation—an endeavor with overtly political ends. The dar ul’alwm was, in the words
of Goyal, “the offshoot of the inspiration that had motivated the [‘alәma] to actively
participate in the 1857 uprising to throw the British out of the country.”32
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But there are formidable scholars who oppose this view outright, and some mention
of their reasoning should be included. Barbara Metcalf, without question Western
academia’s leading scholar of Deobandism, has argued that the school’s political ties
have been “distorted” by scholars and others due to the later role many of its ‘alәma
would play in independence politics. The result of such distortion has been that, in the
context of academic writing, the dar ul’alwm has come off as “anti-British and
revolutionary” in character. With more than a little finality, Metcalf stated
unequivocally in a 1978/1398 article, “[T]he school’s concerns were entirely apolitical.”33 Other scholars, like Francis Robinson, have faithfully towed this line as
they cast doubt on (or simply outright deny) any militant motives on the part of Shah
Abdul Aziz, any political (much less militant) role for the Deobandi fathers in the events
of 1857/1273, or any political motivations in the founding of the school—all the while
citing “the conclusions of Barbara Metcalf’s deep study of the school…” As evidence,
Robinson points out that the school’s founders “were careful to steer clear of
government” and “stressed that it should not accept government help and that its
associates should not have recourse to government courts of law.”34 In so doing,
however, Robinson only demonstrates the very political nature of the Deobandi
endeavor; the British government was, ultimately, the enemy (however one might be
forced to “work with,” or at least tolerate, such an entity in the short run)—thus the
school would “steer clear” of it as far as practically possible, refrain from accepting,
much less soliciting, financial or political aid, and set up a righteous alternative to its
inferior (even wicked) legal system.
By the early 1980s/1400s, however, Metcalf would characterize the early Deobandi
movement (in her masterful Islamic Revival in British India) as “quasi-sectarian,”
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concerned more than anything else with “issues of the Law,” and involved in a struggle
of “identifying popularly based ‘ulama as the foci of religious leadership.” In addition,
the Deobandis, while “discreet in their political stance,” nevertheless “in fact held the
foreign rulers in deep contempt.”35 Even Robinson admits that “[p]ossibly the ‘ulama
of Deoband, having noted the problem of resisting British military might, were biding
their time.”36 Taken together, it is difficult not to interpret at least one strand of the
early Deobandis’ motivations in political terms, even when one is limited to using the
Metcalf-Robinson interpretation only. After all, it is widely recognized that the
Deobandis represent a successor movement to the Shah Walliulahi tradition, whose own
reformist movement, as Robinson himself has pointed out, was directly motivated by the
great eighteenth-century AD Delhi scholar’s “distress” at “waning Muslim power”—and
the hope that with such reforms in place “divisions would end and power would return”
(italics added). Indeed, Robinson rightly framed the founding of the school at Deoband
as representative of the shifting focus of the mәdrәsәħ—from a place to train scholars for
work within the state apparatus (up to the eighteenth century/twelfth century) to a
place wherein “training for Islamic survival in a world where Muslims had no power”
was the goal (an echo of Metcalf). The mәdrәsәħ had always been political to one degree
or another, and Deoband was no different. In fact, the university there stood as a
symbol—even the symbol—of the “institutionalization” of the above-mentioned focus
change, standing on that shift’s “leading edge.” “The training for empire built up over
800 years faded away,” Robinson wrote, to be replaced by an emphasis on survival and
internal, even individual, reform.37 And while it might be true that the Deobandis’
“were coping with the challenge of an infidel government by turning inwards and
fashioning the machinery of an Islamic community which need owe nothing to the
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state,” it would be absurd to think that the political goals of the mәdrәsәħ simply
disappeared altogether, especially given the Muslim religious leadership’s general
disdain for their alien rulers.38 No (and Deobandi historians are adamant on this point):
the goal was always political—and nothing less than the eventual establishment of
Islamic government.39 “After the failure of the 1857 uprising,” wrote Muhammad Mian
Ansari, a close associate of Mahmud Hasan (d. 1920 AD), “the desire arose to establish a
center under whose influence people would be prepared to exact retribution for the 1857
failure” (italics added).40
It likewise would be absurd to interpret the university’s very limited (perceived)
cooperation with (or, more accurately, some perceived lack of explicit hostility towards)
the British government as proof of some sort of apolitical position, a kind of approving
toleration, or any kind of endorsement on the part of the Deobandi movement’s
leadership. On the contrary, the focus shift that certainly took place within the
institution of the South Asian mәdrәsәħ never removed the seminaries’ overarching
objective—that is, the propagation of Islamic Law (within the framework of an Islamic
order), facilitated by able, moral, wise ‘alәma, with the purpose of establishing
righteousness upon the earth. The difference was that now Muslim society had to be
reformed first, from within, before political power could be obtained. This goal in no
way transformed the ultimate aim; rather, it inserted an additional step in that aim’s
achievement. “Islam envisages its adherants as a religious and political community,”
wrote Mujeeb Ahmad, “therefore, [‘alәma] claim for themselves a socio-political role
along with their religious functions.”41
Combined with the above, one final point (previously touched upon in Chapter 1)
might be repeated briefly here. That is: Islam is an inherently political system, a definition
100

offered by its very own intellectuals. From the days of Muhammad, this was so. To
quote religious scholar Karen Armstrong at length:

In Islam, Muslims have looked for God in history. Their sacred
scripture, the Quran, gave them a historical mission… A Muslim had to
redeem history, and that meant that state affairs were not a distraction
from spirituality, but the stuff of religion itself. The political well-being of
the Muslim community was a matter of supreme importance. Like any
religious ideal, it was almost impossibly difficult to implement in the
flawed and tragic conditions of history, but after each failure Muslims
had to get up and begin again.
Muslims developed their own rituals, mysticism, philosophy,
doctrines, sacred texts, laws and shrines like everybody else. But all these
religious pursuits sprang directly from the Muslims’ frequently anguished
contemplation of the political current affairs of Islamic society. If state
institutions did not measure up to the Quranic ideal, if their political
leaders were cruel or exploitative, or if their community was humiliated by
apparently irreligious enemies, a Muslim could feel that his or her faith in
life’s ultimate purpose and value was in jeopardy. Every effort had to be
expended to put Islamic history back on track, or the whole religious enterprise
would fail, and life would be drained of meaning. Politics was, therefore, what
Christians would call a sacrament: it was the arena in which Muslims
experienced God and which enabled the divine to function effectively in the
world. (italics added)42
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Afghan outfit Jamiat Islami mujahydin leader Burnhanuddin Rabbani would later
illustrate this concept when he told western reporters that he preferred the term
“Islamicist” to the oft-repeated “fundamentalist.” “For us,” he explained, “Islam is a
dynamic that concerns all aspects of human life.”43 With this understanding, and set
within the context of the decline and fall of “Muslim” power on the subcontinent, the
very political Shah Waliullahi tradition, the political violence of 1857/1273, the
university’s obvious contempt—from the very beginning—for dependence upon the
British government, and the subsequent, undisputed major role of many of the school’s
students and teachers (if not that of its founders) in the pre-Partition politics of India,
perhaps scholars can take the university’s leaders at their word when they proclaim the
founding of the great dar ul’alwm at Deoband to have been motivated in large degree by
the highly political Imdadullahi “program.” Indeed, Mahmud Hasan—more familiar
than perhaps anyone when it comes to the school’s founding and early development, as
the nephew of one of its founders, its very first student, personally the disciple of
Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad, and the undisputed leader of the university’s
“second generation”—once stated that, as far as he knew, “this institution [the dar
ul’alwm at Deoband] was established after the failure of the 1857 uprising with the aim
of preparing a cadre for avenging that defeat.”44
The local reaction to Muhammad Qasim’s grandiose vision was, perhaps predictably,
not entirely positive. ‘Abid Husain, who more than anyone else actually ran the little
mәktәb that Muhammad Qasim proposed to transform, rejected the scholar’s vision
entirely. But the mwlana from Nanauta eventually convinced even ‘Abid Husain, and
the project commenced.45
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So it was that the school that would become the great dar ul’alwm, originally known
popularly as mәdrәsәħ-e-‘arәbiyәħ,46 was founded in one of Deoband’s six mosques built
by the Delhi kings over the centuries, the mәsjyd-e-chhәttәħ, “where,” Metcalf informs us,
“the great Sufi Hazrat Baba Fariu’d-Din Ganj-i Shakar was said to have meditated.”
Deobandis still proudly motion visitors towards a pomegranate tree within the original
mosque’s grounds, said to have been the very one under whose shade the school’s first
instruction took place.47 But the school quickly branched out from this more traditional
setting to realize the Qasimi vision, acquiring a library, classrooms, and a permanent,
professional staff of administrators and teachers. Its students need have no familial tie
to the school in order to attend; all were welcome and invited to study there. The
institution was dependent on no government, court, or wealthy family, but relied,
instead, on private donations (typically as annual pledges) from a wide variety of
people—some rich, some poor, some socially connected, others virtually unknown
outside of their own neighborhoods; donations might be given in kind too—in food,
clothes, books, etc.48 (This same pattern of financing continues to this day; the
grandson of the Deobandi scholar Muhammad Shafi proudly displayed the donation
boxes in the main offices of the dar ul’alwm Karachi to the author in the summer of
2012/1433, while the grandson of Barelvi great Muhammad Hussain Naeemi did much
the same in the front office of the Jamia Naeemia in Lahore that same year). Donations
didn’t flow one-way, either; monies garnered via these collection efforts allowed
students to receive a religious education at the dar ul’alwm (plus clothes, laundry
money, shoes, medical care, a quilt, and oil and matches for light)49 more or less gratis,
and multitudinous are the stories of generous teachers or administrators, whose own
salaries were purposefully kept small, donating money, books, or other gifts to needy
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students.50 Eventually (by the 1890s/1310s) a boarding house was established,
replacing the old system of housing students in family homes or mosques; the new
arrangement facilitated the formation of bonds that transcended kinship or geography,
bonds based upon common experience within the dar ul’alwm system. Metcalf sees in
the boarding house brotherhood preparation for the “mutual cooperation” required for,
among other endeavors, future political undertakings.51
An organized hierarchy, drawn up along British-inspired lines, included the sәrpәrәst
(which Metcalf equates with “rector,” but which might also be translated as “guardian”),
a sort of “patron and guide” with no direct administrative role; a muhtәmim (Metcalf:
“chancellor,” though the school as of this writing refers to the muhtәmim as “rector”), the
institution’s head administrative official; an әrbab-e-yhtymam (or “vice-chancellor”),
perhaps the most important administrative officer in terms of day-to-day decisionmaking; a Sәdәr mәdarys (or “principal,” though a more exact translation would be “head
teacher”), upon whom lay the chief responsibility for the school’s instruction (and
scarcely less important in decision-making than the vice-chancellor); a mufti (from
1892/1309), responsible, of course, for the juridical rulings emanating from the dar
ul’alwm (a dar ul-yfta, or center for juridical rulings, was formally established in
1893/1310, and between 1911/1329 and 1951/1370, almost one hundred fifty thousand
fәtawa emanated from the school);52 and, perhaps most importantly of all, a mәjlys-eshwra (or “advisory council”) composed of administrators, teachers, and seven others.
This last was given a central role in major decision-making for the school, thereby
preventing a single individual, family, or clique from dominating its affairs (with mixed
success).53 Still, though the school was organizationally British, the old personal ties
between teacher and gifted student—the shix-disciple relationship, the heart and soul of
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the traditional mosque-centered schools—were maintained, as students became disciples
of Sufi shixs (often their teachers). The Sufi shix especially cared for his disciples
thereafter; both shared a lifelong bond.54
Interestingly, neither Muhammad Qasim nor Rashid Ahmad held official posts
within the newly founded institution at Deoband for its first three years; indeed, in the
case of Rashid Ahmad, he never held any sort of permanent, day-to-day position at the
school. Rather, Muhammad Qasim is credited with informally though firmly guiding
the school’s founders during this early period from his printing house in Meerut fifty
miles away, in particular through his good friend Rafiuddin (d. 1890 AD), who held top
posts within the dar ul’alwm’s administration for almost two decades. His influence was
likewise felt through several other family connections he enjoyed with the school,
including his cousins, Muhammad Ya’qub (the institution’s principal from 18671886/1284-1303), Zu’l-Faqar ‘Ali (a member of the advisory council for forty years),
Muhammad Munir Nanautawi (the school’s chancellor from 1894-1895/1311-1312),
and, of course, Mahtab ‘Ali (who also served as a council member).55 “Leadership in
Deobandi institutions has traditionally been influenced by clan and family loyalties,”
wrote one scholar, and this was true from the beginning; such a phenomenon was not
uncommon (and remains so) in the subcontinent among educational institutions of all
stripes.56 It should be noted, however, and evident from the aforementioned description
of the school’s genesis, that despite this role of informal influencer, Muhammad Qasim
was, in the words of Faruqi, “the guiding spirit of this venture,”57 and he did hold the
somewhat informal position of sәrpәrәst until his 15 April1880/5 Jumada I 1297 death
(perhaps to keep a healthy distance so as not to potentially “taint” the school in the eyes
of the British authorities, considering his 1857/1273 actions). Even with this family
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clique fully invested in the school, the administrative mechanisms set in motion by
Muhammad Qasim himself prevented the institution’s out-and-out “takeover” by the
family.
Meanwhile, Rashid Ahmad lived as a jurist, Sufi shix, and teacher of hәdis in Gangoh
(about thirty miles from Deoband); his opinions about the dar ul’alwm, however, “were
followed,” particularly as they pertained to the “organizing and shaping of the school,”58
and he would “succeed” Muhammad Qasim as sәrpәrәst after the latter’s passing. Not
infrequently the aged mwlana made visits from Gangoh to the university at Deoband,
counseling teachers and students and generally guiding the institution’s direction.
When students desired more advanced instruction in fyqħ or hәdis, they would often
travel to Gangoh to learn at the feet of the old scholar. It was here, too, that Rashid
Ahmad continued to initiate the best and the brightest into the four great South Asian
Sufi orders, as he had been initiated years before by his own murshyd, Imdadullah.59
Present during the weeks and days of Muhammad Qasim’s final illness was the dar
ul’alwm’s first student, who had studied hәdis under Muhammad Qasim in the Meerut
printing houses: one Mahmud Hasan.60 After the subsequent death of Rashid Ahmad
(who, along with Muhammad Qasim, had represented the dar ul’alwm’s “first
generation” of leadership), it was Mahmud Hasan—born in 1851/1267 and head of the
institution from 1890/1307—who would be considered the undisputed leading
personality of the institution’s “second generation.”61 In time, the young studentturned-mwlana would become arguably the school’s most celebrated political activist
and one of India’s most revered Muslim shixs; indeed, his title, by which he was and
continues to be known to millions: shix ul-hynd, or “The Scholar-Jurist of Hindustan.”
Meanwhile, the old agenda, passed on down the Shah Waliullahi line, and inherited by
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Mamluk ‘Ali, Imdadullah, Muhammad Qasim, and Rashid Ahmad, was taken up now
with a vengeance by the dar ul’alwm’s first țalyb when his time came to lead. The
“program” may have been passed on as far back as 1877/1294, when Mahmud Hasan
accompanied Muhammad Qasim on the hәj to Mecca. In the holy city the future shix ulhynd met with Imdadullah himself, receiving bi’at under his hand—thereby “vowing
allegiance” to the one-time leader of the short-lived Islamic mini-state at Thana
Bhawan—and becoming his xәlifәħ. Around a hundred men, including Rashid Ahmad
as well as Muhammad Yaqub Nanautawi (Mamluk ‘Ali’s son and, at the time, the
principal of the dar ul’alwm; Mahmud Hasan would succeed him a few years after his
1884/1301 death), and Ahmed Hasan Kanpuri likewise participated in this special hәj
journey.62 We shall return to Mahmud Hasan and the political initiatives he
spearheaded shortly.
As the school developed throughout its formative decades, students began to flock
to the institution from all over the Muslim world. One observer (writing around
1917/1335) noted of the dar ul’alwm, “[S]tudents from Russia, China, Balkh and
Bukhara, Kabul, Turkey, Syria and Arabia and Persia—indeed, from every country and
city—are present there. By now more than a thousand scholars, graduated from the dar
ul’alwm, have spread throughout the country…”63 By the early twentieth
century/fourteenth century, the Muslim religious leadership had attained such elevated
status that even Muslims educated in the West began taking on religious titles (such as
mwlana), and were addressed as such by the public at large.64 And thus it was that,
along with its growing prestige, the school’s teachers and graduates began to exert a
noticeable influence on the day-to-day Islamic practice of the subcontinent’s Muslims,
especially concentrating on stamping out the “impurities” that had crept into the faith
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through its centuries-long contact with (indeed, through Deobandi eyes, the nearcomplete encirclement by and infiltration of) local, mostly Hindu customs and ritual.
Practices of which the Deobandis were critical included the charging of interest on
loans, the array of rites and ceremony associated with the tombs of Muslim saints, the
forbidding of widow remarriage, and extravagant feasts and weddings. (For the
Deobandis, as discussed in Chapter 1, this did not include a rejection of Sufism, though
the movement clamped down, as mentioned previously, on what it considered the
inappropriate spiritual elevation of Sufi saints, among other sufistic “excesses”). For
Metcalf, for a group to qualify as an “Islamic reform movement” it must accept the
“period of the life of the Prophet and the first decades of Islam as providing the
fundamental examples of behavior and belief; all [Islamic reform movements] seek selfconsciously, by a wide variety of means, to relive that pristine time.”65 This is precisely
what the ‘alәma of the dar ul’alwm sought to achieve—the very aim of Muhammad
Ishaq’s two-pronged program—through these criticisms, in the tradition of their
spiritual forbears, going back to Shah Waliullah and beyond. The “accretions” that had
developed within South Asian Islam had to be removed, as they clearly represented
post-Muhammad, post-Rashidun innovations. Many Muslims in India and even beyond
became adherents of the new, more puritan (or “reformist”) school based in the little
qәSbәħ north of Delhi.
Others, however, pushed back.
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Counter-Reformation: The Birth of “Barelvism.”
The same year that the dar ul’alwm in Deoband was founded under the direction of
Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, a Muslim holy man approached the dwelling of a noted
(but far from famous) ‘alym in the small western-U.P. town of Bareilly, one hundred fifty
miles east of Delhi. His knock brought the ‘alym’s ten-year-old son to the door; the boy
opened it. He looked up into the face of the fәqir, at which, Zafaruddin Bihari informs
us, the holy man abruptly placed his hand upon the boy’s head and said, “You are a great
scholar.”66 The ten-year-old boy was the young Ahmad Raza Khan, son of mwlana Naqi
‘Ali Khan and grandson of mwlana Raza ‘Ali Khan. The incident with the holy man
wasn’t the first time a pronouncement of spiritual or scholarly greatness had been made
about the child, either. Indeed, a decade before, shortly after Ahmad Raza’s 1856/1272
birth, his venerated grandfather had laid him on his lap and uttered very nearly the
same words. “This son of mine will be a great scholar,” he had said about the newborn.
Ahmad Raza Khan was of Pathan stock, his ancestors hailing from the Kandahari
region of what is today southern Afghanistan. During the Mughal era, some of the
family had moved to Lahore, then Delhi, eventually settling at the qәSbәħ of Bareilly in
Rohilkhand. Throughout their migrations, Ahmad Raza’s ancestors benefitted from
Mughal rule by fulfilling various government appointments, both military and civilian.
In Bareilly, the family continued to benefit from state employment, as well as the
income derived from government-endowed properties. Beginning with Ahmad Raza’s
grandfather, Raza ‘Ali Khan, however, a new family tradition was initiated: that of the
attainment of religious scholarship. Raza ‘Ali Khan was known in his day, according to
one Barelvi historian, as not only an “unparalleled scholar” but a “perfect saint,” thus
juxtaposing Ahmad Raza’s predecessors with those of the Deobandi fathers and
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declaring the former’s spiritual heritage the superior one. (It was Raza ‘Ali Khan, too,
who, it was said, had been made invisible to British thugs following the repression of the
Mutiny.) His son, Naqi ‘Ali Khan, a contemporary of Rashid Ahmad and Muhammad
Qasim, followed in the footsteps of his father, and was likewise recognized as a
“glorious, holy scholar” and, significantly vis-à-vis his Deobandi counterparts, an
“unequalled writer and critic [of deviant practices within Islam].” Thus the foundation
was laid by his fathers for Ahmad Raza not only to become a great scholar and teacher,
but also a critic, reformist (or counter-reformist), and opponent of “the enemies of Allah
and the Prophet.”67
Ahmad Riza’s father tutored him in religion at home; the two enjoyed a close
relationship. Stories abound concerning Ahmad Raza’s childhood and youth—about
how he had memorized the entire Qur’an by age four, that he was addressing
worshippers at the mosque by age six, that he had surpassed his scholarly and
distinguished father in knowledge and wisdom by his early teens (when he was already
issuing fәtawa). By age twenty Ahmad Riza was debating with and contradicting (and,
according to his followers, soundly defeating) several of India’s most prominent ‘alәma,
including those representing the Deobandi wave. When he was twenty-one years old,
Ahmad Riza (along with his father) became the disciple (murid) of Sufi pir and sәyyid
Shah Al-e-Rasul of Marehra, a small town southeast of Aligarh. Shah Al-e-Rasul was
affiliated with the Baghdad-born Qadiri order, belonging to the Barkatiyya branch of
that sylsәla. The Barkatiyya, renowned for its spiritual heritage, had sprung up in the
United Provinces town of Bilgram, about sixty miles southeast of Badayun, and was
named after the Aurengzeb-era Sufi master Shah Barkatullah, based in Marehra.
Marehra was one of several proto-Barelvi centers in what is today the northwestern
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sector of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh—centers that included Badayun, Rampur,
Pilibhit, and, of course, Bareilly itself.68
Shortly after attaining official discipleship under Shah Al-e-Rasul (and being named
his xәlifәħ), Ahmad Riza went on pilgrimage to Mecca, visiting Medina as well and
receiving recognition and authority from several powerful Muslim leaders and scholars.
By 1900/1318, Ahmad Riza was being referred to by most non-Deobandi ‘alәma in
India generally (and even by some ‘alәma in the Middle East) as the mujәddyd (or
“renewer”) of the present (fourteenth) Islamic century.69 In 1905/1323 he went on a
second pilgrimage to Mecca, spending several months there; during this visit, he was
treated with the utmost respect—as one of the Muslim world’s leading scholars and
teachers.
By the turn of the twentieth/fourteenth century, then, Ahmad Raza Khan was in a
position to seriously compete, as the leader of a rival “movement” that had “come into
its own,” with the Deobandis for the spiritual supremacy of the subcontinent’s Muslims.
Indeed, the counter-reformational sect had been identifiably distinct since the
1880s/1300s, “when,” explains Sanyal—certainly Western academia’s most renowned
scholar of Barelvism to the time of this writing—“the movement began to take shape.”
Throughout the 1890s/1310s, too, its core principles solidified, its tenets spread, and
the number of its adherents “grew steadily” across India (especially in the north).70
Ahmad Riza certainly viewed himself as the leading Muslim authority in India, too.
Once, he unilaterally appointed Amjad ‘Ali A’zami the judge of Islamic law for “the
entire Indian nation,” subsequently appointing his own son, Mustafa Riza Khan, and
Burhan ul-Haqq as the new judge’s assistants.71 (Amjad ‘Ali A’zami will be further
scrutinized later in this work.) Ahmad Riza’s disciples established several notable
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seminaries in which the Barelvi point-of-view was promulgated. The Barelvi counterreformation, like its Catholic predecessor, was itself reformist, but “central to the
formation of Ahl-e-Sunnat [i.e. Barelvi] ideology” was the “debate and rivalry amongst
the [‘alәma],”72 particularly the populous Deobandis; this is what made it a counterreformation. That debate was carried out in person and in print, in the case of the latter
via the Barelvis’ numerous journals, newspapers, and books. Indeed, during this period
(the turn of the century to 1921 AD, or from about 1318 to 1339 AH), the BarelviDeobandi rivalry was characterized almost exclusively by the presentation of arguments
via the written word or the formal debate. Nothing like the political battles of later
years (and certainly not the murderous enmity displayed in 1990s and 2000s AD
Pakistan) surfaced during these early years, when the debate, though heated, remained
nevertheless “gentlemanly.”

The Early Disputes I: fәtwa War of 1902/1320.
Since the days of Shah Abdul Aziz, the fәtwa had been used as a popular form of
intercourse between the ‘alәma and regular Muslims—and also as a means of
discrediting, or striving to discredit, rival scholars and their schools of thought.
Perhaps no one ever wrote more fәtawa than Ahmad Raza Khan, however, who used the
juridical ruling as his chief weapon of choice within the context of his many scholarly
battles. At the same time, Ahmad Raza’s fәtawa earned him an unprecedented
reputation among thousands of South Asia’s Muslim scholars (as well many from
Central Asia, the Middle East, and beyond) as an eminent ‘alym, all the while serving to
expand his influence far and wide among ordinary Muslims across the subcontinent.
“Fatwa-writing was to be Ahmad Riza’s single most important scholarly activity,” noted
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Sanyal, who elsewhere described the pursuit as the “hallmark” of the man’s ‘alymi career;
indeed, the Barelvi “founder” was said alone to have produced the work of ten muftis. If
one were forced to place Ahmad Raza within a single occupational category, that of
fәtwa-writer might be the most accurate, as he was to spend the majority of his days
engaged in the activity. He is said to have interrupted his work composing fәtawa only
rarely, and then only to attend religious (and especially “Barelvi”) ceremonies like ‘urs.73
In 1902/1320, Ahmad Riza Khan kicked off a fәtwa war between the Deobandis
(based around the university) and the newly dubbed “Barelvi” ‘alәma (based around
Ahmad Riza). The initiatory event was the publication of a fәtwa, authored by the
tireless scholar out of Bareilly. Certainly, he’d previously published pronouncements
condemning this or that idea, or even this or that group or movement, as heretical,
Satanic, or otherwise erroneous. But in this ruling, Ahmad Riza did something he hadn’t
done before; that is, he named names. In all, he listed five individuals—all prominent
Indian ‘alәma—and declared them kafyr (“infidel” or “unbeliever”). Of the five men
listed, fully four were Deobandi. The fifth, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadiyan, was the
founder of the much-maligned “Ahmadiyya” or “Qadiyyani” movement (more on this
movement later). Thus not only had Ahmad Raza singled out four of the Deobandis’
most renowned scholars as infidels, he’d grouped them together with a man who was,
quite possibly, the most detested “Muslim” leader in all of South Asia.
The four Deobandis (all described using the catch-all term “Wahhabi”) thus singled
out included the school’s very “founders,” Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi and Rashid
Ahmad Gangohi. Muhammad Qasim, Ahmad Riza asserted, had denied the finality of
the Prophet (xәtәm-e-nәbәwwәt, i.e. that Muhammad was the last, or “seal,” of the
prophets); all who followed Muhammad Qasim, then, must have allowed Satan to plant
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“deceit in their hearts.” And Rashid Ahmad, in the tradition of Muhammad Ismail
(against whom Ahmad Riza had already written many fәtawa), believed that Allah could
lie—and additionally held that Satan’s knowledge (in particular his “knowledge of the
unseen” [ylm-e-Gaib]) was greater than had been Muhammad’s.74 These were
obviously very serious allegations, and clearly stemmed from the enormous emphasis
placed by Barelvis on respect—bordering on worshipful adoration—for the Prophet, as
well as for God. To lay such a juridical ruling at the feet of the Deoband school’s two
greatest guiding lights was akin to throwing down the gauntlet. “He who doubts that
they are kafyrs is himself a kafyr,” declared Ahmad Riza, with some finality.75 But the
deceased Muhammad Qasim and the still-leading Rashid Ahmad weren’t the only
Deobandi targets of Ahmad Riza’s ire. Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, who would go on to
become one of the school’s most prolific writers (and who Robinson has described as
“the most influential Sufi of his day”),76 also attracted the Bareilly scholar’s literary
darts. His alleged crime: refusing, like Rashid Ahmad, to grant Muhammad ylm-e-Gaib,
thus, in Ahmad Riza’s eyes, equating the Prophet’s knowledge with that of any other
human or beast. (The Barelvi divine would author at least three book-length treatises
specifically denouncing Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, condemning the Deobandi for the content
of his juridical rulings and for his alleged disrespect of the Prophet).77 Along the same
lines, a fourth Deobandi scholar, Khalil Ahmad, was charged with believing that Satan’s
knowledge was greater than that of the Prophet. Both Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi and Khalil
Ahmad, the fәtwa severely declared, confused Satan with God.
As in his allegations against Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad, Ahmad Riza’s
emphasis in these last two anti-Deobandi decisions rested entirely on perceived
disrespect toward the Prophet (of whom they “decrease[d] the glory”) and, to a lesser
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degree, to Allah (to whom they “ascribed lies”). Thus was put into words the very
foundation of the theological Deobandi-Barelvi conflict; “it was the differing conceptions
of the Prophet,” wrote Sanyal, “…that lay at the heart of the Ahl-e-Sunnat [Barelvi]
denunciation of the Deobandis.”78 After Barelvi bodyguard Mumtaz Qadiri assassinated
Punjab governor Salman Taseer in 2011/1432, he admitted that he had been motivated
to do so after listening to the speeches of Barelvi cleric Hanif Qureshi Qadiri; in his
description of the speech, which he evidently heard in person, he described the scholar’s
behavior as well as the audience’s response—a perhaps powerful demonstration of the
Barelvi devotion to Muhammad. “Delivering the sermon, Hanif Qureshi expressed his
love for the prophet so passionately that his turban fell off, his hair got disshevelled, and
the microphone, too, fell off. The congregation was overwhelmed by grief and burst
into tears. Carried away by their love for the holy prophet, I, too, was in tears.”79 To
the Barelvis, emotionally and spiritually invested as they were in the Prophet as an
object of devotion, the Deobandi position seemed to smack of the worst form of
disrespect.
Heretofore, however, the proto-rivalry had been played out mostly indirectly, as the
two loosely organized scholarly groupings vied for influence and the right to speak for
truth and righteousness among South Asia’s Muslims. Now, finally, it had come head to
head.
It is interesting to note that these original arguments against Deobandism’s leading
figures have remained potent barbs within the Barelvi arsenal to the present day. For
example, observe the very same accusations, against the very same individuals, in the
following paragraph, taken from one Barelvi publication published over half a century
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after Ahmad Riza Khan’s original ruling (and consistently published in updated editions
to the time of this writing):

mwlwi Ashraf ‘Ali sahyb Thanawi, in [his book] hәfiz ul-iman [equated]
the knowledge of the Holy Prophet with the knowledge of animals.
mwlwi Khalil Ahmad sahyb Anbitwi makes the knowledge of Satan and
the Angel of Death [mәlәk ul-mwt] greater than the knowledge of the
Holy Prophet in his book bәrahin qaț’aah. mwlwi Ismail sahyb of Delhi
wrote that, during prayer, the thought of the Holy Prophet is worse than
the thought of a donkey or an ox. mwlwi Qasim sahyb Nanautawi, in [his
book] tәhźir ul-nas, denied the finality of the Holy Prophet—and said
that if other prophets come after the Holy Prophet, it would in no way
contradict that finality; “final” denotes the “True Prophet,” while other
prophets would only be temporary [‘aarżi]. On this, even Mirza Ghulam
Ahmad Qadiani said, “I am a prophet.” Thus [even] Mirza Ghulam
Ahmad is their student when it comes to this issue.80

In this modern-day Barelvi denunciation of Deobandism, the scholar (in this case a
learned and well-respected Pakistani) has accused both Ashraf ‘Ali and Khalil Ahmad of
disparaging the knowledge of the Prophet Muhammad, just as Ahmad Riza Khan had
done in his groundbreaking 1902/1320 ruling. Similarly, Muhammad Qasim here
stands accused of denying the Prophet’s finality—the same indictment directed toward
him by Ahmad Riza. Additionally, a characteristic jab is taken at sәyyid Ahmad’s
companion, Ismail (more on this later), while the final insult lies in the grouping of the
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four men named with the Ahmadiyya prophet-founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad; in this
last, too, the scholar has followed the lead of Ahmad Riza, who had done just that many
decades before. Not long after the publication of his 1902/1320 fәtwa, Ahmad Riza
applied for confirmatory signatures from esteemed ‘alәma in Mecca and Medina. The
signatures came. Perhaps with such an indictment, confirmed by the greatest scholars
of the holiest sites in Islam, the scourge of Deobandism might be finally stamped out.
But the Deobandis responded. Deobandi ‘alәma across north India were recruited to
gather signatures of their own in an attempt to countermand Ahmad Riza’s original
juridical ruling; the list of signees was impressive. This prompted a counter-response
from the Barelvis, who, in turn, gathered Indian signatures of their own to nullify the
opinion of the Deobandis.81 The fәtwa war drew thousands of Indian Muslim scholars
into its orbit, more or less compelling them to take a stand: either behind famed ‘alym
Ahmad Riza and the Barelvis or behind the ‘alәma trained at the great Deobandi dar
ul’alwm. Thus the line was drawn between the two camps, as scholars of various stripes
stood in support of one or the other position. Surely neither side would have guessed
that the same division, over the same issues, utilizing the same arguments, and leveling
the same accusations, would exist largely unchanged over a century later.

The Early Disputes II: the Battle for History.
For the Deobandis, the years after the fall of Muslim power on the subcontinent
literally represented a dark age, when “paganism and apostasy” (shәrk w byd’at) rose up
to engulf the land in the east and the west, in the north and the south.82 True religion
had only been saved—and not in a figurative sense—during the long night of Muslim
political fragmentation and British rule by the Deobandi fathers and the university they
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had established. Without these towering personalities and the institution that they
created, Islamic knowledge would have ceased to be a force in the lives of South Asia’s
Muslims (later Deobandi writers would interpret non-Muslim victories over Muslim
populations in Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo in much the same way).83 Fortunately for
religion in the subcontinent, however, figures like Shah Waliullah, sәyyid Ahmad of
Raebareli and his loyal companion Muhammad Ismail, Imdadullah, Muhammad Qasim,
Rashid Ahmad, and the dar ul’alwm as an institution—perhaps not unlike the monks of
Ireland’s crag-clinging monasteries after the fall of Rome (or, later, the Muslim Arab
conquerors of Iberia)—had served as critical cultural and theological preservers.
“Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi,” one dar ul’alwm Deoband graduate told the author,
“was greater than your Voltaire.” Whether Muhammad Qasim can be compared to the
witty French writer-philosopher (let alone whether or not Voltaire qualifies as “the
author’s”) is up for debate, yet the fact remains that to the Deobandis, men like
Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi were not just pious religious scholars but among the
great movers and shakers of human history. To the Prophet Muhammad the final great
Revelation had been revealed, but it had been the founders of Deobandism who had
preserved the purity of the faith during a time of crisis that had threatened the very
existence of true religion.84 The university at Deoband played a redemptive role within
Islamic history; “this was certain—that here there was a way, a place where Muslims
could go to dispel the darkness from their hearts and minds”: thus proclaims the
Deobandi historical narrative.85
Moreover, Deobandi historians insisted that not only was their tradition the
standard-bearer for the rightful Sunni position, but that the Barelvis, and especially
Ahmad Riza Khan, should be equated with the ever-present opposition to the truth—
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with “groups originat[ing] from amongst the Muslims themselves whose distinction was to
deny the faith…” (italics added).86 From the very days of Muhammad, there had always
been those who, despite their own great knowledge and understanding, yet turned from
pure religion and persecuted its faithful adherents. The inhabitants of Mecca—the
Prophet’s own people—had rejected that greatest of men virtually wholesale. Not many
years later, the Shi’a sect had broken away from the ummәt and criticized the righteous
Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Usman. The Khawarij and the Nawasib sects had, in turn,
sharply condemned ‘Ali—then murdered him in cold blood, all the while sure that they
were in the right.

“Intellect-defying deviance like this,” proclaimed one Deobandi

writer, “can be found in abundance in the later periods of Islam also. And such people,
who made it their chosen pastime to oppose, [criticize] and offend the best and the most
pious people of their time continued to appear in different eras.”87 Ahmad Riza Khan
and his followers, then, were just the latest in a long line—even a tradition—of
“deviancy” that stretched all the way back at least as far as seventh-century/firstcentury Arabia.
To buoy up this claim, the Deobandi historians dug deeply into Ahmad Riza Khan’s
past, where they emphasized the allegedly dubious ties of his genealogy (which, it is
pointed out, certainly did not include any of “India’s great families”) to the Persian
pillager Nadir Shah and, more importantly, the Shi’a sect. For Ahmad Riza Khan’s
family, so the Deobandi narrative asserts, descended from actual members of Nadir
Shah’s “Shi’a army”—an army responsible for numerous and sundry wicked acts,
including the sacking of Delhi and the murder of tens of thousands. Perhaps worse than
the mayhem meted out by his troops, however, was the fact that Nadir Shah was himself
a Shi’a, and his foray into Hindustan had been carried out not only in a quest for booty
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but out of a desire to crush the dominant Sunni faith of the subcontinent. Ahmad Riza
Khan’s family “was included among the Shi’a heretic’s [rafżi] army”—indeed, “they
came to fight”—and thus deserved a share of the ignominy associated with the Persian
raider’s Indian invasion.88
And in the Deobandi narrative, the alleged links to Shi’ism don’t end with Nadir
Shah. Deobandi historians also claim strong connections between the Shi’a nawabs of
Awadh and Ahmad Riza Khan’s ancestors. The Shi’a dynasty that ruled Awadh after
the fall of the Mughals has been briefly addressed already in this work, but Deobandis
emphasize that the royal family had displaced Sunni rule, besides exhibiting an
administrative style characterized by “unfair governance.” Most significantly of all,
however, they interpret the still-strong presence of the Shi’a minority in South Asia as a
distinctly Awadh-driven phenomenon; it was during this period that “this sect [the
Shi’a] was disseminated more than during any other time,” one Deobandi historian
declared. The Shi’a nawabs, in effect, had opened a floodgate and were thus directly
responsible, perhaps more than any other group or institution, for the “spread of the
Shi’a sect.” And in the midst of all of this, the Deobandis argue, Ahmad Riza Khan’s
family remained “highly sympathetic” to the Awadhi ruling family; the Bareilly scholar’s
great-grandfather, Kazim ‘Ali Khan, is particularly singled out in this regard as a Shi’a
sympathizer and a beneficiary of the Awadhi state.89
The Barelvi ‘alema, of course, look at Islamic history through a very different lens.
Among western academics, Sanyal has perhaps written the most concerning Barelvism,
though others, including Metcalf, have also touched upon the movement at some length.
Metcalf’s work focused on what she called “the reformist ‘ulama,” the “most important”
of which were the Deobandis. But she adds the following:
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Their opponents, the Barelwi ‘ulama or the Ahl-i Sunnat wa Jama’at
adhered to a more custom-laden religious practice and a more
intercessory style of religious leadership linked to the pirs of the medieval
tombs. In fact, however, they also thought of themselves as reformist
(that is, as scholars engaged in tәjdid or renewal) and indeed—even if I
and the Deobandis begrudge them the title of reformers—in their selfconsciousness and their concern with disseminating familiarity with the
Law, they were, in the end, close to those they opposed.90

Thus the Barelvis, too, saw themselves (and particularly their movement’s guiding
light, Ahmad Riza Khan) as reformers and renewers of the faith. But their
interpretation of the historical threats to South Asian Islam differ significantly from
that of their Deobandi counterparts. For starters, Ahmad Riza Khan looked upon the
Deobandi guiding lights in much the same way as they looked upon him—as “the latest
in a line of kafyrs that went all the way back to the Prophet’s and ‘Ali’s own time.”91
Ahmad Riza and his followers attacked those movements and personalities considered
by Deobandis to be integral parts of their religious heritage.
Perhaps their most notable proto-Deobandi target: the jyhad movement of sәyyid
Ahmad of Raebareli and his top lieutenant and most trusted disciple, Muhammad Ismail.
The Barelvi narrative particularly singles out the latter as a deviant and a kafyr—and an
unabashed convert to the clearly un-Islamic Wahhabi movement launched in Arabia
under the leadership of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. As proof, the Barelvis point to
Ismail’s book tәqwiәt ul-iman (“Strengthening of the Faith”), published in Urdu in India,
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claiming that Ismail simply plagiarized and summarized (xulasәħ kia) Abdul Wahhab’s
own kytab al-twhid (“Book of [God’s] Oneness”), a fundamental Wahhabi text. The
long-held assertion that Deobandis are nothing but Wahhabis in disguise is thus buoyed
by associating one of their predecessor-heroes directly with the Nejdi movement. Ismail
is further denigrated by the Barelvi assertion that he was not martyred in a sacred
struggle with the infidel Sikhs at all, but rather died unjustly fighting fellow Muslims, in
this case Pathans, who had rightly taken offense at his aforementioned book.
Meanwhile, sәyyid Ahmad is pilloried as a fraud whose first jyhad was not targeted
against the Sikhs, but against the Muslims “of Yaghistan” (i.e. the Pathans).92
Both schools likewise tend to view their own historical roles—essentially that of the
‘alәma—quite differently. While the Barelvis point to the heroic deeds of Fazl-e-Haq
Khairabadi and others during the Mutiny, this is rarely emphasized. The ‘alәma are not
portrayed, generally speaking, as political heroes, but rather as saints—and particularly
as anti-“Wahhabi” crusaders. This is the emphasis, mostly devoid of any overarching
“liberty” narrative (as opposed to the Deobandis, who tend to stress their scholars’
pivotal roles in the “independence movement”). The direst threat to Islam was from
within (i.e. not from the British), and it is thus the struggle against apostate groups like
the Deobandis, as well as the Ahl-e-Hadis, out-and-out Wahhabis, and the Shi’a sect,
that takes center-stage in the Barelvi (post-Mughal) “political” history of the ‘alәma. On
the other hand, the Deobandi histories and biographies tend to support a radically
different worldview, one in which it is a “fact [that] cannot be denied” that in the “effort
for independence in Hindustan, no other group can boast of being a rival to the proud
position held by the ‘alәma.” Indeed, the scholarly divines’ struggle stretched back to
the “first war of independence” in the mid-nineteenth/mid-fourteenth century:
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After the turbulent revolution of 1857, only this party [the ‘alәma] kept
the concept of independence alive. In the end, their continual endeavors
spread the spirit of freedom across the entire country. hәżrәt
[Muhammad Qasim] Nanotvi was the greatest instigator of [the spread
of] this concept, and the greatest preacher of this movement. With this
enthusiasm he nurtured this concept [India’s liberty]. It is a pity that
the writers of the history of the war of independence have not done
justice to him.”93

The Deobandi perception of India’s history thus places the ‘alәma, from Shah Waliullah,
not only at the center of the much-needed South Asian Islamic revivalist movement, but
also—and just as critically—at the very head of the subcontinent’s liberty struggle
against the tyranny of Britain. According to this Deobandi narrative, it is thanks to the
‘alәma that those who traditially have received credit for liberating India from its
British rulers (by leading the nationalist movement) were inspired to do so at all—the
“passion for freedom” kept alive by Muhammad Qasim after 1857/1273, infusing into
much of Muslim India (and beyond) by Mahmud Hasan, and, having “passed over from
the Muslims to the [other] sons of the nation [әbna’-e-wәtәn]” in the course of the
Khilafat movement (italics added).94 This is perhaps aptly illustrated by the cover art of
one Deobandi history, entitled tәhrik-e-rishmi-e-rwmal (“The Silk Handkerchief
Movement”), a tome chronicling the shix ul-hynd’s attempt to mount a Muslim-led
invasion of British-controlled India from that country’s northwest frontier (covered
later in this work). A map of the subcontinent is shown weighed down by four massive
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chains, while the Union Jack waves over it triumphantly from atop a flagpole planted in
the middle of India. Only one place-name (apart from the Indian Ocean and the Bay of
Bengal) graces the cartograph: Deoband—and flames are rising therefrom.95 Deobandis
see themselves, their scholar-jurist leaders, and the revivalist movement out of the dar
ul’alwm as the liberty spark that eventually set fire to British machinations on the
subcontinent.

The Early Disputes III: “Rationalist” versus “Transmitted” Traditions.
Meanwhile, both schools continued to espouse different emphases when it came to
the various Islamic sciences (as reflected in the curricula of their respective mәdarys).
An introduction to mәnqwlat (the “transmitted,” or traditional, sciences) and mәqwlat
(which Sanyal calls the “rational position”) was given previously. While the Deobandis,
like Shah Waliullah and the “Delhi Group,” emphasized mәnqwlat (and especially the
study of hәdis), Ahmad Raza Khan and the Barelvis, like the Khairabadi-Badayuni
Group, favored an emphasis on mәqwlat (plus the study of fyqħ). The debate over which
group of subjects should take precedent in a given curriculum had flared up repeatedly
over the years, long before the establishment of either school, with scholars like Fazl-eHaq Khairabadi carrying the mәqwlat standard in the 1820s AD (1220s and 1230s AH),
especially against his Delhi-based academic opponents. By the 1850s and 1860s AD
(from the mid-1270s to the mid-1280s AH), Ahmad Raza’s father, Naqi ‘Ali Khan, had
entered the fray, echoing much of what Fazl-e-Haq had said several decades earlier.
From the 1890s/1310s into the early twentieth/fourteenth century, the mantle, so to
speak, of leadership among the mәqwlat scholars had fallen upon the formidable
shoulders of Ahmad Raza Khan himself, despite his family’s relative obscurity—even
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when it might “naturally” have been carried by the sires of, say, the Khairabadi or
Farangi Mahali families. But it just so happened that Ahmad Raza’s light shone
brighter; it was Ahmad Raza, after all, who is said to have bested the more senior ‘Abd
ul-Haqq Khairabadi, son of the great Fazl-e-Haq, in a debate at the Rampur court when
he (Ahmad Raza) was only twenty years of age.96
In any case, the same debate over curricula and emphases that had raged among
scholars for years was inherited by the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry and taken up by its
divines. Deobandis continued to battle perceived Barelvi disregard for hәdis instruction
by augmenting the traditional dәrs-e-nyžami curriculum with half a dozen hәdis
collections of their own, in their entirety, and continued to hold up mastery of hәdis as
the crowning achievement of one’s education.

The Early Disputes IV: Other Points of Doctrine.
True to the reformist spirit of their time, the early ‘alәma associated with the dar
ul’alwm at Deoband opposed a number of doctrines and customs that had, they asserted,
crept into the practice of many Muslims on the subcontinent. Such allegedly impure
elements were condemned as innovations or as synthesized Hinduism. One of these was
the celebration of the anniversary of Muhammad’s birthday. Deobandis renounced such
events as encouraging “the belief that a dead person was actually present.” Celebrating
mwlyd, these scholars noted, “elevated the importance of a fixed day” and “resembled
practices of the Hindus.”97 Though Deobandis and other reformists opposed many
“Barelvi” practices, such as ‘urs (literally “wedding” [Arabic], but in South Asia a ritual
observance of the death anniversary of a pir), controversy over mwlyd was the most
heated.98
125

What did a Barelvi mwlyd celebration look like during this formative period?
Employing as her source a Rampur-published newspaper (dәbdәba-e-sikәnderi), Sanyal
describes a mwlyd celebration in 1916/1334 as commemorated by Ahmad Riza Khan.
After dawn bathing and the donning of new clothes, Ahmad Riza’s disciples, admirers,
and others “hurried to the mosque to greet him,” hoping for a chance to kiss the man’s
hand. Thereafter began a poetic recitation of the Prophet’s qualities, after which the
crowd all stood in remembrance of Muhammad’s birth. Ahmad Riza then delivered a
sermon in which many of the doctrines embraced by Barelvis (but reprehensible to
Deobandis) were uttered; in particular, he spoke of Muhammad as the first of Allah’s
creations, formed of the very light of Allah himself—and, as the first light, the
originator of all light, including that of the sun. In this, one might observe the mystical
sheen Barelvis place upon Muhammad, much to the chagrin of their Deobandi
counterparts. After Ahmad Riza’s sermon, another poetic reading “calling down Allah’s
blessings…on the Prophet” concluded the meeting and was immediately followed by a
feast.99
The concept of nwr-e-muhәmmәdi—positing Muhammad as pure light, or a “being
with his own natural light”100—is distinctly Barelvi, as opposed to the Deobandi
position that Muhammad, though God’s true and greatest Messenger, was yet a man
(however perfect he might have been). Echoes of the Barelvi stance, however, can be
heard in Ibn Ishaq’s eighth-century/first-century biography of the Prophet, later
encapsulated by Lings in his Muhammad. “Aminah’s [the mother of Muhammad] one
consolation was the unborn child of her dead husband,” we are informed,
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and her solace increased as the time of her delivery drew near. She was
conscious of a light within her, and one day it shone forth from her so
intensely that she could see the castles of Bostra in Syria. And she heard
a voice say to her, “Thou carriest in thy womb the lord of this people; and
when he is born say: ‘I place him beneath the protection of the One, from
the evil of every envier’; then name him Muhammad.”101

Ahmad Riza would write several book-length treatments on the subject of Muhammad
as a source of light (and hence a being without shadow); some are listed in the footnotes
to this work.102
In any case, from the initial emergence of debate between Barelvi and Deobandi
adherents over doctrine in the late nineteenth/early fourteenth century, it has been the
sects’ relative stance on the attributes of the Prophet Muhammad that have most
widened the divide.103 The ritual of the Barelvis compounded this doctrinal difference,
particularly as they celebrated the birth of the Prophet. Indeed, mwlyd is often
characterized by processions in the streets, massive gatherings, the recitation of
religious poetry, prize-giving, sweets-giving, prayers, and feasting (in Pakistan the date
has traditionally been marked as a public holiday, typically complete with speeches by
high government officials at both the national and provincial levels—and even the
screening of films with “morale-building themes” in place of the “usual movies”),104
much of which is considered “innovation” by Sunnis of the Deobandi persuasion. More
recently, several deadly clashes between Deobandi and Barelvi groups have taken place
on this significant date of the Islamic calendar.
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But Barelvi rituals associated with mwlyd were not the only ones with which the
Deobandis took issue. The Barelvi celebration of ‘urs also sparked the ire of the school
out of Deoband. A typical Barelvi ‘urs celebration, centered on the saint’s dәrgah, lasted
three to five days and included night-long reading of the Qur’an, the recitation of n’ats
(poetic compositions praising the Prophet) and other verse lauding various religious
figures, sermons delivered by the ‘alәma, and possibly a pilgrimage to visit relics of the
Prophet, saints, or other Sufi predecessors. The last day of the ‘urs celebration included
Gwsәl—the washing of the saint’s tomb (though, outside of the context of ‘urs, Gwsәl
refers to a full-body ablution necessary in some circumstances before prayer, among
other rituals).105 Barelvi observation of ‘urs as of this writing follows much the same
pattern. The ninetieth ‘urs of Ahmad Riza Khan himself, for example, for which his
dәrgah served as venue, took place between 20 and 22 February 2009/24 and 26 Safar
1430. The celebration involved numerous speeches from some of Barelvism’s greatest
guiding lights and boasted some five hundred thousand attendees gathered in the UP
town of Bareilly.
On the other hand, the Barelvi denunciations of the Deobandis mostly rested on
theological matters rather than ritual or practice. Some of Ahmad Riza Khan’s
objections vis-à-vis the Deobandi founding fathers and their disciples—dealing with the
finality of the Prophet and the Prophet’s “knowledge of the unseen”—have been
touched upon briefly, above. But the issues brought up in Ahmad Riza’s 1902/1320
juridical ruling were not the only ones dividing the Deobandi and Barelvi schools of
thought. Some other points at which the Barelvis took offense include:
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•

The issue of mәsәlәħ ymkan-e-kәźb—that is, whether or not God can tell a lie.
Barelvis point to several works, notably Khalil Ahmad’s aforementioned
bәrahin qaț’aah, as well as Mahmud Hasan’s jahәd ul-mәqal, as evidence that
the Deobandis do indeed believe that it is possible for God to lie. The
Barelvis hold that a lie, being “an evil, like theft,” could never be associated
with God. Besides, God’s attributes are constant and unchanging (wajyb),
thus the idea that He might “possibly” lie is absurd.

•

The issue of the Prophet’s place as the most excellent of all mankind.
Barelvis claim that the Deobandis believe that any member of the ummәt may
attain the same level of excellence in deed that Muhammad enjoyed—and
even excel beyond the Prophet’s level in this regard. In this, Barelvis point
to Muhammad Qasim’s tәhźir ul-nas.

•

The issue of referencing the Prophet. Barelvis insist that Muhammad must
not be called by “ordinary names,” but should always be referred to as ya
rәswl allah or some similarly respectful designation. The Deobandis, they
claim, teach that Muhammad, being just “a man,” may be referred to as
“brother.” The writings of Muhammad Ismail, as well as Khalil Ahmad’s
bәrahin qaț’aah, are often used to support this claim.106

•

The issue of the application of the classifications dar ul-hәrb and dar ul-yslam.
For Deobandis, Hindustan had been dar ul-hәrb since at least the days of
Shah Abdul Aziz, whose famous 1803/1218 fәtwa, it will be remembered, had
more or less propagated this view. It should be noted that the issue is not
black-and-white, and differences have existed even within the most elite of
Deobandi circles on this issue. For example, while Muhammad Qasim had
129

ruled that India was dar ul-hәrb (or at least “gave preference” to such a
position), both Rashid Ahmad and Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi indicated that India
was in fact dar ul-yslam (though in the context of other questions rather than
in answer to direct queries concerning India’s status). Later Deobandi
opinion (especially from the first decade of the twentieth century AD) clearly
indicated that India was dar ul-hәrb. Meanwhile, Ahmad Riza Khan was
consistent and unambiguous in his ruling that India was absolutely dar ulyslam; since Muslims could freely worship according to shәri’at, it must be so.
The Bareilly divine would write several books on this subject alone (some of
which are listed in this work’s endnotes).107 Thus the early Barelvis,
generally speaking, did not support either the hyjrәt or jyhad movements in
which Deobandis and others took active part.108

Muslims, Hindus, and Politics: c.1875—1916/c. 1292—1334.
The seemingly endless speculation surrounding the great 1947/1366 partition of a
subcontinent began years before the event itself even occurred, and continues to
fascinate scholars to the present day. Was the episode that gave birth to Pakistan,
ripping two wings off of India—West Pakistan in the west, East Bengal (later East
Pakistan, then Bangladesh) in the east—inevitable? If not, what event or series of
events are to blame for setting in motion the greatest schism of the twentieth century?
Was it the refusal of the princes to join the All-India Federation, provided for under the
constitution of 1935/1354? After all, it was this decision that caused the British
government to place its hopes, previously invested in the princes, firmly in the lap of
Jinnah and the League, certainly a major turning point that receives relatively minor
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notice.109 Or was it the resignation of the Congress’s provincial ministries in
1939/1358? This move, in hindsight almost certainly a major blunder, created a power
vacuum in the country—of which Jinnah took full advantage (and which pushed Viceroy
Linlithgow to lean ever more heavily on the League). Speaking of Linlithgow, was it
the Viceroy’s conviction, and actions to that end, that Jinnah should be built up as the
“sole spokesman” of all of India’s Muslims that led, eventually, to India’s great split?
Linlithgow himself had stated, after all, that his goal was to “shepherd all the Muslims
into the [Muslim League] fold.”110 Along these lines, was it the British tactic of playing
off the Muslims, in the form of the League, against the Congress, thus “[creating] the
conditions on the ground that made partition possible” just a few years later?111 Or was
partition born, as some scholars insist, of the British need to preserve an imperial
foothold in South Asia (one that could protect India from Soviet influence and Central
Asia from Soviet designs on oil), a need that led to the Anglo-Muslim League alliance
and, eventually, the emergence of a separate (British-friendly) state called Pakistan?
Whatever the answer to this highly controversial interrogative, one thing is certain:
at least some of the more significant roots of Partition can be clearly identified several
decades before any of the above-mentioned phenomena—within the politics of HinduMuslim unity (and disunity) in the quarter century between about 1890/1307 and
1915/1333, and particularly in the year 1905-1906/1323-1324. For it was over the
course of that brief latter period that several major developments emerged,
developments that would push Muslims of varying stripes into a seemingly single
“Muslim” fold in the name of sticking together against what was perceived as a rising
and even militant Hindu tide. Indeed, one could make a strong argument (and many do)
that the “Hindus” of “Hindustan” were largely indifferent “towards Muslims as
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Muslims,” until the very period in question—when “a separateness began to be asserted
by the Muslims themselves.” Enter Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Barelvi guiding light
Ahmad Riza Khan, poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal, and, eventually, League head
Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah. This alleged prior Hindu indifference “suggests that [the]
political question of whether ‘Muslims are a separate nation’ was fundamentally
misplaced, which is why it became and still remains so divisive.”112 In any case,
something happened over the course of this period (c. 1890/1307 and c. 1915/1333) that
abruptly made Muslims highly aware of their own “separateness.”
In the Deccan, Tilak’s “strictly Hindu” cultural nationalism had roared to life in the
1890s/1310s through a combination of his Marathi-language political paper (Kesari,
meaning “The Lion”) and the revival of a centuries-old Hindu festival commemorating
the birth of one of India’s most popular figures of worship: Ganesh, Shiva’s elephantheaded son.113 The latter became an annual affair lasting ten wild days, as rural
peasants poured into central India’s towns and cities to sing, dance, eat, and experience
“patriotic” presentations based on stories from ancient Hindu scripture. The dark side
of these “Ganapati festivals,” however, lay in the communalism that they fostered,
particularly in the form of the “Ganesh guards,” organized groups of armed young
Hindus who sought to disrupt the worship of Muslims by means of raucous
demonstrations outside of mosques. Such displays obviously alienated the local (and
sizable) Muslim communities. Things got worse for the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity
after 1895/1312, when Tilak inaugurated a second major festival, this one
commemorating the birth of the great Maratha soldier-king Shivaji, who had fought so
relentlessly against both the Bahmani sultans of the Deccan and the Mughals to the
north. Shivaji was cast as a heroic warrior for Hinduism crusading against the evil
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forces of Islam (like the British cast as invading aliens), and while millions of Indians
became caught up in the nationalist movement by means of such symbolism, millions of
Indian Muslims—a quarter of the subcontinent’s population—found no comfort, and
more than a little trepidation, in this explosion of stringently Hindu nationalism. In
1897/1315, that nationalism produced its first act of violent terrorism when one of
Tilak’s disciples, almost certainly inspired by Tilak’s appeal to Hindu scripture as
potential justification for killing, assassinated a British official.
Similar Hindu nationalist surges were then occurring in Bengal, where, by the turn
of the century, “bәnde matәrәm” (“I bow to thee, Mother”)—an explicitly Hindu
equivocation of India with the Hindu goddess, or “Mother,” Durga—had become the
clarion call for Hindu nationalists both in Bengal and beyond to struggle for
independence against the British yoke. “Bande Mataram…was the cry of the day,”
wrote one Indian nationalist of prominence. “It was chanted in schools, in colleges, in
streets, in houses, in public squares, almost everywhere.”114 (In 2009, the dar ul’alwm at
Deoband issued a fәtwa forbidding Muslims to utter the phrase, despite its patriotic
symbolism, setting off a firestorm of controversy and prompting some Indians to call for
the Deobandis’ immediate expulsion from the country).115 Meanwhile, members of the
Hindu revivalist Arya Samaj (a phenomenon one British observer predicted could
become “the most important religious movement in the whole of India”), founded in
1875/1292 in Bombay, were highly active across Hindustan—and often regarded as the
bane of both “the Musulman Mullah and the Christian missionary” as a result of their
often successful efforts aimed at the “reconversion” of formerly Hindu (and now mostly
Muslim) populations.116 By the first decade of the twentieth/fourteenth century, the

133

movement would motivate Hindu nationalist political activists, too, particularly in the
Punjab.
Set within this context, perhaps the divided “Muslim” reaction to the organization of
a pan-“Indian” entity challenging (however gingerly at first) British authority is not so
surprising, especially given the fact that the entity in question was widely regarded as a
Hindu one. In 1885/1302, less than two decades after the founding of the dar ul’alwm at
Deoband, a group of sixty-nine British-educated Indians (mostly Hindus from the
Madras and Bombay presidencies), one Englishman, and two Scots gathered together at
Bombay’s Gokuldas Tejpal Sanskrit College. Their purpose: the founding of an
organization that would stand as a voice (nay, the voice) of the Indian people; they called
it the Indian National Congress. The group attracted scant attention at first, relative to
its later importance, but by 1888/1305 its activities had elicited a response—highly
negative—from the great Islamic reformer and founder of the Muslim university at
Aligarh, the aforementioned Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Decidedly a man of action, the
modernist Muslim leader—who had supported the British during the 1879-1882/12961299 Ahmed Arabi-led Egyptian revolt, and would do so again when the British more
or less backed the Greeks in their quarrels with the Ottoman empire in 1897/1315—
created his own organization, clearly meant to be a “Muslim” alternative to the mostly
Hindu Congress, which he named the United India Patriotic Association. The group
was explicit in its opposition to the Indian National Congress—and, just as importantly,
was committed to actually “strengthen[ing] British rule in India.”117 “The bulk of the
educated Mohammedans has opposed the Congress,” wrote Lala Lajpat Rai, “in order to
please the Government and win their gratitude.”118
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The Deobandis responded to the INC-UIPA division quickly. In an 1888/1306
fәtwa written by Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, and despite the communalist tensions
brewing in various parts of India at the time, the aged mwlana declared that, when it
came to worldly affairs (like politics), cooperation with the Hindus was permitted. As long
as said cooperation did not cause “damage to the faith,” the Deobandi leader could find
no fault in it. Additionally, Rashid Ahmad warned the Muslims of India that they
“should not unite [themselves] with Sayyid Ahmad,” his organization, or his political
movement and philosophy.119 The Deoband-Aligarh breach that grew mostly from this
incident would create in the minds of historians and scholars of later generations the
idea that the major political rivalry within the pre-Partition Muslim community was
between these two parties. There is some truth in this, certainly—but the divide
foreshadowed the political schism between Deobandi and Barelvi that was soon to
follow (and which, it could be argued, would have far more significant and lasting
implications). After all, it was from the ranks of the Aligarh school that the leaders of
the Muslim League would come, and the Barelvis would throw their weight, however
reluctantly, behind them. The Deobandis, by and large, chose to cooperate with the
Congress; by 1916/1334, J. T. Sutherland could write that the INC was “the most
important political organization in the country.”120 It might be said that the seeds of the
Deobandi-Barelvi political rivalry were thus sown when Sayyid Ahmad Khan decided
not to embrace the INC, but to oppose it.
(Incidentally, if any group could claim political leadership of India’s Muslims in the
early twentieth century/1320s, it was, thanks to their position and organization,
probably the Aligarh party, whose stance, generally speaking, was one of loyalty to the
British regime and aloofness from the nationalist movement. But the tenuousness of the
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Aligarh group’s position was revealed beginning in 1912/1330 with the publication of
Al Hilal, Abul Kalam Azad’s highly nationalist Urdu journal; its high circulation—
reportedly twenty-six thousand per week after only two years—and popularity were
evidence that a significant number of educated Muslims did not, in fact, feel politically
represented by the Aligarh party.)121
In any case, and even in the face of a rising Hindu consciousness enmeshing itself
into the pan-Indian nationalist movement, the Deobandis had proclaimed that
cooperation with the Hindus, however limited by appropriate bounds, was the proper
course of action. This was to mark the first major political schism between Deobandi
and Barelvi, for though the very name “Pakistan” wouldn’t emerge until 1933/1352,
Barelvi leader Ahmad Riza Khan was a staunch advocate of his own “two-nation
theory,” one predating Jinnah’s, Iqbal’s, and even Choudhary Rahmat ‘Ali’s by several
decades. In the words of one of his supporters, “[Ahmad Riza] raised the voice against
composite nationalism at a time when Iqbal and the Qaid-e-Azam were captives of [the
idea]… One might say that Imam Ahmad Riza was the leader while these two noble
individuals were the followers with the respect to the Two-Nation Theory.”122 In the
midst of Tilak’s politicization of Hindusim, the founding of the mostly Hindu INC, the
Deobandi call for Hindu-Muslim unification within the political realm, and Sayyid
Ahmad’s plea against any sort of Hindu-Muslim political cooperation, Ahmad Riza
Khan argued that India was essentially composed of two very distinct groups: (1) the
idol-worshippers (but pәrәst) and (2) the idol-breakers (but shykәn; incidentally, this title
is popularly applied to Mahmud of Ghazni as the destroyer of a major idol at
Somnath).123 In so doing, Ahmad Riza was applying a term that had been used to refer
to India’s pagan population since ancient times. Indeed, the term but pәrәst had
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probably first been applied by the Central Asian Zoroastrians, in reference to Buddhist
(hence but) penetration into the region. By the time Muslim armies began pouring into
the subcontinent via the northwest, but pәrәst had come to refer to an “idol-worshipper”
generally, without distinction between sects or religions.124 Unification of these two
diametrically opposed groups into a single polity, Ahmad Riza argued, would be
impossible—indeed, it violated shәri’at, since Hindus were clearly to be looked upon as a
people with whom to be at war, making any sort of united front with them forbidden.125
When, decades after Ahmad Riza’s death, the call came for just such a division (and
despite its source), perhaps it was only natural for most Barelvis to interpret the
League’s demand for Pakistan through this lens—and lend their voices to those
advocating Partition. After all, their movement’s greatest teacher had promoted
something similar. It may not be an overstatement to say that Ahmad Riza’s own
political philosophy had thus laid the groundwork for a general Barelvi acceptance of
the demand for Pakistan a quarter-century after his passing. The challenge, of course, is
that, should Ahmad Riza Khan and Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah ever had had the chance to
sit and chat about their separate visions for a Muslim homeland on the subcontinent
after winning the Partition battle, they likely wouldn’t have agreed on much at all. Still,
to the time of this writing, Barelvis continue to accuse Deobandis of “generally being
with the Hindus”; Deobandis, according to the Barelvi argument, literally “hate” (nәfrәt
kәrna) Muslims, against whom “their attacks” are “always” aimed.126 This position
traces back to the original political positions taken by Rashid Ahmad Gangohi and
Ahmad Riza Khan. To this day, too, a common Barelvi claim is that the Pakistan
Movement may never have been born if not for Ahmad Riza’s original denunciation of
composite nationalism—and any meaningful cooperation with Hindus whatsoever.127
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In any case, Ahmad Riza’s stance was strictly communal, forbidding Hindu-Muslim
political cooperation. But his reasoning went beyond the idea that the two communities
were simply too different—indeed, opposed—to ever practically unite within the
context of politics. Indeed, Ahmad Riza’s definition of religious community was spelled
out in “cultural rather than political terms” (italics added), according to Sanyal. Within
this cultural framework, Ahmad Riza Khan explicitly advised his followers not to engage
in political action against British rule in India. The British, he argued, had not
interfered in the internal affairs of the Muslim community over which they governed.
He pointed out that Muslims were still free to practice their religion, in private and in
public. And he backed up his arguments with examples from classical Islamic sources.
Ahmad Riza’s teachings in this regard naturally rubbed up against strong opinion to the
contrary, even among his own followers, and, sure enough, a schism developed; some
followed his entreaty while others rebelled.128 Despite this, Ahmad Riza maintained
what one renowned scholar of South Asian Islam described as “his normal stance of
support for government…”129 But many Muslims disagreed with Ahmad Riza’s
assertion that the British had not interfered in the Muslim community’s ability to
practice their faith. This was particularly true when it came to the law. Early company
officials (under Warren Hastings), like well-known Orientalist Sir William Jones, for
example, strove to specifically delineate “Mohammadan” law as a basis for its practical
application within British courts. Whatever the intention of such efforts, this almost
certainly had a rigidifying effect on what had most likely been a far more fluid system,
with the several Islamic legal schools and their variants being variously applied across
the subcontinent according to local conditions. Indeed, the British invested “almost
exclusive authority” in a small handful of medieval Islamic legal texts that they
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considered authoritative.130 Later, an 1860/1277 penal code effectively prevented
Islamic criminal law from being applied in British courts altogether; the move was
justified in the name of “unity, precision, and simplicity,” as central authorities are apt to
do.131 Many Indian courts went without a Muslim qazi, or judge of Islamic law, forcing
some ‘alәma (both Deobandi and Barelvi) to create their own shadow court system.
In any case, Ahmad Riza Khan’s assertion that “there was no religious justification
for Indian Muslims taking an anti-British stand” drew hisses from many rival ‘alәma,
who accused him of being pro-British.132 Many Deobandis even came to regard Ahmad
Riza as an out-and-out British agent, a charge consistently leveled against the Bareilly
scholar to the time of this writing, despite the lack of any hard evidence. These
allegations aside, Sanyal describes Ahmad Riza’s more complicated relationship with
British authority as follows:

Ahmad Riza indicated his distance from the British Indian state in a
number of small but nonetheless significant ways. He himself cited some
of these. He had written anti-British poems, he said, in some works he
named; he had spoken out against the Nadwa [who were close to the
Deobandis], which enjoyed British support; he had opposed ‘Abd ulBari’s fatwa on the Kanpur mosque affair of 1913, in which ‘Abd ul-Bari
had said that the demolition (by the British civil authorities) was
permissible as it had taken place outside the mosque proper, and so on.
When mailing a postcard he would deliberately affix the stamp (which
had a picture of Queen Victoria on it) upside down as a mark of disrespect
to the Queen. More importantly, his refusal to attend a British-run court
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in 1916 showed that he did not acknowledge its authority over himself.
But he never made the British a target of his writings—as he did
numerous contemporary Muslim movements and even, to some extent,
Hindus—because they did not really matter to him. Had the British had
an active anti-Muslim policy in terms of interference in religious affairs,
however, Ahmad Riza would undoubtably have become very antiBritish.133

Thus, according to Sanyal, Ahmad Riza’s aloofness to the politics of British rule in
India was rooted in the fact that he and all Muslims remained free to practice their dayto-day religion. British interference here would likely have driven him to agitate
against the government, though, unlike the Deobandis, such agitation would almost
certainly not have included any sort of joint effort with India’s Hindu communities. It is
possible, too, that Ahmad Riza’s seemingly gentler attitude towards the British had
something to do with the political situation in which he was raised—circumstances that
were quite different from the Deobandi fathers’. After all, Ahmad Riza’s home territory
of Rohilkhand had fallen under British East India Company rule more than half a
century before he had even been born (1801/1216; Ahmad Riza was born in
1856/1272). Perhaps British rule was, for him, “normal”—or at least the only sort of
government he had ever known, as opposed to the experience of military and political
loss felt firsthand by the founders of Deobandism.
It was also during this period that the Indian Councils Act (1909/1327)—known
commonly as the Morley-Minto Reforms—was passed, among other things granting
Indians (of privileged class) a layer of self-government, however thin. Such Indians
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could now elect other such Indians to seats on provincial legislative councils, where
previously such seats had been either held by a British person or by an Indian appointed
thereunto. Crucially, the Act granted Muslims reserved seats on these provincial
legislative councils out of proportion to their population, a decision borne of the Muslim
fear that without such safeguards, they would be reduced to second-class citizen status
in a Hindu-dominated country. The reforms are relevant to this study in that they
paved the way for further reforms in 1919/1411 and 1935/1354, galvanizing the ire of
Indian (mostly Hindu) nationalists who viewed separate electorates as a communalistic
measure that would prevent the sort of Hindu-Muslim Indian nationalism they were
ostensibly trying to foster. By institutionalizing separate electorates, the Act pushed
the Congress, in 1916, to accept the arrangement in the Lucknow Pact—and when, with
the coming forth of the Nehru Report, the separate electorates system was dismissed, it
led to a permanent breach both between many Hindu and Muslim political leaders and
their parties and organizations and between Muslims who had, up to that time, been
supporting the Congress.
*
Meanwhile, events overseas contributed to the development of a sort of pan-Islamic
resurgence among Muslims of otherwise diverse political worldviews. In particular, the
Balkan Wars (1912-1913/1330-1331), which saw various once-Ottoman polities
attacking the Ottoman empire (claiming that their territory, based on ethnic
considerations, should extend further into the Ottoman domain), motivated Muslims
around the globe to rally to the cause of the Turks against what was interpreted as a
mostly Christian attempt to hack away at a once-proud Muslim empire. Deobandi
leaders enthusiastically united their voices with those advocating pan-Islamic solidarity
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in the face of non-Muslim incursions; Mahmud Hasan and other divines of Deoband
were particularly vocal in this regard. On the other hand, Ahmad Riza and many of his
Barelvi acolytes shied away from such advocacy, and indeed, many of the subcontinent’s
‘alәma followed suit. Several fәtawa began circulating around India, arguing against
any sort of pan-Islamic intervention into the affairs of the Turks. These dissenting
scholars saw the conflicts then embroiling the Ottoman Empire as more of a civil war—
one that certainly did not affect Indian Muslims. In any case, they argued, the war was
a political one, not a religious one; not even Islam’s holy sites (over which the caliphs
had long been the guardians) were in danger. Finally, these juridical rulings pointed
out, as did Ahmad Riza Khan explicitly in 1913/1331, that the Ottoman sultanate was
not the true Islamic caliphate—and thus Muslims were under no spiritual obligation
whatsoever to go running to its defense. On multiple occasions, Mahmad Hasan
harshly criticized such fәtawa (in particular one written by ‘Abdul Haq and signed by
many others, which was brought to his attention several times and evidently received
wide publicity); their writers criticized back, and the issue remained divided.134 Still, for
millions of Muslims around the globe, including in India, the events rocking the
Ottoman regime drove solidarity more than division.
The next year (1914/1332), Turkey entered the Great War and Sultan Mehmed V
issued a proclamation of jyhad against the Allies (including the British, of course)—a call
that the British tried to squelch by assuring the Muslims under its rule that Islam’s holy
sites would under no circumstances be harmed. In India, Muslims of all stripes rushed
to affirm their fealty to London (though, in the case of some who did this—like
‘Ubaidullah Sindhi—such affirmations should be taken with a grain of salt, especially
considering their political machinations at the time, not to mention their subsequent
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anti-British activities). Once again, too, the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic was made
evident when the British government induced leading loyal ‘alәma, including Ahmad
Riza Khan, to issue juridical rulings supporting loyalty to the British government, in
opposition to such “extremists” as Mahmud Hasan and Farangi Mahal’s ‘Abdul Bari.135
The rulings echoed those of previous years advocating for Indian Muslims to leave the
Turkey issue well enough alone. Still, such events drove millions of Muslims into a
more explicitly anti-British camp, one that would facilitate cooperation even with
Hindus in order to rid the subcontinent of its foreign overlords.
Perhaps the greatest force influencing Barelvi rejection of Muslim-Congress
cooperation was the ardent devotion that its founder demonstrated towards the selfreliance of the Muslim community. In fact, according to one fәtwa, written in 1913/1331
(one which Sanyal asserts may have been his only juridical ruling, from among
thousands, dealing strictly with practical, political issues rather than purely religious
ones),136 Ahmad Riza encouraged the adoption of a four-pronged program aimed at
insulating the Muslim community of India from both potential Hindu predators and the
British Raj. In effect, he was offering an alternative to the Deobandi approach. The
fәtwa suggested Muslims should: (1) boycott British Indian courts, instead relying on
local Muslim law; (2) purchase what they needed only from fellow Muslims (and never
go into debt to Hindu moneylenders); (3) if wealthy and city-dwelling, open up interestfree banks for the use of fellow Muslims; and (4) acquire additional light and knowledge
pertaining to their faith, thereby strengthening the Muslim community as a whole.137 If
the fәtwa represents Ahmad Riza’s political philosophy vis-à-vis the political situation
facing the Indian Muslim community of the time, it may be highly instructive. For it
reveals, first, a desire to see the Muslim community function separately from all others;
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in other situations, as previously mentioned, Ahmad Riza and his followers would go
further, refusing to work even with fellow Muslims if they belonged to “lost” groups or
espoused “bad” doctrine. Second, it suggests that Ahmad Riza did not feel that the
Muslims were in any state to take an active role in the politics of the time; they needed
first to shore themselves up, both temporally and spiritually. Third, it demonstrates a
desire on the part of Ahmad Riza to see a restoration (even elevation), however slowly,
of the traditional role of the ‘alәma within the Muslim community. A boycott of a major
pillar of the British Raj—that of the court system—was a bold move, one that he would
take himself in 1917/1335. All of this goes a long way in explaining Barelvi opposition
not just to standard Deobandi political positions, but to Deobandi involvement in
nationalist politics in the first place.
But perhaps the most important event in its long-term ramifications for the
possibility of Hindu-Muslim unity came in 1905/1323. It was in this year that the great
partition of Bengal into more or less Muslim and Hindu sections took place. The action,
described by Gokhale as “concocted in the dark and carried out in the face of the fiercest
opposition,” would foreshadow the far greater partition that would follow around forty
years later. Viceroy Curzon insisted that the move was strictly practical, meant to deal
with what otherwise represented the bureaucratic nightmare of administering a
province of almost ninety million inhabitants. But to the Bengali-speaking Hindus of
Bengal, and particularly the bhadralok of Calcutta, whose fearless opinion had so long
irked the Crown’s representatives on the subcontinent, the move was clearly meant to
isolate and nullify any influence they might have enjoyed as a majority constituency. By
dividing the province down its middle, with the new border just to the east of Calcutta,
the British—whether by coincidence or by design—had neatly created a Muslim
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majority province to the east (in Eastern Bengal and Assam) and a Hindu-majority
province to the west in which Bengali-speakers suddenly found themselves a minority in
their own bifurcated country (outnumbered by the combined Bihari- and Oriya-speaking
peoples inhabiting the newly created political zone).
While Hindus across Bengal and Hindustan protested vociferously, the Muslims of
newly created Eastern Bengal and Assam, previously dominated politically by Calcutta,
suddenly found themselves un-beholden to the Hindu moneylenders and landowners to
the west, and their one-time backwater of Dhaka abruptly elevated to provincial capital
status. Indeed, to these millions, it was difficult not to interpret the hotly contested
partition of Bengal as a very good thing. But beyond the political freedom that came
with the move, it was the Hindu reaction across India that really isolated many
Muslims, causing them to band together in opposition to their fellow Indians of Hindu
persuasion. Muslim leaders in Dhaka and Aligarh reached out to one another as a
result, and in October of 1906/Sh’aban of 1324, a delegation of said leaders under the
nominal headship of the twenty-nine-year-old third Aga Khan—ostensibly representing
the community of Islam in Hindustan—met Viceroy Minto. Their purpose: to lobby for
the political rights of India’s Muslims. This initial delegation would later evolve into
what the world would come to know as the All-India Muslim League, officially
organized and founded (significantly, in Dhaka) two months later, on 30 December
1906/14 Dh’ul Q’adah 1324. The partition of Bengal had thus awoken the Muslim
minority—or at least the most financially, socially, and politically elite among them—
and provided the stimulus necessary for their initial political organization. From now
on, the fate of the independence movement would, in large measure, be dictated by the
dynamic between these two now-politically-organized groups. The battle lines had
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been drawn, and the Deobandis and the Barelvis, by and large, would choose to stand on
opposite sides.
With the anullment of the Bengal partition in 1911/1329 under largely “Hindu”
pressure, “Muslim” disappointment only increased. Indeed, the British decision to
restore Bengal “annoyed the Muslims” and was “a clear breach of assurances and
commitments made by the British regarding the inviolability of the partition.” And the
following years clearly demonstrated that a sort of political “turning point” in the
history of Indian Muslims had occurred. “It could be argued,” one Pakistani legal
commentator would opine decades later, “that the seeds of Pakistan were sown by this
one event.”138
With the passing of a couple years, however, there were signs that the communalism
might actually be ebbing in the face of a common enemy. A younger cadre of
Aligarhists (whence came the core of the League), disaffected by Sir Sayyid’s old loyalist
policy, pushed a more ardently anti-British agenda. Many of these had been influenced
by a rationalist-traditionalist scholar from Azamgarh, mwlana Shibli (d. 1914 AD),
whose passion for the glorious Muslim past seemed veritably contagious and whose
politics lined up more or less with the Deobandi leadership’s.139 Under this pressure
from within, in 1913/1331 the Muslim League adopted a position much like that of the
Congress’s, advocating for a level of self-government in India, albeit still under the
auspices of the British Crown. This shift in stance opened the way for a brief period of
communal unity, generally speaking, exemplified by the Lucknow Pact of 1916/1334
(according to which the Congress agreed to the League demand for separate communal
electorates) and the subsequent cooperation of the Muslim League with the Indian
National Congress. One of the most dedicated proponents of Hindu-Muslim unity was
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a young London-trained lawyer named Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah. Ahmad Riza Khan and
many of his Barelvi followers, meanwhile, were fierce opponents of the Pact; the divine
out of Bareilly characterized Deobandi cooperation with the Hindus as nothing more
than a disgraceful “sell-out.”140

Spreading the Rivalry: the Proliferation of mәdarys Networks.
Rashid Ahmad Gangohi passed away in 1905/1323, and with him the last of the
major “first generation” founders. The Deobandi university’s first student, Mahmud
Hasan, easily slipped into the role of the revivalist movement’s leader. Described by one
of his more illustrious students as “of spare frame, unassuming” (and even “skeletal,
frail,” though in his capacity as a teacher or lecturer reportedly able to assume the
presence of “a lion of God”)141 Mahmad Hasan had, to quote Faruqi, “drunk deep in the
spirit and the ideas underlying the foundation of the [dar ul’alwm]” and was a “man of
action.”142 Virtually since birth, Mahmad Hasan—by virtue of his family—had been
tied to the institution at Deoband and the movement that grew out of it. His father,
Zulfiqar ‘Ali (d. 1904 AD), had studied at Delhi College with the great Mamluk ‘Ali and
Sadr al-Din Azardah, as had his uncle, the aforementioned Mahtab ‘Ali. Later, Mahtab
‘Ali would be numbered “among Deoband’s most distinguished teachers,” while Zulfiqar
‘Ali, who worked as a professor at Bareilly College and as deputy inspector of mәdarys in
Meerut before relocating to Deoband, would gain a significant reputation as a great
scholar himself, particularly of Arabic (but also of Farsi and even “western knowledge”).
At Deoband, Zulfiqar ‘Ali’s family acquired a sort of scholarly distinction in the area,
despite the proliferation of both noted local ‘alәma and great families for whom religious
scholarship was a long tradition; his three younger brothers, mwlana Hakim
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Muhammad Hasan (who worked in the service of Rashid Ahmad in Gangoh, studied at
the dar ul’alwm in Deoband, and later served as a teacher there for over four decades),
mwlana Hamid Hasan, and mwlvi hafyž Muhammad Mahasan, all achieved impressive
levels of scholarship. Both Mahtab ‘Ali and Zulfiqar ‘Ali had served as teachers to the
young Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, both were among the Deobandi university’s most
distinguished and active founders, and both became “pillars” of the dar ul’alwm’s mәjlys-e
shwra. In fact, Mahmad Hasan’s “entire household participated in this scholarly
movement [the founding of the dar ul’alwm at Deoband].”143 Thus it was perhaps only
natural that under Mahmad Hasan—evidently the xәlifәħ of Imdadullah himself—the
Deobandi movement would enter its first explicitly political, even anti-British, phase.
Concurrent with that development was the establishment and spread of a Deobandi
“network” of associated mәdarys, typically run by former students of the dar ul’alwm at
Deoband and dedicated to the spiritual (including political) vision of the school’s
founders and current leadership. During Mahmud Hasan’s tenure as the university’s
Sәdәr mәdarys, the student population is reported to have tripled, from around two
hundred when he first took office to over six hundred when he passed away. Around a
dozen schools associated themselves with the institution at Deoband by 1880/1297, ten
years before Mahmud Hasan began as principal. By 1900/1317, a decade into his
tenure, there were around forty.
Indeed, by the turn of the twentieth century AD (a decade after Mahmud Hasan was
made principal) the dar ul’alwm had associated schools established as far east as
Chittagong, and in Dhaka, Calcutta, Patna, Arrah, Darbhanga, Benares, Ghazipur,
Mubarakpur, Jaunpur, Fatehpur, Shahjahanpur, Karnal, Lahore, Gujranwala, and as far
south as Madras.144 In the northwest (especially in Peshawar) among the Pathan tribes,
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Deobandism quickly established itself, too. Thanks in large part to the groundwork laid
by the combination of Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidi dominance (set in motion after the
1748/1161 Afghan raid of Delhi) and the influence of sәyyid Ahmad and, later, the
powerful Akhund of Swat, many among the tribal ‘alәma—and particularly those of the
eastern Pathan, in what is today northwestern Pakistan—looked to Deoband for
religious inspiration and spiritual guidance. After all, Akhund Ghaffur had acted as a
major player in what might be considered a nineteenth-century/thirteenth-century
microcosmic precursor to the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry: the feud between the divine of
Swat and the Kotah Mullah, Muruf Bey. The latter had supported the British (as did, in
the eyes of many Deobandis as of the time of this writing, Ahmad Riza Khan, however
tacitly) even as the Akhund actively fought against them. In addition, the Akhund was
a dedicated revivalist, while the Kotah Mullah, according to Abdul Ghaffur,
incorporated un-Islamic ritual into his religious practice (the same charge, of course,
leveled by Deobandis against Barelvis a few years later). Later, too, the pir of Manki
Sharif would split with the Hadda Mullah, by far the Akhund’s most prominent spiritual
successor, over similar religious differences; the schism would foreshadow the divide,
half a century later, between the pir of Manki Sharif (now classified as Barelvi and a
hard-core Muslim League supporter) and the (mostly Deobandi, INC-supporting) “Red
Shirts” in the years before Partition. As the Akhund’s “pedagogic line” was the
“dominant one” among the eastern Pathans, perhaps it was only natural that
Deobandism would find such ready acceptance there.145 Thus, to quote Haroon,

The pirimuridi line of the Akhund Ghaffur-Hadda Mulla, unified by the
bait and directed by the Hadda Mulla into the twentieth century, became
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the vehicle for the dissemination of a revivalist ideology of religious
practice through the eastern Pakhtun regions, and, with its creation, the
Tribal Areas.146

The continuity that existed between the Akhund Ghaffur’s line of authority and the dar
ul’alwm at Deoband—a continuity that resulted in the widespread establishment of
Deobandi mәdarys among the Pathans—may be demonstrated by the example of the
Hadda Mullah’s “most important” disciple, Fazal Wahid (d. 1937 AD), later known as
Haji Turangzai. Fazal Wahid initially studied under one of the Akhund’s murids, then
in a Waliullahi mәdrәsәħ in Tehkal, before relocating to Deoband in order to study at
the now-famous university there. Just the fact that he chose to make the long journey
to the UP to study at Deoband demonstrates, perhaps, the institution’s powerful pull in
the Pathan northwest. In any case, at Deoband he became friends with Mahmud Hasan,
with whom he performed the hәj to Mecca. While in Arabia, Fazal Wahid met with and
received bi’at from none other than Imdadullah, to whom he swore to carry on the
legacy of sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli—to “promote revivalism and opposition to the
British,” specifically among the Pathans. After returning home, Fazal Wahid became a
student of the Hadda Mullah, only to become a famous ‘alym himself, helping to spread
Deobandism in the tribal areas.147
A number of other prominent Deoband graduates moved to the Pathan northwest
after the completion of their religious training, along with several Pathan ‘alәma who
likewise received their education at the dar ul’alwm. Many of these former students
established Deobandi seminaries of their own in the frontier region. One of these
Pathan Deobandis (described by Haroon as “the most important”) was Saifur Rahman,
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from Mathra. After studying at Deoband, Saifur Rahman taught for some time in an
‘Ubaidullah Sindhi-founded school near Delhi, where he (Saifur Rahman) recruited
many other Pathan students to join him. After 1914/1332, he moved back to the
northwest frontier (followed by many of his students) to carry on the revivalist
endeavor among his fellow Pathans.148
*
From the very beginning, the Barelvis lagged behind their Deobandi counterparts
within the domain of mәdrәsәħ-building. Sanyal attributes Ahmad Riza Khan’s seeming
lack of emphasis on the religious seminary (at least in its revivivalist form, as in the case
of the Deobandi dar ul’alwm or even Sir Sayyid’s college at Aligarh) to his own
educational experience, gleaning as he did the vast majority of his own knowledge by
himself from books, or at the feet of a small handful of teachers in the traditional, oneon-one setting. Still, by 1920/1338 the movement could claim a number of institutions
as adhering strictly to the “Ahl-e-Sunnat” (i.e. Barelvi) way. In 1904-1905/1322-1323,
with Ahmad Riza Khan’s personal approbation, one of the great man’s students—
Zafaruddin Bihari (later to become one of Ahmad Riza Khan’s authorized
biographers)—together with Ahmad Riza’s young son Hamid Riza (d. 1943 AD) and
brother Hasan Riza (d. 1908 AD), founded the mәdrәsәħ Manzar al-Islam. It would
never become a great dar ul’alwm (in this early period the school graduated a mere four
to ten students per year), much less the institutional hub of the movement, but as
Ahmad Riza Khan acted personally as its sәrpәrәst and his son Hamid as its chief
administrator (with their descendents—to this day—running the school attached to the
mәsjyd Bibiji), the seminary quickly acquired, from the beginning, a sort of symbolical
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status as an Ahl-e-Sunnat center. Indeed, as early as 1908/1326, its graduation
ceremony was attracting scholars and Sufis from hundreds of miles away.149
But there were other, grander schools (mostly in northern India), which, by the
early twentieth/fourteenth century, had established themselves as belonging to the
movement. These included the centuries-old mәdrәsәħ ‘Aliyya in Rampur, where,
perhaps appropriately, Barelvi predecessors Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi and ‘Abd ul-Haqq
Khairabadi (d. 1899 AD) both had taught; the mәdrәsәħ al-Hadis in Pilibhit, founded in
1893/1310 by Wasi Ahmad Muhaddis Surati; the mәdrәsәħ Shams al-‘Uloom in
Badayun, founded by ‘Abd ul-Qayyum (d. 1900 AD) in 1899/1317; and the mәdrәsәħ
Hanafiyya in Patna, established by ‘Abd ul-Wahid Firdausi Azimabadi (d. 1908 AD) in
1900/1318. Other schools, too, associated with Ahmad Riza Khan and Barelvism,
proliferated across the subcontinent, especially from the 1920s/1340s (like the Jamia
Naeemia in Moradabad, about which more later). Each of these institutions was
formulated with an express purpose: to combat the pernicious spread of “Wahhabism,”
including more than any other sect that of the Deobandis. To illustrate the point, one
Barelvi commentator, lauding the efforts of Didar ‘Ali Alwari (who founded the dar
ul’alwm Hizb al-Ahnaf in Lahore in the 1920s/1340s), wrote that, if not for his (Didar
‘Ali’s) endeavors, “the whole Punjab would today be full of ‘Wahhabis’.” Such
sentiments reinforce the status of Barelvism as a counter-reformational movement. In
any case, as Sanyal concludes, these early-twentieth-century AD Ahl-e-Sunnat
seminaries were nonetheless “instrumental in creating a network of personal links
between ‘ulama’ and in producing new leaders.”150 Still, the early characterization of
Barelvi efforts to build mәdarys as trailing that of the Deobandis would continue to be an
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accurate portrayal through Partition, in Pakistan, and into the twenty-first/fifteenth
century to the time of this writing.
*
Given the now-established preponderance of Deobandism in the northwest frontier
region—plus its long history of insurgency against the encroaching British leviathan,
especially via Deobandi forebear sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli and his various jyhadi
successors—perhaps it is only natural that the Deobandi leaders, no longer fearful of
being associated with a long past “Mutiny,” would select this very area as the staging
ground for their first major anti-British scheme since the school’s founding. After all,
Mahmud Hasan himself had long been establishing “rapport” with the religious scholars
of the northwestern frontier regions, many of whom were former students of the dar
ul’alwm.151 Remarked one official at the Deobandi university in 1947/1366 of Mahmud
Hasan and his compatriots,

[T]he passion of these great men against British power was neither for rank nor
station, was not for ministerial chairs, was not for the power of any one party,
but it was only for this: that the oppressed country be taken out from an
oppressive nation’s grasp…

The principal pastime of these great men was always talk and anxiety—[about]
how to throw from [their] shoulders the yoke of the British. This was the focus
of their predictions and revelations…152
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In addition, “large groups” of the Sәdәr mәdarys’s associates, including teachers, former
students, disciples, and other contacts, many of whom had taken part in the countless
clandestine meetings held in the dar ul’alwm principal’s own house, had already “fanned
out in India and abroad…striving ardently and with temerity to put into action
[Mahmud Hasan’s] prepared plan.” Present at those secret meetings were “some men
of the northwest border.”153 The future president of the tens-of-thousands-strong
Pathan xuda-e-xydmәtgar (also known as the “KKs”), Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (later
dubbed the “Frontier Gandhi”), would visit Deoband in 1914/1332 after receiving a
personal invitation by letter from Mahmud Hasan. In Deoband he met with several of
the university’s most eminent scholars to discuss the establishment of a base (or
“center”) within one of the northwest frontier’s “free areas”—a base from which to
launch the movement that would finally free Hindustan from British tyranny and pave
the way for an Islamic resurgence.154
The Deobandi leader’s idea was simple, grand, and infused with the hope of
generations for the return of Islamic power on the subcontinent. Today it is described
by Deobandi historians as more or less naturally occurring within a succession of
political action whose players included, in order, “hәżrәt Shah Waliullah, hәżrәt Shah
‘Abdul ‘Aziz, hәżrәt sәyyid Ahmad shәhid, and hәżrәt Shah [Muhammad] Isma’ail
shәhid… and hәżrәt Nanautawi and hәżrәt Gangohi.”155 This was to be shix ul-hynd’s
contribution to the great struggle as the spiritual and political successor of the
aforementioned freedom-fighting scholars. Mahmud Hasan’s plan (evidently in
incubation since at least 1905/1323):156 to start a tribal insurrection against British
authority among the Pathans of the frontier, with the aid and support of Britain’s
enemies—namely Afghanistan, Ottoman Turkey, and, to a lesser extent, Iran, imperial
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Germany, and even Russia. Islamic law demanded that military jyhad be launched from
the base of a Muslim state; in this case that state was to be Afghanistan. The British,
fully invested in the violence of the Great War, half a world away, would be unable to
quash the seemingly spontaneous militant movement, and Muslims across India would
thereby be inspired to join the ranks of their frontier brethren in a pan-Indian Islamic
revolt that would ultimately drive the foreign scourge from the subcontinent altogether.
The “banner of Islam” would be planted in Hindustan once again, and Muslims would
finally be free to practice their religion—including, essentially, the institution of its
political structure. This was the plan. But first, the governments of Afghanistan,
Turkey, Iran, and Germany would need to be convinced of its feasibility.
With this in mind, in October 1915/Dh’ul Hijja 1333 Mahmud Hasan sent one of his
most trusted disciples, the “highly trained” and indefatigable ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi, to
Kabul.157 Sindhi was a converted Sikh who had worked on political projects before—
like the mysterious jәm’aiәt ul-әnsar,158 and the establishment of the Nazaratul Ma’arifulQuraniyya school in old Delhi. The latter endeavor was designed to increase the
‘alәma’s influence among the more Westernized segment of Muslims.159 Working
under Mahmud Hasan’s direction, Sindhi (who, according to one London newspaper,
had “infected some of the [dar ul’alwm’s] staff and students with his own militant and
anti-British ideas”)160 would spend the next seven years in Afghanistan’s capital city,
meeting with disaffected Indians and other enemies of the British presence in Hindustan
(by December 1915/Safar 1334 he had already met with the Berlin-Indian Committee),
organizing them into an effective resistance, helping to establish an Indian governmentin-exile (including individuals tied to the Ghadr Party),161 and even setting up a branch
of the Indian National Congress, himself at its head and officially affiliated with the
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main organization in India. (It is interesting to note—and characteristic of the
Deobandi modus operandi, that the head of the Sindhi-organized provisional government
featured a prominent Hindu, Mahendra Pratap, as its president). On the way to Kabul,
too, Sindhi had met with the still-active remnants of the Indian fighters originally
organized by sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli around eighty-five years previously—the
“Hindu Fanatics” as they were known by some (or, as a British report put it, “the
fanatical India party of fighters”), originally based around Sittana.162 Sindhi hoped that
from his Kabul base, he would be able to organize a great Muslim army, headquartered
in the Hijaz (more specifically Medina, where Mahmud Hasan was to be commander-inchief) but with regional command centers in Istanbul, Tehran, and Kabul (where he
himself would act as regional commander). And though the әmir of Afghanistan never
fully committed himself to out-and-out supporting an anti-British uprising among the
Pathans—crucial to the success of Mahmud Hasan’s original plan—’Ubaidullah Sindhi
was able to build very warm relations with the royal court, and played a significant role
(sometimes directly, often indirectly) as an influencer of Afghanistan’s India-related
foreign policy.
Meanwhile, Mahmud Hasan (some say to avoid arrest)163 traveled to western
Arabia, to Islam’s holiest cities, ostensibly to perform the hәj. The Hijaz was mostly
intended as a springboard, however, from where he might journey to Istanbul to meet
with representatives from the Turkish government. Such travel became unnecessary
when, in 1916/1334, Turkish War Minister Anwar Pasha met with the Deobandi leader
in Arabia. Mahmud Hasan also met with Ghalib Pasha, the Turkish governor of the
Hijaz. Both officials seemed open to the idea of supporting Mahmud Hasan’s plan to
incite insurrection in India’s northwest frontier areas. In fact, the high-ranking Anwar
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Pasha even penned a letter, subsequently distributed widely by ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi and
others (including one of Mahmud Hasan’s traveling companions, Muhammad Mian
Ansari, who had acted as messanger in actually bringing the letter back to the
subcontinent from Arabia and who was later charged with “inculcat[ing] jihad”164
amongst the Pathan tribes)165 in Afghanistan and northwestern Hindustan, promising
Turkish support and calling for a general Muslim uprising against the British in India.
All seemed to be going according to Mahmud Hasan’s original plan. It was now time
for him to return to India’s borderlands to rescuscitate the old jyhad of sәyyid Ahmad.
Unfortunately for the movement, the whole anti-British scheme—which would have
been hard-pressed to work anyway without full support from Kabul, let alone help from
a soon-to-be ousted government in Istanbul—went up in smoke when the the British
government in India, through its secret police network (the CID), intercepted
communications from Sindhi meant for Mahmud Hasan, relating to his progress in
Afghanistan. Thus the great pan-Islamic plan was discovered in 1916/1334, almost as
soon as it had been set in motion, and a flurry of arrests followed in India. Later that
year, Sherif Hussein bin ‘Ali launched the Arab Revolt against Ottoman Turk rule in
Arabia; and through the Arabs—for now, allies of London—the British were able to
capture Mahmud Hasan (in fact, he and four of his associates were first arrested by the
Arabs themselves, and only later handed over to British authorities).166 Eventually he
was interned at St. Clement’s Barracks, a British prison on the island of Malta, where
the old Deobandi cleric and anti-British activist was “among the world’s most renowned
political prisoners.”167 Here he received some comfort through letters from home,
particularly those written by his little brother, Muhammad Mahasan, who kept him
apprised of goings-on in the outside world.168 The whole affair was painted by the
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British media as a Berlin-directed conspiracy (the headline screamed, “German Plots in
India”); the one-hundred-fifty-page “Rowlatt Report,” too, commissioned by the
Government of India, characterized the “Silk Letters’ Plot” as “an amazing story of
sedition” that “equaled any romance of Robert Louis Stevenson”—behind which lurked
the inciting Germans.169

Khilafat: Ephemeral High Point of Hindu-Muslim Unity.
By 1920/1338, when the British set Mahmud Hasan free in Bombay (the old man,
suffering from a debilitating case of tuberculosis, evidently no longer seemed like much
of a threat), most signs indicated that the future would be characterized by united
Hindu-Muslim activism. For long, many Muslims, as members of a minority
community, had remained at least implicitly loyal to the British, more wary of the
perceived threat of the majority Hindu population. But the first two decades of the
twentieth century AD saw the British government’s foreign policy continually
ostracizing its Muslim subjects, especially as the Russian threat—for long the British
impetus for maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire—began to
subside in the wake of a new, German one. During the 1911-1912/1329-1330 Tripoli
War, London had been more interested in good relations with Rome than the negative
repercussions its actions might induce across Muslim communities worldwide (despite
Viceroy Hardinge’s warning of “considerable effervescence” on the matter among
India’s Mohammedans), and similar results came of Britain’s overtures to Greece in the
subsequent Balkan Wars (Hardinge: “In all these wars against Turkey, it is we out in
India who in reality have to pay the piper”).170 Indeed, one prominent Indian nationalist
would write in 1917/1335, “Turkey’s war with Italy followed by her struggle with the
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Balkan States, has done wonders in nationalising the Indian Mohammedans. At the
present moment the Mohammedans perhaps feel even more intensely than the
Hindus”—certainly a wind change in Indian politics.171 Later, during the Great War,
Turkey made the disastrous decision to forego neutrality in order to side with the
Central Powers, prompting a secret 1916/1334 agreement between London and Paris
(with the consent of St. Petersburg) to carve up a post-war Ottoman empire between
them; this, of course, famously contradicted previous British promises to the Arabs of
the Hijaz, who expected to inherit a large, independent Arabia when the fighting was
over. After the war, the “hated” Treaty of Sèvres (1920/1338) threatened the
geographical integrity of Turkey by adding once-Ottoman territory to several
neighboring states, including Greece; the agreement also tore all non-Turkish
territories from the empire.172 These incidents caused trepidation among Muslims
worldwide, who feared not only for the caliphate, but also for other Middle Eastern
“Muslim” lands then under the control of non-Muslim powers. As a result, Muslims in
India launched the Khilafat (xylafәt) Movement, protesting these developments, calling
for the preservation of the integrity of the caliphate, and generally rallying Muslims
against non-Muslim intervention in Muslim lands. The movement, organized in large
part by the ‘Ali brothers and Abul Kalam Azad, joined forces with the Indian National
Congress; Gandhi agreed to support Khilafat and the Khilafatists agreed to support the
INC’s non-cooperation movement. (Jawaharlal once opined that, though there was
certainly “no lack of vulgarity” when it came to the addresses of Congress leaders to one
another during their various conferences, “some of the minor Khilafat leaders probably
led the rest” where the use of the expletive was concerned).173 Thus by “declaring his
support for the Khilafat, Gandhi secured the allegiance of an impressive array of Muslim
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ulema and political activists for his policy of non-violent non-cooperation.”174 One
western newspaper correspondent observed that the British were by now “so
unpopular…among Indian Mahomedans…that if an Indian Musulman cannot find an
obvious cause for a political evil he [n]aturally blames it on Lord Curson [sic] as a sort
of fons et origo of the evils that beset the Mahomedan world.”175
At the same time, the British government had created a detested common enemy for
both Hindus and Muslims alike to hate (i.e. itself) through a succession of highly
unpopular domestic moves. The generally detested Press Act of 1910/1328 (recalling
smoldering memories of the Vernacular Press Act of 1878/1295) had threatened the
forfeiture of a press’s security deposit as well as the seizure of all copies of any offensive
(i.e. “allegedly seditious”) publications. Meanwhile, newspapers considered loyal to the
regime were subsidized in order to provide “wholesome literary food for the masses.”176
The result, according to one Hindu commentator of the period, on Muslim newspapers:
“All the independent Muslim papers have either been wiped out or are dragging on a
lifeless and miserable existence.” Many of these publications were Deobandi, or at least
tended to be Deobandi-leaning in tone and political philosophy. “The Comrade is gone.
The Hamdard has been strangled to death, the Muslim Gazette ceased to exist long ago,
Al-Hilal is no more, the Zamindar is carrying on its colorless existence with a sword of
Damocles always hanging over its head.”177 Then, during the Great War, the
government passed the Defence of India Act (1915/1333), legislation that greatly
curtailed civil liberties, among other things bypassing due process. The act was an
attempt to deal with pesky nationalist “schemes” during a time of war (similar
legislation was passed in Britain itself), and its “emergency powers” were to remain in
force for six months after the war ended. It was during this period that the
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aforementioned Lucknow Pact, uniting Muslim League and Congress efforts, was
forged. Perhaps the words of the League’s newly elected president Mazhar ul-Haq,
spoken on the occasion of the party’s December 1915/Safar 1334 conference in Bombay,
best exemplify the wind change in Indian politics during this period. “We are Indian
Muslims,” he said.

These words, “Indian Muslims,” convey the idea of our nationality and of
our religion, and as long as we keep our duties and responsibilities
arising from these factors before our eyes, we can hardly go wrong.
Indian Muslims are Indians first!178

Considering the party’s major course adjustment only a few years later (not to mention
its hard-line separatist position later on), such sentiments may seem out of place at a
Muslim League conference, yet they are illustrative of the sort of united, nationalist
feeling then extant within such circles during and immediately after the Great War.
For now, the pendulum was swinging the Deobandis’ way, even if the League’s
pronouncements stopped far short of denouncing its loyalty to the British
government.179
When, with war’s end, the time came for normalcy to be restored after the
imposition of the Defence of India Act, the Imperial Legislative Council refused to enact
the promised restoration (despite Montagu’s 1917/1335 assurances to the contrary),
and on 10 March 1919/7 Jumada II 1337, the tyrannical measures enacted four years
previously (including indefinite detention sans trial, two years’ incarceration for those
merely suspected of being terrorists, warrantless arrests, juryless trials, and a curtailment
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of freedom of speech vis-à-vis the press) were extended indefinitely. The 1919/1337
legislation—known as the Rowlatt Act, named after the chief of the committee who had
recommended the measures—prompted wide criticism from Indian political leaders and
activists, and Gandhi organized a nationwide fast and strike (the “Rowlatt sәtyagrәhә,”
the latter meaning “truth-force”), to be held on 6 April/5 Rajab, in protest. But the
Mahatma, an integral part of whose strategy was the use of non-violence as a moral
means of struggle, was unable to contain the pent-up frustration felt by millions of
Indians at these political developments; a series of riots in the Punjab caused him to
suspend the sәtyagrәhә only days later. Then on 13 April/12 Rajab, one hundred fifty
troops led by British General R. E. H. Dyer opened fire on a crowd of around twenty
thousand Indians gathered in Jalianwalla Bagh, Amritsar, to protest the Rowlatt Act;
the volley continued at least six minutes without pause, resulting in piles of bodies: over
three thousand civilian dead and one thousand five hundred wounded. If the
nationalists—Hindu, Muslim, and otherwise—hadn’t been fired up and united before,
this event (and the follow-up violence meted out by the British government in the
Punjab in the days following) fueled the movement like none before it. Even many
Barelvis joined the fray, despite their leader’s stance to the contrary. “The most
significant development of Nationalism,” wrote Arya Samajist and Indian activist Lala
Lajpat Rai three years after the end of the Great War, was “the unity between Hindus
and the Mohammedans on the question of self-government.”180
When Mahmud Hasan arrived in Bombay, then, it was this show of unity that
greeted him. The news of his freedom had been published in “all the great newspapers
of Hindustan,” and immediately Khilafatist and Cogressite leaders alike scrambled to
arrange a grand reception for him upon disembarkation.181 Indeed, Gandhi himself
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traveled down from Ahmedabad just to meet the Deobandi leader—and to explain the
political situation, much to shix ul-hynd’s approbation. Soon thereafter, Farangi Mahal’s
‘Abdul Bari likewise met with Mahmud Hasan, outlining for him the joint KhilafatistCongressite plan. In response, Mahmud Hasan penned a fәtwa (whose “each and every
word spilt fire,” opined one Deobandi commentator)182 in support of Khilafat and noncooperation; it would be signed by almost a thousand Muslim scholars.183 The
Deobandis were officially on board the Khilafat/non-cooperation program. To continue
to garner support, Mahmud Hasan—despite his worsening condition—embarked on a
tour of the United Provinces, delivering speeches and meeting with Muslim political
and religious leaders to encourage them to buoy up the Khilafatist (and noncooperation) effort.184 Mahmud Hasan had no problem working with Hindus (and
others) in accomplishing the shared goal of bringing down the British government. “If
the people of another community come forward and help in your pious mission and
extend support in crisis, you should cooperate with them,” he urged fellow Muslims in
1920/1338. “You should be equally courteous to them. [In fact], you should act more
generously.”185
But the Barelvi guiding lights did not support the Deobandi position on the Khilafat
issue. Indeed, Ahmad Riza Khan of Bareilly had a completely different take on the
situation then embroiling what was once the mighty Ottoman Empire. The Barelvi
divine opposed the Khilafat movement outright—though not necessarily because he
disagreed with its aims. Instead, Ahmad Riza, who interpreted the actions of the
Khilafatists as mere “political fuss and noise,”186 approached the matter practically (as he
saw it); he felt that, given the state of the Indian Muslim community, there was not
much it could do to really help its Turkish counterpart in any functionally useful way
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(eventually he would admonish Indian Muslims to donate a month’s salary to Turkish
relief). Mostly the Ahl-e-Sunnat leader thought all of the Khilafatists’ travels and
meetings and goings-on were a big waste of money. Indeed, once he himself had been
charged by a Deobandi political organization (called the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind; jәm’aiәt
‘alәma-e-hynd, or “Assembly of Indian Clergy,” hereafter JUH) ) of doing nothing for the
cause of the Turks or the Muslim holy sites; in reply, Ahmad Riza countered that,
simply put, neither had the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind—the difference was that the latter had
taken large sums of money from Muslims in the process!187 He also took issue with the
general Muslim defense of the “caliphate,” arguing that the sultan of Turkey, not even
of the Quraysh line, could not rightfully enjoy the title of caliph. Besides, Ahmad Riza
argued, the whole Khilafatist issue was a front; its members were insincere at best and
manipulators at worst—for, said he in one 1920/1338 fәtwa, the movement’s leaders
were merely using the issue of the Ottoman caliphate as a smokescreen for their real
aim: political independence from the British.188 Gandhi was a charlatan anyway; after
all, how could a man embroiled in a nationalist cause genuinely adopt an internationalist
movement with explicitly pan-Islamic aims? The Barelvis interpreted the Mahatma’s
maneuverings vis-à-vis the Muslim Khilafatist leaders as nothing more than shrewd
politics—and shame on the Deobandis and their cohorts for being so easily duped into
the Gujarati’s game. Some amongst the Khilafatist leadership even seemed, through
Barelvi eyes, to lavish praise upon Gandhi fit only for a bona fide prophet of Islam; once,
Ahmad Riza is reported to have compared the esteem which Khilafat leaders granted
Gandhi to that which the leaders of that most apostate group, the Ahmadiyya, accorded
their own false prophet. “Neither can Gandhi be an ymam, nor [Mirza Ghulam Ahmad]
Qadiani a mujәddyd,” he reportedly told one Deobandi with whom he was acquainted.
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Of course, any perceived affront to Muhammad (as the Khilafatist attitude toward
Gandhi was interpreted) only further alienated the two groups politically.189
Most of all, however, Ahmad Riza opposed the Khilafat movement because he refused
to work together with many of those associated with it. In his view, a significant number
among the Khilafat leadership were “bad” Muslims, or those who had “lost their way.”190
Such exclusion would characterize the Barelvi attitude towards Deobandi cooperation
with the Indian National Congress through the Partition period; such a united front was
simply unacceptable “Hindu-Muslim unity.” In the words of Sanyal,

Ahmad Riza Khan believed that the relationship between Hindus and
Muslims being advocated by the non-cooperators was one of love,
intimacy, even unity, all of which, being forms of muwalat, were
forbidden; while, on the other hand, worldly or social relations with the
British were being forbidden although they had shar’i approval.191

Once again, Ahmad Riza’s exclusionary social worldview was made manifest, an outlook
perhaps best illustrated by one incident involving the INC’s most famous icon. At the
advice of several of his high-ranking Muslim counterparts—including the ‘Ali brothers
and ‘Abdul Bari—Gandhi reportedly tried to arrange a meeting with Ahmad Riza to
attempt to win the Barelvi divine over to the Khilafat cause. Upon hearing that the INC
leader was looking to meet, Ahmad Riza is alleged to have said, “What would he speak
about? Religion or worldly affairs? If it is wordly affairs, how could I partake—for I
have [chosen to] abstain from the world, and have no interest in it.”192 In fact, Ahmad
Riza took a great interest in the world, but refused to meet with Gandhi or align himself
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with his allegedly Hindu-dominated movement.193 To Ahmad Riza and his followers,
the Khilafatists were striving for “nationalist” (qwm pәrәst) goals while ignoring the
potential such action possessed—the potential, quite literally, to “destroy the true faith.”
In such a threat to Islam they were playing an active part, since, in the words of one
Barelvi commentator, “swәraj means Hindu Raj.”194
It is interesting to note the difference in philosophy here, generally speaking,
between Ahmad Riza Khan and his disciples and the Deobandi leadership. The latter
saw no contradiction in their position as ‘alәma, dedicated to the acquisition and
communication of religious knowledge, and their participation in Ahmad Riza’s
“worldly” (i.e. political) affairs. On the other side of the rivalry, Ahmad Riza emphasized
his own personal detachment from such things—an implicit jab at his scholarly rivals
who participated in the political arena. But Muhammad Mian would later justify the
Deobandi position in this regard in his book әsiran-e-malTa (“Prisoners of Malta”), in
his preface to the work’s mini-biography of Husain Ahmad Madani. To Muhammad
Mian, the elders of Deoband had taken the more difficult road, while the Barelvi head
and his kind had elected for the path of least resistance. It is obvious, reading
Muhammad Mian’s words, whose path he considers worthier of praise. “It is easy to opt
for the study of voluminous books for years…[but] it is difficult to submit before your
Creator and, with devotion and piety, render selfless service to His Creation…” Often,
Muhammad Mian argued, such submission involved going to the mosque, or leading a
study group, or preaching from the pulpit. But sometimes, too, it meant standing upon
“the political platform, for the greater well-being of your community and for upholding
the truth.” Such action often earned such men “abuse” from their “own people” (an
obvious reference to the literary barbs of Ahmad Riza and others)—and even “fetters
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and a dark cell from your oppressive enemy.” Such a man, willing to selflessly endure
the privations heaped upon him by both friend and enemy: this was “the true follower of
the Prophet,” Muhammad Mian insisted. After all, religious leaders had always played a
political role in Islam, from the beginning. For a religious scholar to become a recluse
(a form of “asceticism”) when his community needed him far more urgently in another
capacity was, certainly, the less noble path.195
Thus, as one scholar of political Barelvism has noted, in 1920/1338—the very
height of the Khilafat movement—“no one was ready to listen [to] any anti-Khilafat
and anti-non-cooperation statements,” even from the likes of Ahmad Riza Khan.196
While this statement is obviously an exaggeration if taken literally, it nevertheless
captures to a degree the general feeling of the period, or at least the way the political
winds were blowing. In time, however, that wind would change, as many Muslims
became disillusioned with Khilafat, the politics of the Congress, the Congress’
leadership, united political efforts with the Hindus, and/or the Deobandi political
leadership—and turn to voices like Ahmad Riza’s. In a sense, over the coming decades,
the denunciations by the Barelvi “founder” of both Khilafat’s ineffectuality and a united
Hindu-Muslim India would be more or less vindicated by history; whether or not such
vindication was “natural” or merely self-fulfilling is, of course, open for debate.
In any case, as Deobandis rallied behind the anti-British Khilafat-INC banner,
Ahmad Riza and his followers more or less supported the British government of India
throughout the Great War years and throughout the Khilafat movement period.197
(Remember, Ahmad Riza considered India, without question, a dar ul-yslam. At least the
British were Christian; would it not be worse to be led by a government of pagans—i.e.
Hindus?) And though Nehru would later describe the Khilafat Committee of 1920/1338
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as “powerful and far more representative” than the League198 (which also opposed
Khilafat), it must be pointed out that the Barelvis, by and large, were not represented
therein. On the contrary, they would form their own Turkish relief groups and
organizations; the most prominent was the Ansar al-Islam, an association made up of
Ahmad Riza’s inner circle, including Muhammad Mian Marahrawi, Zafaruddin Bihari,
Naimuddun Moradabadi, and Didar ‘Ali Alwar. The organization was formed according
to the admonition of Ahmad Riza Khan (outlined in his 1913/1331 juridical ruling): to
avoid association with Muslims who had, in their view, spiritually lost their way—and,
of course, to avoid “unity” with Hindus outright. Most of its tenets involved the
implementation of Ahmad Riza Khan’s (predominantly economic) reforms. But
unfortunately for the Ansar al-Islam, the group was constantly fighting off the charge of
being a British front organization.199 In fact, Barelvi self-imposed insulation from other
groups during the 1910s/1330s and 1920s/1340s, at that time centered mostly around
helping the Turks, foreshadowed the movement’s general behavior during the late
1930s/1350s and 1940s/1360s. Over the course of the latter period, too, Barelvi
organization—even whilst supporting the call for Pakistan—tended to include only
other Barelvis (or at least Barelvi-leaning scholars and pirs—the “proto-Barelvis” of
today’s Barelvi majority among South Asian Muslims), and certainly not Deobandis or,
heaven forbid, Hindus. This would have serious political consequences for the
movement later, in the new state of Pakistan, despite its numerical majority.
When, in 1919/1337, the Congress held its special session in Calcutta, partisans of
the Khilafat movement, fueled by the admonitions of the Deobandi ‘alәma, played a
major role in propelling Gandhi into the position of uncontested leader of the INC.
Indeed, thousands of the Mahatma’s Muslim Khilafatist supporters flocked to the
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gathering, making up a considerable portion of the approximately fifteen thousand
observers present (five thousand official delegates from across the country additionally
were in attendance). This groundswell of popular support, made up in part by Deobandi
or Deobandi-leaning Muslims seeking to protect the Ottoman caliphate, marked a
turning point for the Indian National Congress; henceforth the party’s base would be
swelled with Indians of the lower classes, not just those of the upper-middle-class elite.
By December of the same year (Rabi I 1338), the new-look Congress (during its Nagpur
conference, attended by fourteen thousand delegates) was shouting down the
aristocratic Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah and his warnings about sәtyagrәhә. Politics was a
gentleman’s game, as the League leader was apt to say, and Gandhi had dirtied the
party with his appeal to the unwashed masses, not to mention his infusion of religion
into what should be preserved as a strictly secular arena. (Ironically, this is, in effect,
precisely what Jinnah would do from the late 1930s/1350s as League head.) The
Khilafat movement, which had “swamped the politics of the Muslim League,” together
with the ascent of Gandhi and his quasi-spiritual form of resistance, had changed
politics, dragging it out of the smoking rooms and marble chambers and onto the
streets.200 Thanks to Khilafat, wrote one Indian commentator in 1917/1335, “the
political influence of the Muslim League among the people was…little as compared with
the influence of the Pan-Islamic party.”201 That party had already alienated the Barelvi
religious leadership, and this new political development alienated the more secularminded elites like Jinnah.
After the December/Rabi I conference, the future qayd-i-ә‘ažәm abruptly left the
Congress “in disgust,” never to return.202 Khilafat, wrote one noted South Asian
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historian, “by one of those quirks of Indian history had put the Mahatma into the saddle
of the Indian National Congress.”203
*
The Barelvis had a difficult time jumping onto the non-cooperation bandwagon, too;
Ahmad Riza’s attitude towards Gandhi has already been mentioned. Such involvement,
after all, would be unacceptable Hindu-Muslim unity. It would also mean working with
those (Muslims) of “bad” faith, in particular the Deobandis. In 1920/1338, leading
Barelvi alym Naimuddin Moradabai—who would, in the coming decades, play a major
role in the political promotion of the Barelvi religio-political agenda—issued a fәtwa
that out-and-out forbade Muslims from participating in the non-cooperation movement
(warning the ummәt, for example, of the dangers of working together with the Hindu
majority).204 That year Ahmad Riza Khan did the same, accusing the non-cooperationsupporting Muslims (like the Deobandi leadership) of confusing that which was neutral
(represented by the Christian British) with that which was expressly forbidden
(represented by the pagan Hindus). After all, the Muslim non-cooperationists were
loudly denouncing a government that was not interfering in Muslim worship (the
British one) in favor of one that would invariably be led by those already meddling in
that worship (the Hindus; this was a reference to the cow slaughter controversy then
rocking the subconinent, in which some Hindu groups sought strict legislation banning
the sacrifice of cows, a regular Muslim ritual).205 It should be noted, however, that such
declamations as these were not unanimous among Barelvis; there were a handful of
dissenters. For example, xәwajәħ Muhammad Ziauddin Sialvi went along with
Gandhi’s program, at least as far as non-cooperation was concerned; the xәwajәħ went
so far as to reject all gifts from any of his disciples working for the police or the British
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Indian Army, a move that clearly supported the Congress-led non-cooperation
movement.206 Another Barelvi leader, Abdul Majid Badayuni (elements of whose family
had been involved in a sort of power struggle with Ahmad Riza for some time) actually
helped found the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind. Similarly, powerful pir Jama’at ‘Ali Shah, who
would later help found the mostly Barelvi All-India Sunni Conference, supported the
Khilafat movement with his time, money, and speeches—and went so far as to
characterize anyone who didn’t do likewise as “non-Muslim.”207 But generally speaking,
Barelvis fell in line behind Ahmad Riza and his disciples. (This went both ways; one of
the Deobandi greats, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, evidently opposed non-cooperation along
lines similar to those of Ahmad Riza Khan).208
The heads of both schools (Deobandi and Barelvi) would issue at least one highly
circulated fәtwa supporting their positions on the Khilafat issue, including views on
non-cooperation. Mahmud Hasan’s 1920/1339 juridical ruling (though technically he
did not consider it to be a true fәtwa; “I am not a mufti,” he wrote, “[thus] to write a
fәtwa is the work of other ‘alәma [who are muftis]”)209 has already been mentioned, but
it is worth examining at greater length, revealing as it does much in terms of Deobandi
political philosophy and worldview. Ahmad Riza Khan’s own 1920/1338 ruling
likewise sheds critical light on the general Barelvi approach to politics and British
rule—and on their position vis-à-vis the Deobandis, who, in supporting the “Hindu”
Congress, according to Ahmad Riza, were merely “running from the rain only to enter
the drainpipe.” It may be useful, then, to compare and contrast these two diametrically
opposed fәtawa.
To buoy up his argument that cooperation with the Hindus was futile (not to
mention hәram) Ahmad Riza emphasized what he described as the “oppressive
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viciousness” of Hindus generally. As examples, he pointed to recent communal
tragedies in Katarpur, Arrah, “and elsewhere.” Three years earlier, Katarpur—a twothird Hindu, one-third Muslim village where tensions had long been simmering on
account of the cow slaughter issue—had been the scene of a brutal mass killing. The
Hindu perpetrators, allegedly motivated by the report of a Muslim individual who had
assaulted a Hindu untouchable, had set fire to a mosque and houses after burning thirty
Muslims alive; a later court decision confirmed the Hindus’ guilt when one hundred
forty-two of them were convicted for the crime, their punishments ranging from a
couple years’ imprisonment to the death penalty.210 Around the same time, the cow
slaughter issue had likewise ignited an anti-Muslim riot in Bihar’s Arrah district (as
mentioned earlier, a Barelvi stronghold, and thus naturally on Ahmad Riza’s radar),
where, in the words of nationalist leader M. A. Ansari, “Muslims…suffered untold
miseries” at the hands of the hooligans.211 Deobandis and other composite nationalists
insisted that such incidents were the work of individuals, anomalies vis-à-vis the general
Hindu whole. Ahmad Riza rejected this. The individuals and groups involved in the
Katarpur and Arrah riots, and countless others, were most certainly representatives of a
larger “Hindu nation.” The Deobandis were kidding themselves if they believed
otherwise.212
Both Deobandis and Barelvis cited the Qur’an as the ultimate proof that their
respective positions were God-sanctioned, and, of course, such citations could be found
in abdundance in their respective fәtawa. Mahmud Hasan cited Surah 60 (AlMumtahanah), verses 8-9:
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8 Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of
religion and do not expel you from their homes—from being righteous
toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, Allah loves those
who act justly.
9 Allah only forbids you from those who fight you because of religion and
expel you from your homes and aid in your expulsion—[forbids] that
you make allies of them. And whoever makes allies of them, then it is
those who are among the wrongdoers.213

Ahmad Riza answered back with another Qur’anic reference, earlier in the scripture
but chronologically received by the Prophet later—and thus, according to the most
generally acceptic theory, considered more authoritative and, in the case of
contradiction with earlier revelations, possessed of an annulling power. The reference
was Surah 9 (At-Tawbah), verse 73:

73 O Prophet, fight against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be
harsh upon them. And their refuge is Hell, and wretched is the
destination.

The trouble was that such verses held an entirely distinct meaning for the
Deobandis, who interpreted “disbelievers” in a different light altogether. Observe, for
example, the following Qur’anic citations, used by Mahmud Hasan in his fәtwa.

173

O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as
allies. They are [in fact] allies of one another. And whoever is any ally
to them among you—then indeed, he is [one] of them. Indeed, Allah
guides not the wrongdoing people. (Surah 5:51)

Let not believers take disbelievers as allies rather than believers. And
whoever [of you] does that has nothing with Allah, except when taking
precaution against them in prudence. And Allah warns you of Himself,
and to Allah is the [final] destination. (Surah 3:28)

Give tidings to the hypocrites that there is for them a painful
punishment—Those who take disbelievers as allies instead of the
believers. Do they seek with them honor [through power]? But indeed,
honor belongs to Allah entirely… O you who have believed, do not take
the disbelievers as allies instead of the believers. Do you wish to give
Allah against yourselves a clear cause? (Surah 4:138-139, 144)

These examples, cited by Mahmud Hasan to buoy up his argument against
cooperation with the Christians (i.e. the British), clearly illustrate the disconnect
between the Deobandis and the Barelvis. Indeed, for Ahmad Riza, the above citations
would only strengthen his own position; “disbelievers,” after all, referred to pagans like
the Hindus, not the Christian British. As for the verse from Surah 5, few Barelvis would
have considered the British an “ally” in any true sense of the term; a lack of desire on
their part to agitate against British rule did not make them the Christians’ “friends.”
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No, their motivation lay strictly in action based on shәri’at (as they interpreted it). The
same interpretational disengagement could be applied to the other Qur’anic verses cited
by Mahmud Hasan in his ruling; “how wretched” that “many of them [become] allies of
those who disbelieved” (Surah 5:80), “[y]ou will not find a people who believe in Allah
and the Last Day having affection for those who oppose Allah and His Messenger”
(Surah 58:22), “O you who believed, do not take My enemies and your enemies as allies”
(Surah 60:1)—and so on. Each of these verses might be used by both groups, the
Barelvis interpreting “disbeliever” as “Hindu” and the Deobandis interpreting
“disbeliever” as “Britisher.” When Mahmud Hasan asserted that “cooperation with
infidels [kuffar, which might also be translated as “idolaters,” “deniers,” or
“unbelievers”] is not permissible,” Ahmad Riza would have agreed wholeheartedly. The
question revolved around the identity of the kuffar—the British or the Hindus? The
Deobandis insisted on the former (especially given the political situation of the
subcontinent; had not the British made war upon the Muslims?), while the Barelvis
vehemently pointed to the latter.214
Mahmud Hasan considered Muslim quietism in the face of British tyranny a
refutation of the “the first duty of every Muslim.” Indeed, Muslims who harbored such
positions (like the Barelvis) had simply been fooled by “a cunning trick”—one that,
without shame, would steal the “most precious wealth of the Muslims”: that is, their
very faith. Thus Ahmad Riza and his ilk were only playing the British game, like
pawns. The great threat to Islam wasn’t Hinduism; Hinduism could be dealt with
peaceably over years of proselytization. Islam’s greatest threat was the theft of its faith,
led by the British by means of tyrannical government. A cursory look at the Muslim
world (and the vast portions of it then under the direct sway of London) should have
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been enough to convince any Muslim of this reality. Amongst a Hindu majority for a
thousand years, Islam had yet experienced major growth; under the British yoke for
barely a century-and-a-half, the faith had been battered and beaten by a waide variety of
forces, including political and social ones. And now, Mahmad Hasan lamented, “Iraq,
Palestine, and Syria” were “the targets of greed of the enemy of Islam,” while “the honor
of the caliphate” lay “in tatters.” Truly, there was no doubt in his mind about who the
real enemy of Islam was; that enemy certainly wasn’t the Hindu, however religiously
misguided Hindus might be. Was it because of the Hindus that the Muslims had “lost
their dignity, their honor, and their self-respect”? No—the British were the enemy,
combined with the Muslims’ own “ignorance and over-indulgence in frivolities.” That
Mahmud Hasan’s stance in this regard was adopted generally by the Jamiat Ulema-eHind was expressed at that party’s October 1920/Muharram 1339 conference; during
the event the organization declared unequivocally, “The greatest enemy of Islam and
Muslims is the British.”215 And now Barelvi Muslims like Ahmad Riza Khan and
Naimuddin Moradabadi had the audacity to forbid their brothers from assisting fellow
Muslims—“the eagerness to earn the goodwill and friendship of a kafyr has led a brother
to chop the head of his own brother. Muslims have drunk the blood of Muslims.”
Indeed, the condition of the caliphate had much to do with Muslim collaboration with,
of all things, the British behemoth.

You know it better than me that the thunder and fire that burned the
tents of the Islamic world and set fire to the castle of the Islamic
caliphate came from the hot blood of Arabs and Indians. And a great
portion of…the wealth with which the Christians have succeeded in
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subjugating Muslim nations came from your hard labor. Thus, is there
any stupid and thick-headed Muslim who won’t understand the results of
cooperation with the Christians? (Italics added.)

Among Mahmud Hasan’s “stupid and thick-headed” was the Barelvi leadership. To
them he said, “[This] is the time to act with Islamic spirit for the honor and prestige of
our religion.” And then the olive-branch: “I fear that differences, big or small, among
‘alәma might dampen [our] spirit and courage.” Despite those differences, then, they
should work together—not necessarily by “grab[bing] a sword and go[ing] to Iraq
and Syria for jyhad,” but to prevent at all costs the “strengthen[ing of] the hands of
[the] enemies of Islam.”216
*
Non-cooperation and Khilafat enjoyed initial success, organizing demonstrations,
strikes, protests, and general civil disobedience across Hindustan. When Mahmud
Hasan died on 30 November 1920/18 Rabi I 1339 (eleven months before Ahmad Riza
Khan, his true contemporary), things were looking up. The passing of shix ul-hynd,
leader of the second generation of Deobandi scholars and the inheritor of the Qasimi
program, occurred just months after his being released from prison and in the midst of
carrying out the political agitation for which he was known. He was buried at the small
cemetery adjacent to the school that had played such a central role in his life, next to the
grave of his own mentor, Muhammad Qasim. But shix ul-hynd didn’t give up the ghost
before presiding over the second annual conference of the JUH in Delhi, and traveling
to Aligarh to lay the foundation of the Jamia Millia Islamia.217 The latter school would
later move to Delhi, where it is located at the time of this writing.
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The meeting in Delhi was momentous; an estimated five hundred scholars from all
over India—hailing from as far afield as the northwest frontier and border areas, Sindh,
Punjab, Bihar, Bengal, and Assam—there resolved to call upon Muslims across the
subcontinent to cease any form of support for the British government. This was clearly
a move inspired by the non-cooperation program, tied up in the efforts of the Khilafat
movement. The presence of the old Deobandi head, who served as the assembly’s
presiding officer, added to the meeting’s importance; for those assembled it must have
been thrilling, injecting a psychological boost to morale, to see the aged Mahmud, fresh
from his Malta prison but now free and politically active once more, seated on the
platform before them (little did they know, surely, that he would pass away only days
later). In the end, the November 1920/Rabi I 1339 Delhi conference of the JUH
produced a juridical ruling, signed by four hundred seventy-four religious scholars,
forbidding Muslim employment in any capacity whatsoever within the British
government structure—whether as a municipal council member, a soldier, or even a
businessman engaged in a transaction with the “enemies of the faith.” The ruling was
distributed far and wide across Hindustan. (The next year, 1921/1339, the British
government reportedly confiscated all copies of the fәtwa that it could find, while many
of its signers were arrested and incarcerated, sentenced to two-year imprisonment.)218
Immediately after the Delhi JUH conference, in an initiatory speech at the Jamia
Millia Islamia inauguration at Aligarh, Mahmud Hasan described the institution as “an
independent university which has nothing to do with government subsidy and
interference [an obvious jab at Sir Sayyid’s school, as well as some Barelvi educational
institutions then accepting grants from the British ruling power as Ahmad Riza had
instructed] and whose organization is based on Islamic principles and national
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aspirations.” He may as well have been describing the dar ul’alwm at Deoband. It was
fitting, perhaps, that he would eulogize such an establishment—like the one around
which his own life had revolved—in the final hours of his life.
Accompanying him on this, his final journey, was one of the leaders of Deoband’s
“third generation”—a middle-aged ‘alym who had helped him write his masterwork (a
multi-volume commentary on the Qur’an) and who had been as politically active and
ardently loyal as anyone at the university in Deoband. His name was Shabbir Ahmad
Usmani.
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3 - THE IDEA OF PAKISTAN: The Rivalry in Pre-Partition
Politics, 1921-1947

‘See for yourself,’ Bakshiji said. ‘In our group there are Sikhs, Hindus and
Muslims. There stands Aziz. Here is Hakimji.’
‘Aziz and Hakim are the dogs of the Hindus. We do not hate the Hindus, but we
detest their dogs.’
EXCERPT FROM BHISHAM SAHNI’S TAMAS

The year 1921/1338-1339 was, in the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, “a year of great
tension,” with “much to irritate and annoy and unnerve the official” and “a strange
mixture of nationalism and politics and religion and mysticism and fanaticism.”1 Such
was the atmosphere when the political aspect of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry came into
its own within the context of pre-Partition independence politics in India. In order to
faciliate an in-depth examination of the rivalry during the period in question, the reader
will be presented with the brief biographies of four ‘alәma (two Barelvi, two Deobandi)
in addition to the continuation of the central narrative. Each of the four scholars was
born between 1879/1296 and 1886/1303, and each passed away not long after the
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subcontinental Partition, between 1948/1367 and 1957/1376. Most importantly, each
played a major role within their respective communities in the religio-political battles
waged across the Indian subcontinent before 1947/1366. It is hoped that their histories
might bring the political contest between Deobandi and Barelvi—and the intra-sect
divisions that accompanied it—to life.
*
By the early 1920s, “it was Hindu-Musalman ki jai everywhere,” according to one
eyewitness, though behind the ambiguous Indian nationalism “could be distinguished a
Hindu nationalism” and “a Moslem nationalism partly looking beyond the frontiers of
India,” though “for the time being they overlapped and all pulled together.”2 As Britain
pushed back the implementation of any meaningful reforms in government that might
allow for “Indian governance over India,” the “feeling against Great Britain” was
“aggravating…every day.”3 The frustration over seeming British intractability was
thus the glue holding the two communities together. Meanwhile, the JUH continued to
campaign for the protection of the caliphate. In December 1922/Rabi II 1341, the JUH
held a conference at Gaya, conferring upon Mustapha Kemal the grand title of “Savior
of the Caliphate,” at the same time passing a resolution requesting the Kemalists to “try
to keep the Calpih’s prestige and power intact.” Critically, the JUH officially
acknowledged Sultan Abdul Medjid as Islam’s one and only xәlifәħ (in stark contrast to
the Barlevi position, aforementioned).4 The JUH may have truly believed that Atatürk
would protect the caliphate (though it was clear from some of the conference’s speeches
that Mustapha Kemal’s curtailment of the sultan’s powers had the ‘alәma worried), but
it seems more likely that the organization was simply hoping that an ego-stoke might
soften the Turkish leader’s attitude towards the sultan. In any case, the JUH enjoyed
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the Congress’ support in these efforts. Indeed, the “Moslem Conference” (as it was
known) of December 1922/Rabi II 1341 was more or less a Congress meeting for
Muslims only; its resolutions were even submitted afterwards to the Congress “for final
decision.” The arrangement underscored the Muslims’ resolve for joint action with
Hindus against the common British threat. Indeed, along with the conference’s Turkeycentric agenda, the Muslim assemblage advocated “the formation of a national pact to
secure Hindu-Moslem unity.”5
And Muslim members of the Congress weren’t only interested in the caliphate issue.
Some of the most radical elements within the Congress were Muslims—like
Muhammad ‘Ali (at the time, Deobandi-leaning, though this would change later when
he “repented” at the feet of Barelvi leader Naimuddin Moradabadi). On 1 January
1924/23 Jumada 1342, for example, Muhammad ‘Ali declared that “a demand for swәraj
is impossible without complete independence,” and that independence was “essential
whether Indians were within or without the British Empire.” India must, ‘Ali
contended, “cut the cackle”—in other words, stop all the chattering and actually do
something. ‘Ali was tired of all the talk; it was time for action. “By merely shouting for
liberty Indians [make] themselves the laughing stock of the world,” he said. Perhaps it
was time to “walk out of their [the British] Empire” for good. With this position,
Muhammad ‘Ali had surpassed even Gandhi in his demands. Just over a year after the
JUH’s December 1922/Rabi II 1341 Conference, the party met again (1 January
1924/23 Jumada I 1342) for a conference in Cocanada (present-day Kakinada) on India’s
east coast, where delegates continued to express confidence in the new Turkish regime.
Still, it was clear that patience was running thin—shouldn’t this issue have been put to
rest by now? An idea was presented: the ‘alәma, as guardians of the ummәt, should hold
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a global conference “of Muslim divines and leaders from all parts of the world” in order
to finally settle the question of the caliph’s political position “in light of the injuctions of
the Koran.” This was necessary because the caliph “must be a link between Moslems
throughout the world” (a poisition that obviously flew in the face of Ahmad Riza’s
rulings).6 The Muslims of India, too, “must owe him allegiance.” In all of this, and
despite the pan-Islamic nature of Khilafatism (including their calls for allegiance to a
technically foreign politico-religious figure), the Congress continued to support the
Khilafatists and the JUH. Had the caliphate been preserved, it likely would have
remained a hot-button Deobandi-Barelvi issue, widening the gulf between the two
schools.
But this soon became a moot point—as did Hindu-Muslim unity, which unraveled
quickly when Khilafat became a non-issue. On 9 March 1924/2 Sh’aban 1342, the New
York Times headline, TURKS STIR ALL ISLAM BY DEPOSING CALIPH, signaled the abrupt
removal of the Khilafat phenomenon’s central purpose; just like that, the movement to
protect and restore the caliphate came crashing down. There was no caliphate. This
meant, of course, that the hoped-for world conference of Muslim scholars proposed by
the JUH never took place, and it was soon made evident that any confidence in the
Turkish government had been seriously misplaced. In the end, Barelvi leader Ahmad
Riza Khan’s warnings about the practical inability of the Indian Muslims to affect the
Ottoman caliphate situation proved annoyingly correct.
The 1924/1342 collapse of the Ottoman caliphate pushed Muslim politics in India
into a state of confusion. The Muslim League was still more or less a non-entity, made
seemingly insignificant by the Khilafatists over the previous several years. With the
Turkish sultan’s fall, the Khilafatists themselves lost the proverbial wind in their sails.
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As for the Congress Muslims, these were “in disarray” without the propellant of the
Khilfatat issue driving their base.7 It was a time of regrouping, of licking wounds and
figuring out where to go from here. For many, the zeal of the last several years
wouldn’t return until Gandhi’s relaunch of the non-cooperation movement in
1930/1348. The “fall[ing] apart” of 1920s/1330s-1340s national Muslim politics was
helped in part, too, by the Government of India Act of 1919/1337, which
institutionalized the concept of diarchy, shifting politics away from the center (and from
pan-Indian issues) to the provinces. The shift helped bring local issues to the fore,
issues that were less likely to be split along broad, communal lines—which might have
resulted in less communal politics at the national level. But with separate electorates,
elites continuted to stress their “Muslimness.” After all, the reforms that had granted
the Muslims an official, state-sponsored separateness motivated such individuals to step
forward and claim to be the legitimate representatives of the community (and thus
deserving of the new government’s “patronage”).8 And while it may be exaggerating
the effect of the 1919/1337 Act to say, as some scholars of South Asian history do, that
it was the legislation that was mostly responsible for terminating the united HinduMuslim political activism of the 19-teens/13-thirties (Khilafat remained a force, for
example, years after the act was made law), the Act did pander to influencial Muslim
elites, many of whom continued to be—or quickly became—loyal to the British
government.
Even before this, however, the joint Hindu-Muslim movement engineered by the
Khilafat Committee and Gandhi’s Congress had suffered a set of debilitating losses from
which it would never recover, at least in terms of presenting a unified front. The
Mahatma’s own languishing in prison (arrested for “sedition”) for almost two years,
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from early 1922/mid-1340 to early 1924/mid-1342, removed a key facilitator of HinduMuslim cooperation; for years after he emerged, too, the symbolic leader of the
nationalist movement distanced himself from politics significantly (despite his being
made president of the Congress in 1925/1343), preferring instead to concentrate on
local, internal efforts for social reform rather than on grand, nationwide political
agitation. Then there was the Muslim League; it had never embraced Khilafat, and held
fast to its position. Some Hindu organizations, too—including the now-powerful Hindu
Mahasabha—were critical of the Khilafat movement’s goals and of the Congress for
seeking out partnership therewith. Meanwhile, Muslim scholars like Ahmad Riza and
his disciples had continued to criticize both the effort itself as well as the movement’s
cooperation with Hindus; their arguments struck home to many, who watched new
developments—like the highly successful recoversion efforts (usually from Muslim to
Hindu) across India of Swami Dayanand Saraswati’s disciples engaged in shuddhikәrәn
and sәngәTәn (popularly known as the Shuddhi Movement, and considered by many
Muslims as nothing more than an “armed terrorist” phenomenon).9 In 1921/1339,
Muslim peasants in India’s Malabar region (known as Mohplas), who “became
convinced that the rule of the Khalifa had been established in India,” violently rioted
against their Hindu landlords; thousands died, mostly among the Moplahs themselves,
during the six-month-long government attempt to quell the uprising.10 This was a
period, too, when the Urdu-Hindi conflict was flaring up again (provoking Gandhi to
push for a single, merged language—Hindustani—written in either script; his efforts
failed). The Muslim hyjrәt movement, in which thousands of Muslims had migrated out
of India to Afghanistan only to be turned back, penniless, by the Afghan government,
had resulted in numberless cases of Muslim families returning home only to find their
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property occupied by erstwhile (and mostly Hindu) neighbors; tension over the issue
turned violent in several instances. To top it off, many of the Hindu and Muslim leaders
who had helped foster inter-communal unity—and might have continued to do so had
they been free—were locked up in British prisons, having organized demonstration after
demonstration in the wake of the highfalutin November/Rabi I visit to India of Britain’s
Prince of Wales. Indeed, by year’s end some twenty thousand Indians had been
imprisoned in the British backlash to these and other anti-government protests.11
But worst of all, just before Gandhi’s March 1922/Rajab 1340 arrest, two dozen
policemen were burned alive by a mob at Chauri Chaura; the event prompted Gandhi to
completely suspend his non-cooperation movement, a move that stunned thousands of
already-jailed non-cooperation activists and led to bitter criticisms against the Mahatma
from Khilafat leaders like the ‘Ali brothers. Indeed, after the Chauri Chaura incident,
the ‘Alis disassociated themselves from Gandhi altogether (they would later join the
League—and many Muslims would follow their lead in this regard). Later that year,
the police and military were forced to occupy Multan, where the “tension” was “acute,”
in order to stop the deadly communal riots rocking the city;12 many Hindus would
subsequently rally to the cry of “Malabar and Multan” as part of this revitalized
“communal resurgence.”13 Indeed, almost a full year before the Ottoman caliphate was
scrapped, W. G. Tinckom-Fernandez, a New York Times correspondent who had been
born in India and toured the subcontinent between 1921 and 1922/1339 and 1340,
described “Moslem Indian” support of Gandhi as “half-hearted,” anyway. “Even as I
write,” said Tinckom-Fernandez, “Moslem and Hindu communities at Ahmedabad, at
Multan and other places in India are being kept from doing each other violence by

186

British troops and police.” The subtitle of his May 1923/Shawwal 1341 article: “Bonds
With Hindus Weakening.”14
Indeed, Atatürk’s abolishment of the caliphate was simply the deathblow to any
comparable future Hindu-Muslim cooperation. In the words of Tinckom-Fernandez,
“the Treaty of Sèvres wrecked Gandhism.”15 He was half-right.
*
Naimuddin Moradabadi: father of political Barelvism.
Many of Ahmad Riza Khan’s inner circle (his xәlifәħs) would, in the decade
following his death, play leading roles as representatives of the Barelvi movement
during Khilafat’s heyday, in the face of a surging Indian nationalist movement. Sanyal
describes this group as Ahmad Riza’s “lieutenants or right-hand men who could be
counted on to debate with an opponent, run a newspaper or school…and generally
promote the goals of the movement in their hometowns.”16
One of these men was Naimuddin Moradabadi. Born in 1882/1299 in what is today
the northwestern corner of Uttar Pradesh (about a hundred miles from Delhi) in
Moradabad, young Naimuddin had, by age twenty, memorized the Qur’an, learned
Persian and Arabic, trained in traditional medicine (țybb), completed the dәrs-e-nyžami,
and trained as a writer of fәtawa. Most of his education had taken place in a school
called Madrasah Imdadia, located within a stone’s throw of the Muhammad Qasimfounded Jamia Qasimia Madrasah-e-Shahi; “what impact this proximity to a Deobandi
school may have had on the young Na’im ud-Din is unknown,” writes Sanyal. What is
known is that his father was a disciple of Muhammad Qasim—until, so the story goes,
he read Ahmad Riza Khan’s 1902/1320 juridical ruling harshly condemning the chief
founder of Deobandism. It is likely that Naimuddin Moradabadi played a role in his
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father’s rejection of the Deobandi school, considering that he (Naimuddin) was in his
twenties at the time and already a devoted follower of the Bareilly divine. In any case,
Naimuddin early on published works in defense of Muhammad’s knowledge of the
unseen, in addition to works attacking “Wahhabism,” and thereby quickly gained the
notice and admiration of Ahmad Riza Khan. Naimuddin also rapidly developed a
reputation as a skilled debater, taking on Deobandis and others as his opponents.
Indeed, just as the fәtwa was Ahmad Riza Khan’s forte, the debate became Naimuddin’s,
and Ahmad Riza would often ask the young Moradabadi, a quarter-century his junior,
to represent the Barelvi side in such contests all over India.17 But by the time of
Naimuddin Moradabadi’s 1948/1367 death, he would be known for much more than his
semantic skill.
After the passing of Barelvism’s “founder,” Naimuddin Moradabadi quickly moved
into a powerful position of leadership within the movement, partially (some would say
mostly) filling the vacuum left behind by the larger-than-life Ahmad Riza. One of his
first moves was to found the Jamia Naeemia (around 1920/1338, perhaps before the
divine out of Bareilly died), arguably his most long-lasting legacy, and certainly so
outside of the political realm. (This was around the same time that Naimuddin had
issued the famous Barelvi fәtwa, aforementioned, opposing non-cooperation, forbidding
Muslims from participating in it, and warning them of the dangers of Hindu-Muslim
cooperation.) The school was located in Naimuddin’s hometown of Moradabad and
became a regional center for Barelvi activism. At least three years before the founding
of the school however—in 1917/1335—Naimuddin organized the Jama’at-e-Riza-eMustafa, a group whose mission was to curb, and if possible reverse, the tide of
reconversions threatening the Muslim community in the wake of the Shuddhi
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movement;18 it would also act as a quasi-political organ when required (as in opposition
to the Deobandi-dominated JUH, for example). The Jama’at-e-Riza-e-Mustafa is
credited with preventing around four hundred thousand reconversions to Hinduism,
especially among the poor Muslims of the eastern UP and in the area known today as
the Indian state of Rajasthan.19 His reputation as a Barelvi divine was such that both
‘Abd ul-Bari and Muhammad ‘Ali—major Muslim religious and political figures in their
own right, of course—came to him to perform twbәħ, or repentance; this was partially to
absolve them of sins they had ostensibly committed as leaders of the Khilafat
movement.20 Indeed, on this occastion ‘Abd ul-Bari explained that he had “accepted the
viewpoint of Ahmad Riza Khan,” and his statement in this regard was published on 20
May 1921/12 Ramadan 1339 in a Lucknow newspaper. Muhammad ‘Ali’s own
“repentance” came almost a decade later, in 1930/1349, towards the end of the year.21
This is significant in that these two well-known leaders, in denouncing their “old ways”
(including intimate cooperation with both Deobandis and Hindus), came to one of the
most visibly “Barelvi” figures (perhaps the most “Barelvi,” along with Ahmad Riza’s own
son, Hamid Riza Khan) in all of Hindustan. In the mid-1920s/1340s, Naimuddin
Moradabadi—who warned his fellow Muslims that the rising Hindu generation would,
in the coming decades, “play Holi with [Muslim] blood”—invited “Sunni” (i.e. Barelvi
and Barelvi-leaning) religious scholars and pirs “from all parts of the country” to gather
together in a grand meeting in his hometown.22 It was time to deal with the Deobandi
threat to the ummәt .
But before examining this meeting, a quick note on what might be called “the
Hindu-Muslim political spectrum” may be in order. Over the coming years, the various
parties populating the Hindu-Muslim political spectrum might generally be classified
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into four groups—two Muslim, two Hindu (see figure 3.1). The first Muslim group
(M1) might be called the “Islamic exclusionists,” made up of the retooled Muslim
League (especially from the 1930s/1350s), most Barelvis, and generally any Muslim
who refused to work with the Hindus in any political capacity. At first, this group
sought power and security by means of its relationship with the British; as long as the
latter were in charge, the Muslims’ vulnerability as a minority people surrounded by the

Figure 3.1. The Muslim-Hindi political spectrum within the context of prePartition independence politics.

majority Hindu population remained more or less a non-issue. Later, as the
independence movement heated up and it became clear that the expulsion of the British
from the subcontinent was no longer a wishful nationalist dream (but was, in fact, a
likely scenario), this group would advocate the partition of Hindustan into completely
independent Muslim and majority-Hindu zones as the solution to the minority-majority
problem. This first Muslim group would be mirrored on the other end of the spectrum
by a similar Hindu one (H1), the “Hindu exclusionists,” made up of Hindutva-inspired
entities, the Hindu Mahasabha, its offshoots, and other explicitly Hindu nationalist
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organizations—groups that would, like their Muslim counterparts in M1, refuse to
work with Muslims. It was largely the actions of these two groups that fueled each
other, driving Hindus and Muslims alike (who otherwise might have found a place
among the “inclusionists” of their spheres) into the exclusionary camps. In the middle,
M2 and H2 represented the “Muslim inclusionists” and the “Hindu inclusionists,”
respectively; the former was made up of Congressite Muslims, most Deobandis, and
other Muslims who felt that the risks of working together with Hindus were far
outweighed by the danger posed to Islam, the Muslim community, South Asian Islamic
culture, and the future prospects of Islam on the subcontinent by the creation of
Pakistan. At first many of these Muslims would be driven by a hatred of the British,
deep-seeded and passed on over several generations since the collapse of Muslim power
in the eighteenth/twelfth century. Later that animosity would be supplemented by a
belief that Islam could flourish (and her cultural centers be preserved) best in a united
India, as well as by the resolution that if a “Pakistan” were to be created in South Asia, it
would only give the British a continued foothold in the region.
Sentiments expressed by Ahmad Riza Khan’s son, Hamid Riza Khan, illustrate well
the early position of the Muslims of M1, and it is here that we return to Naimuddin
Moradabadi’s seminal meeting. The year was 1925/1343, and the occasion was the AllIndia Sunni Conference’s first summit; the AISC was a Barelvi-dominated organization
whose aims included the unification of “the Sunni majority” under a single political,
economic, and socio-religious platform. The four-day gathering, from 16-19 March/2023 Sh’aban, was held at Naimuddin Moradabadi’s recently founded Jamia Naeemia, and,
as previously mentioned, the more than two hundred and fifty religious scholars in
attendance (like the influential Punjabi pir Jama’at ‘Ali Shah) came at his personal
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invitation.23 Just a few months before, Moradabad had been the scene of serious
communal riots, as “a large number of Mohammedans” had attacked and seriously
injured a group of Hindus, then desecrated several Hindu temples.24 This communal
schism only served to reinforce what seemed to be the consensus of the conference.
Facing the voluminous crowd of religious scholars gathered together in this volatile
district, Hamid Riza argued that political independence from the British for India would
only lead to Hindu domination over the Muslim minority. As long as British power was
secure, so, too, was Muslim security in an India populated mostly by Hindus. Remove
that power and the Hindus would lord over the Islamic community, among other
depravations enacting legislation—enforced by the guns of government—repugnant to
shәri’at. No: Muslim religious leaders should stop wasting their time working with the
nationalist movement in the vain dream of pushing out the British (in essence digging
their own graves) and instead focus, as Ahmad Riza Khan had always admonished, on
bettering the economic situation of and improving education within the Muslim
community. Hamid Riza’s statements at the 1925/1343 All-India Sunni Conference
meeting clearly reveal M1’s loyalist preferences—a loyalty not borne of any sense of
real fealty to the British, but rather out of a practical anxiety for what a Hindudominated Indian state might do to Islam’s prospects on the subcontinent. For now,
independence was far from a certainty; once that changed, however, the Barelvi call, like
that of the rest of M1, would be for complete political and territorial partition. Other
themes prevalent at the gathering included the Muslim migration option, the Khilafat
movement, right-wing Hindu groups, and “the final fate of the Muslim community’s
independent identity.”25 Barelvi scholars and pirs were determined to set up branches of
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the All-India Sunni Conference, as well as a mәdarys network to rival their Deobandi
counterparts, all over India.
The All-India Sunni Conference (or, as it was officially known, the Jamiat-e-‘Aliyah
al-Markaziah) arose as a mostly Barelvi response to the Deobandi-dominated JUH and
the Khilafat movement. The group was “the first political platform of the Barelvi
[‘alәma].”26 Membership criteria were kept strict so as to prevent any Deobandi from
becoming one with the party; indeed, only a true (or “orthodox”) “Sunni” could join its
ranks, with orthodoxy explicitly defined by the group on the organization’s membership
form. A true Sunni, the AISC held, was one who followed the mәslәk of the great
Jahangir- and Shah Jahan-era Islamic scholar and Sufi Abdul Haqq Dehlavi;
seventeenth-century/tenth-century Farangi Mahali scholar Abdul ‘Ali (the
aforementioned bәhәr ul’alwm); the aforementioned Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi; Fazl-e Rasul
Badayuni (who, mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, was a contemporary of Fazl-e-Haq
Khairabadi, a chief “Barelvi” Mutiny figure, and a fierce opponent of Wahhabism); and,
of course, first “Barelvi” Ahmad Riza Khan of Bareilly.27 The Conference admonished
Muslims everywhere against joining the Indian National Congress. And though Hamid
Riza Khan would participate as a speaker, and influential Muslim leaders like Jamaat
‘Ali Shah (the pir of ‘Alipur Sayyidan Sharif) take prominent roles (the sәyyid was elected
the organization’s president at the 1925/1343 meeting), the true founder of the
organization was Naimuddin Moradabadi, at whose institution the conference took
place. Naimuddin would be elected the group’s first general secretary (nazym-e-‘alәħ).
The All-India Sunni Conference came away from its first meeting with a set of
specific objectives, touched upon by Hamid Riza and outlined in the organization’s six
official aims. First and foremost, the Conference would strive to act as a vehicle of
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unification for the subcontinent’s Sunni community. “Sunni” here was, as always, a
(Barelvi) catchword for the Barelvis themselves, or “Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jamaat” (defined
by one Barelvi group as “the largest group of Muslims and the only group whose beliefs
and teachings are truly in accordance with the Holy Quran and Sunnat of the Holy
Prophet”);28 perhaps more accurately, though, the label might be considered an
exclusionary term, discounting not only the Shi’a but also Sunnis possessed of a more
“Wahhabi” bent—by far the most prominent (and populous) among them the
Deobandis. By using the term, the Barelvis were pushing the Deobandis and others out
of the Sunni umbrella altogether. The goal to unite Indian “Sunnis” was to be brought
about through a variety of means. These included the establishment of regional and
local religious organizations, active in their areas but linked to the subcontinent-wide
All-India Sunni Conference; the organization of proselytizing efforts (especially aimed
at Muslims who might otherwise fall under Deobandi sway); and the founding of
religious schools—certainly a reaction to successful Deobandi efforts in this regard.
The rest of the Conference platform dealt with the improvement of Muslim social
conditions vis-à-vis the promotion of intra-community (i.e. Muslim community)
business and trade, the fulfilling of the employment needs of Muslims, and the freeing of
Muslims from the shackles of debt.
The AISC would meet at least four more times between 1925/1343 and 1930/1349,
with conferences in Bihar (16-18 May 1927/14-16 Dh’ul Q’adah 1345; it was during this
gathering that Hamid Riza was elected the organization’s next president), again in
Moradabad (in August 1928/Safar 1347), a month later (September/Rabi I) in the same
city, and in Bengal (20-21 May 1930/21-22 Dh’ul Hijja 1348). The September
1928/Rabi I 1347 conference in Moradabad was particularly significant in that the
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AISC came out strongly and formally against the Nehru Report (about which more
later). The Congress-produced document was proof, alleged the Barelvis, that the
Hindus were only manipulating their Muslim co-activists for their own political
advantage. A resolution passed (“unanimously”) by the conference on this regard stated,
“This meeting considers the Nehru Committee Report as dangerous for the interests of
the Muslims, and condemn it.”29 The 1930/1348 Bengal conference went further,
admonishing Muslims to stay away from the INC, out-and-out condemning the JUH for
its pro-Congress stance, and describing its (the JUH’s) leadership as “working like
puppets in the hands of the Hindus.” The Deobandis, the Sunni Conference had
officially asserted, had lost any mandate it might have once possessed as representatives
of Islam or the ummәt in South Asia.30 By 1930/1348, then, it can be accurately stated
that the Barelvis and the Deobandis, heretofore engaged in what might be called a
political cold war among the subcontinent’s Muslim communities for religio-political
supremancy and “sole spokesparty” status, now faced one another as explicit political
enemies.
In December of 1930/Rajab of 1349, the Muslim League held its all-India
conference at Allahabad, none other than Muhammad Iqbal presiding. The poetphilosopher emphasized what would become the underlining facet of the League’s
Pakistan pitch: “The principal of European democracy cannot be applied to India
without recognizing the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation
of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified.” Indeed, Iqbal went on
to call for just that—and got specific, proposing the creation of a separate, Muslim state
on the subcontinent, carved out of the northwestern regions (more or less equivalent to
Pakistan’s present-day boundaries). “I would like to see the Punjab, North-West
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Frontier Province, Sindh, and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State.” This, he
said, was “the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.”31 Around the
same time, of course, Choudhary Rahmat ‘Ali and his friends—students at Cambridge—
used the designation “Pakistan” for the first time. Their fantasy state, like Iqbal’s,
essentially included what one would recognize as Pakistan as of the time of this writing.
Interestingly—and perhaps significantly—neither Iqbal nor ‘Ali included Bengal in
their hoped-for scenarios for a new Indian Islamic state. And at least one Pakistani
historian has identified Naimuddin Moradabadi as “most probably” the first Barelvi
scholar to embrace the propositions of Iqbal’s 1930/1349 Allahabad address.32
Thousands would follow suit, even if their collective vision for the exact nature of a
future Pakistan almost assuredly differed from that of Iqbal himself. (One historian has
deftly observed that “there is no quintessential national culture, only mythic images of it,”
an idea that seems to aptly describe the various “images” of a future Pakistan; the big
question was this: whose “mythic images” would serve as the true reflection of
Pakistan’s “quintessential national culture?”)33 Most Pakistan supporters seem to have
been driven less by an animosity against the British (one Pakistani scholar has noted
that even into the early 1930s/1350s, the Muslim League continued to be “dominated
by pro-British elements”)34 than anxiety about how Muslims might fare in a Hindumajority (and therefore Hindu-controlled) western-style democracy—just as Iqbal had
said. Some, too, were driven to support Pakistan despite opposition to the League (and
to Congress, for that matter). “Already there is no justice and much faction,” one
Muslim subedar near Shewa told an English observer in 1946/1365. “We don’t want
either League or Congress. What we want is tranquility, so there must be division” (italics
added).35
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Speaking of Iqbal and the League, it should be noted that later Barelvi scholars
would appropriate the legacies of Iqbal and even Jinnah as part of their own narrative.
While Deobandi histories write of the “freedom movement,” expounding upon the
religio-political exploits of figures like Mahmud Hasan, Husain Ahmed Madani, and
even (in Pakistan) Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, they remain mostly quiet when it comes to
Iqbal and Jinnah (and, of course, any of the Barelvi leadership). Meanwhile, Barelvi
historians write of the “Pakistan movement,” granting space to Iqbal and Jinnah as well
as Ahmad Riza Khan, Naimuddin Moradabadi, and the All-India Sunni Conference.
Iqbal’s positions vis-à-vis the Khilafat movement, as well as his two-nation theory, are
prominent and underscored in the Barelvi narrative (often including verse he composed
to communicate his political views). Jinnah’s role as a model Muslim—a devout Sunni,
it is insisted, not a Shi’i—who has unfairly been labeled a secularist is also highlighted
in the Barelvi histories.36 The Aligarh movement revolving around Sir Sayyid’s AngloOriental University is similary treated as part and parcel of the Barelvi story.
Deobandi historians are less kind to Jinnah, the League, and the Aligarhists—a
phenomenon that is especially true in India.
The rumblings for a separate state surely lent added political emphasis to the AllIndia Sunni Conference’s second subcontinent-wide gathering in 1935/1354 at
Badayun, a town that, as previously mentioned, had long been a seat of Barelvi
influence. It had been a decade since the organization’s first gathering in Moradabad,
and five years since Iqbal’s statements to the Muslim League, but the AISC under
Naimuddin Moradabadi (and pir Jamaat ‘Ali Shah, who was again elected the
organization’s president on this occasion)37 had decided the time had come to make
several formal pronouncements. First, the Barelvi organization officially declared its
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support for the “two-nation theory” (though the gathered scholars were apt to trace the
idea to Ahmad Riza rather than to Jinnah or Iqbal). Second, and perhaps more
importantly from a political point-of-view, the Sunni Conference called for outright
independence for the subcontinent’s Muslims—independence not so much from the
British as from Hindu-dominated India. Geographically, that independence should
resemble the proposition put forward by Iqbal and subsequently adopted by the AllIndia Muslim League.38 Though the Conference kept its distance, technically speaking,
from the League (not declaring itself, for example, an official ally of the secular AIML,
nor seeking out Jinnah to organize united efforts in support of their joint political
goals), it unambiguously fell in line with the League’s political agenda, even as the
Deobandis, under the leadership of the JUH, were striving for “composite nationalism”
and a united India. Such “falling in line,” however, was not done without reservation—
and conditions. Yes, the Barelvis at Badayun had articulated their vision, however
broadly, of a South Asian Islamic state. But they would support the League “only to the
extent that, in one part of Hindustan, the free governance of the Qur’an, of Islam, will
prevail.” Should the League pursue a different course, “no Sunni [Barelvi] will accept
it.” The League’s secular roots obviously clashed with the Barelvi ‘alәma’s goal of the
establishment of an explicitly and unambiguously Islamic state. Such fears were
articulated at the conference, too; those “professing the [kәlymәħ]” yet are “irritated by
the thought of an Islamic authority” should meet with disfavor in Pakistan, it was
argued. Thus the AISC’s support of the League was conditional, even if its call for
Pakistan was officially unequivocal. In a formal resolution adopted at the Badayun
conference, the Barelvi guiding lights announced that the AISC “fully supports the
demand for Pakistan,” an “Islamic state” for which the Barelvi ‘alәma and mәshayx were
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“prepared for whatever sacrifice may be necessary.” Pakistan, they maintained, would
be guided by “the Qur’an, hәdis, and the principles of fiqh.”39 These were the Barelvis’
“mythic images,” the symbols of their “quintessential national culture,” whatever the
League’s might be. (Jawaharlal Nehru would touch upon the ambiguous idea of
“Moslem culture” around this time, too, writing, “Is [Muslim culture] a kind of racial
memory of the great deeds of the Arabs, Persians, Turks, etc.? Or language? Or art
and music? Or customs? I do not remember any one referring to present-day Moslem
art or Moslem music. …[T]he influence of Persian has no element of religion about it.
…[Persian language and culture] is a common and precious heritage for all of us in
India. I have tried hard to understand what this ‘Moslem culture’ is, but I confess that I
have not succeeded… The Moselm peasantry and industrial workers are hardly
distinguishable from the Hindu.”)40
After the Congress’s landslide electoral victory in 1937/1356, the face of Indian
politics began to change quickly. This was, in some part, the fault of the INC itself,
which, flush with victory, rejected Muslim League participation in government
(actually, the League had demanded that any Muslim considered for governmental
position be vetted by itself—as self-appointed spokesparty of India’s Muslim
population—but the Congress had refused to recognize this foundational League claim).
Muslim leaders and their parties all over India looked on with mounting trepidation at
such developments, which seemed to confirm Jinnah’s long-time assertion that the
Hindu majority would be an abusive ruler. In the face of this perceived “Hindu”
arrogance, one by one these influencial figures (among them “large numbers” of Barelvi
or Barelvi-leaning pirs, ‘alәma, and other religious leaders) and Muslim parties began to
align themselves with Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah and his party. All-India Sunni
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Conference leader Jamaat ‘Ali Shah, for example, in 1938/1357 launched a tour of the
largely Congress-controlled northwestern frontier in support of Jinnah, the League, and
Muslim separateness, addressing “huge gatherings” in Rawalpindi, Kohat, Sialkot, and
Peshawar. This major figure within the predominantly Barelvi AISC condemned the
Deobandi ‘alәma who had sided with the Congress, praying “to God to unite the
Muslims and save them from the clutches of [the] pro-Hindu coterie of the so-called
Muslim scholars.” (By 1945/1364 he would characterize the Congress, with direct
allusion to its Muslim supporters, as “the party of infidels and apostates” and “the worst
enemy of the Muslims.”)41 Thus, and thanks in significant measure to Barelvi support,
the great electoral loser of 1937/1356 was transformed into “the champion of free Islam
against Hindu dominance.”42
From the late nineteenth century/thirteenth century, the division between the
Barelvis and the Deobandis was, in the words of Jaswant Singh, “exploited by the
British to neutralize the Deobandis and to entrap the Barelwis in the loyalist camp:
Quad Erat Demonstrandum.”43 This may have been true, but became more complicated
after the October 1921/Safar 1340 death of Ahmad Riza Khan, when a Barelvi split—
which had commenced in the volatile political climate in the decade before the great
man’s passing—saw many younger Ahl-e-Sunnat leaders move to the overtly antiBritish camp. But the British soon found an answer for that, too. In August
1938/Jumada II 1357, Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah met with India’s acting British viceroy
and offered his foreign overlord a deal. Simply put, the League leader promised that his
organization would remain loyal to the British—if the government recognized the
League as the sole mouthpiece of India’s Muslims (something Minto had agreed to back
in 1906/1324, when the League was founded, but had subsequently carried little weight
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due to realities on the ground, until recently). It was a wry move, but one that would
pay off, despite the viceroy’s initial dismissal of the offer, for after the breakout of World
War II the government of India readily agreed to Jinnah’s proposal, in line with its
long-established policy of setting up “the Muslim minority” as “the hope of the British
Government in India,” in the words of one Indian commentator writing many years
before the Jinnah-Linlithgow meeting.44 For decades, the British government had been
rewarding loyal Muslims with educational grants, a disproportionate number of
government posts, titles, honors, disproportionate representation in the councils, and
separate electorates, to name a few. Now the government had identified what it viewed
as the premier Muslim organization in India (or at least the one it preferred the most)
and offered its patronage in order to ensure its loyalty. Jinnah thus won his place as the
“sole spokesman” of South Asia’s Muslims—a position on which he would never
compromise, despite South Asian Islam’s multiplicity of communities, interests, and
divergent parties, and despite the fact that others claimed to possess similar status (or at
least a more legitimate claim to it); among these could certainly be counted the AISC
Barelvi leadership, who saw themselves as the standard-bearers of Indian Islam’s
majority (their foundational claim), as well as the JUH, who had long viewed itself as
the premier ‘alәma party in South Asia and who pointed to its central role in many a
national (and even pan-Islamic) movement for almost twenty years as compelling
evidence. (The idea that Jinnah could be the sole spokesman of India’s Muslims could
only have been motivated by political considerations, since it was obviously a ludicrous
claim. Even within the League, there were powerful voices opposing Jinnah’s
separatism. In fact, the Muslim League premiers in the two major provinces claimed by
Jinnah for Pakistan—the Punjab and Bengal—both stood adamantly against the idea;
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the Punjab’s Sikandar Hayat Khan mockingly referred to it as “Jinnahstan.”45 Right up
to independence, in August 1947/Ramadan 1366, the League was unable to win
absolute majorities in any of the Muslim-majority provinces. In the words of one
historian personally close to these events, “Jinnah’s scheme would foist Pakistan on
those not interested in it and leave out those who might welcome it.”)46 The terms of
the League head’s offer fit more squarely with the general Barelvi political position,
obviously, than with the Deobandi one. From the beginning, Ahmad Riza had preached
Muslim reform from within, and had identified the subcontinent’s Hindus (and its
apostate Muslim collaborators) as subcontinental Islam’s greatest threat. Viewed from
this perspective, Jinnah’s proposition entailing loyalty to the British was justifiable, and
it was therefore natural that so many Barelvis would fall into line behind the wiry
Karachi-born politician (something many of their leaders had done at the 1935/1354
Badayun conference of the AISC), while so many Deobandis, reared within the context
of a virulently anti-British tradition, would reject him entirely, especially after this
latest treachery.
That so many Barelvis, including several of its most notable leaders, had in fact done
exactly that vis-à-vis Jinnah and the League (that is, fallen in line behind them) was
demonstrated powerfully on 22 December 1939/10 Dh’ul Q’adah 1358, when Muslims
across India observed the Jinnah-inspired “Day of Deliverance” in celebration of the
resignation from provincial and national government office of Congress positionholders across the country. The Congress move—supported strongly by Nehru but
only reluctantly by Gandhi—was meant as an INC protest against both not having been
consulted before Indian resources and military forces were committed to participation in
the Second World War as well as for the usual lack of any sort of independence promise
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from the government. As usual, Jinnah (who was reportedly “overjoyed” at the news of
the INC’s decision) took full political advantage of what was probably a rash move on
the part of the Congress, utilizing the situation to consolidate his position relative to the
British by promising “honorable” Muslim support while calling for an increase in
protection for Muslims by the government. His call for a Day of Deliverance—that is,
deliverance from Congress “tyranny”—was hailed by a segment of Muslims (including
many Barelvis) but condemned strongly by others (notably, the Congress’s Deobandi
supporters).
On the occasion of the controversial Day, two-time AISC president and influential
pir Jamaat ‘Ali Shah addressed a crowd in his hometown of ‘Alipur. “There are two
flags [in India],” he said, “one of Islam and the other of kufәr.” This would be the sharp
diametric presented by advocates of Pakistan in the months running up to Partition. “O
Muslims,” the great pir continued, “under which flag will you stand?” The crowd
reportedly answered, “Under the flag of Islam!” Jamaat ‘Ali then asked, “If anyone
standing under the flag of kufәr died, [would] you bury him in the Muslim graveyard?
[Would] you pray at his funeral?” “No! No!” came the multitude’s answer. And then
the critical statement: “The flag of the Muslim League,” proclaimed the eminent pir, “is
the flag of Islam.” His final enjoinder: “We must all join the League.”47 (Jamaat ‘Ali
Shah reportedly made similar statements even before the “Day of Deliverance.” On 22
April 1938/21 Safar 1357, he had addressed a crowd in Sialkot thus: “Dear Muslims,
today there are two banners. One belongs to Islam and the other to infidels. Which
will you choose?” The gathering allegedly “vowed to close their graveyards” on
Deobandis and other “co-religionists who have gone under the non-Muslim banners.”
Several other reports confirm that the old pir routinely equated rejection of the League
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with kufәr, or “disbelief.” “It is binding,” he told a gathering on 11 May 1938/11 Rabi I
1357, “on all the Muslims of India to join the Muslim League.” Such language would be
repeated by Jamaat ‘Ali in the critical years leading up to Partition, from 1945/1364 to
1947/1366).48 The effect on public (Muslim) opinion by such calls is difficult to
measure, of course, but was likely considerable. Indeed, without the League’s change of
strategy—without the co-opting of the pirs and mәshaix, of men like Naimuddin
Moradabadi and Jamaat ‘Ali Shah (not to mention, later, some key Deobandis like
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani)—it is difficult to see how Jinnah would have secured the
victory he eventually won.
General Barelvi support for the League was further cemented by that organization’s
formal adoption, in March 1940/Safar 1359, of the Lahore Resolution—a clear-cut
statement of purpose on the part of Jinnah and his party.49 As Hindus and Muslims
were two different nations, “the only course open to us,” Jinnah declared on the occasion
of the resolution’s passing, “is to allow the major nations separate homelands.” The
goal was now an unambiguously separate, absolutely independent (i.e. from Hindu
India) Muslim polity (or polities) on the subcontinent; “[t]he Muslim-majority
provinces in North Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute
Independent States,” the Resolution announced, “in which the constituent units shall be
autonomous and sovereign.”50 Before this momentous resolution, the idea of Pakistan
had been the domain of a small group, and the destiny of India’s Muslims had remained
a hotly contested topic possessed of a long spectrum of opinion voiced by a wide variety
of both secular and religious leaders. Post-Lahore Resolution, however, an increasing
number of Muslims appear to have been drawn to the League’s new, simple, and
infinitely measurable aim. This trend continued despite efforts by the JUH, the Ahrars,
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Shi’a political groups, and others to challenge the League’s claim to represent all
Muslims. In April 1940/Rabi I 1359, for example, the JUH—together with the Shi’a
Political Conference and the Majlis-e-Ahrar—organized an Azad [“Free”] Muslim
Conference, accusing the AIML of ignoring the real Muslim minority in the Hindumajority areas of India in favor of the Muslims who already enjoyed majority status in
their respective areas; Jinnah responded that these minority Muslims would be
minorities whether Pakistan was created or not—it was a choice between all Muslims
under Hindu Raj, or only some.51 Perhaps these challenges from within the Muslim
community didn’t matter, since the British had already selected the League as its
approved Muslim voice.
Most Barelvis, it seems, could be counted among those supporting the League, at
least as far as the organization’s call for a separate homeland (i.e. separate from the
Hindu majority) was concerned, however their visions of a future subcontinental Islamic
state might have diverged from Jinnah’s in other respects. The AISC, under the
direction of Jamaat ‘Ali Shah and Naimuddin Moradabadi, sent delegates to the
League’s annual session on the occasion of the Resolution’s passing (Abdul Hamid
Badayuni and Abdul Ghafur Hazarvi, both actually League members), and Jamaat ‘Ali
himself issued a statement in the decision’s favor: “The Muslim League is the only
Islamic organization,” he said, taking a swipe at the Deobandis and their JUH.
“Therefore, I advise the Muslims [of India] to join it [the League], as no other party is
a well-wisher of the Muslims.” And then the final jab, a la Ahmad Riza: “It is futile to
think that the Hindu-dominated Congress can be sympathetic to them and support their
cause.”52 For his part, after the passage of the Lahore Resolution, Naimuddin
Moradabadi crisscrossed north India, delivering speeches in favor of Pakistan and the
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All-India Muslim League.53 In April 1941/Rabi I 1360, the Lahore Resolution’s call for,
essentially, the creation of Pakistan (Jinnah would say as much in an April 1941/Rabi I
1360 statement)54 was strengthened and clarified by the Madras Resolution (as it was
passed in a session of the League in that city), demanding “completely independent
States” carved from India’s northwest and eastern regions that together would
constitute “Muslim Free National Homelands.” Two years later (April 1943/Rabi II
1362) Jinnah would specifically admonish the pirs of India “to pray and exhort their
followers” to be willing to lay down their lives, if necessary, for the attainement of an
independent Islamic state on the subcontinent.55 The League’s appeal motivated many a
Barelvi leader to take to the road to campaign for Jinnah and Pakistan; Jamaat ‘Ali Shah,
for example, “despite old age and deteriorating health [being over a hundred years old
at the time],” toured eastern Punjab in 1944/1363 on just such a platform. The next
year he and other Barelvi scholars and shixs stumped for the League in, among other
places, Amritsar, where their party (dubbed by followers “the caravan of light”) was
greeted with the slogan-shout, “Long live әmir-e-myllәt [Jamaat ‘Ali Shah’s honorary
title], long live the Muslim League, and long live qayd-i-ә‘ažәm [Muhammad ‘Ali
Jinnah]!” An AISC meeting at the Jama mәsjyd in Amritsar saw Naimuddin
Moradabadi, along with several other powerful scholars (plus pir Jamaat ‘Ali Shah),
deliver “forceful” addresses in support of Pakistan.56
In January 1946/Safar 1365, thousands of Barelvis, including many scholars and
shaixs, traveled to Bareilly in order to commemorate the death anniversary of Ahmad
Riza Khan (who had passed away exactly twenty-five years before). It was normal, of
course, for throngs of disciples to assemble for the great divine’s ‘urs, but this particular
gathering in Bareilly evolved into a political meeting of sorts. The massive assemblage
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produced a formal expression of support for Pakistan. Perhaps more significantly, the
meeting clarified just what that meant—a state in which shәri’at must be established and
enforced. Anything less was unacceptable. A similar meeting, this time officially under
the aegis of the AISC, took place the next month in Etawah district, about ninety miles
due south of Badayun. Its call matched that of the Ahmad Riza ‘urs gathering.57 The
spontaneous nature of the political meeting brought forth by the annual ‘urs gathering
in Bareilly makes clearly recognizable the way the religio-political winds were blowing
among Barelvis across India. The general support for Pakistan was there, yes—but for
Pakistan as an explicitly Islamic state established according to the Sunni (i.e. Barelvi)
interpretation of Islamic law. Such powerful expressions underscore, perhaps, the
future disappointments of the Barelvis and their leaders when the Deobandis were given
an official place at the constitution-crafting table in independent Pakistan—while the
Ahl-e-Sunnat ‘alәma were left seemingly out in the cold. That perceived exclusion
would be even more painful given the fact that, four months later, on the occasion of the
All-India Sunni Conference’s largest gathering to date, Naimuddin Moradabadi would
be appointed chairman of an official AISC committee created to formulate a plan for
enshrining Islamic law within the Pakistani constitution. The result of this committee’s
work, largely undertaken by Naimuddin himself, was known as the “Eleven Points.”
The mega-gathering took place four months after Ahmad Riza Khan’s ‘urs and the
spontaneous political meeting that had accompanied it. According to Barelvi reports,
some five hundred Sufi shixs were joined by around seven thousand Barelvi or Barelvileaning ‘alәma and not less than two hundred thousand other attendees. Led by
Naimuddin Moradabadi, as well as Zafaruddin Bihari and Ahmad Riza’s younger son
Mustafa, the conference’s focus was familiar to those who had attended the
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organization’s first two India-wide gatherings: on the spiritual uplift of Indian Muslims
through, among other things, preaching and missionary work (tәbliG) and the extension
of the Barelvi (or “Sunni”) mәdrәsәħ network through the establishment of more
mәdarys. But what made this mega-conference different, apart from the sheer number of
its attendees, was its enunciation of a hoped-for goal, the very purpose of such selfimprovement efforts. That goal was “Pakistan,” or a land of purity—a play on the
meaning of the word that would shortly become the name of a new Islamic state. “The
meaning of ‘Pakistan,’” newly elected AISC president Muhammad Ashrafi Kachhuchhavi
(d. 1961 AD) told the assembled thousands, “is an independent state of Islam and the
Qur’an, in a small part of India...” And then the crux of Muhammad Ashrafi’s point:
“[B]ut we [the AISC] are working for a grand ‘Pakistan’…the rule of Islam all over the
world.”58 This was where Muslim League goals diverged from those of the Barelvis
(and where Deobandis, in a future independent Pakistan, could later find some common
ground with their long-time theological rivals). What debate may have occurred at the
conference vis-à-vis Pakistan we may never know (there were, after all, some Barelvi
scholars and pirs who opposed the establishment of Pakistan, and certainly cooperation
with the Muslim League; support of the latter, according to one scholar of Barelvism,
was “the subject of considerable controversy” among Barelvi ‘alәma),59 but the
overarching message of the Varanasi (then called Benares) gathering was that the
Barelvis had much more revivalist (or, depending on one’s point-of-view, anti-revivalist)
work to do, especially in light of Deobandi and other “Wahhabi” gains among South
Asian Muslims; all this was to be done with the goal of “Pakistan” in mind. If the
League was to be the vehicle to accomplish the latter, it seems most Barelvi leaders
were willing to accept it as such. In any case, the resolution in favor of Pakistan at the
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1946/1365 Benares AISC gathering represented, in the words of M. Ahmad, “the climax
of support of the Sunni [Barelvi] [‘alәma] for the cause of Pakistan”—though the
Barelvi contribution on the frontier and in the Punjab (two crucial provinces the League
could ill-afford to lose) might arguably lay claim, too, to the Pakistani historian’s
classification.60
Naimuddin Moradabadi’s “Eleven Points” showcase what might be considered the
general Barelvi point-of-view, at the time, vis-à-vis Pakistan as an Islamic state. The
document defined “Pakistan” as a “free Islamic government” in Hindustan, established
“according to shәri’at and the principles of fyqħ.” What this meant in practical terms
was outlined in Moradabadi’s eleven points, which underscore not only the role of the
‘alәma in government, but also the right kind of ‘alәma. In fact, the first nine points, if
implemented, would have effectively shut out any meaningful Deobandi participation in
Pakistan’s governance. Point #1 (“This government will be ruled by a Sunni әmir”)
would have placed a “Sunni” (read: Barelvi) әmir at the head of the state. That an әmir
of the proper sectarian persuasion be elected would be ensured by Point #2 (“This әmir
will be elected by the majority of the Sunni [әhl-e-sunnәt ] Muslims”), which not only
excluded non-Muslims, but also Shi’a Muslims and, potentially, all “Sunni” Muslims
who failed to meet a state requirement of orthodoxy. Based on the AISC’s membership
criteria, the Deobandis would have fallen far outside such a requirement and may
therefore have been unable, under Naimuddin Moradabadi’s constitution, to vote for the
әmir. Once a Barelvi (or “Sunni”) әmir had been elected, he would create a shwra
(“advisory council”), as per Point #3 (“That әmir will appoint a group of pious
[Muslim] people and statesmen for a shwra”), almost certainly, of course, stacked with
those of the Ahl-e-Sunnat persuasion—and traditionally made up mostly of ‘alәma.
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Point #4 (The jәma’at-e-shwra will be directed by the әmir) and Point #5 (The suggestions
of the jәma’at-e-shwra will be considered final after the әmir’s acceptance) assured the Barelvi
religious leadership a powerful place within the political apparatus—that is, direct
access to the ear of the head of state, with that head’s general compliance with their
suggestions (as implicit in Point #5) constitutionally binding. Point #6 further ensured
that a Pakistani government would be in good “Sunni” hands by having the (almost
certainly Barelvi) әmir in charge of appointing a Prime Minister with “responsibility”
(nәžәm w nәgrani) over “all internal and external affairs” (according to Point #7).
Department heads would be nominated by the Prime Minister (as per Point #8)—but
only after approval by the әmir himself (Point #9). Rounding out the “Eleven Points,”
#10 and #11 dealt with taxes and the status of non-Muslims, respectively.
Moradabadi’s constitutional framework underscores the Barelvi leadership’s belief that
they did indeed represent the “Sunni majority,” and could thus rest easy that in a true
Islamic state like the “Pakistan” they envisioned, one incorporating democratic
mechanisms (like voting), they would naturally emerge electorally victorious and thus
occupy high places of power. The draft made no mention of bicameral or unicameral
assemblies, provincial assemblies, or any other republican-style entity, emphasizing
instead rule by a righteous әmir (under the firm guidance of his ‘alәma-filled shwra) or
әmir-approved officers and their respective departments.61
Na’imuddin Moradabadi never migrated to Pakistan, either at the time of
Partition or afterward. He did visit the new Islamic state, however, meeting with
Barelvi leaders and others in Lahore, Karachi, and elsewhere.62 (Naimuddin
Moradabadi’s activities in Pakistan during his final months are addressed at some
length in Chapter 4). But lasting influence within the Barelvi school even in Pakistan is
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demonstrated by the achievements of his many students there, hundreds of whom went
on to establish schools of their own in the new “Muslim” state. Muhammad Hussain
Naeemi, for example (born in Uttar Pradesh’s Moradabad District in 1923/1341), was
one of those disciples. Muhammad Hussain’s father had died young—at only nineteen
years of age—so Muhammad Hussain had been left in the care of his sister and her
husband, who had eventually enrolled him into Naimuddin Moradabadi’s Jamia Naeemia
mәdrәsәħ in Moradabad. He was ten years old, and the Jamia Naeemia, as
aforementioned, was one of Barelvism’s most influencial institutions on the
subcontinent (and still listed, as of the time of this writing, on the Raza Academy’s list
of “Prominent Sunni [Barelvi] Madresas in India”).63 Muhammad Hussain would have
witnessed Moradabadi’s many pro-Pakistan activities over the years first-hand, and the
impression that these early years under Moradabadi’s tutelage made on the young man
is difficult to overstate.64 But the critical moment came when Naimuddin Moradabadi
asked Muhammad Hussain to move to Lahore, despite the fact that all of his
(Muhammad Hussain’s) siblings and his parents opted to remain in the Moradabad area
(even after Partition; Raghib Hussain Naeemi, Muhammad Hussain’s grandson in
Lahore, lamented in 2012/1433, “We are alone here”). For a while he stayed at the old
Chowk Dalgirah mosque, about a quarter-mile west down the road from the Lahore
train station, but eventually he would found his own institution. Within six years,
however, space at the newly established school no longer sufficed and he was forced to
publish an advertisement asking for land to build something bigger. His efforts were
rewarded when the real estate upon which the Jamia Naeemia of Lahore (named, of
course, after Naimuddin Moradabadi’s school) currently resides was gifted to him.
Work began on the new site in 1959/1378. The mәdrәsәħ’s alumni would eventually be
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found leading prayer or otherwise filling positions in mosques and mәdarys across the
world, while the Jamia Naeemia is considered one of the most important Barelvi
institutions of learning in Pakistan (and even the target of deadly Deobandi violence).
Hundreds of Naimuddin Moradabadi’s other students followed paths similar to
Muhammad Hussain Naeemi’s.
Naimuddin Moradabadi died in 1948/1367. In his early years, his reputation had
been that of a great debater. But by the end of his life, he was described by one of his
followers as “hәżrәt, priest of Islam, [the] dignity of religion…unparalleled learned
man, incomparable orator, [the] embodiment of inward and outward virtues…[and
the] Defender of [a] strong religious code of life.” One eulogy included the following:
“The eye of India [had never seen] such an eloquent speaker…whose every word
captivated the heart.”65 Unfortunately for the old Barelvi ‘alym, his organization, which
would basically become the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (on which much more later), as
well as his thirteen-point draft for a Pakistani constitution would be sidelined in the
new “Islamic” state in favor of a mostly western, qausi-secular system—one that tended
to favor Deobandism, anyway.
*
Husain Ahmad Madani: Taking up the Mantle of Mahmud Hasan.
In 1879/1296, Husain Ahmad Madani was born in Bangar Mau, a village fifty-five
miles west of Lucknow where his father, Habibullah, was working as school headmaster.
Habibullah set him upon the path of religious scholarship and imbued within him a
hatred of the British government. From his mother he learned Arabic and a love for the
Qur’an. Both brought him up in an environment of strict discipline; despite his
“inclination to playfulness” he was not allowed to frolick with the other village children
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and only occasionally was able to steal a few minutes for marbles or playtime with a
nearby cousin. Even these tiny infractions were enough to worry his father, who
eventually sent him to the dar ul’alwm at Deoband to keep him out of trouble. He was
twelve or thirteen years old,66 but due to his “weak constitution and short stature” the
boy didn’t “look more than eleven.”67 In time millions would know him as shix ul-yslam:
“the Spiritual Leader of Islam.”
Husain Ahmad Madani’s ancestors (led by one Shah Noor ul-Haq) were sayyids who
had come to India sometime around the beginning of the sixteenth/tenth century,
subsequently establishing a xanәqaħ on the banks of the Ghagra River about a hundred
miles east of Lucknow (near present-day Tanda in India’s Uttar Pradesh). For several
generations Shah Noor ul-Haq’s descendants enjoyed prominence, wealth, and the
notoriety of being a pir family, living off of generous revenue grants from the Mughal
government (garnered from no less than twenty-four villages) and generally enjoying
the patronage of the state. But the family’s fortunes began to decline in the
nineteenth/fourteenth century, and by the time of the Mutiny, the number of villages
from which the house drew revenue had been reduced almost by half. The downward
trend continued late into in the century, underscored by the drowning in the Ghagra of
family head Akbar ‘Ali, the deaths of several of his heirs, and the loss of virtually all of
their property. As a result, little Habibullah—Akbar ‘Ali’s grandson and the future
father of Husain Ahmad Madani—grew up very differently than had his ancestors,
raised on the earnings of his adoptive mother, who herself spun cotton to put food on
the table.68
Habibullah possessed the natural inclinations of the scholar. As a student, he
memorized the Qur’an, learned Persian, and composed poetry in Persian, Urdu, and
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Bhasha. After the completion of his studies, he took up a job as a primary school teacher
in a small town a few miles outside of Tanda. Some time later he earned a teaching
diploma from a school in Lucknow and won a headmastership at a middle school in
Safipur, a village fifty miles west of Lucknow. In time he was transferred to Tanda,
where he was able to slowly but surely re-possess some of his ancestral land and build
an independent house for himself. At one point he was “tempted” to learn English—a
move that likely would have opened up more lucrative career opportunities—but, he
told his son later, a dream in which his hands were covered in excrement (which he
interpreted as a sign that learning English was “dirty”) convinced him not to embark on
such a path. The story hints at a hatred for the British, then recently and firmly
established as a more or less invincible power on the subcontinent (his choice to send his
sons to the university at Deoband also suggests such an aversion). Apart from the
dream, he’d been told by his mother and other family members since he was a boy that it
was largely due to British machinations that the family’s land had been lost around the
time of the Mutiny. Much of Habibullah’s animosity towards the British would be
passed on to his son. Once, he told Husain Ahmad and his brothers (at the time all
adults), “I have brought you up with the aim that you should perform jyhad in the path
of God and attain martyrdom in the process.” Not long after this pronouncement
(probably in 1898/1316),69 Habibullah migrated with his entire family to the Hijaz,
never to set eyes upon India again.70
Speaking of Husain Ahmad’s brothers, each of them attained prominence as religious
scholars—just as their father had hoped. His oldest brother, Muhammad Siddiq,
attended the dar ul’alwm at Deoband, impressing Mahmud Hasan and becoming a
disciple of old Rashid Ahmad Gangohi. (Later, the British would imprison Muhammad
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Siddiq’s son, Wahid Ahmad—who had also attended the dar ul’alwm—with his uncle
Husain Ahmad and Mahmud Hasan on the island of Malta after the latter was caught up
in the “Silk Letters Conspiracy”). Another brother, Ahmad, attended the university at
Deoband, likewise became a disciple of Rashid Ahmad, and was later imprisoned during
the Great War in Turkey while his brother and nephew were languishing in Malta;
afterwards, he set up a combined orphanage-school in the Hijaz. A third (and Husain
Ahmad’s younger) brother, Mahmud Ahmad, would become qazi of Jeddah, and
Mahmud Ahmad’s son Habib Ahmad would go on to run the orphanage-school set up
by his uncle. Still, some of Habibullah’s five scholar-sons, including Husain Ahmad
Madani, would re-migrate to India from the Hijaz, a move that would have major
consequences for the political situation in Hindustan, the political dynamics within the
Deobandi school, and the history of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry.71
As a student at the dar ul’alwm, Husain Ahmad Madani studied under Mahmud
Hasan (reportedly receiving considerable personal instruction therefrom on account of
his exceptional abilities as a promising young scholar) and, like his older brother,
eventually became the disciple of Rashid Ahmad Gangohi. The latter is significant in
that the brothers had first requested that Mahmud Hasan be their Sufi shix—but
Mahmud Hasan had recommended them instead to the much-revered Rashid Ahmad.
Such a turn of events was rarely seen, but in this case Rashid Ahmad, on Mahmud
Hasan’s personal and fervent recommendation, agreed to be the brothers’ mentor.72
Afterwards, Husain Ahmad migrated with the rest of his family (at his father’s request)
to the Hijaz. But the continuity he’d already experienced with the Deoband movement’s
founders continued even in Arabia, for it was here that Husain Ahmad trained for a time
under Muhammad Qasim’s and Rashid Ahmad’s own spiritual mentor: Imdadullah. The
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great shix died just weeks after making Husain Ahmad’s acquaintance, but the
connection had been made between Deobandism’s grandfather figure and a leader from
its “third generation.” The period was financially a rough one for Madani’s family, but
Husain Ahmad was able to obtain work as a religious teacher in Medina. Eventually he
achieved some renown as a lecturer at the Mosque of the Prophet—probably Islam’s
most sacred site apart from the holy sanctuary in Mecca—where, for ten years, he
reportedly taught hәdis for twelve hours a day;73 the fact of his position at such a
prominent location would hold significance for the entire Deobandi movement later on,
after his return to India. “The reason for such powerful attraction toward and general
popularity of an Indian religious divine in the holy land of Hejaz[,] especially in the
Prophet’s Mosque,” explains one official biography of Madani, “should be attributed to
[the peculiar method] of teaching that he had imbibed and inherited from the teachers
[from] the [dar ul’alwm ].”74 Upon receiving an invitation from Rashid Ahmad
Gangohi to visit him in India, Husain Ahmad and his older brother Muhammad Siddiq
returned to India. While in Gangoh visiting their aged shix, Rashid Ahmad
distinguished the brothers as among his foremost spiritual successors.75 Soon
afterwards, Husain Ahmad returned to the Hijaz, where he remained between
1913/1331 and 1916/1334.
And it was during this three-year period that Husain Ahmad Madani’s world
changed. He would later identify the very year; “I have been associated with
Hindustan’s freedom movement since 1914 [1332],” he reportedly said. What drove
such an association? In short: a determination to expel the British entirely from the
subcontinent. “I consider it the religious duty of every Muslim to oppose the British”
(italics added).76 It was no coincidence, either, that this stage saw Husain Ahmad pick
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up the anti-British charge; Mahmud Hasan, it will be remembered, arrived in the Hijaz
during the same period. One official historian of the JUH would later record that
Husain Ahmad “took to revolutionary activities” while Mahmud Hasan was in Mecca; it
seems, too, he accompanied the great ‘alym when the latter met with Turkish War
Minister Anwar Pasha and Medinan governor Jamal Pasha.77 Indeed, when, in
1916/1334, the shix ul-hynd was arrested by British authorities and eventually placed in
the Malta prison, Madani went with him—despite his not being charged of any crime.
The move was a voluntary one, a demonstration of support for his teacher and political
mentor. It would cost him three years and seven months confined to a prison cell.78
Upon his release (together with Mahmud Hasan) and return to India, Husain
Ahmad Madani quickly agreed to the Khilafat and, especially, non-cooperation platform.
In June of 1920/Shawwal of 1338, Husain Ahmad agreed to back Khilafat at the
movement’s pre-launch conference in Allahabad; Khilafat officially commenced that
August/Dh’ul Q’adah. When Mahmud Hasan passed away in November/Rabi I,
Husain Ahmad Madani “was unanimously acknowledged,” according to one official
biography, as the shix ul-hynd’s successor.79 Then in 1921/1339, this time at a
conference organized by Muhammad ‘Ali in Karachi, Husain Ahmad earned a reputation
as a particularly passionate champion of collective Hindu-Muslim action. Indeed, after
the Karachi meeting, the up-and-coming mwlana was praised not just by Muslims
within the Khilafat movement but Hindu religious and political leaders as well,
including the Jagadguru Shankaracharya of Puri, Swami Bharati Krishna Tirath. But
the British were none too amused; for his sentiments of “sedition” (and for his
distribution of the now-banned Mahmud Hasan-authored juridical ruling in support of
non-cooperation and Khilafat, discussed earlier)80 Ahmad Husain Madani, so recently a
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British prisoner on Malta, was put behind bars, this time in his own land. He was
locked up for two more years.81
Imprisonment seemed only to drive the one-time student of Mahmud Hasan to
further pursue his anti-British purposes. Indeed, upon his release one of the first things
Husain Ahmad did was address the fifth annual conference of the JUH at Cocanada
(over which he served as president; this was the same meeting mentioned previously at
which confidence was expressed in the Turkish regime and the idea of a worldwide
conference of Muslim scholars put forth), in January of 1924/Jumada I of 1342. The
mwlana’s message hadn’t changed; it had only gained in strength. An excerpt from his
presidential address to the assembled Muslim clergy and others aptly demonstrates this.

Hindu-Muslim unity is a prerequisite to freedom in this country. It is the
religious and political duty of the Muslims that they should work for the
freedom of India and continue this struggle until the government accedes
to their demand. It is their duty, which they must do with or without
companions—it is the order of the Almighty. If non-Muslims extend to
you the hand of friendship, you too must extend yours, for compromising
for the right cause will establish you as true believers in God. And, if
they [non-Muslims] turn their back on you and leave you alone, you
should not complain about it because God is your biggest supporter.82

The general Deobandi point-of-view, borne of the juridical ruling of Rashid Ahmad
Gangohi (and alive and well, some Deobandis would argue, since the days of Thana
Bhawan, when Hindus had fought side-by-side with Muslims against the British to
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defend Imdadullah’s mini-state) and developed by Mahmud Hasan, had now come into
its own, and Husain Ahmad Madani was its standard-bearer. In March 1926/Sh’aban
1344, the JUH officially adopted Husain Ahmad’s position when it passed a resolution at
its seventh conference (in Calcutta) for India’s complete independepence.
Madani and the majority of his Deobandi brethren cultivated a nationalism tied as
much to the land as to the faith. This allowed Deobandis to identify with both Islam
and India. “Our religion tells us that Adam descended in India,” he would write later, in
a booklet well known in its time called “Our India and Its Glories” (hәmarah hyndustan
әwr uske fәżail). Adam, then—the father of the human race—had been sent by God to
India first. “He inhabited this land and it was from here that his race spread… It is
necessary for the Muslim to understand that this country is his ancient home.” “Our
India” reminds the South Asian Islamic community that Muslim remains have been
buried in Indian soil since time immemorial—and while Hindus and other Indian
communities cremated their dead, the Muslim dead still lay in the Indian earth (and
would till the Day of Judgment). Indeed, “it is an unchallengable fact that from the very
beginning India has been the land [vәtәn] of Islam.” Even from a historical point-ofview, Husain Ahmad argued, and taking into account all of the subcontinent’s invading
populations (Aryans, Greeks, Parthians, Huns, etc.), Muslims could stake a more ancient
claim to the land, as so many Indian Muslims were descended from the subcontient’s
aboriginal, pre-Aryan populations, subsequently converted to the one true faith.83
Husain Ahmad and the Deobandi fathers thus strove to tie Muslims to India specifically;
a Muslim could be as strong and fervent an “Indian” as any Hindu—indeed, stronger.
In any case, Deobandi support for the Congress and a united India came not from “ideas
of parliamentary democracy” or faith in some other “modern” political system. No—the
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scholars “still thought in terms of the self-regulated millat. In direct continuation of the
position of the earlier ‘ulama, they believed that with independence they could in fact
form their own community, with their own shar’iat-based courts and their own
educational institutions, inhabiting the same space as Hindus but culturally apart—until
such time, at least some of them thought, as their example would win the Hindus to
Islam at last.”84
The (general) Deobandi view of the Muslim place vis-à-vis the Indian subcontinent,
elucidated above, stood in stark contrast to that of the Barelvis, who by and large saw
“nationhood” in more ummәt-based terms—as a space (any space) governed by shәri’at.
The emphasis for the self-styled Ahl-e-Sunnat was not geographically demarcated,
bordered on the north and south, the east and west, by mountains, deserts, and seas.
No, Barelvi “nationalism” was based soley on the Islamic concept of the pure society (as
interpreted by Barelvis). It was defined by faith, existing in the minds of its people,
however scattered amongst the non-Muslim population they might be. Possessed of
such an emphasis, it was only natural for the Barelvis to look not towards cooperation
with Hindustan’s non-Muslim communities but rather towards a sort of strict selfsegregation. In time, of course, that self-segregation would evolve into a more complete
separation—and culminate in the Indian subcontinent’s extraordinary Partition.
Ironically, it was out of the Barelvi, ummәt-based conception of “nationhood” that the
necessarily geographically demarcated Pakistan call would emerge.
Now recognized by many as Mahmud Hasan’s most likely heir, Husain Ahmad was
appointed Sәdәr mәdarys, or head teacher, of the university at Deoband in 1927/1345
(when Anwar Shah Kashmiri resigned amidst a political rift that saw several of the
school’s teachers expelled, followed by scores of its students, addressed later in this
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work), as well as head of the hәdis department (a decision that did not come without
consequences for intra-Deobandi unity, either), in 1924/1342.85 (It was tradition at the
school that the head teacher also teach hәdis).86 He would hold both of these positions
until his death in 1957/1377. (Husain Ahmad taught off-and-on, too, at the Jamia
Qasmia Madrasah-e-Shahi in Moradabad for a decade-and-a-half—the school mentioned
previously as being only a stone’s throw from the institution attended by Barelvi leader
Naimuddin Moradabadi, the Madrasah Imdadia.) As Mahmud Hasan’s seeming political
heir, as well as the head of the Deobandi movement’s central religio-educational
insititution, Husain Ahmad Madani, all in a few years, abruptly and fortuitously found
himself poised to finally institute Mahmud Hasan’s political vision (one he’d inhereited,
in large degree, from his own spiritual mentors) for India’s Muslim millions. This
position was strengthened when his own faction within the school at Deoband won out,
in 1927/1345, against the Anwar Shah Kashmiri-led faction (the latter allegedly seeking
an apolitical stance for the institution); teachers belonging to the Kashmiri group were
expelled (or resigned), and scores of students followed them, many to a new school in
the village of Dabhel near the Gujarati coast.
From 1924/1342 to 1929/1348, in addition to the numerous duties connected to his
positions at the dar ul’alwm in Deoband, Husain Ahmad led “hundreds” of public
meetings across India (not to mention literally thousands of political discussions with
smaller groups; the teacher of hәdis was known for rarely eating dinner with less than
“ten or fifteen guests” at his table).87 His emphasis, as always, was communal unity
against the subcontinent’s number one threat: the British. These two emphases—(1)
Hindu-Mulsim cooperative action and (2) the British as Islam’s biggest threat—were
fully in line with the political philosophy of Husain Ahmad’s mentor, Mahmud Hasan.
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(The Barelvis, of course, differed with Madani and the Deobandi mainstream on both
counts.) At one JUH conference in Saharanpur, Husain Ahmad elucidated on the British
threat. London’s policy in India, he explained, was to divide and rule; as long as the
major communities remained divided, the British could rule. Thus parties like the
Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League played right into the hands of the British
authorities. Such groups actually served the British purpose, prolonging the English
presence on the subcontinent and ensuring Indians’ continued subjugation. The British
political method of divide-and-rule was, Madani insisted, the single greatest danger
facing India. The only way to fight it was to make such division impossible—and that
meant Hindu-Muslim political unity.88 Interestingly, both Gandhi and Jinnah made
similar appeals during this period—at least in terms of the importance of Hindu-Muslim
joint action—calling for a revitalization of the spirit of 1916’s/1334’s Lucknow Pact.
But the two leaders’ own incompatibility vis-à-vis one another symbolized the deaf ears
with which their calls were met by their own constituents, not to mention the Hindu
and Muslim communities at large, and such a revitalization never took place. As if to
make the point, Hindus and Muslims in Calcutta were at one another’s throats for
weeks in 1926/1344; the riots were so bad that around a hundred were either killed or
injured and the city ground to a halt for a month-and-a-half. Incidentally, the violence
happened to coincide with the arrival of Lord Irwin, India’s new viceroy.
Nationalist tempers flared across India in 1927/1345 after the Secretary of State for
India, Lord Birkenhead, announced the makeup of a special commission charged with
the task of making recommendations for the establishment of a more “responsible
government.” Part of that task entailed finding ways to further develop the country’s
representative institutions. Perhaps the establishment of such a commission might have
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brought nationalist Indians hope that much-needed change was on the way, but the
group’s makeup suggested that the British weren’t interested at all in what Indians
thought about their government, let alone hoped; all seven members of the commission,
led by Sir John Simon, were British. It was, to borrow a phrase from Motilal Nehru,
simply “eye-wash,” nothing more. Husain Ahmad Madani agreed wholeheartedly, and
said as much at the JUH’s Peshawar Conference that year. He urged fellow Muslims
and “composite nationalists” to boycott the commission—to refuse to speak or otherwise
cooperate with its members. In this, the Congress eventually followed Husain Ahmad’s
lead,89 organizing black flag demonstrations and strikes all along the commission’s path
after it arrived in 1928/1346; “Simon go back!” was the slogan of the day. Many of the
demonstrations were joint Congress-JUH affairs; many demonstrators were arrested,
imprisoned, and beaten—some even killed. Mounted police charged into Indian crowds,
hammering at demonstrators with metal-tipped bamboo lathis or trampling them down.
(This was Nehru’s first personal experience with physical injury at the hands of
government; at least one of his own wounds, sustained at the time, would ail him for the
rest of his life).90 Meanwhile, ever prepared to fill a vacuum left by the Congress, the
Muslim League (albeit only a section), plus several smaller parties, did meet with and
make reccomendations to the commission.91
After the Simon Commission left India, having earned the abhorrence of millions of
Indian nationalists (though its recommendations would largely be used as the
foundation for the Government of India Act of 1935/1354), the British government
turned the tables. If the Indians didn’t want their European overlords to recommend an
improved government for India, perhaps they themselves could offer one. Of course,
British authorities were confident that such a challenge would never be met, divided as
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Indian politics remained. The differences between the Hindus and the Muslims, the
Hindu/Muslim nationalists and the composite nationalists, the Deobandis and the
Barelvis, the Congress and the League—all of these schisms would virtually guarantee
that any Indian attempt to come up with their own consititution (and one that they
would all agree to) would end in colossal failure. The Indians needed the British. Much
to the dismay, perhaps, of the colonial government, however, Indian political parties
representing a wide variety of opinion—from the Hindu Mahasabha to the Muslim
League, and including the Congress and the JUH—met in an All-Parties Conference in
mid-May 1928/late Dh’ul Q’adah 1346 in Calcutta. But British worries soon
evaporated; Indian schismatics did win the day, for the result of this brief episode was
the Nehru Report—a document which, to the relief of the British government, did
indeed fail to bring the subcontinent’s divergent communities together. (Indeed, it was
probably the last real chance for Hindu and Muslim leaders to restore the unity of the
Lucknow Pact era—and that opportunity had been lost.) Unfortunately for the
Deobandis, the report was not to their satisfaction, either. The biggest complaint
among the Deobandi leadership was that the Nehru Report failed to include any
substantive provisions safeguarding the rights of minorities. Thus something of a split
occurred, however temporary, between the two parties (Congress and JUH) for the first
time, almost, since the days of Khilafat.
What provisions was the JUH actually seeking in an Indian constitution? For
starters, the party insisted upon a truly federal system possessed of highly autonomous
states. Certain specifically enumerated powers would be granted to the center, but all
residual powers would be reserved to the states and the people. The JUH additionally
desired a sort of US Bill of Rights-style constitutional guarantee that the federal
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government would never interfere in the realm of Muslim education, Muslim religious
institutions, religious traditions, and Muslim personal law. Muslim religious cases
should only be decided by Muslim religious officers, they maintained, and Muslim areas
like Baluchistan and Sindh (both singled out by name) should receive state status, on par
with any other Indian state. The autonomy of the states was to be further reinforced by
a provision that any change to the federal consitution must be approved not by a
majority or a super-majority but by full-fledged unanimity. Interestingly, the JUH did
not demand reservations for Muslims in either Bengal or Punjab, a major policy
difference between the Deobandi party and the League.92 (Compare this to Jinnah’s
reaction to the Nehru report: the League leader stormed out of Calcutta and traveled
straight to Delhi—the venue of the Aga Khan’s All-India Muslim Conference. This
latter gathering resolved absolutely to stand firm on its bid for separate electorates.)93
The JUH-INC divide was somewhat bridged on Christmas Day 1929/23 Rajab
1348, when the Congress passed a resolution calling for complete independence. (In
1927/1345, Nehru had visited the Soviet Union—on invitation from the Stalinist
regime—to celebrate the Russian Revolution’s tenth anniversary. The experience
evidently thrilled him, and he returned to India seemingly charged with added vigor,
energizing the leftist elements within the Congress.94 Thus, the next year, and together
with quasi-communist Subhas Chandra Bose, Nehru organized the Socialist
Independence for India League, which quickly demanded complete Indian independence,
as opposed to the official Congress demand—including that of Gandhi and Nehru’s own
father, Motilal—for Dominion status within the British Empire. Astutely measuring
the way the political tides were turning, however, Gandhi and the Congress later
adopted Nehru’s position as the party’s goal.) In such a declaration the JUH, “largely
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due to the efforts of Madani,” could offer its strong support. After all, the JUH’s official
stance—since 1926/1344—had been to demand complete independence.
But after the Nehru Report, things were never quite the same between the Congress
and the JUH. Indeed, even at the Jamiat’s ninth conference (at Amroha), in May of
1930/Dh’ul Hijja of 1348, there were considerable murmurings against a continued
alliance with the INC; the Nehru Report had sown the seeds of mistrust among some
within the upper echelons of Deobandism.95 Despite the opposition, the party was able
to pass a resolution for full cooperation with the Congress, moved by Hafizur Rahman
and supported loudly by Husain Ahmad Madani.96 Once again, Husain Ahmad
demonstrated through his actions that he really did consider Hindu-Muslim unity in the
quest to free India from the British the number one priority. Despite the reservations—
some quite vehement—that plagued several of his brethren, Husain Ahmad had argued
that the overarching goal was worth a rapprochement. Most Deobandis would follow
him, but the rumblings of dissent within the movement had begun to sound, as a small
faction of the school began agitating for Muslim separatism. Some of the loudest
Deobandi dissidents were Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi and his two students, Shabbir Ahmad
Usmani and Muhammad Shafi (on whom more later),97 a split that would have major
repercussion for both Deobandism and the political structure of South Asia. Thus even
the Congress’ adoption of complete independence as its goal didn’t fully heal the wounds
inflicted during this brief period of division. The Congress had gone back on its word
(in 1916/1334, it should be remembered, it had committed to separate electorates, for
example, but the Nehru report had run roughshod over the idea, dismissing it
completely), and for some Deobandis their trust in the mostly Hindu INC had been
permanently removed.
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On 12 March 1930/11 Shawwal 1348, now sixty-one-year-old Mohandas Gandhi
left Sabarmati Ashram with seventy-eight personally selected men and set out on what
would become a twenty-four-day, two-hundred-forty-mile journey to the sea. It didn’t
take long for the whole world to notice. In the end, the prolonged demonstration
resulted in the “Gandhi-Irwin Pact” (through which the government agreed, among
other things, to release all non-violent political prisoners, lift the ban over the Congress,
and restore confiscated property to political activists), the eventual repeal of the Salt
Act, and the galvanization of tens of thousands of nationalists in their opposition to the
British. The Gandhi-led “Salt March,” supported by Husain Ahmad and the JUH, did
much to rekindle the fire of Indian nationalists, including some Deobandi Muslims. The
JUH did much to publicize the event, especially through its newspaper, al-jәm’aiәt.
Many respected Deobandi ‘alәma actively participated in the Salt March (like Hafizur
Rehman, who would, a couple months later, help pass the resolution affirming JUH
cooperation with the Congress at the Jamiat’s Amroha conference, and who marched to
Dandi from the village of Dabhel—home to the recently erected Deobandi mәdrәsәħ
mentioned previously.98 Some Deobandi and Deobandi-leaning leaders were arrested
and imprisoned for their involvement in the Dandi march, including Abul Kalam Azad,
Hafizur Rehman, Fakhruddin, Muhammad Mian, and Bashir Ahmad Bhatia.99 Other
Deobandi and Deobandi-leaning figures, notably Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, were
arrested in other parts of India, having participated in or organized demonstrations
connected to the march; indeed, in the northwest, between two hundred and twohundred-and-fifty Muslim Pathans were massacred as British troops and armored cars
opened fire on a crowd of non-cooperators demonstrating in support of Abdul Ghaffar
and Gandhi. (The agitation was so effective—and the ire of the Pathans so white hot—
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that British control over Peshawar didn’t resume until May/Dh’ul Hijja.)100 But the
march also demonstrated that a large section of Muslims (including, generally speaking,
the Barelvis) were not interested in any Gandhi-led resistance; as a result, Muslim
participation in the Salt March and its aftermath has been described by some historians
as “paltry.”101 Such descriptions, however, ignore the involvement, active participation,
and support of many notable Deobandi leaders, the JUH, Abdul Ghaffar’s Servants of
God (xuda-e-xydmәtgar) organization, and the hundreds of Muslims who perished in
Peshawar on 23 April/24 Dh’ul Q’adah.
At the same time, Gandhi launched a massive civil disobedience operation—his first
major attempt at non-cooperation since the “embarrassingly abrupt withdrawal” of the
original campaign after the Chauri Chaura incident of 1922/1340.102 Indeed, the Salt
March had only been the launch event of the new round of non-cooperation, agitation
that would last (with a temporary hiatus in 1931/1349) through 1934/1353.
Churchill’s “half-naked fakir” was able to energize hundreds of thousands who hadn’t
readily taken part in the first non-cooperation efforts a decade before, including women,
populations in central India, and Indians from the south (by the mid-thirties the INC
would replace the Justice Party as the latter region’s foremost political organization),
and the period saw the emergence, too, of the “Red Shirts”—or, more correctly, the
aforementioned xuda-e-xydmәtgars (sometimes referred to as the “KKs”) in the Pathan
Muslim northwest.103 These last were led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the “Frontier
Gandhi,” and his brother Khan Abdul Jabbar Khan (or “Dr. Khan sahyb”). The brothers
and their organization (which, by 1930/1348, counted around fifty thousand members)
worked closely with the Congress; its supportive action connected to the Salt March has
already been mentioned, and in 1931/1349, Abdul Ghaffar was even offered the position
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of Congress president, but he humbly refused. (Ironically, KK envoys had previously
been sent to the Muslim League in an attempt to obtain support from that body for Red
Shirt endeavors in the northwest frontier areas, but the ML rejected Abdul Ghaffar’s
organization and the opportunity to bring it into the League fold; League leaders likely
regretted this decision after their party’s overwhelming loss to the Congress in the
Muslim-majority NWFP, thanks largely to KK efforts. At the same time, the Congress
embraced the movement—as long as its members joined the INC—and for the next
decade-and-a-half the two parties worked hand-in-hand.)104 But the Gandhi-led civil
disobedience campaign of 1930-1931/1348-1349 also led to around one hundred
thousand arrests (including Gandhi’s own). Both JUH president Kifayatullah and party
general secretary Ahmad Sayeed Dehlawi were likewise arrested and imprisoned for
civil disobedience. While the Deobandis actively participated in non-cooperation, the
Barelvis played little to no meaningful role, relatively speaking, in Gandhi’s India-wide
movement to paralyze the British Indian machine.
In November 1930/Jumada II 1349, the first Round Table conference on India’s fate
took place in London. But devoid of even a single Congress represetative (Gandhi was
in a British prison at the time as punishment for the aforementioned civil disobedience
campaign, then in full swing in India), the gathering was almost certainly doomed to
failure from the start. Indeed, the whole affair was rather “like trying to stage Hamlet
without the Prince of Denmark,” in the words of one historian.105 Muslim princes, the
Aga Khan, and Jinnah participated (indeed, the League’s delegates outnumbered those of
any other party by a large margin, not counting those of the many princely states), but
neither the Barelvis nor the Deobandis could claim any real place at the conference’s
table. In terms of political demands, at least the Barelvis could mostly count on the
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League to push for “their” general positions. Even if they’d wanted to attend, many of
the Deobandi leadership were in prison for their participation in the salt sәtyagrәhә
earlier in the year. The only result of the first Round Table conference was a vague
resolution to work out an All-India Federation plan.
In early 1931/mid-1349, Gandhi met with Viceroy Irwin. The result of these
deliberations would be known to history as the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, aforementioned.
According to their agreement, the government would set all political prisoners free in
exchange for Gandhi’s assurance that the Congress would call off the civil disobedience
campaign. Gandhi additionally agreed to act as the INC’s lone representative at the
second Round Table conference later that year. Many celebrated the pact as an Indian
victory, but others viewed it as an unnecessary concession to the enemy. Indeed, to
some the agreement was nothing less than a betrayal of Congress’ bedrock principles,
not to mention its official position in support of outright Indian independence. Nehru
reportedly shed tears of grief upon hearing news of the pact.106
And so the second Round Table conference (held in late 1931/mid-1350) did include
a Congress representative—Mohandas Gandhi himself. Before leaving to attend the
deliberations in London, Gandhi sought earnestly for a compromise with Muslim
leaders. The Mahatma was convinced that unless Muslims and Hindus (or, in this case,
the Congress and other Muslim parties) could arrive in Britain under the banner of a
joint platform, the talks would be useless—even an embarrassment. Indeed, he made
this his motto in the run-up to the London talks: that “London was out unless unity was
in.” As such, Gandhi attended the JUH’s annual conference in Delhi, emphasizing the
futility of any Round Table discussion without “a communal agreement,” and essentially
handed the non-Congress Muslims “a blank check”; let them name their demands, and if
230

it meant unity, Gandhi would accept. Even so, the communal oneness that the
Mahatma sought was not forthcoming, in part thanks to the intractability of some
Congress Muslims.107 In the end, the loincloth-clad “fakir,” who claimed that the
Congress was the political voice of India, was alone at this second London gathering—
and the INC’s political rivals easily shouted him down. This second round table attempt
was a non-success like the first. A year later, a third conference was attempted, but
without any Congress representative (not to mention the absence of Jinnah) the meeting
ended in yet another failure.108 Perhaps the only development of significance was
Choudhary Rahmat ‘Ali’s use of the term “Pakistan” during the conference’s
proceedings—a first.
After Gandhi returned to India from the second Round Table talks, he decided to
relaunch the civil disobedience campaign, which had been put on hold under the terms
of the Gandhi-Irwin pact. Civil disobedience would thus resume from January
1932/Ramadan 1350. As part of the effort, the Deobandi JUH set up a sub-organization
called the daira-e-hәrbiyya, or “Circle of War,” to recruit activists and generally organize
resistance in support of the nationwide non-cooperation movement. The Circle’s first
president, former JUH head Kifayatullah, was arrested after leading tens of thousands of
demonstrators (Deobandis claim a full one hundred thousand) in procession through
Delhi. Leadership then fell on Husain Ahmad Madani, but he was arrested in turn on
his way to Delhi from Deoband. The pattern continued, too; Ahmad Saeed Delhawi,
Hafizur Rahman Ludhianvi, and others were all arrested soon after becoming daira-ehәrbiyya chief. Most were jailed for one to two years, along with thousands of their
followers.109 To add to the loss of these influential men, in September 1934/Jumada II
1353 Gandhi himself resigned from the Congress; he would go on to suffer a set of
231

nervous breakdowns, become estranged from his wife, and move to a one-room hovel in
the middle of nowhere in central India.
The year after Gandhi’s resignation, the British enacted the 1935/1354 Government
of India Act—legislation that was viewed by many Deobandi nationalists and others as
simply one more British exercise in delaying the inevitable. The Act produced no new
preamble, instead retaining the ambiguous introduction to the old 1919/1337 Act
(which had vaguely defined the purposes of the Act as the “gradual” establishment in
India of self-governing institutions and responsible government—all as an “intergral”
part of the British Empire, of course). To Madani and other Indians of similar political
bent, the Act smacked of insincerity and the usual British deception. And despite the
Act’s dismantling of the dyarchy system in the provinces and its veneer of increased
democracy, it actually granted the Viceroy and his appointed (British) provincial
governors the authority, when considered necessary, to seize the government within
their spheres and act, for all intents and purposes, as quasi-dicatators (something some
governors did from 1939/1358, after the Congress ministries resigned). As part of its
divide-and-rule strategy—meant to curb the influence of parties like the Congress while
simultaneously increasing the power of “collaborator” groups—the British via the
1935/1354 Act widened the voter base and, crucially, granted separate electorates not
only to Muslims, but also to Sikhs and Christians.110 Of course, only members of the
community tied to those reserved seats could vote for them, thereby fostering both a
dependence on government among minorities and a communal spirit in politics. The
League, many Barelvis, and others applauded such measures as necessary for the
protection of minority populations; the Congress, most Deobandis, and their allies did
not.
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The 1935/1354 Government of India Act also set the stage, to the dismay of Husain
Ahmad Madani, for a very brief alliance between the All-India Muslim League and the
JUH, signaling a win (however brief) for the aforementioned Deobandi faction opposed
to the Congress. This faction was led by Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, who was not only known
for his support of the League and League positions, but had, the same year the
Government of India Act came into being, cancelled his patronage of the dar ul’alwm—a
major act of dissent. His reason? In a resignation letter sent at the time of his
cancellation, he explained that he deemed unacceptable the “Madani group’s”
introduction at the school of “the Congress ideology.”111 But since the Act had widened
the voter base and further institutionalized separate electorates for Muslims, it made
little sense for the JUH to continue to campaign with the Congress, as the majority of
Congressites were Hindu and thus could not vote for its candidates. Seeing that only
Muslims could vote for Muslims where the reserved seats were concerned, the JUH
leadership reluctantly agreed to join forces with the League after passage of the Act.
Signs of a JUH-League rapprochement had been visible as early as November 1932/Rajab
1351, when the working committee of the JUH met with the Council of the AIML in
Delhi. The occasion was the repudiation of a Hindu-Muslim-Sikh “Unity Conference”
organized, at least in part, by the Congress in Allahabad to demand joint electorates.
But the repudiation of the Allahabad meeting was less important than this rare show of
solidarity between the Deobandi ‘alәma and the Muslim League. It was, wrote one
newspaper correspondent covering the event, “the most impressive demonstration of
Moslem unity seen in India for many a long day.”112 The reporter’s remark is telling in
that it speaks not only of the sudden appearance of apparent unity among two of that
community’s most politically relevant organizations, but also of the politically,
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regionally, theologically, and even linguistically fractured nature of the state of affairs
among South Asia’s Muslims previous to the Delhi conference.
In any case, the period of League-JUH unity, throughout which the latter worked
under Jinnah’s leadership, was short-lived.113 At a JUH conference in April
1936/Muharram 1355, Jinnah addressed the JUH personally, urging its members to
“organize separately” from “the Hindus,” and then—only after this separation—could
the two groups “together tread the path of cooperation.”114 What this meant in practice
was unclear, but the new separate electorates system naturally engendered a new level
of political mudslinging between the League and the Congress that weakened the
strength of Jinnah’s call, much less any contrivance of Hindu-Muslim unity, however
“separate” their organization. For many in the JUH, the blatant communalism of the
campaign became too much to bear. Jinnah, too, disapproved of the JUH’s continued
ties with the INC.115 Eventually, the Deobandi ‘alәma leading the Jamiat, fearing that
they were being used, decided enough was enough, and after the 1936-1937/1355-1356
elections (in which the Congress came to power in every province but Bengal, Punjab,
and Sindh, and in which the League failed to form a government in any province,
including a pathetic showing in the Muslim-majority provinces) the short-lived alliance
was broken.116 The exact date of the fateful break may have been 15 July 1937/6
Jumada I 1356, when Congress leaders formally asked League leaders, via an Abul
Kalam Azad-delivered letter (dubbed a “death warrant” by some), to consider dissolving
their party and uniting with the INC; the JUH subsequently broke with the League—an
act later Pakistani historians described as “a political abduction,” and its participants as
“political turncoats.”117 Jinnah had thus lost both the election as well as the support of
the influential JUH.
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Perhaps as a reaction to the League’s non-success, as well as the JUH’s passing stint
as ML ally (a move he had almost certainly opposed loudly), in 1938/1357 Husain
Ahmad Madani published his groundbreaking muttәhydәħ qwmiәt әwr yslam (“Composite
Nationalism and Islam”). The book prompted “an instant reaction” from Muhammad
Iqbal and produced a years-long controversy over the nature of South Asian Muslims’
separate identity. Madani’s position, in his own words, was that in “the modern age,

nations are founded on homelands; nations are not founded on the basis
of race or religion. The dwellers of England are recognized as one
nation, whereas they have Jews and Christians as their citizens, and such
is the case with America, Japan, and France.118

Iqbal would compose his own refutation—in verse, of course—directed unswervingly at
Husain Ahmad Madani:

Hasan from Basrah, Bilal from Abyssinia, Suhayb from Rome;
Deoband produced Husayn Ahmad, what monstrosity is theirs?
He chanted from the pulpit that nations are created by homelands;
What an ignorance regarding the position of Muhammad!
Take thyself to Muhammad, because he is the totality of Faith;
And if thou [dost] not reach him, all [thy knowledge] is Bulahabism.119

(Bulahab was a wealthy Arab man whom the Prophet cursed for rejecting the message
of Islam; he is a symbol of rejection.) One of Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi’s students (his
235

nephew, in fact), one Zafar Ahmad Usmani, in the late 1930s/1350s put together an
attempted refutation of the concept of composite nationalism, too, highlighting the
intra-Deobandi schism in this regard. The effort, included in Zafar Ahmad’s yla al-sunan
(a legal commentary on hәdis), was evidently undertaken under the direct guidance of
Ashraf ‘Ali himself and reportedly motivated, at least in part, by a dream he (Zafar
Ahmad) had had in which he had seen the Prophet Muhammad. Muhammad had given
him “glad tidings” of a “near victory for the Muslims,” which Zafar Ahmad’s admirers
have interpreted as an obvious allusion to the creation of Pakistan ten years later.120
Thanawi himself was so opposed to Madani’s decision to work for composite
nationalism (and that with the Congress) that he issued a juridical ruling in 1939/1358
stating that the only shәri’at-worthy course for Muslims was to join with the All-India
Muslim League; thereafter the prolific Deobandi scholar, as mentioned previously,
resigned from the dar ul’alwm at Deoband—and immediately joined the League. His
fәtwa, wrote one Pakistani scholar, “had a far reaching impact on Muslim politics.”121
Probably thanks to this faction’s continued influence within Deobandi circles, JUH
leaders were attempting, as late as 1940/1359, to find some sort of common ground
with the AIML—a shared overarching goal, something—but Jinnah insisted that the
only way such cooperation could be forthcoming was for all JUH members to resign
from the Congress. This was too much, of course, and the gulf dividing the two parties
remained permanently unbridged.122 Incidentally, Thanawi’s break with the main dar
ul’alwm was a permanent one. His grave lies within the grounds of his old Thana
Bhawan mәdrәsәħ on the outskirts of town, surrounded by cultivated fields. A small
blank slab of stone marks the muddy mound, nothing more. Outside of the diminutive
cemetery, affixed to the wall of the dilapidated seminary, is a plaque engraved in Farsi
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lettering. Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi lived a modest life, it declares, and he left this world in
similarly humble circumstances. When asked about any remnants of the scholar’s life
that might remain in and around the old mәdrәsәħ, the aged custodian informed the
author that, after all, in terms of material possessions Husain Ahmad Madani’s political
nemesis, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, never had much.
In any case, the tide turned relatively quickly for the League when, in 1939/1358,
the Congress ministries across India resigned over Britain’s committal of India to the
war effort without consulting Indian leaders, as well as the British declaration of
Dominion status as India’s goal—something to be discussed as soon as the war was
over. More vague promises were not what the Congress leaders had had in mind, and
so the Congress ministries stepped down in protest. With no ministries, under the
terms of the 1935/1354 Government of India Act the provincial governments fell into
the hands of the British governors. Jinnah couldn’t have been happier, and celebrated
this turn of events on 22 December/10 Dh’ul Q’adah as the aforementioned “Day of
Deliverance.” Combined with the League’s new emphasis on wooing the ‘alәma and pirs
to its side, an endeavor for which the party had made “serious efforts” since
1937/1356,123 the move marked the turning point of the League’s fortunes as a political
force in India. By March of 1940/Safar of 1359, newspapers were describing “Moslem
India” as being “on guard” against the alleged “dangers of Hindu ‘democracy,’” painting
“Mr. Jinnah” and his League as a veritable catch-all for India’s Muslims. (British
newspapers like The Times of London jumped at the League position, decrying Congress
control of the provinces under its ministries as “a dictatorship.” The INC’s electoral
victories, winning eight of eleven provincial ministries, had “warped the judgment of
Congress leaders,” whose subsequent attempts, via its “mass contact” campaign, to
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attract Muslims to the Congress fold had only succeeded in pushing them further away.
The Congress was trying to divide the Muslims—this was the allegation, and for many
Muslims it was enough to drive them to the League and its Pakistan demand. The
effect was to deligitimize the JUH and place the erstwhile loose-knit and hapless
League, abruptly, on a pedestal as the chief representative organization for India’s
Muslims.)124
On 11 March 1942/22 Safar 1361, Winston Churchill announced another special
mission to be sent to India, this one led by Sir Stafford Cripps. Its mission: to “rally the
forces of Indian life to guard their land from the menace of the invader” (by promising
each province the post-war opportunity to remain united with or secede from British
India, the latter as independent Dominions within the Empire). Considering the
independence agitation then extant in India against what was perceived as the longentrenched British invader, Churchill’s choice of terminology seems odd indeed. But the
invader of which he spoke, of course, was of the Japanese variety. A “crisis in the affairs
of India” had arison “out of the Japanese advance,” and thus the time had come to solve
the Indian question once and for all, and then get to work defeating the enemy. One
contemporary Indian commentator described Churchill’s statement as merely another
“sweet nothing,” and most Indian nationalist leaders were likewise skeptical. Husain
Ahmad Madani no doubt fit within this latter category. Still, he would listen to what
the old man had to say. Several weeks later, Cripps arrived in Hindustan.
Stafford Cripps met in turn with Abul Kalam Azad (then serving as the president of
the Congress), then Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah, then Mohandas Gandhi. It is interesting to
note that Cripps’ choice of audience vis-à-vis the Muslim political leaders—meeting
with both Azad, a Congress-supporting (and Deobandi-supported) Muslim and Jinnah,
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the (generally Barelvi-supported) League leader, was a tacit acknowledgement of the
schism that existed within South Asia’s Islamic community. Soon afterwards the British
representative proposed (via radio broadcast from Delhi) that India obtain
representation on both the British war cabinet and the Pacific War Council, then offered
Indians (once again) a chance to write their own constitution—along the road to
Dominion status, of course. But the general reaction to Cripps’ proposal was one of “too
little, too late.” Gandhi famously described the offer as a “post-dated check,” and at a
conference of the JUH in Lahore, Husain Ahmad likewise rejected the proposal,
characterizing it as a last, futile British attempt to meddle in purely Indian affairs.125 On
10 April/23 Rabi I, the Congress formally rejected Cripps’ proposal, a move followed by
most every other Indian political party (though each for their own reasons). Cripps left
India in shame, having utterly failed in his quest, two days after the formal Congress
rejection.126 But the event, underscoring as it did the opposition from seemingly every
quarter to Britain’s belated attempts to preserve some vestige of empire on the
subcontinent, left London and Delhi more dependent than ever on Jinnah and the
League. It also gave “greater strength to the Pakistan demand in that the offer of the
British government brought discussion of partition into the open,” in the words of one
Pakistani historian.127
During the Second World War—and despite Gandhi’s admonishments to assist the
British against what he perceived as the greater, Nazi evil—the JUH, led by Husain
Ahmad Madani, condemned the war effort, vehemently opposing any support from the
Indian quarter for Britain in her struggles against Hitler in Europe, Africa, and the
Middle East and Tojo in Asia and the Pacific. The crippling of British power was a
good thing; let the great colonialist powers pound themselves to dust. The greatest
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threat to India wasn’t Hitler—it was the British foreign policy of imperialism. The call
for independence must not be suspended out of deference to yet another war. Besides,
the memory of broken British promises dating back to the first Great War still
smoldered in Indians’ collective memory. The JUH’s Bachar Ayun conference (23-25
April 1942/6-8 Rabi II 1361)—convened as the Japanese were making serious headway
in British-occupied Burma, German subs were sinking British vessels in the Atlantic,
and British bombers were flying missions over Germany, and just days after Cripps left
India—saw Husain Ahmad call, once again, for Hindustan’s complete independence.
Such a declaration, in the middle of the war, was certainly not welcomed by British
authorities, who by now had been monitoring JUH activities for years. As a result of his
independence and liberation rhetoric and obvious sway over a large population, Madani
was arrested (during the conference’s very proceedings) and thrown into prison.
(Ironically, the arrest occurred on the same day that Churchill, addressing the British
House of Commons, declared that the “main war plan” of the country was the liberation
of Europe.) Except for a very brief moment of release six months later, Husain Ahmad
would remain behind bars until August 1944/Sh’aban 1363—almost two-and-a-half
years.128
Between late June and early July 1945/mid- to late Rajab 1364, British Viceroy
Wavell met with Indian leaders at Simla to discuss his future plans for India. The
Muslim League delegation, led by Jinnah, made discussions all but impossible when it
demanded recognition as the sole spokesparty for India’s Muslims. The Congress, in a
wily move, had sent its delegation (the Congress working committee) under the
personal leadership of a Muslim: Abul Kalam Azad. To further buoy up the Congress’
own claim that it, too, represented a sizable proportion of Muslim opinion—and should
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therefore be regarded as representative of not one Indian community but all Indians—
the JUH, in the form of its president, also attended at least a portion of the conference,
specifically the deliberations of 4 July/23 Rajab. (This was the same day that, quite by
accident, Jinnah and Nehru crossed paths in the Hotel Cecil lounge nearby; evidently
these two political opponents “had a couple of minutes’ friendly conversation” before
moving on to their separate business.) In any case, the intractability of both sides led to
the breakdown of the talks, and on 14 July/3 Sh’aban Wavell announced that his
attempt at negotiating a plan with India’s leading political parties had failed.129
In September of 1945/Shawwal of 1364 (just over a year after his release from
prison), Husain Ahmad tried to address the League threat by hosting a conference of
Muslims on an all-India level. One hundred fifty Muslim representatives of other
political parties and organizations (i.e. non-League) reportedly attended the gathering.
The conference produced what Husain Ahmad called the Muslim Parliamentary Board,
a body (ultimately of little significance) meant to reinforce to the now many wavering
Muslims that they were not alone—that a strong section of the South Asian Islamic
community was, in fact, made up of composite nationalists. But the divide between
Leaguers and composite nationalists was apparent even in Deoband. One prominent
Deobandi cleric remembered joining a “children’s Muslim League” in the town at the
age of eleven, a group that was composed of some six hundred kids. “Every Friday,” he
recalled years later, “we took out a procession through the bazaars and important
places.” But the youngest composite nationalists—or “children from the Congress”—
would come out in full force, too, marching through the streets and competing with the
young Leaguers for decibal supremacy. “[S]ometimes we hurled stones at one
another,” the League-supporting cleric remembered. One or the other procession would
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raise “faith-inspiring slogans,” stopping in front of the police station or the revenue
office to chant raucously. “The officers of the British Government locked the gate from
the inside on hearing the slogans from a distance which prompted us to become more
vociferous and we stayed there for a long time.” The composite nationalists would
shout, “Hindu, Muslim, brother, brothers!” to which the Leaguers would answer,
“Muslim, Muslim, brother, brothers! We will not stop till we divide India! We will
create Pakistan! At the cost of our head, we will create Pakistan! Will bear the bullet
on our chest, but create Pakistan! Rivers of blood will flow, but we will create Pakistan!
Pakistan, zyndabad!” Both sides practiced the South Asian martial art of club-fighting
(bynnwt) in preparation for the coming violence (according to Muhammad Shafi’s son,
bynnwt was even incorporated into the dar ul’alwm’s curriculum during this period);
apparently the local Hindus “stood in awe” of their Muslim neighbors’s skills in this
regard.130 For the adults, however, the Pakistan-India tug-of-war was more than a
competition to see who could shout the loudest, and even in the children’s words more
than a mere hint of future violence might be clearly discerned.
Given Husain Ahmad’s uncompromising position when it came to preserving a
united India, it came as a shock to the old ‘alym when, on 14 June 1947/25 Rajab 1366,
the Nehru-led Congress formally accepted a plan of partition. The sense of betrayal
must have been acute, for Madani—long a staunch supported of the INC, even in the
face of opposition from his Deobandi brethren—railed against it.131 But it was too late.
On 14 August 1947/27 Ramadan 1366, the state of Pakistan came into existence, sawn
asunder from the now-separate state of India. As for the latter, it officially emerged
from under British paramountcy the next day.
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That night (15 August 1947/28 Ramadan 1366), the vice-chancellor of the dar
ul’alwm at Deoband addressed the students and faculty of that institution. Mention of
Pakistan was brief. The focus, as always, was on the freedom narrative based on the
Waliullahi program kept alive and, eventually, spread far and wide by the Deobandi
movement. “It is the mujahyd party of Shah Waliullah’s daring disciples that, for two
hundred years, has been lighting the path in this effort [to bring freedom to India]—
not only with pen and ink, but also with sword and blood.

hәżrәt Shah Abdul Aziz gave a fәtwa against the British and [therein] declared
that Hindustan was dar ul-hәrb. hәżrәt haji Imdadullah sahyb and hәżrәt mwlana
Muhammad Qasim sahyb Nanautawi used this fәtwa, and drank this prescription
for recovery, [albeit] their own special mixture—and gave [it to others] to
drink. hәżrәt shix ul-hynd preserved this same prescription, [this] compounded
medicine, and made it so that anyone could use it. Thus, having begun to be
used, [such use] became widespread. In the Khilafat movement, too, everyone
used it despite [the fact that] the prescription was bitter. And anyhow, having
begun to be used generally, the passion for freedom passed over from the
Muslims to the [other] sons of the nation and they too became zealous, and [the
fruit of] the sacrifices and joint Hindu-Muslim efforts [is] before us in the form
of the independence of the country...132

The Deobandi worldview—with the (Deobandi and proto-Deobandi) ‘alәma playing the
central role in the Indian independence struggle—is clearly evident here, but so, too, is
an emphasis on its culmination: the “efforts” and “sacrifices” of a joint Hindu-Muslim
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front. Such a speech would have been highly unlikely to be uttered from a Barelvi
xuțbәħ gaħ, but even now, in the midst of only a half-victory, Deobandi leaders
underscored Indian independence as a product of Hindu-Muslim unity (albeit inspired
originally by their own tradition).
But the issue of Pakistan was yet to be addressed. “The independence of India is the
independence of the entire Islamic world,” the vice-chancellor continued. And then the
delicate topic was broached: “Both the states of India and Pakistan deserve our
congratulations,” he said, in conciliatory fashion. Now that Pakistan was a reality—and
the fight for a united India finished—a paradigm shift was in order. The League, with
the help of its mostly Barelvi supporters, not to mention a handful of key Deobandi
dissenters, had prevailed; it was time to move on. “We congratulate Pakistan as
Muslims and India as our native land.”133 It was possible to celebrate both the
expulsion of the British (and the subsequent independence of India) as well as the
emergence of Pakistan, whatever the “Deobandi” position might have been before this
momentous day.
After India won its independence from the British, Husain Ahmad Madani withdrew
to a large extent from politics, preferring instead to concentrate on his routine at the
dar ul’alwm (prayer, zykr, fulfilling chancellor duties, Qur’an reading, tea and breakfast,
hәdis-teaching, lunch, prayer, answering mail, entertaining guests, prayer, more hәdis
instruction, recitation of the Qur’an, prayer, dinner, prayer, and still more hәdisteaching until midnight). In 1957/1377, while traveling in Madras, Husain Ahmad
suffered a heart attack, but survived. Upon his return to Deoband, he was seen by
doctors, experienced what seemed to be a general improvement in his health, and then
suddenly passed away in his sleep on 5 December/12 Jumada I.134
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Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi: Chief of Islamic Law.
Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi’s educational pedigree was impressive—and very Barelvi. Apart
from his blood tie to both a scholar-grandfather and a scholar-brother, it was the
connection to his renowned teacher, the great Hidayatullah Khan Rampuri (d. 1908
AD), which stood out most. Hidayatullah had studied at the feet of none other than the
famous spiritual forefather of Ahmad Riza’s movement, Fazl-e Haq Khairabadi, and
during Amjad ‘Ali’s formative years taught in Jaunpur. The journey from Azamgarh,
where Amjad ‘Ali lived, to Jaunpur, where the young man studied—a distance of about
forty-five miles—was one bereft of any sort of regular transportation option, so Amjad
‘Ali made the trip mostly on foot, catching a camel cart part of the way when he could;
but the arduous back-and-forth, spread out over years, foreshadowed the redoubtable
‘alym’s future career, marked as it would be by much journeying in the cause of the Ahle-Sunnat wal Jamaat, often on the errand of its spiritual head, Ahmad Riza. After
completing the dәrs-e-nyžami under Hidayatullah Khan Rampuri’s supervision, Amjad
‘Ali studied under another distinguished scholar, Wasi Ahmed Surti (d. 1916 AD), in
Pilibhit, just over twenty miles northeast of Bareilly. Ahmad Riza Khan had once
referred to mwlana Surti as Hindustan’s premier expert on hәdis (a compliment that
doubled as a jab at the hәdis-emphasizing Deobandis)—a good thing, since Amjad ‘Ali
aspired to follow in Wasi Ahmad’s footsteps in this regard. Thus Amjad ‘Ali’s education
brought him progressively closer, both academically and geographically, to the spiritual
guide whose impact upon his life would be greatest.135
Indeed, it didn’t take long for the separate paths of Ahmad Riza and Amjad ‘Ali not
only to cross but to unite; soon after Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi’s 1902/1320 graduation at
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Pilibhit, Ahmad Riza selected him to fill a teaching position at his fledgling Bareilly
seminary, the aforementioned “dar ul’alwm” Manzar-e-Islam, and Amjad ‘Ali was only
too happy to accept. His responsibility at the school quickly widened to include the
issuance of juridical rulings (including at times the writing of fәtawa at the dictation of
Ahmad Riza himself; the Barelvi leader would later describe Amjad ‘Ali as his “most
skilled” student in the writing of juridical rulings)136 and a supervisory position over a
major Barelvi printing press, and he soon developed a reputation for being a “work
machine.” But it was his purely spiritual responsibilities, obtained during this period,
which held deeper meaning for the Azamgarhi; he took bi’at at the hands of Ahmad Riza
Khan, helped the latter produce his translation of the Qur’an (under the title kәnz ulәiman), and then, after some time, was honored as the Barelvi founder’s xәlifәħ. One
Muslim scholar later characterized Amjad ‘Ali as “probably the best loved and most
erudite xәlifәħ of [Ahmad Riza Khan].”137 Over time Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi thus earned
the title by which he would be known by future generations: Sәdәr ul-shәri’at, meaning
“Chief of Islamic Law”; many of his rulings would be gathered and published as the fourvolume fәtawa әmjәdiәħ, and his bhar-e-shәri’at (written over the course of three decades
and only completed after his death by family members and former students) is
considered by Barelvis to be a veritable encyclopedia of Hanafi jurisprudence.138
It was here in Bareilly, too, where Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi became politically active,
faithfully towing the line of his mentor, Ahmad Riza Khan. Part of that activism was
manifest in his capacity as president of the education wing of Naimuddin Moradabadi’s
aforementioned Jama’at-e-Riza-e-Mustafa. For example, one Thursday in March
1921/Rajab 1339, the Deobandi-Barelvi political antagonism came to a head in
Bareilly—where the JUH had decided to hold its convention in this, Ahmad Riza’s
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hometown. The gathering was dubbed “the Khilafat Conference,” and Congress
stalwart Abul Kalam Azad (who, two years later, would become the Congress’s
youngest president) was just one of many prominent “nationalist” Muslims in
attendance. Of course, Deobandis dominated the organization itself. Four months
before, it should be remembered, the JUH had held its second major gathering in Delhi,
with none other than Mahmud Hasan presiding. On this day, the old Deobandi head
had been dead for three months, but the party very evidently lived on. By now a leading
Barelvi scholar, Amjad ‘Ali (following the example of his shix) strongly opposed the sort
of “Hindu-Muslim unity” espoused by the Deobandi jәm’aiәt, and his ire may have been
exacerbated by the fact that one of the Barelvis’ own, mwlana ‘Abd ul-Majid Badayuni
(whose rivalry with Ahmad Riza has already been touched upon), was at that moment
acting as the conference’s secretary.139 In any case, on this occasion the Sәdәr ul-shәri’at
Amjad ‘Ali personally approached the JUH convention with a seventy-point
questionnaire dealing specifically with the communal issue—and demanded a reply.
The Barelvis would later insist that the JUH “failed to send even one reply to the
questions posed,” despite “repeated reminders.”140 According to Naimuddin Moradabadi
(who considered Amjad ‘Ali’s questionairre so “inspired” as to leave the Deobandis with
“[no] room for a convincing reply”), Abul Kalam Azad himself addressed the issue of
the questionnaire at the Bareilly train station before his departure. “All the various
objections raised in the questionnaire are real and correct,” he is purported to have said,
before allegedly admitting that the JUH had made indefensible “errors” that the Barelvis
could now “seize.”141 Amjad ‘Ali’s opposition to cooperation between Muslims and
Hindus clearly demonstrated continuity with the views of his aged teacher, Ahmad Riza
Khan, who, as mentioned previously, felt strongly that “political alliances forged with
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Hindus for the sake of overthrowing the British were misplaced.”142 As previously
mentioned, too, Ahmad Riza Khan had just appointed Amjad ‘Ali ‘Azami qazi for all
India, with Ahmad Riza’s son Mustafa and Burhan ul-Haqq Jabalpuri to assist him as
muftis.143 His formal and highly visible opposition to the JUH on this occasion,
therefore, was significant—and appropriate, given his new appointment.
But the Deobandis were intent on convincing their Barelvi counterparts that
political unity, at least within the context of opposing the British, was necessary. The
next month, another meeting was called by the JUH, likewise in Bareilly—this time
chaired by none other than Abul Kalam Azad (casting some doubt, perhaps, onto the
details of Naimuddin Moradabadi’s train station story). The JUH delicately invited a
group of Barelvi dignitaries, including the aforementioned mwlana Muhammad Burhan
ul-Haqq Jabalpuri, mwlana Sayyid Sulayman Ashraf, and Ahmad Raza Khan’s own
grandson, mwlana Hamid Raza Khan. It is likely Amjad ‘Ali attended as well. This
invitation was a more or less unprecedented opportunity for the two sides to come to
some sort of rapprochement. But the Deobandi effort to win over these pious scholars
failed, in part because the Barelvis seemed intent only on proving the other side wrong.
To make the point, mwlana Sulayman Ashraf addressed the gathering personally,
contending that the JUH and others of their ilk were acting without religious
sanction—and that, in fact, no such sanction existed justifying cooperation with Hindu
people.144 Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations—an idea promulgated by
Ahmad Riza and even at this early stage ingrained into the political philosophy of the
movement—and thus Barelvi historians continue to label the Deobandi scholars and
leaders of the JUH “pro-Hindu.” Meanwhile, Amjad ‘Ali stood as a stalwart even at this
early date for “Muslim nationhood” and the “Muslim entity,” having “defended and
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extolled the Islamic nation.”145 Thus the meeting ended without resolving the issue; or,
rather, resolving in the minds of both parties that the respective differences dividing
them were more or less irreconcilable. The Deobandis apparently made no effort,
either, during this second Bareilly conference to answer Amjad ‘Ali’s seventy-point
objection delivered to them at the first, though the very fact that they invited the
Barelvi scholars indicates some desire on their part to develop warmer relations with
their Barelvi brothers. Unfortunately for the Deobandis, and perhaps for the history of
the subcontinent, the opportunity was squandered and no rapprochement was
forthcoming. When the conference ended, the Deobandis and the Barelvis were as
divided as ever. For Amjad ‘Ali’s part, he left the next year (1922/1340) to perform the
hәj to Mecca.146 He would return to Bareilly almost every year afterwards (for the ‘urs
of Ahmad Riza Khan), dutifully met and welcomed at the train station on each occasion
by Ahmad Riza’s son (and eventually spiritual successor), Mustapha Riza.147
In 1924/1342, Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi left Bareilly to accept an appointment as head
teacher at Ajmer’s dar ul’alwm Mu’iniyah Usmaniyah. The desert town of Ajmer, long
a pir center and place of Muslim pilgrimage (remember Akbar) in Rajasthan, would be
his home for almost a decade. Here the mufti’s talents as an organizer and administrator
were put on display, both in his capacity as head teacher and, especially, in his
spearheading of an impressive tәbliGi movement whose purpose was to revitalize and
reform the “nominal” faith amongst the region’s formerly Hindu descendants of
Prithviraj Chauhan (d. 1192 AD). Evidently this specific population practiced Islam
only superficially, having kept on or adopted many of the old Hindu worship customs (a
charge, ironically, leveled by Deobandis against the Barelvis). Many in the community
were falling prey, too, to the seemingly ever-present Shuddhi movement. Apparently
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the efforts of Amjad ‘Ali and his cohorts had “pleasant effects,” in that the Muslims of
the area “clustered around these enthusiastic preachers” and “resolved to act upon [their
admonitions].”148 Such action is instructive in the context of the Deobandi-Barelvi
rivalry, as it illustrates that both groups were reformist in nature (often the Barelvis are
portrayed as staticly traditional and thus not revivalist in the true sense of the term),
seeking to reinvigorate the subcontinent’s Islamic community, rooting out innovation
and revitalizing the faith. One aim of Amjad ‘Ali’s missionary endeavors, certainly, was
to prevent Muslim communities like Ajmer’s from falling prey to such “deviant” sects as
that represented by the Deobandis.
A quick note on the place of the anti-shuddhi activities of the Muslim scholars and
their students and disciples is in order here. The Barelvi historians, in particular, tend
to place a heavy emphasis on the efforts of the Ahl-e-Sunnat ‘alәma in combating Hindu
reconversion. Interestingly, such activism on the part of the Barelvi fathers is set
within the context of the pre-Partition “Pakistan movement.” (Such placement stresses,
perhaps, the religious lens through which the Muslim scholars viewed history in
general, even what was otherwise strictly political history.) Deobandi histories may
make mention of the Shuddhi movement, but it is typically given short shrift, if it is
treated at all. The reason? Perhaps the Deobandis have plenty of other political
material to cover—from their front-and-center involvement in the Khilafat movement
to the organization and activism of the JUH, not to mention the life stories of political
crusaders like Mahmud Hasan, ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi, and Husain Ahmad Madani. Indeed,
Deobandis would later look back on this period—this time of pre-Partition political
struggle—as a badge of honor, particularly vis-à-vis their Barelvi opponents. After
Habibur Rehman Ludhianvi’s great-grandson, speaking to the author, had finished
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extolling the sacrifices of the Deobandis as an integral part of the freedom movement,
he asked rhetorically (and sarcastically), “How many Barelvis spent time in prison?”149
This, according to many Deobandis, is why the Barelvi histories of the freedom
movement spend so much time dealing with seemingly non-political things like
combating the shuddhi movement. But to Barelvis such activities were wrapped up with
the renewal of the faith in the subcontinent along the road to establishing Islamic
government in a free and independent Muslim state.150
Another issue that features prominently in the Barelvi version of the “Pakistan
movement” (as opposed to its near-absence in the Deobandi “freedom movement”
narrative) is the Shahid Ganj mәsjyd incident, which took place while Amjad ‘Ali was
back in Bareilly on a brief three-year teaching stint (1933-1936/1352-1355). The
incident stands as another example of a less explicitly political issue being inserted by
Barelvi historians into an (or “their”) explicitly political narrative. Built as a Muslim
mosque in Lahore in the early eighteenth/twelfth century during the Mughal period,
the compound was captured forty years later—along with the rest of the city—by
victorious Sikh troops of the western Punjabi Bhangi mysәl (a state within the Sikh
Confederacy), trading hands again (though those hands remained Sikh) in the wake of
the establishment of Ranjit Singh’s empire. Muslims were subsequently forbidden to
worship at the mәsjyd, and soon it had been converted into a Sikh gwrdwara, the main
mosque edifice serving as housing quarters for Sikh priests. When, in the mid1800s/mid-1200s, the British in turn conquered Lahore, some Muslims began agitating
for a restoration of the mosque, but the Sikhs were allowed to retain the property.
Then, in 1935/1354, Muslims got wind of Sikh intentions to demolish the mosque
(“owing to its dangerous condition”),151 and Muslim groups around the country, led in
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large part by Barelvis, but including important (usually Barelvi-leaning) pirs (including
erstwhile Sunni Conference president Jamaat ‘Ali Shah) and religious scholars from both
sides, rallied around the issue of saving Shahid Ganj from destruction. One Barelvi
group, the Anjuman Hizb al-Ahnaf—connected to Lahore’s Wazir Khan mosque, tied to
a number of powerful Sufi pirs, and set up as an opposition organization to the JUH and
other Deobandi groups active in the city—played a prominent role in the affair.152 As
per the general Barelvi position, the Anjuman Hizb al-Ahnaf (which typically reserved
its activities to internal behavioral and spiritual reform within Lahore’s Muslim
community) “seems to have been far more sympathetic to the British administration,”
but in the case of Shahid Ganj came out strongly against it (or, perhaps more accurately,
against the Sikhs whose claims were supported by the government).153 In particular,
Barelvis point to the involvement of Ahmad Riza Khan’s son, Hamid Riza, as well as
“other Ahl-e-Sunnat ‘alәma” including Amjad ‘Ali (who was with Hamid Riza at the
time) in the movement to restore Shahid Ganj mәsjyd to Muslim control. “The effort to
recover the mosque,” Hamid Riza is reported to have proclaimed, “was, from an Islamic
point of view, a…[religious] duty,” one for which it was worth laying down one’s life;
such a potentiality would, “with certainty,” earn one holy martyr status.154 This may be
compared to the position of the major Deobandi leaders and organs in the city, who
seemed to cultivate more of a hands-off policy when it came to the issue of the mosque.
The heavily Deobandi Majlis‐e‐Ahrar‐e‐Islam (hereafter MAI), for example, “shied
away” from the spirited agitation that centered around Shahid Ganj; once, hundreds of
Muslim demonstrators amassed threateningly outside the party’s Lahore office,
protesting the organization’s lack of enthusiasm—indeed, its perceived complete
indifference—on the issue. Lahore’s leading Deobandi scholar, the famous Ahmad ‘Ali
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Lahori (who had been imprisoned by the British in 1914/1332 for his role in the
Mahmud Hasan-led “Silk Letters Conspiracy”), likewise played no active role in the
campaign. Neither did his Anjuman Khuddam al-Din, a group (still functioning as of
the time of this writing, under the leadership of Ahmad ‘Ali’s grandson) not unlike the
Barelvi Anjuman Hizb al-Ahnaf (but which more strongly focused on the personal
application of the message of the Qur’an). Notable MAI/Deobandi leaders like Ataullah
Shah Bukhari did not, like their Barelvi counterparts, come running to Lahore to take
part in the Shahid Ganj campaign, but stayed away. Such leaders would later explain
their actions by enunciating a desire to have seen the issue dealt with via constitutional
means. (By 1937/1356, it should be noted, the MAI had caved to pressure and joined in
the fray over the mosque, very much on the table as the issue had stubbornly remained;
the party’s non-intereference had evidently been causing it real political damage).155 In
any case, the attitude of the Ahrars vis-à-vis the Shahid Ganj episode, in the words of
one commentator of the time, “lessened its prestige among orthodox Muslims.”156
Led by such parties as the Barelvi Anjuman Hizb al-Ahnaf, Muslims gathered in
front of the one-time mosque by the thousands (between four and five thousand, to be
more precise, many of them armed with sticks and hatchets), creating an armed human
wall protecting the edifice. The British governor of the Punjab did attempt a SikhMuslim negotiation—and even obtained Sikh assurances that the demolition would be
postponed—but to no lasting avail; a week later some Sikhs involved with the gwrdwara
began demolishing it by night, much to the shock and dismay of the city’s Muslims, as
well as Muslims around the country. Communal riots, Muslim versus Sikh, erupted in
Lahore’s streets, prompting a quasi-military response from the British. Indeed, by the
8th of July/6th of Rabi II, planes were “circling the city,” British soldiers were “patrolling
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the streets with armored cars,” and a curfew “proclaimed by the beat of the drum” had
been enacted.157 158 In mid-July/mid-Rabi II, a march was organized, beginning at
Lahore’s mighty Badshahi Mosque and culminating in the procession’s arrival at Shahid
Ganj. Unfortunately for the demonstrators, however, the British met the crowd with
bullets; by the time the Royal Scots had stopped firing, around a dozen Muslims lay
dead in the streets, and several British soldiers lay wounded or dead as well, victims of
stoning, trampling, beating—or some deadly combination. By 21 July/19 Rabi II, the
crowd was still “menacing” and “refused to leave the streets” despite the curfew,159
though the next day the multitude reportedly dispersed (after “sitting in the same place
for 36 hours”) at the injunction of their religious leaders.160 By the 29th/27th the British
Official Wireless could report that “the situation in Lahore was…quiet,” and that the
Muslims had decided to pursue the matter via “constitutional methods.” This last
referred to a plan to appeal through the British Indian court system.161 (This had been
tried before, for years directly following the British occupation of the city; British
authorities had ruled in favor of Sikh ownership). In any case, the most serious phase of
the crisis had passed.
After his threee-year residence in Bareilly, Amjad ‘Ali took up another head teacher
position, this time at the dar ul’alwm Hafiziah Shervani in Aligarh. He worked in this
capacity for seven years (also serving as a curriculum advisor at Sir Sayyid’s AngloOriental College), and one of his fellow teachers would later describe him as one who
had “full command over the profession of teaching.” Even as a writer of fәtawa (it was
in Aligarh that he came to be known as Sәdәr ul-shәri’at), a debater, a Sufi shix, and a
political agitator, Amjad ‘Ali was first and foremost a teacher; many of the religious
scholars, on both sides of the Deobandi-Barelvi divide, would likely view themselves in
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much the same way. Even so, and despite his multitude of responsibilities, the political
questions facing Muslims in India weighed heavily on the mufti’s mind. In 1939/1358,
on the occasion of a major All-India Sunni Conference gathering, Amjad ‘Ali—like
hundreds of other prominent Barelvi ‘alәma—made the trip to Naimuddin Moradabadi’s
hometown of Moradabad, where the meeting took place. None other than Ahmad Riza’s
son and xәlifәħ ul-әwwәl (“number one successor”) Hamid Riza Khan chaired the
conference on this occasion, while “hәżrәt Sәdәr ul-shәri’at [Amjad ‘Ali],” wrote one
Barelvi historian later, “was prominent by his august presence.”162 The respected
Azamghari was now sixty years old.
In 1943/1362, Amjad ‘Ali moved to Varanasi for a year before returning once more
to Bareilly. In 1946/1365 another major All-India Sunni Conference convention took
place (the organization’s last pan-Indian gathering) in Varanasi. This last assembly, as
previously mentioned, was the Sunni Conference’s largest by far, with an estimated five
thousand scholars and pirs in attendance, plus another two hundred thousand of their
students and disciples. Of course, Amjad ‘Ali (now sixty-seven and beginning to suffer
from a series of serious physical ailments) attended, too, weighing in often on the topic
about which the conference mostly revolved: the practical creation and functioning of an
Islamic government on the subcontinent, now that the real emergence of an
independent Pakistan glistened on the horizon. In order to facilitate the production of a
formal resolution, the Conference created a committee to draft a blueprint for an Islamic
state. Naturally, Naimuddin Moradabadi served as a member of said committee, along
with Ahmad Riza’s son, Mustapha Riza—and Amjad ‘Ali.163 Their production—
Moradabadi’s “Eleven Points”—has already been mentioned.

255

The mega-conference in Varanasi was in large part organized by mwlana Abdul
Hamid Badayuni (d. 1970 AD), a scion of the famed Khairabadi-Badayuni Group and a
fourty-eight-year-old Barelvi leader whose association with the Muslim League dated
back to 1918/1336. In March of 1940/Safar of 1359, Abdul Hamid had voiced his
support for the League’s Lahore Resolution—when the ML, that same month, had
called for the creation of a federation of “autonomous and sovereign” Muslim states in
the subcontinent, later interpreted as the League’s first formal demand for Pakistan.
Thereafter Abdul Hamid had campaigned hard within the Barelvi community of South
Asia in a highly successful attempt to see the idea of a separate Muslim state accepted
generally.164 Perhaps it was natural, then, for the AISC to appoint him as its Secretary
of Propaganda.165 A fәtwa out of Bareilly’s Manzar-e-Islam supporting the League,
authored by a murid of Hamid Riza named Ijaz Wali Khan (a future head of the hәdis
department at a major Barelvi school in Lahore), had also experienced significant
circulation at that time.166 To see so many scholars, pirs, and regular “Sunnis”—Amjad
‘Ali among them—now gathered together in Varanasi signified the culmination of
Badayuni’s years of effort. Significantly, on the occasion of the Varanasi conference the
Badayuni mwlana endeavored hard to convince his fellows to actually merge the AISC
with the League—a move that would likely have had major consequences vis-à-vis
direct Barelvi influence in the future Pakistani state (and especially in a constituent
assembly), particularly as it was measured against that of the Deobandis’. But Abdul
Hamid Badayuni’s efforts were in vain, his idea batted down by the many Barelvi
guiding lights who looked to the League only circumspectly (not to mention a few
whose attitude thereunto was nothing short of hostile), and valued their trademark holy
separation.167 (Even Naimuddin Moradabadi, in a letter to a fellow AISC leader in the
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Punjab around 1946/1365, wrote, “Jamhurriyyah-e-Islamiah [a name adopted by the
Conference in the 1940s/1360s, though the organization continued to be referred to as
the All-India Sunni Conference] in no circumstances can give up the demand for
Pakistan, whether Mr. Jinnah himself remains its supporter or not.”168 The statement
illustrates the distinction in the eyes of some Barelvi leaders between support for an
Islamic state and support for the political means to create it. The end was to be
Pakistan.) In any case, it is perhaps a testament to the lack of unity on the issue of
Jinnah and the League among Ahl-e-Sunnat leaders that Badayuni’s proposal was
rejected. “We did not think it proper for [the ‘alәma ] to come on the platform of the
Muslim League,” Naimuddin Moradabadi explained, of the AISC’s decision in this
regard, “but we countered the activities of the opponents of the League [i.e.
predominantly, among Muslims, the Deobandi JUH].” (“This was not to oblige the
League,” Moradabadi would add, somewhat tellingly, “as our attitude was always
governed by the dictates of Islam.”)169 The decision to deny Abdul Hamid this
additional victory (and the AISC’s general attitude of maintaining some distance,
however small at times, from the League) cleared the way for Shabbir Ahmad Usmani
and the better-organized Deobandi network to assume a more powerful (not to mention
official) political role within the soon-to-materialize Pakistani state. Still, the general
assembly’s decision not to officially join with the League didn’t stop a core group of
fifty-six scholars and pirs at the Benares conference from issuing a joint statement
supporting the ML.170
Perhaps it is not coincidental, then, that that same year two other events occurred
which helped bring the Muslim League and the Barelvi mәshayx and ‘alәma together.
The first was the sending of an official AISC delegation overseas—to the Arabian
257

peninsula and elsewhere within the Islamic world—to present the pro-Pakistan
argument to fellow Muslims abroad and thereby garner an increased base of
international Muslim support for the cause. Abdul Hamid Badayuni led the delegation
himself. When the group returned to India, it met with Jinnah (on 3 May/1 Jumada II),
who lauded its international efforts. (The meeting with Pakistan’s qayd-e-ә’ažәm seems
to have fired up Abdul Hamid, who, just three days later, reportedly declared before a
sizable Lahore audience, “For us, Pakistan is a matter of life and death.”)171 The second
event was the organization, spearheaded by the Muslim League, of a committee of
mәshayx made up of prominent Muslim religious figures to help drum up support for the
party and for Pakistan (a move in line with the League’s now Islam-centric policy, a
policy that made it possible for ML leaders to go over the heads of regional politicians
and admonish religious power-holders across the country); the committee included
powerful individuals like the pir of Manki Sharif, Makhdum Riza Shah of Multan (whose
father had been mayor of Multan, and who himself served, from 1946/1365, as a
member of the provincial legislative assembly after beating out the Unionists),172 AISC
leader Jamaat ‘Ali Shah (who, among his many other pro-League activities, was heavily
involved in the “condemnation of pro-Congress Muslims and Muslim groups,” like the
Deobandis),173 and the powerful pir of the far western Punjabi shrine city of Taunsa
Sharif. Other influential pirs or sajjada-nishins, especially in the Punjab (a province
where League victory was vital to the establishment of any sort of meaningful
“Pakistan”), were likewise swayed to Jinnah’s side, including those tied to the shrines at
Sial Sharif, Golra Sharif, Pakpattan Sharif, Jabalpur Sharif, and Chura Sharif.174 The
next year, of course, all this effort would pay off, and the Sunni Conference’s political
goals—if not its spiritual ones—would see fruition. “The Sunni [‘alәma] fully
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participated in the freedom movement,” wrote M. Ahmad, with particular emphasis on
the AISC, “and played an important role in the last and final phase of the Pakistan
Movement.”175
Unfortunately, it was around this time that, combined with his advancing age, a
series of personal setbacks (the deaths, in a short three-year span, of eleven of his family
members) took a serious toll on Amjad ‘Ali. Indeed, by 1946/1365, the Azamgarhi
scholar had lost his sight completely; for the first time since childhood the prolific
scholar was bereft of the ability to read and write. His published works thus all pre-date
this pivotal year. His condition prevented him, too, from traveling to the northwest
frontier during the controversial “Frontier Referendum,” but many other Barelvi ‘alәma
and pirs made the trip (joining those already based in the region) in order to garner
support—and critical votes—for the League. The Referendum will be discussed in
more detail in the following section (following the career of Shabbir Ahmad Usmani),
but it should be noted here that, if not for Barelvi support, it is doubtful that Jinnah
would have been able to eke out a victory in the NWFP (indeed, minus fervent Barelvi
cooperation a victory would have been almost certainly impossible). One Barelvi whose
participation remains legendary was the pir of Manki Sharif who, in October
1945/Shawwal 1364, organized the Jamiat al-Asfiah, an organization made up of
hundreds of scholars and mәshayx.176 That organization’s support of the Muslim League
was critical in the region; without it, opined both M. Ahmad and K. Sayeed, “the Muslim
League could not have [built] up its position in the Frontier,” let alone gone on to win.
It is clear, too, from Jinnah’s letters that he had used promises hinting at the
implementation of shәri’at in a future Pakistan to woo the pir and his party to his side;
this was in line with League policy aimed at the Muslim religious leadership since the
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1937/1356 election debacle. Notice the wily politician’s ambiguous, non-committal
language, from an oft-reproduced November 1945/Dh’ul Hijja 1364 letter to the
abovementioned pir: “It is needless to emphasize that the constituent assembly which
would be predominantly Muslim in its composition would be able to enact laws for
Muslims, not inconsistent with the Shariat laws and the Muslims will no longer be
obliged to abide by the Un-Islamic laws.”177 Other big-name “Sunnis” played a similarly
major role in stumping for the League, including the aged but seemingly indomitable
Jamaat ‘Ali Shah, whose “whirlwind tours” helped mobilize considerable support for
Jinnah and Pakistan.178
The League’s Referendum victory was a critical stepping stone in the achievement
of its ultimate aim—the establishment of Pakistan—and Barelvi backing, with the
perhaps equally critical help of some dissident Deobandis, made that win possible. The
issuance in both the Punjab and the NWFP of a handbill containing a juridical ruling in
favor of Pakistan and the League and signed by thirty-five ‘alәma illustrates this
phenomenon well. The pamphlet, entitled hәżrәt-e-Swfi-e-kyran ka ә’alan-e-hәq: Muslim
League ki hymayәt kәrin (“Eminent Sufis’ and Honorable Ones’ Declaration of the Right
Way: Support the Muslim League!”), included mostly Barelvi signatories; however,
three Deobandi ‘alәma could also be found among the scholars listed thereon.179 A
Frontier Referendum loss in this critical Muslim-majority province would have been a
crushing blow to the League—an organization claiming to be the sole spokesparty for
India’s Muslims; in the end, the support of the (mostly Barelvi) ‘alәma and pirs ensured
victory. Barelvi leaders likewise helped secure a League win in the east, where a
referendum at Sylhet (in what is today the far eastern corner of Bangladesh) decided, in
early July 1947/mid-Sh’aban 1366, in favor of joining East Bengal; here Barelvi notable
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Abdul Hamid Badayuni, for example, campaigned hard for the ML, delivering
passionate speeches in favor of Pakistan.180
Even in Amjad ‘Ali’s debilitated state, the old ‘alym set out with his wife and a small
party (including Ahmad Riza’s son Mustapha Riza Khan) on 1 September 1948/26
Shawwal 1367 for Mecca to perform his second hәj. Hundreds gathered at the railway
station to see him off, surely wondering if this might be the last they’d set eyes on the
great mufti. Unfortunately for Amjad ‘Ali, the fever that developed soon after
embarkation turned into full-fledged pneumonia by the time his party reached Bombay.
He remained mostly unconscious for a year. Before Mustapha Riza continued on to the
Arab peninsula he is reported to have recited an Ahmad Riza-authored poem of praise
for the Prophet to the ailing and unresponsive Azamgarhi; Amjad ‘Ali evidently opened
his eyes immediately, was propped up by means of a pillow, and listened intently to
Mustapha Riza’s words. When he finished, Ahmad Riza’s son is said to have whispered,
“Go on [to the next life], I shall follow behind you.”181
Then, a year to the day, almost, since his departure from home, Amjad ‘Ali Khan
passed away on 2 September 1949/9 Dh’ul Q’adah 1368, aged seventy-one. His dәrgaħ
is in Ghausi, near Azamgarh, and every year, as of this writing, pilgrims continue to
flock to the spot on the anniversary of his death to pay the crusading ‘alym homage.

Shabbir Ahmad Usmani: Jinnah’s Gamechanger.
Previously it was suggested that the dar ul’alwm at Deoband could boast firstgeneration leadership under Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad and secondgeneration leadership under Mahmud Hasan. With the latter’s death, a third generation
of leaders was now pushed to the forefront, most notably including Husain Ahmad
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Madani, hafyž Muhammad Ahmad, Anwar Shah Kashmiri, and Shabbir Ahmad Usmani
(the latter aided by his indomitable relative, mufti Muhammad Shafi).182 Of this group,
it was perhaps Shabbir Ahmad whose actions would have the most lasting effect on the
movement—and on the political evolution of South Asia. Despite Husain Ahmad
Madani’s tireless efforts to keep Deobandism firmly beneath the Congress umbrella, it
was Shabbir Ahmad’s breakaway Deobandi faction that would eventually ensure the
emergence of Pakistan and, ultimately, dominate Deobandi politics in the new “Muslim”
state.
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was born on 27 September 1885/17 Dh’ul Hijja 1302, about
one hundred miles from Delhi in the north Indian town of Bijnor. His father, Fazl alRahman Usmani, was a gifted poet and “a great Islamic scholar of his time.” After
completing an elementary Islamic education in Deoband, Fazl al-Rahman especially
excelled at Persian and poetry while at Delhi College, where he was a stand-out student
of the venerable Mamluk ‘Ali (whose acolytes, as previously mentioned, also included
founding fathers of the Deobandi school Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi and Rashid
Ahmad Gangohi). As a result of his scholarly gifts, Fazl al-Rahman was appointed
deputy inspector of schools in the town of Bijnor and other towns across the United
Provinces—a pensioned position. But “the movement of Muhammad Qasim” beckoned,
and Fazl al-Rahman united with it. As such, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani’s father helped
found the dar ul’alwm at Deoband, and served on the school’s mәjlys-e-shwra until his
death in 1907/1325. To this day Fazl al-Rahman is considered one of the university’s
“Six Great Ones” responsible for the institution’s very establishment.183 One twentiethcentury Pakistani historian would write of him, “He remained a pillar of the mәdrәsәħ to
his last breath.”184 He was married three times, two of the unions producing children—
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and it was one of Fazl al-Rahman’s sons who would go on to change the course of
history for hundreds of millions of people.
But even apart from the towering legacy of his father, Shabbir Ahmad’s own mark
on the university at Deoband was significant—indeed, far greater. From early in his
childhood, Fazl al-Rahman’s son had seemed possessed of a serious nature. “Games and
amusements evoked no apparent interest in him,” wrote one biographer, adding that,
since boyhood, “he had a boundless interest in study.”185 As such, six-year-old Shabbir
Ahmad was placed in the hands of hafyž Muhammad ‘Azim Deobandi for religious
education, and the next year he was accepted at the dar ul’alwm where his instructors
included the indefatigable Mahmud Hasan (a teacher of all-important Arabic). After
graduation, the young, newly minted mwlana moved to Delhi, where he taught at a local
“Arabic” mәdrәsәħ; during this period, too, the young teacher was married (1905/1323).
It didn’t take long, however, for the university at Deoband to decide to avail itself of
Shabbir Ahmad’s special talents (әsәl mәshGәlәħ) as a teacher-lecturer; he was hired in
1907/1325 at a salary of 35 rupees a month.186 The man’s ability to give a great speech
would come in handy later within the context of independence politics.
But first he would be tested within the administration of the dar ul’alwm. As an
administrator, Shabbir Ahmad appears to have been especially involved in the
university’s fundraising efforts (a duty especially pertinent to one possessed of the
talents aforementioned), once journeying all the way to Dhaka—a distance of almost a
thousand miles, as the crow flies—to help secure a sizable sum from the city’s ruler.187
He also played a role, about six years later (1927/1345-1346), in facilitating a
substantial increase in the annual donation of the Nizam of Hyderabad.188 In fact, it was
later reported that the Nizam had only pledged the monthly donation that he did after
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hearing Shabbir Ahmad Usmani’s religious lectures. The ruler of the Deccan even
offered the now-famous scholar a very lucrative position in Hyderabad—but Shabbir
Ahmad, apparently fully invested mentally and spiritually in the life of the dar ul’alwm,
turned down the powerful Nizam in favor of his modest university salary. “’alamәħ
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani,” wrote of his biographers, “was a soldier of Islam.”189 But he
was active politically, too, in cooperation with others at the school, in the Khilafat
movement of the early 1920s/late 1330s-early 1340s.190 As part of the latter, his
reputation for delivering “impassioned sermons” with the capacity to energize his
listeners (and, indeed, the “Muslim nation” at large, according to some) grew, along
with his standing within the Deobandi movement and his general fame throughout
India. These early years saw Shabbir Ahmad as an “avid” member of the Deobandi
school’s political organization, the JUH, which had been organized, as aforementioned,
in the wake of the Khilafat movement in 1919/1337.191 Indeed, Shabbir Ahmad was
among its founding figures, along with such luminaries as Abul Kalam Azad and ‘Abd
ul-Bari of Farangi Mahal.
But his greatest contributions to the Deobandi movement during this earlier period
fell within the realm of scholarship. When the king of Afghanistan visited the
university in 1939/1358, it was the work of Shabbir Ahmad, along with that of Mahmud
Hasan, which was displayed most prominently (the Afghan government would go on to
translate it from Urdu to Persian).192 When a new section of the university library was
added in the mid-1960s/mid-1380s, Shabbir Ahmad’s works were specially arranged
and showcased along with those of other leading scholastic luminaries at the school.193
Leading mufti Muhammad Shafi would later compare Shabbir Ahmad during this time
to the great Sunni theorists, philosophers, and mystics Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058264

1111/450-505) and Fakr al-Din al-Razi (1149-1209/543-606), a tribute of very high
order. Indeed, Muhammad Shafi likened the level of saintliness, learning, and
scholarship then extant at the university at Deoband to “an assembly of angels” that
included, by name, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. (Just as significantly, Muhammad Shafi
added that this assembly “[ultimately] broke up”).194 Muhammad Shafi’s son, a
prominent Islamic scholar in his own right, would later describe Shabbir Ahmad as
having achieved “complete mastery of every science.”195 When shix ul-hynd Mahmud
Hasan, principal of the university at Deoband since 1890/1307, was called to lay the
foundation stone of the Jamia Millia Islamia at Aligarh—despite his exceedingly frail
condition at the time; he would pass away one month later—it was Shabbir Ahmad,
among a few others, who accompanied him.196 One of the most prolific Islamic scholars
of the last century would write that God had “blessed hażrәt ’alamәħ Shabbir Ahmad
sahyb Usmani with both writing and speaking ability unique in the world.”197 Then in
1934/1353 Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was appointed acting vice-chancellor, only to be
made chancellor the next year. From 1935 to 1942/1354 to 1361, he occupied this
exalted post. According to one official source, the school’s advisory council had decided
to appoint him to this supreme position on account of his “esteemed personality,
knowledge, and integrity” (‘ažim shaxSiәt әwr ‘alm w fәżәl).198 Despite his newfound
position, Shabbir Ahmad’s biographers insist that he continued to live humbly,
materially speaking (and even later, when he obtained significant political power)—“to
the end living modestly.”199
It is not without some irony, then, that of all the Deobandi ‘alәma to reject the
position of the school’s main political wing, rupturing friendships and associations and
splitting the movement, it should be Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. Perhaps a hint of
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contrarianism on Shabbir Ahmad’s part might have been perceived when, in the mid- to
late 1920s/mid-1340s, he sided with a raucous student group at the university against
school administrators; many of the students and a handful of teachers and
administrators were consequently expelled or otherwise let go, though Shabbir Ahmad
retained his position (in name, at least).200 Perhaps an intimation of fickleness might
have been detected, too, in his spending most of his time as university chancellor not in
Deoband at all, but seven hundred miles away in Dabhel, a village on the southern tip of
modern-day Gujarat (about 20 miles south of Surat), where a Deobandi seminary had
recently been founded.201 In fact, the Dabhel school—Jamia Islamia Talimuddin
Dabhel, still functioning and, at the time of this writing, boasting around a thousand
students—might offer a key to understanding Shabbir Ahmad’s somewhat mysterious
(and “sudden”) quasi-break with the institution which his father had helped found and
which he himself had led.
The “Dabhel Jamia Islamia,” as the Dabhel school is commonly known, was founded
in the late 1920s/mid-1340s—just after students and, crucially, some teachers at the
university at Deoband had been expelled or otherwise let go on account of their
agitation-related activities, aforementioned. Shabbir Ahmad had sided with them, at
least for a time, as stated above. It seems that some of these dissenters, led by Anwar
Shah Kashmiri, decided to establish an institution of their own (though certainly still
Deobandi in organization and philosophy [mәslәk], and even affiliation). Shabbir
Ahmad would rationalize the situation in terms of “divine will” when he wrote, shortly
after becoming chancellor at the university in Deoband in the mid-1930s/mid-1350s,
that the contention a decade previously might be compared to a “storm” or a “squall”
which, though raging, in the end becomes “the immediate cause of the freshness and
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greenness of the earth,” despite “partial losses” incurred during the storm itself. In
other words, “by the arrival of the ‘alәma of Deoband there the magnificent mәdrәsәħ
that came into existence at Dabhel…is today watering every part of Gujarat…”202 Thus
the removal of rebel faculty and students at Deoband had providentially resulted in the
founding of a sister institution at Dabhel—run by the same. And it was as dean of the
latter that Shabbir Ahmad spent the vast majority of his time as chancellor of the former.
But what had been the reason for the agitation in the first place—agitation that had
been so serious as to drive a luminary like Anwar Shah Kashmiri from Deoband itself?
The dar ul’alwm’s official history remains vague on the issue, and, when the author
visited Dabhel in August 2012/Ramadan 1433 specifically to inquire as to the reason for
the schism, no one at the school seemed to know much about it. At least one scholar has
identified some rumblings of dissent within the Deobandi movement in the 1920s/1340s
over the school leadership’s sanction of, participation in, and cheerleading for the
“Hindu-led” non-cooperation movement (a deal chalked out with Gandhi in return for
his support vis-à-vis the Khilafat movement, as previously noted); evidently there were
those who felt that working with the Hindus was too steep a price, whatever the cause.
Could it have been this issue that eventually led to the exodus of teachers and students
from Deoband to Dabhel? Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, once singled out by Ahmad Riza Khan
as an apostate, and head teacher Anwar Shah Kashmiri had, at least since the Khilafat
days, spearheaded a faction within the school that felt that the dar ul’alwm’s “primary
objective” should be the pursuit of scholarship and religious learning (i.e. not politics or
even relgio-political “movements”). (As early as 1920/1338, Abul Kalam Azad had
made reference to two factions present at the school within the ranks of the Deobandi
leadership, each vying for influence over the other, thus providing a clue as to how early
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an intra-Deobadi political schism had begun to materialize).203 In other words, direct
political involvement should be avoided. Shabbir Ahmad, despite his own personal
involvement in the JUH, evidently agreed that the school itself should adopt an apolitical
stance—and for years he had acted as one of the faction’s chief spokesmen. In the end
the other faction, governed by the thinking of Mahmud Hasan and ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi
and lead most prominently by one Husain Ahmad Madani, won out, and in 1927/1346
the Kashmiri faction was expelled from the institution altogether. Noting Shabbir
Ahmad’s personal support of this group (indeed, his part as an active member of it), it is
not surprising that he should hold a similar view a couple decades later over the JUH’s
alliance with the INC. In this context, Shabbir Ahmad’s repudiation of the mainline
Deobandi political position—indeed, his active struggle against it—perhaps loses some
of its mystery, for he’d been associated with a more dissenting element within
Deobandism all along. In 1928/1347, Shabbir Ahmad left Deoband, too, pushed out by
Husain Ahmad; the latter apparently had opposed the proposition, put forward by some
within the school’s administration, that Shabbir Ahmad be promoted to higher office.
The idea had sparked “controversy,” and Madani’s viewpoint prevailed.204 Between
1928 and 1934/1346 and 1353, Shabbir Ahmad taught at the mәdrәsәħ in Dabhel, acting
as head of the school’s hәdis department for several years.
Another theory, explained to the author by one of the dar ul’alwm’s top officials in
2012/1433 and backed up later by one of the university’s other old-timers, holds that
Shabbir Ahmad expected to become head of the hәdis department after Anwar Shah
Kashmiri but was snubbed by the appointment of Husain Ahmad Madani, whose
experience teaching hәdis in Medina reportedly granted him an aura of respectability
with which even Shabbir Ahmad could not compete. Shabbir Ahmad was considered the
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school’s preeminent authority on hәdis before Madani arrived; it was customary, too, at
the university for the head teacher to augment his duties with hәdis-teaching, thus
combining the position with added prestige. Apparently, then, somewhat of a rift
developed between the two men as soon as Madani began working at the school.
“Husain Ahmad Madani, when he started teaching here [at Deoband],” explained the
great-gransdon of Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, “Shabbir Ahmad Usmani had
differences with him.” If Shabbir Ahmad did indeed feel unfairly treated vis-à-vis
Madani and the hәdis department position, it would have only been exacerbated by the
fact that Husain Ahmad was also widely seen as the head of the highly politicized,
overtly anti-colonial (Mahmud Hasan-inspired) faction within the school, opposed to the
Thanawi- and Kashmiri-inspired group of which he (Usmani) was a vocal member.
(The animosity, if such a strong word can be used, didn’t flow one-way, either, as
Madani’s push for Shabbir Ahmad’s ouster in 1928/1347 appears to demonstrate). Such
“differences,” it seems, proved too much, and the resultant Usmani-Madani split would
seem to define both men’s political careers (not to mention that of the JUH and the
future Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, or JUI) from that period forward. Over the five to seven
years after Shabbir Ahmad’s departure from Deoband, his difference with Madani did,
however, “lessen” to an extent, allowing him to return and take up the post of vicechancellor and, a year later, chancellor.205 (The real impetus behind his return to
Deoband, however, might have been the “pressure from his supporters within the
executive of the School,” supporters who rallied in his behalf and ultimately opened up a
way for his 1934 reinstatement and official elevation.)206 But even this rapprochement
wasn’t to last.
In the meantime, Shabbir Ahmad remained an active and high-ranking member of
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the JUH, fought politically for the rights of Muslims as he understood them, and
maintained a reputation for religiously inspired ardor throughout. “But when [he]
realized,” writes one of his biographers, “that the Jamiat Ulema-e Hind had become the
Jamiat Ulema-e Congress”—a reference, of course, to the “Hindu-dominated” INC—he
broke away from the organization and formed his own.207 The biographer’s
characterization of the JUH-INC relationship as one of domination on the INC’s part,
and humble obedience on the JUH’s, is inherently unfair. But for those ‘alәma, like
Shabbir Ahmad, who had opposed the union from the beginning, such a characterization
was to become more and more compelling. The Hindus were dominating the Deobandi
‘alәma, they argued; the brightest Muslim scholars on the subcontinent were being
taken for fools. This had to stop.
But whatever Shabbir Ahmad’s personal ruminations, between 1942/1361 and
1943/1362 another major schism occurred among the faculty and students of the
university at Deoband, a divide that was not so much theological as political—
inherently tied to the tumultuous events then rocking India and the world. The British
Empire, of course, was engaged at the time in a fight for its life against Hitler’s forces at
home and against Tojo’s forces abroad, the latter of which were threatening to conquer
the entire Southeast Asian peninsula; by mid-year, the Japanese were knocking on the
doors of India and Burma. Meanwhile, on the subcontinent itself, millions of Indians
were outraged that the British Government had committed Indian forces to war
without so much as a consultation with Indian political representatives. The British
quickly dispatched Sir Stafford Cripps to try and assuage the affronted Indian parties—
particularly the Congress; Cripps and Jawaharlal Nehru were, after all, somewhat
close—but the “Cripps Mission” failed. It had, in fact, only served to further distance all
270

major parties involved (the Congress and its allies, the League and its allies, and the
British Government) from one another. One historian put it thus: “1942 was the
moment of political and mental alienation on all sides.”208 Gandhi’s reaction, despite the
wartime situation, was to launch the “Quit India” movement, a massive civil
disobedience campaign whose stated aim was complete political separation from Britain.
But not everyone in the Congress greeted Quit India with enthusiasm (indeed, some
prominent Congress leaders even quit the party in protest); still, most Congressites
rallied behind their leader, reservations or no. Jinnah would famously refer to Gandhi’s
decision to launch Quit India as a “Himalayan blunder.”209
Naturally, then, Jinnah and the League called on the Muslims of the subcontinent
not to support Quit India. Instead, Jinnah took full advantage of the subsequent
imprisonment of many of the Congress leaders, quickly securing positions for Muslims
in India’s several provincial governments. What’s more, as the non-violence-supporting
wing of Congress, including Gandhi, found itself behind bars, a more violent set of
revolutionaries in the party quickly seized control. Within weeks of the mass arrest,
this more radical group had organized and carried out the destruction of an estimated
two hundred fifty railway stations, ripped up large sections of railroad, cut telegraph
lines, and devastated over two hundred police stations and post offices, mostly in Bengal
and Bihar. Indeed, supplies and communications to the British eastern front were for a
time obstructed completely. In the violence that accompanied the British attempt to
restore order, around sixty thousand Indians were arrested and an estimated one
thousand were killed, some by aircraft-borne machine gunners firing desperately into
crowds. Viceroy Linlithgow would describe the uprising as the most serious since
1857/1273.210 It was against this ferocious backdrop, then, that Shabbir Ahmad’s break
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with most of his fellow Deobandis occurred, with students and faculty often acting as
full participants in the struggle—and lining up behind the Congress or the League.
Not surprisingly, the number of students attending the university that year was
considerably smaller than usual. Some were involved in the Quit India movement and
had put off their studies for the time being. Others considered travel unsafe due to the
destruction of the railway lines; this was particularly true for many of the school’s
Bihari and Bengali students, many of whom opted not to make the journey. (A severe
famine in Bengal might also be added to this list of interferences). All of this disruption
to the university’s regular operations, combined with the overwrought mood then
pervading the country, made for a tense atmosphere at the dar ul’alwm. The official
history commissioned by the school several decades later would describe the rift as a
“difference of political ways” (siasi mәslәk ki yxtylaf) among the school’s administrators,
largely fracturing any unity that had previously existed between them—and leading to
a general state of aloofness (kәshidәgi) and serious confusion at the school. But the
official history fails to supply much in the way of details vis-à-vis these various factions,
stating simply that the infighting “finally ended in the resignation and separation of the
chancellor [Shabbir Ahmad] and five teachers.” An estimated sixty students also left
the university in response to this rupture.211
But what was Shabbir Ahmad’s contention? Why did he feel the need to tender his
resignation, even as he occupied the university’s top position? Why did five fellow
teachers—including mwlana Muhammad Ibrahim, mwlana mufti Muhammad Shafi, and
mwlana Zahoor Ahmed—leave, too?212 What could have been so compelling that a full
sixty students would follow them? The official history of the school is not especially
enlightening here, either. According to its version of events, Shabbir Ahmad simply felt
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that the university should have no political position, or at least no practical involvement
in the politics then rocking India and the world. What resulted, the official history
insists, was non-cooperation—causing Shabbir Ahmad ultimately (and prudently) to
sever himself from the institution. Thus ends the official version of events. But
considering the man’s later activities (not to mention those of Muhammad Shafi, one of
the teachers who left with him), it seems clear that this is a whitewashed story. Indeed,
far from advocating some sort of non-alignment for the university, Shabbir Ahmad and
his associates were actively involved themselves in a rival movement—one calling for the
creation of a separate state for Muslims. Thus while most Deobandis, including the
movement’s then-imprisoned leader, Husain Ahmad Madani, called for cooperation with
the Congress and preservation of a united (though independent) subcontinent (Madani
supported his idea of “united nationalism” by pointing to the “pact of Medina” [see
Chapter 1], in which Muhammad had included non-Muslim tribes of the oasis),213
Shabbir Ahmad, like Jinnah and the Muslim League, was striving for Partition. Shabbir
Ahmad felt that cooperation with India’s Hindus would inevitably lead to a “kind of
twisting of Islamic teachings or Islamic customs for the sake of Hindu-Muslim unity.”
Additionally, supporters of the “two-nation” theory argued that working with the
Congress (or even just within a united India) was tantamount to putting “the fate of the
Islamic community into the hands of the Hindu majority.”214 Thus the argument for
Pakistan (or, perhaps more accurately, the argument against working with the Congress
for a united India) possessed both religious and political aspects. This, and not some
nebulous call to be apolitical, was what actually led to the schism of 1942-1943/13611362. Indeed, Muhammad Shafi’s son, himself a highly respected mufti, would write
later that his father had resigned from the dar ul’alwm at Deoband “due to his active
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involvement in the Pakistan movement” (italics added).215 Shabbir Ahmad had been no
apolitical observer. He had, instead, led the opposition, making an eventual break all but
inevitable.
By 1944/1363, Madani, freshly released from prison, was railing against the
oppression of the British and, characteristically, calling for “the independence of India
and the Islamic countries,” which “alone can satisfy our hearts; as long as it is not
achieved, our duty will remain and the struggle for independence will continue.”216 At
the same time, Madani’s erstwhile Deobandi rival was being welcomed with open arms
by the JUH’s fiercest political opponent: the Muslim League. Indeed, in time Shabbir
would been hailed as the latter organization’s “most eminent ‘alym.”217 Another scholar
described him as “foremost” among the pro-Pakistan ‘alәma.218 To politically secede
from his Deobandi brethren, however, Shabbir Ahmad had to separate politics from
religious discipleship. Just as one Deobandi scholar could say, “I am a political disciple
of Maulana Azad and a disciple of Hazrat Maulana Syed Hussain [Ahmad] Madani at
Deoband”219—clearly drawing a line between the temporal and the spiritual—Shabbir
Ahmad could claim to be a disciple of the Deobandi school despite his political
alignment with the League (or, more to the point, against the JUH). These seemed to
be separate and distinct, at least in his apparent worldview.
Long before this schism, however, the JUH had been expanding across the
subcontinent, including within what would become the Northwest Frontier Province of
Pakistan; here the JUH was represented (from 1924/1342) by the Jamiat Ulema-eSarhad (“Assembly of Frontier Clergy,” hereafter JUS). The ‘alәma of the JUS, in
keeping with Deobandi “policy,” attempted to set themselves up as an alternative to the
state court system. As part of their aim to implement shәri’at, the JUS encouraged
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Muslims in the area to “come to the ulema of the JUS for settlements” instead of
“turning to the state‐run courts for justice.”220 Other localized organizations, while not
explicitly defined as branches of the JUH, nevertheless expounded a mostly Deobandi
philosophy vis-à-vis Islam, the mainstream Deobandi position vis-à-vis independence
(namely: pro-independence but anti‐Pakistan), and employed markedly Deobandi
methods (including mosque‐based activism and the garnering of voluntary support in
the name of Islam) in carrying out their objectives.221 For example, in the Punjab the
leadership (and membership) of the Majlis‐e‐Ahrar‐e‐Islam included several notable
Deobandi scholars, Habibur Rehman Ludhianvi and Ataullah Shah Bukhari among
them; the latter served as the party’s first president and was dubbed әmir-e-shәri’at by
Anwar Shah Kashmiri, who would himself serve as president of the JUH in 1926/1344.
Samina Awan, in her groundbreaking 2010/1431 in-depth treatment of the MAI,
described the party thus: “Many of those who joined the MAI were inclined towards the
Deobandi school of thought.” The organization’s ranks were swelled with erstwhile
Khilafatists, whose movement had, as previously mentioned, been fueled in large
measure by the Deobandi leadership. In addition, “some of the [party’s] leaders and
workers” had been “actively associated with the INC,” another Deobandi trademark.222
The MAI agitated for the rights of Muslims (especially in Kashmir, just to the north,
where Muslims lived under what was considered the repressive rule of a Hindu prince,
and in the former princely state of Kapurthala, now within the boundaries of Indian
Punjab). Like the JUS to the northwest, the Deobandi‐leaning MAI acted as a sort of
JUH on the local level in the Punjab, paving the way for increased Deobandi influence
in politics later on; “the protagonists of the Deobandi [school of] thought,” writes
Kamran, “owe a good deal to the Majlis‐i‐Ahrar” which “acted as an instrument of
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political articulation for them in the Punjab.”223 The party was headquartered in Lahore
(and was, as Kamran noted, by far most active in the Punjab), but also ran branches as
far afield as Peshawar, Delhi, Lucknow, as well as in the princely state of
Bahalwalpur.224 Other groups, some explicitly linked to the JUH, some not, did the
same within their respective spheres across the subcontinent. Certainly, the Deobandi
political machine was a force with which to be reckoned, much to the chagrin of the
Barelvis—and, of course, to the organization which they had selected as their “vehicle”
for Pakistan: the Muslim League.
What Jinnah and the League needed, then—perhaps desperately—was a religious
leader who could throw “theological weight” (in the words of one Pakistani historian)
behind the idea of Pakistan to counter the efforts of the anti-League Muslim parties like
the JUH.225 True, the Barelvi leadership provided this on a certain level, but their lack
of organization and unity was an issue, not to mention the fact that it was the highly
organized Deobandi opposition, aforementioned, that represented the League’s greatest
Muslim threat. Jinnah’s answer came in October 1945/Dh’ul Q’adah 1364, when
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani founded the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (“Assembly of Islamic
Clergy,” hereafter JUI) in Calcutta, over which he (Shabbir Ahmad) presided as the
group’s first president. According to some, it was the League itself that organized the
JUI—to be a “parallel organization” to the JUH; the League then “called upon” Shabbir
Ahmad Usmani to lead the new party. One historian goes so far as to claim that the
leaders of the League intentionally sought out Pakistan sympathizers among the
Deobandis, since it was the Deobandi JUH that was the standard-bearer when it came to
the political organization of Muslim religious leadership.226 Evidently mwlana Zafar
Ahmad Ansari (a future member of independent Pakistan’s national assembly) was
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tasked with the mission to “establish contact” with the Deobandi ‘alәma and organize
this opposition-from-within.227 Zafar Ahmad eventually found success with Shabbir
Ahmad. But whatever the circumstances of its coming into existence, the JUI was
clearly organized along the same lines as the JUH, but as a League-backing clerical
party to oppose its Congress-supporting rivals. Of course, the JUH was being led by
Shabbir Ahmad’s erstwhile friends and associates from the dar ul’alwm when he
organized the JUI to oppose them.
It wasn’t two months before Shabbir Ahmad had arranged his party’s first major
conference of Indian ‘alәma—in Meerut in December/Muharram. The next month,
January/Safar, saw Shabbir Ahmad, together with Ghulam Murshid, organize and lead
a similar conference, this time in Lahore, where a branch of the JUI had been set up the
month before. Though some variety of ‘alәma attended (along with a large group of
politicians), they mostly represented urban centers in the Punjab. A poster issued by
Shabbir Ahmad afterwards indicated the participation of around three hundred religious
leaders.228 In March/Rabi II, the Bombay Sentinel announced “the first Provincial
Conference” of the JUI, a three-day event to be convened “under the presidentship of
His Holiness Sheikul Islam Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Sahib Usmani” in Bombay; the
ardently anti-League, pro-Congress paper declined, however, to cover the actual
event.229 Despite his sixty years of age, Shabbir Ahmad had literally traveled “the
length and breadth of the country” for four months, campaigning for Pakistan at the
grass-roots level.230 His “passionate speeches” injected “zeal” into “the Muslim nation,”
one historian has written—and his “great renown spread across all of Hindustan.”231
The JUI had been created to carry out several purposes, chief among them (1) the
organization of the League’s supporters among the Muslim religious leadership and (2)
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the lending of religious credibility to a party (the League) that was often seen as secular
(and even, according to some Muslim detractors, un-Islamic). But whatever the talents
of the JUI leadership vis-à-vis organizing conferences, it seems that most of the
League’s religious support chose not to avail itself of this particular political vehicle,
opting instead for involvement at the local level. The JUI, according to Gilmartin, “was
in fact ill-suited for the organization of the rural religious leaders who formed the
backbone of the League’s religious support [mostly Barelvis], and whose influence
remained diffuse and centered on the shrines.”232 It was true—the JUI and the JUH,
though almost identical in terms of organization and modus operandi, were meant to
accommodate very different groups of ‘alәma and mәshaix. The JUH appealed to
Deobandi scholars and teachers as well as other educated, mostly urban Muslim
religious leaders. On the other hand, the JUI, though a carbon-copy Deobandi
organization led by a Deobandi, was, broadly speaking, expected to rally a largely
Barelvi corps of scholars and pirs drawn mostly from rural areas. It isn’t surprising,
then, that so many among the (often Barelvi) League-supporting religious leadership in
South Asia remained more or less aloof from the Muslim League’s political machine.
The fact that the JUI was led by a prominent Deobandi almost certainly played a major
role in dissuading the Barelvi religious leadership from flocking to its banner, too.
(These circumstances would have major consequences for this latter group after
Partition; see Chapter 4.) In any case, if Jinnah’s purpose had been to divide his most
formidable Muslim rivals, the JUI seems to have served this goal well, despite its
inability to act as the League’s chief political organ for most Pakistan-supporting
Muslim scholars and pirs.
As for lending religious credibility to the League and its cause, it would be difficult
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to argue that the JUI didn’t largely succeed; indeed, it was for Shabbir Ahmad’s vital
efforts in this regard that later historians, particularly in Pakistan, would characterize
him as “included among the highest order of the architects of Pakistan,”233 not light
language. In the words of Al-Mujahid, between December 1945/Muharram 1365 and
March 1946/Rabi II 1365, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani and his party “activized the religious
groups across the subcontinent,” mobilizing the ‘alәma and mәshayx for Pakistan “as
never before.” Arshad explains that Shabbir Ahmad “amassed support and power for
the Pakistan movement from the religious element,” his relentless campaigning creating
“a new enthusiasm among the Muslim masses” (italics added).234 The aged scholar’s
efforts were “extremely critical” among “the semiliterate” of the latter category,
previously swayed as they had been by the “Congressite” ‘alәma—a reference to the
Deobandi JUH—and the Deobandi-leaning MAI and other parties. Thus Shabbir
Ahmad’s JUI fanned out across Hindustan, categorizing its Muslim political opponents
as blatantly “un-Islamic.”235 And though the scholar’s rhetoric took aim at his fellow
Muslims, one Muslim League poster of the time, described by Gilmartin, attempted to
portray Shabbir Ahmad as a great proponent of unity. “For Muslims to be agreed and
unified on a true purpose is a magnificent gift,” the erstwhile Deobandi chancellor
declared, going on to explain that Harun (Aaron) had placed the danger of division
above even the suppression of idolatry when he had gone along with the children of
Israel as they worshipped the golden calf. “I worried that you would blame me if I
caused division without waiting for your word,” Harun is reported to have told Musa
(Moses). Those Muslims who attacked the League, the JUI, and others struggling for a
Muslim homeland were thus guilty of divisiveness, of attacking Pakistan “with narrow
sectarian arguments.” No—it was the Muslim’s duty to become “of one heart and one
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voice” and “raise the Pakistan slogan.”236 Of course, part of that duty entailed fighting
corruption within the Muslim community itself. As such, the approximately two years
between the founding of the JUI and the partition of India witnessed a furious exchange
of fәtwas between the Deobandi ‘alәma supporting the Congress and the Deobandi
‘alәma supporting the League—in essence, between the JUI, Shabbir Ahmad at the head,
and Madani’s JUH. For every fәtwa issued by the JUH, Shabbir Ahmad “answered…in
the light of the Qur’an and the Shariat,” as he saw it.237 Meanwhile, the Barelvis looked
on, not sure whether to be more agitated about the anti-Pakistani activities of the
Deobandi JUH or about the rising status of the Deobandi JUI within Jinnah’s proPakistan coalition.
The JUI was thus organized in the run-up to the 1945/1364 central and provincial
elections, described by one Pakistani scholar as “by far the most critical” elections “at all
levels in all the annals of subcontinental history.”238 The breakdown of the Simla
Conference in July/Sh’aban after Jinnah’s posturing as the Indian Muslims’ sole
spokesman provided “a shot in the arm” (to quote Hodson) for the League and set the
stage for his call for general elections, later seconded by Cripps and even Abul Kalam
Azad. On 21 August 1945/12 Ramadan 1364, elections were announced by Viceroy
Wavell, to be held over the winter of 1945-1946/1364-1365—and abruptly “election
fever gripped India,” with Nehru even announcing, “A revolution is inevitable.”239 But
what made these elections so potentially groundbreaking were the “two critical issues at
stake,” questions that the contest might finally and definitively answer: Was the All-India
Muslim League really subcontinental Islam’s “sole” political spokesparty? and Did Muslims
support the creation of a separate, “Muslim” state called Pakistan?240 In Jinnah’s efforts to
emerge victorious from the 1945-1946/1364-1365 elections, Shabbir Ahmad “played an
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extremely important role in the success of the Muslim League in the central and
provincial elections.” “Defined structurally as an arena of public competition,” writes
Gilmartin, “the electoral arena encouraged…the depiction of the League’s opponents as
enemies of the community in a great electoral battle”; Muslims were fighting a
constitutional war, Shabbir Ahmad insisted, “a war not of guns, ditches, and bullets but
of votes, a war in which the life and death of India’s Muslims” was on the line.241
Metcalf writes that, by now, the Muslim League “was supported by some of the
religious scholarship, some ‘ulama, and many of the pirs of the shrines”; these last
“brought the old ideal of Shah Waliyu’llah into play, for they wanted a Muslim state
with all that symbolized and devoutly hoped to establish the religious leadership as
advisers, even partners, to a ruling class whose political goals (as they perhaps failed to
see) were largely secular.”242 Metcalf’s assertion, as far as it pertains to the ‘alәma, is
certainly true (though her application of the Waliullahi program to the pirs seems less
so), and may have motivated many—including, perhaps, Shabbir Ahmad—to rally
behind Jinnah and the AIML. In the end, the League scored far better than its
detractors anticipated, winning big in the crucial Punjab and Bengal contests (as well as
sweeping the central assembly’s Muslim seats). Though the Congress walked away
with most of the non-Muslim seats in the elections, the Muslim League obtained almost
all of the Muslim ones (the only glaring League loss had come in the Muslim-majority
NWFP, where the Congress-supporting and Deobandi-leaning KKs won the contest for
the Congress—and while the League had won big in the Punjab, Bengal, and Sindh, it
yet failed to win absolute majorities in any of these provinces). Still, Jinnah celebrated
11 January 1946/7 Safar 1365 as a “Day of Victory”; after all, in 1937/1356 the League
had barely managed to win a third of Muslim seats, and now, less than a decade later,
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the party had captured nine out of every ten. Congress had won big, yes, but not where
it counted—i.e. among India’s Muslims. “Jinnah had campaigned to secure a mandate
for Pakistan,” wrote one historian, “and in this he was successful.”243 But it may not be
an exaggeration to say that the Muslim League, in the words of one historian, “should
interpret its historic success in the elections as the momentous result of the efforts of
’allamәħ Usmani.”244 The Barelvi scholars, pirs, and their supporters would meet a few
months later in Varanasi by the hundreds of thousands, but their importance by then
had been overshadowed by a Deobandi and his JUI.
Soon after Mountbatten’s arrival in India in March/Rabi II, the last Viceroy
proposed partition for India. But what this meant for the North-West Frontier, which
had voted majority-Congress despite its Muslim-majority population, was still
nebulous. The Moutbatten plan called for a referendum to be held in the NWFP to
determine whether the province would end up affixed to India or to Pakistan.
Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress, perhaps surprisingly, agreed to Mountabatten’s
partition scheme—arousing mixed feelings among the Pathans of the northwest,
particularly those who had been loyal Congress supporters. Had they not voted for the
Congress just one year previously? Had Jinnah’s Pakistan mandate not failed soundly in
the frontier province already? To many of the NWFP’s Congress-supporting Muslims,
Nehru’s accord smacked, at best, of abandonment—and, at worst, of betrayal. “We
Pakhtuns stood by you and [endured] great sacrifices for attaining freedom,” Abdul
Ghaffar Khan famously remarked afterwards, “but you have now deserted us and
thrown us to the wolves.”245
How had the Congress won so much influence in so Muslim a province as the
Northwest Frontier? The Deobandi layer of this history has already been mentioned.
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Based on his contact with local residents over several decades combined with his
experiences traveling through the region on horseback just months before Partition,
Englishman Malcolm Darling reported, too, that “all agree that it began with the Red
Shirt movement in the late twenties, when to challenge the established order was
automatically to be pro-Congress, Congress being then the only nationalist organization of any
importance. In Abdul Ghafar Khan, too, the movement had a born leader, who succeeded
in rallying round him the poorer and more discontented elements in the province. After
the fashion of those days he gave them red shirts to wear and a semi-military
organization. This, of course, led to violence, and the organization was drastically dealt
with. A legacy of bitterness is the result” (italics added).246 Darling’s supposition is
doubtless at least partly accurate, but fails to explain why, by the late 1930s and early
1940s, when the League was gaining ground among Muslims in, say, the U.P., it yet
failed to win a majority in mostly-Muslim provinces like the North-West Frontier. Of
course, a knowledge of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry’s history, including Deobandism’s
success in establishing itself among the Pathan, could have provided Darling with some
answers in this regard. Still, the League’s popularity in the region should not be
underestimated; “What we want is Pakistan—to be free of the Hindus, because of their
greater numbers,” one local told an English observer, just months prior to Partition.
“Here we are cent per cent for the League.”247 Especially after Nehru’s October
1946/Dh’ul Q’adah 1365 visit to the Northwest Frontier—when, according to Darling,
the “sight of a Hindu addressing them as the spokesman of the Government of India
made the tribesmen realize, as nothing before, the reality of the impending change and
convinced them that it meant Hindu Raj”—League ranks began to swell more
rapidly.248 By 1946, according to a British observer, Hindu domination was an
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“obsession” haunting the minds of most Muslims in the Punjab.249 Still, Khan Abdul
Ghaffar Khan and his KKs were the dominant party in the frontier regions, despite these
developments.
Muslims in general feared minority status within an independent but mostly Hindu
India. Now, and similarly, many Pathans were afraid that unification with the far more
numerous Punjabis, Muslim or not, would “destroy the Pashtun nation,” in the words of
Abdul Gaffar Khan. Thus the brawny Pathan and his Congress-supporting KKs
requested that, at the very least, the creation of an autonomous “Pashtunistan” be
included as an option for which the people might vote in Mountbatten’s referendum.
Exactly what such autonomy meant, much less where exactly “Pashtunistan” began and
ended, remained hazy; Schofield has described the request, however, as “a demand for
self-rule whilst maintaining relations with both India and Pakistan.”250 But the request
was denied (at Nehru’s personal appeal, according to Mountbatten—an interesting
tidbit),251 leaving Abdul Gaffar, his KKs, and other Congress supporters no choice, in
their eyes, but to boycott the referendum completely. As a result, only half of all
registered voters—just over seven percent of the population—participated, casting their
ballots between 6 and 17 July/17 and 28 Sh’aban. With no Pashtunistan on the ballot,
virtually no Congress supporters voting, and almost certainly significant election
fraud,252 the League managed, however scarcely, to emerge triumphant when the
referendum’s results were published on 20 July/2 Ramadan.
Most histories of the northwest, Partition, or Pakistan now leave the referendum
alone, moving along instead to the emergence of the Pakistani state and the gathering
of that polity’s constituent assembly in Islamabad. This version of the referendum
narrative paints the League as lucky to have squeezed out a victory, with “an absence of
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any real political creativity and pragmatism on the part of the Muslim League and
Congress towards the Tribal Areas” during the contest.253 Arguably there is some truth
to this idea, to be sure. But the situation was quite a bit more complicated. Among the
Pathans, in the run-up to the ballot casting, emotions ran high. For years, of course, the
League had been framing the India-or-Pakistan question in terms of loyalty to Islam.
With the coming referendum, however, the Muslim League “mobilized all their
resources,” sending for “leaders from every corner of India,” in the words of one KK
leader, “to foment hatred.”254 (Future Pakistani historians would paint things a little
differently, pointing to the “intense animosity from hard-line [mostly Deobandi]
Muslim clerics” of “the ultra right-wing,” and their “vile propaganda.”)255
The indefatigable Jamaat ‘Ali Shah was one Barelvi divine (of many) who heeded the
call; just one year before, the AISC leader had stood in Peshawar, in the old gardens of
Shahi Bagh—near the home of Abdul Ghaffar himself, not coincidentally—and issued a
fәtwa declaring that “no Congressman will be allowed to be buried in a Muslim
graveyard, as it is impermissible.”256 Another of these religious leaders was Shabbir
Ahmad Usmani. Shabbir Ahmad and his colleagues crisscrossed the province, declaring
resistance to Pakistan as opposition to an Islamic state (Jinnah had used similar
language when he toured the NWFP in 1945: “Every vote against the Muslim
League…means Hindu Raj”).257 Shabbir Ahmad’s “speeches and campaigning” produced
“a great enthusiasm” for Pakistan and the League among many of the province’s
Muslims.258 Such a spark was critical, as will be demonstrated. As a result of the
renewed contest, however, “tensions and violence” were “simmering in the Province,”
especially “among the would-be [jyhadis] in the Tribal Areas”—and by design. For ill
feeling and hostility had reached such an extent that a vote in favor of unification with
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India “would be tragically divisive and risk unleashing unbridled violence” in the
region.259 The result of such a contest would be, in the words of Wali Khan, a
“confrontation between anti- and pro-Pakistan elements at a time when the situation
was highly explosive.”260
Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his supporters hadn’t boycotted the referendum out of
pride or resentment, then; no, they feared what the contest itself (let alone a win for
their side) might do to the Pathan population. It was, in the words of Banerjee,
“Badshah” Khan’s “final great act of principle.”261 And the League, with the “especially
decisive” help of Shabbir Ahmad, had created the very state of affairs that had “forced”
Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his supporters—whose party, the year before, had won
provincial elections in landslide fashion; was this not a referendum?—to sit at home
during the crucial vote of 1947/1366.262 Perhaps the League should be credited with
some creativity after all, more than a little thanks to the energetic though aged former
chancellor. It was that organization’s strategy of “Islam in danger!”—with Shabbir
Ahmad as a lead spokesperson, “visiting the entire frontier province”263—that turned
the tide. (Perhaps, too, the Congress-supporters should be credited with a little
creativity as well; they did, after all, come up with the League-alluding tәppa, “The stick
that used to beat us now has a flag on it”).264 Speaking of flags, it has been written that
before Jinnah and Liaqat ‘Ali Khan arrived at the time of Partition, Shabbir Ahmad
Usmani “was the first to wave the Pakistani flag in western Pakistan.”265
In the end, the Muslim League won a mere 0.5% more than half of the vote; would
that crucial 0.5% have come but for the efforts of Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, to say
nothing of Jinnah’s Barelvi supporters who arrived from across India? The result of the
dubious frontier referendum: the North-West Frontier Province became a part of
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Pakistan and the realization of the dream of an independent Pashtunistan vanished—
some might say, with more than a hint of irony, at the hands of a Deobandi cleric. To
this day the fiery cleric from Uttar Pradesh is considered by millions to have been the
real game-changer for the destiny of the League and Pakistan; perhaps the words of one
of the man’s scholarly biographers best illuminate this particular point-of-view: Shabbir
Ahmad Usmani “made the impossible possible.”266
*
There are several observations one might make via an examination of the four
individuals whose exploits were touched upon in this chapter: Naimuddin Moradabadi,
Husain Ahmad Madani, Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi, and Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. It should be
noted, for example, that while each was politically active in the independence politics of
pre-Partition India and/or Pakistan, none was chiefly so. In other words, both
Deobandi and Barelvi leaders were primarily scholars first—teaching Islam, running
schools, authoring juridical rulings, mentoring students one-on-one, writing tracts and
books on Islamic topics, and otherwise engaged in such religio-educational activities.
Others in their respective movements, too (like Abdul Hamid Badayuni, for example),
might have played a more crucial part in the politics of independence rocking the
subcontinent before 1947/1366, than some or all of the four selected here. Even so,
each played an important role within the context of pre-Partition independence politics
and in the development of a more overtly political Deobandism/Barelvism. True, the
‘alәma (or at least a powerful segment among them) had always been political creatures,
from the days of the Abbasid empire to the Indian Mughal period and beyond. But it
was during the period covered in this chapter that the foundation was laid for the
emergence of distinct ‘alәma parties, in the western political tradition. These parties—
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most notably the JUI (after the creation of Pakistan, most Deobandi JUH remnants in
the new “Muslim” state would gravitate towards the Shabbir Ahmad-founded
organization) and the Barelvi Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (or JUP), the latter built upon
the ashes of the AISC—would, with one or two others, dominate clerical politics in
Pakistan.
Divided as they were, however, might it be said, as Metcalf did, that the role of the
‘alәma in the pre-Partition politics of the twentieth/fourteenth century, “was in fact
modest”? She goes on: “Indeed, one can argue the very success of their inward-looking
strategy developed during the nineteenth century was a hindrance to them in the
twentieth.”267 Sanyal, in turn, would characterize the Barelvi impact as “small.” This
author contends that the words “modest” and “small” are probably far too feeble to
describe the impact of the ‘alәma and pirs during this period, of either sect, despite the
latter’s perhaps waning influence (just months before Partition, one English observer
traveling across the Northwest Frontier noted that “all along my route people agree
that the influence of the Pir is nothing like what it was twenty years ago”).268 Elitist
histories shine the spotlight on individuals like Nehru and Jinnah and their parties, but
it was grassroots elements that propelled Gandhi to power, and it was this unheralded
base that subsequently pushed Jinnah not only out of the Congress but also into the
arms of the League—where the one-time “Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity” went on
to craft that organization’s Pakistan agenda. The Deobandi ‘alәma played a critical role
here, fueling the Khilafat movement and populating the base responsible for the decisive
state of affairs described above. This alone represents, perhaps, a more than “modest”
role. Thousands of Islamic scholars, many of whom in turn greatly influenced hundreds
or thousands of other Muslims each, on a local level, were politically active—attending
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conferences, agitating for or against the League, delivering sermons in favor of the twonation theory or for composite nationalism, and writing, publishing, and distributing
juridical rulings “proving by the light of the Holy Qur’an and sunnәt that the Muslim
League was the representative party of the Muslims”—or that the opposite was true.269
Obviously, any claim to measure the practical effect of these diverse efforts, expended by
thousands and tens of thousands over the course of years across a large geographical
area, would be futile. But could Jinnah have mustered the support he needed, especially
after 1937/1356, without Barelvi backing? Thousands of influential scholars and pirs
stumped for the League all across India—is this a “small” thing, their efforts ultimately
trivial? On another note, could Pakistan have come about without the “consent” of the
NWFP in that province’s 1947/1366 referendum? Here, again, it was the ‘alәma—
mostly Barelvi, but including Deobandi dissident Shabbir Ahmad and his party—who
actually turned the tide. The League’s victory came by a mere half-percent, despite the
KK boycott! Does not this, too, represent a more-than-“modest” role for the religious
scholars? The Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry itslef, by the early 1920s/late 1330s, had
developed a strong political aspect, and this probably played a key role in dividing
Muslims and thereby protracting the pre-Partition political conflict. Throughout the
period, the Deobandi-Barelvi divide, in the form of his Deobandi opposition and
reluctant Barelvi support, helped push Jinnah into a corner, to a mountain over which
he simply could not climb alone—and, it could be argued, only the sudden emergence of
a League-supporting, dissident Deobandi faction led by Shabbir Ahmad finally saved the
day for the Pakistan dream, pushing the League leader over the stubborn mountain’s
summit. Had the Barelvis lined up behind the Deobandi position, it seems highly
unlikely Jinnah could have carried the day at all—and India might be a single, united
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political polity today, with all that that entails. (Indeed, Jinnah may never have become
an advocate of the “two-nation theory” at all.) Had the Deobandis joined forces with the
Barelvis behind Ahmad Riza’s position, on the other hand, Jinnah might have achieved
sole-spokesman status years earlier, or the Congress might have been forced to accede
to League demands in the 1920s-1930s/1340s-1350s, likely resulting in an independent
though united India operating under a highly federal system with separate electorates.
Instead, their rivalry ensured a protracted pre-independence battle among Muslims
over the meaning of Islam, nationhood, citizenship, heritage, and culture on the
subcontinent. Surely the weak “modest” is a descriptive that fails to apply when it
comes to the impact of the ‘alәma, the pirs, and the Deobandi-Barelvi religious
leadership in general in the context of pre-Partition politics.
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4 - DEFINING A NEW ISLAMIC STATE:
The Rivalry in Pakistani Politics, 1947-1977

To achieve a country is easy, but to run a country is very difficult. May Allah bless you
with the ability to run the country.
JAMMAT ‘ALI SHAH, IN A LETTER TO MUHAMMAD ‘ALI JINNAH1

The Ulema would like to reproduce a society which no longer exists and a polity which
was suited to the early days of Islam.
G. W. CHOUDHURY, 19552

With the creation of Pakistan, the religio-political Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, while still
vigorous from a theological point-of-view among Deobandis and Barelvis in India,
shifted to the new “Muslim state” of Pakistan. (The political aspect of the rivalry in
India was there, too, of course, particularly as the Deobandi and Barelvi religious
leadership based in Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar contested for power and place
within the various local, provincial, and central government bodies dealing with
minorities, religion, and culture; a statist system of government recognizition and

patronage thus exacerbated the conflict.) That the rivalry had more or less shifted to
Pakistan was underscored as early as India’s independence day: 15 August 1947. That
evening, the central Deobandi dar ul’alwm’s vice-chancellor, Muhammad Tayyib, told a
large assemblage of students and faculty that with the achievement of political freedom,
a new opportunity had presented itself (with respect to intra-Sunni sectarian strife,
foremost that of the Barelvis and the Deobandis) to “forget past events,” to “desist from
the cycle of reviling and mocking” and to “stop intending to lay blame [on one
another].” It was time now to rid the ummәt of sects and division and unite under a
single ymam and a single әmir. “In my opinion,” declared the mwlana, grandson of
Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi himself, “the chances of our being united are better now
than ever.” Why? According to Muhammad Tayyib, the winning of independence,
including the successful utilization of revolution, had “turned upside down” (munqәlyb)
the parties involved in petty disputes.3 Now that the political side of the schism had
been removed, Muhammad Tayyib reasoned, the two schools would surely be able to
work out their differences. This was one Deobandi position (and, as it turned out, not a
very accurate one, given the events that followed), but it signaled a slight wind change
in India alone. In Pakistan the story was much the same as it had been before
independence was won, only exacerbated now that an actual place at the seat of power
was at stake. Indeed, with the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, the Deobandi-Barelvi
dynamic added a new dimension to the sectarian rivalry. Within the context of prePartition politics, the Barelvis had, by and large, fought for the establishment of an
Islamic state, complete with a constitution that they would have a hand in designing
(along the lines of Moradabadi’s “Eleven Points”) and a government that they would
help lead as the spiritual guides of the Sunni majority. On the other hand, except for
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dissidents like Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, the Deobandis’ goal had revolved around British
expulsion, not constitution-making for some Muslim “homeland,” nor position within a
subcontinental Islamic state. But now, in Pakistan, the Deobandis in the form of the
JUI—and thanks in large part to that organization’s willingness (unlike the Sunni
Conference’s) to be officially associated with the Muslim League—abruptly had a place
at the political table. The political game had not only shifted geographically; it had
shifted goal-wise, such that now the political wings of the Deobandi and Barelvi schools
were fighting over the same thing: that is, official (government) recognition, and the
power and patronage that comes with it. In a sense, the birth of Pakistan instantly
turned them into direct enemies in a contest that, in the end, could have only one victor.
One result of this new dynamic was that the clerical parties consistently failed to unite
in truly joint action, even when they appeared to be fighting for (or against) the same
thing (a phenomenon the author calls “separate unity”). A unified “Sunni” party,
populated by a unified base and led by a unified Deobandi-Barelvi leadership, might
have presented a serious force with which to be reckoned—but this never happened; the
rivalry was too strong, too deep-seeded. Over time, then, and even taking into account
the vacillations of power and prestige characteristic of politics, the dynamic generally
helped only to marginalize both the JUI and the JUP within Pakistan’s political
structure.

Constitution-Making: A Cold Alliance.
Four days before Muhammad Tayyib’s remarks at Deoband (and thus several days
before Pakistan had actually come into being), Jinnah addressed the new constituent
assembly of the future “Muslim” state in Karachi. He had just been elected that body’s
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first president during its 10-14 August inaugural session, and took occasion to elucidate
upon the assembly’s two-pronged purpose. “The constituent assembly has got two
main functions to perform,” he told the gathering of newly minted representatives.
“The first is the very onerous and responsible task of framing the future constitution of
Pakistan and the second of functioning as a full and complete sovereign body as the
Federal Legislature of Pakistan.” The assembly’s purposes, then, were (1) to formulate
a constitution and, in the meantime, (2) to act as the national legislature. (This had been
previously stipulated, too, in the India Independence Act of 1947). And though Muslim
Leaguers (now the Pakistan Muslim League, or PML) largely dominated the assembly,
the body would prove to be quite clearly split on the question of what Pakistan’s
“Islamic” character was to be. That religio-political battle—together with the suddenly
ever-present tug-of-war between eastern Pakistan and western Pakistan for recognition,
influence, and power—largely characterized the next nine years of the constituent
assembly’s existence. Since the debate more or less separated the secularists from the
Islamists, the Deobandis and the Barelvis abruptly found themselves on what appeared
to be the same side. A cold alliance, however reluctant and superficial (certainly in light
of what was brewing beneath the surface, on which more later), was implicitly struck.
Over the years 1947 to 1956 (when a constitution was finally adopted, however shortlived), though disagreements were many and resentment ran high, the Barelvi and
Deobandi ‘alәma-politicians’ main targets were those seeking to implement a more
secularist form of government in the new country. For the first time on a general basis,
both groups were forced to work together, in the spirit of Jinnah’s call, during the same
address, to “[forget] the past,” and “bury the hatchet.” “I cannot emphasize it too
much,” he said. “We should begin to work in that spirit,
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and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority
communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community—
because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias,
Sunnis and so on, and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas,
Khatris, also Bengalees, Madrasis and so on—will vanish. Indeed if you
ask me, this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain
the freedom and independence, and but for this we would have been free
people long long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a
nation of 400 million souls, in subjection; nobody could have conquered
you, and even if it had happened, nobody could have continued its hold on
you for any length of time, but for this. Therefore, we must learn a lesson
from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to
go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of
Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has
nothing to do with the business of the State… We are starting in the
days where there is no discrimination, no distinction between one
community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed
and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle: that we are
all citizens, and equal citizens, of one State. The people of England in
[the] course of time had to face the realities of the situation, and had to
discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the
government of their country; and they went through that fire step by
step. Today, you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and
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Protestants do not exist; what exists now is that every man is a citizen,
an equal citizen of Great Britain, and they are all members of the Nation.

It seems clear from Jinnah’s words that his vision for Pakistan did not include the
implementation of an Islamic state like that proposed by Naimuddin Moradabadi in his
“Eleven Points.” While a constitution like that put forward by the All-India Sunni
Conference would have underscored the “angularities of the majority and minority
communities”—for the most part excluding Deobandis from the state’s highest seats of
power, for example, to say nothing of other Sunni sects like the Ahl-e-Hadis and the
Ahmadiyya, the Shi’a, nor the country’s twelve million non-Muslims—Jinnah seemed to
be pressing for a strongly secularist system, one in which “caste or creed” had “nothing
to do with the business of the State.” As one Pakistani scholar noted, Jinnah’s
presidential address seemed to strongly indicate that “Pakistan would not be a
theocratic state” and that “religion would be a citizen’s private and personal matter.”4
The Pakistani founder’s reference to England’s “Roman Catholics and Protestants” was
particularly apt, given the Deobandi-Barelvi rift then characterizing the vast majority of
the country’s Sunni Muslims. Whatever Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan,
whether for a secular modernist state after the Western model or a democratic-Islamic
amalgam harking back to more traditional “Muslim” regimes, his remarks set the stage
for a protracted battle over Pakistan’s Islamic character.5
At this early stage, the main religious “parties,” described by one Pakistani scholar
as the “persistent, vocal and durable protagonists” of the struggle for an Islamic state in
Pakistan, were five. There was the Deobandi JUI, of course, led by constituent
assembly member Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, well organized and working mostly within
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the Pakistan Muslim League party framework; this phenomenon would phase itself out
as differences with the League surfaced and eventually became irreconcilable. The JUI
“wielded great influence on the government immediately after independence,” in the
words of one Pakistani scholar. After the creation of Pakistan, the party was
reorganized (December 1947) with its new headquarters at the home of Deobandi
scholar Ihtisham al-Haq Thanawi (d. 1980; more on Thanawi later) in Karachi. The
JUI—whose post-Partition purpose now clearly evolved around the implementation of
an explicitly Islamic government, an “Islamic order,” in which the Deobandi religious
leadership might play a key role—would eventually be resuscitated and molded into a
political party in its own right rather than a religious wing of the Pakistan Muslim
League. For now, however, the Deobandi organization’s strategy lay more in gaining
influence over power-holders rather than directly weilding that power itself. The same
could be said for another influencial party, active especially in the Punjab: the heavily
Deobandi Majlis-e-Ahrar. Apart from these two, there was also the newly organized
JUP—a Barelvi party, borne of the now defunct All-India Sunni Conference, whose
strategy was similar to that of the JUI: to gain influence and sway over the overtly
political parties in order to bring about the implementation of an Islamic government in
which they might rightfully weild influence and power as the representatives of the
Sunni majority. The approach of the JUI and the JUP in this regard, which shaped their
separate policies “for a long time” (roughly over two decades) after Partition, was in
harmony, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, with their leaders’ historical role as ‘alәma—as
influencers rather than direct power-holders. Though the JUP enjoyed no official seat
within the constituent assembly, the party did have a representative present during the
assembly’s deliberations: a lawyer named Hakim Ahmad (d. 1976 AD) from Pilibhit, a
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town less than twenty-five miles northeast of Bareilly.6 In additional to the JUI and the
JUP, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), founded by Deobandi-trained Abul Ala Mawdudi, with its
program of Islamic revivalism not unlike that of the Deobandis, was also gaining
prominence in the country. While the JI’s official membership count was small,
numbering only a few hundred (due in part to very strict membership requirements), its
sympathizers and supporters reportedly numbered in the tens of thousands. Over the
first two decades of Pakistan’s existence, the JI would experience significant growth in
terms of both membership (especially among students and in the government sector)
and influence, eventually setting the stage for the party’s high point, during the Zia ulHaq years. Finally, a somewhat influential segment of the Pakistan Muslim League
itself possessed strong religious leanings—mostly Deobandi or Barelvi, but others,
too—and likewise played a role, often crucial, in supporting the clerical parties’
admonitions for an Islamic constitution and an Islamic government.7
And while the constituent assembly was supposed to be devoid of party conflict,
different from a typical legislative body made up of elected representatives, the truth
was that such divisions existed from the start and were evident throughout. “[I]n the
actual working of the constituent assembly,” wrote one Pakistani historian of the period,
“the presence of political parties was as conspicuous as in any other political field,”
despite the Pakistan Muslim League’s possession of forty-nine out of the original sixtynine seats (this would later increase to sixty out of a total of seventy-nine).8 Naturally,
the Deobandi and Barelvi parties sought out those individuals and parties within the
assembly with which they might be able to work—and, hopefully, institute Islamic
government at last. The religious political parties “vitally affected the process of
constitution-making,” wrote Afzal, “especially the Islamic character of the
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constitution.”9 This was to be the scholars’ great struggle.
Perhaps a quick note here on Mawdudi and the JI is appropriate. The Jamaat-eIslami was itself borne of the Deobandi movement—a distinctly Deobandi creation.
Over time, however, the organization would distance itself officially from a strictly
Deobandi stance (leading Deobandi ‘alәma would do the same vis-à-vis the JI). The JI
was founded by Abul Ala Mawdudi, who himself had been educated in the Deoband
tradition before working as editor of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind’s newspaper during the
1920s. By the thirties, however, Mawdudi found himself less concerned about ridding
India of the British colonial administration than of Western ideas in general; his
preoccupation centered around those ideas’ corroding influence, as he saw it, on Islam.
In 1941, Mawdudi founded the JI as a sort of vanguard party—to cleanse Islam of
Western influence in preparation for the establishment of a truly Islamic state. Though
he remained, like most Deobandis, a staunch opponent of the Muslim League, Mawdudi
migrated (or, as some claim, was forced to migrate)10 to Pakistan after Partition—where
the JI “soon turned to directly political concerns,” its aim toward an Islamic state
intensifying. Mawdudi focused on the rural population, dispatching JI preachers
carrying JI literature out into the countryside to fire up the bucolic masses.11 According
to one Indian scholar, writing in 2005, “many of the roots of Islamic terrorism sweeping
the world today lie buried in the partition of India.”12 Indeed, both the Taliban
administration of Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden were influenced by the ideas of the
Jamaat-e Islami founder, himself heavily influenced by the Deobandi movement.
Mawdudi’s ideas inspired Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, as well as its
intellectual guiding light, Sayyid Qutb (who would go on, of course, to encourage “more
militant Islamic groups” that grew out of the Brotherhood). The Ayatollah Ruhollah
299

Khomeini, despite his belonging to the Shi’a sect of Islam, translated several of
Mawdudi’s works into Persian. Yusuf Azzam, the Palestinian scholar, was heavily
influenced by Mawdudi (and it was through Azzam that bin Laden, his young student,
would inculcate much of the Jamaat leader’s thought).13 In Pakistan, the JI would exist
as a “religious party” alternative to either the Deobandi or Barelvi parties.
While the Deobandi JUI’s transition from pre-Partition party to post-Partition
party had been accomplished smoothly, without even the need for a name-change, the
All-India Sunni Conference’s transition to Pakistani politics was not so seamless.
Indeed, on Thursday, 4 March 1948, mwlana Ahmad Saeed Kazimi—a well-known
Barelvi scholar born in Amroha (now in India) and an active Muslim Leaguer in the
southern Punjab—was upset. From his base in Multan, where he’d migrated as a young
twenty-something, Ahmad Saeed had watched as other religious sects—Islamic parties
representing small minorities—were honored with titles by the League or high posts in
the new government. The appointment of Shabbir Ahmad Usmani had particularly
bothered him. In League circles, that Deobandi mwlana was being addressed as shix ulyslam, and he had been appointed a member of the constituent assembly, to boot—the
body that would draft Pakistan’s new constitution (and few things were more important
to the Barelvi ‘alәma than seeing the installation of a truly Islamic constitution, as they
interpreted it). As a former member of the JUH, Shabbir Ahmad had been a
“Congressite” ‘alym, once (though not really, as previously explained), and others,
besides, were receiving similarly high posts. These men weren’t genuinely interested in
an Islamic constitution, Ahmad Saeed was sure. “In fact, they are working to usurp the
rights of the Ahl-e-Sunnat [Barelvis], and crush them forever”—and this he wrote in a
letter to mwlana “Abu’l Hasanat” sayyid Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri that very day. The
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duty—nay, the right—to protect and maintain the “rights of the Sunnis” was theirs, not
the Deobandis’ or the followers’ of Mawdudi (the latter cut from the same cloth as the
former, anyway). Ahmad Saeed stressed that he was not targeting any particular sect—
only claiming what was rightfully his, and that of all other Barelvi ‘alәma and religious
guiding lights. They were “the majority,” thus they should lead. All others were
pretenders and must not be allowed to grasp the reigns of power. The Muslim League
had ridden to victory on the false promise of an Islamic state; the League had betrayed
the Barelvis. And now it was time for the Barelvis to organize a party of their own—
and take back the country from its usurpers.14 Kazimi’s letter, and subsequent actions,
demonstrate that, whatever forced alliance the Deobandis and Barelvis were then
experiencing in their quasi-joint fight for an Islamic constitution, underneath the
surface the rivalry continued with vigor. The goal was still the supremacy of one sect
over the other within the framework of the (hopefully Islamic) Pakistani state.
In fact, mwlana Ahmad Saeed Kazimi had already begun. Before ending his letter to
Muhammad Ahmad, the ‘alym from Multan informed his friend that he and other
Barelvi ‘alәma in the city had formed what they called the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (or
JUP), the first religious party to be born in Pakistan after the country’s founding. As
far as Kazimi was concerned, the fledgling JUP he had inaugurated was only the
beginning, only temporary—until all of the Barelvi ‘alәma and pirs and other religious
leaders could gather together and form a countrywide party. Whether or not this
future mega-party was called the JUP mattered little to him (though the name would
stick); what mattered was that the party came into existence to stand for the Barelvis,
the Ahl-e-Sunnat. The great initiatory meeting was to be held at the end of the month,
from 26-28 March. Come to Multan, Ahmad Saeed insisted. The invitation was sent far
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and wide, to “all the leading Sunni ‘alәma and masha’ikh.”15
After the realization of its chief goal—the creation of an Islamic state in South Asia,
namely Pakistan—the All-India Sunni Conference had formally disbanded within the
hall of the әnwar ul-ul’alwm in Multan in 1948, but the dissolving of the Conference did
not rid the Deobandis of its politico-sectarian opposition. Thus, in place of the
Conference, and at the insistence of scholars like Ahmad Saeed, its (the Barelvis’) leaders
had now established a new organization, a new party: the JUP. “Abu’l al-Hasanat”
Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri, the man to whom Kazimi had addressed his 4 March letter,
was selected as the party’s first president, with Ahmad Saeed Kazimi himself as
secretary-general. A new era for Barelvi political involvement was thus born with the
passing of the All-India Sunni Conference. Over the next 22 years, the JUP would act
as a sort of religious influencer of (and legitimator for) political elites; perhaps it is not
inaccurate to say that it played a similar role to that of the AISC during the heydey of
pre-Partition independence politics. During this period it acted less as a traditional
political party than as a loosely-organized interest group, often used by politicians and
other power-seekers to lend an Islamic veneer to their otherwise secular pursuits.
When religio-cultural issues of alleged import found their way into the national
spotlight, the JUP would weigh in, often vociferously, supporting or rejecting this or
that position, according to its interpretation of Islamic law. (The JUP wouldn’t break
out of this mold and emerge as a serious political contender until the 1970s, when it
commanded considerable support in the towns and cities of Sindh as well as the rural
Punjab, made up an important part of the opposition, and played a major role at the
provincial level in Sindh.)16
The party’s objectives were very similar, of course, to those of the AISC. It sought
302

to convert Pakistan into a “true Islamic state,” one in which the political framework was
designed specifically to eradicate “social and moral evils.” This was the culmination of
shәri’at—its destiny and purpose. The JUP would not only strive to spread the “true”
message of Islam throughout the country (“by initiating the spirit of religious-cumpolitical awakening and the spirit of jihad among [Muslims]” and thus “divert[ing]
their attention from Western culture and civilization towards Islamic culture and
civilization”), but also fight for actual assembly seats at both the national and provincial
levels for the ‘alәma. The party would help maintain and improve mosques, shrines, and
xanәqaħs, yes, but also demand that the country’s centralized education system make
hәdis, Qur’anic commentary, fyqħ, and the history of Islam mandatory subjects in
schools for all students, regardless of religion. The JUP was to be an active
organization—actively striving, for example, for “pan-Islamism” (the fulfillment of
which promised “peace in the world”) as well as “the spirit of jihad” via the organization
of “Muslim militia.” The JUP resolved to organize branches of the Barelvi party across
Pakistan. Interestingly, given the party leaders’ anti-Deobandi motivations for
establishing the organization, one of the JUP goals specified a resolve “not to indulge in
any activity against other religious and political organizations.” Still, membership in
the party was, like its predecessor, restricted only to “Sunni” ‘alәma and other
“religious-minded” Barelvis.17
One of the party’s first acts was to send a delegation, headed by none other than
mwlana Ahmad Saeed Kazimi, to East Bengal to participate in the deliberations of a
committee of “Sunni elite.” Their purpose: to draft an Islamic constitution, to be sent to
government leaders and legislators as a guide in their constitution-formulating task.
Such a draft constitution was indeed produced by the gathering—and was subsequently
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presented to Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah by the “Sunni” committee head, mwlana
Muhammad Abdul ‘Alim Siddiqui. Muhammad Abdul was a highly educated (both in
traditional Muslim disiplines as well as the Western tradition) disciple of Ahmad Riza
Khan from Meerut who had traveled the world as a preacher of Islam. According to
Barelvi sources, the learned Muhammad Abdul spoke with Jinnah for a full three hours,
and in the end obtained a promise from the qayd-e-ә‘ažәm that the draft would indeed be
adopted by the constituent assembly. Considering Jinnah’s secularist sentiments, this
seems unlikely—but likewise considering the Pakistan founder’s apparent penchant (like
most any politician) for making contradictory promises based on the audience at hand,
the account might indeed be based in truth. Some Barelvis continue to believe that, had
Jinnah not suddenly passed away, the constitution that their religious leaders had drawn
up in East Bengal would have been implemented.18
*
Pakistan’s first decade of independence was an uncertain one. After the death of
Jinnah in 1948, the apparent cohesion of the Pakistan Muslim League gave way to
reveal a party divided, even as provincial leaders battled for power with the central
authorities. The constituent assembly was marked by “varied interests and conflicting
views,” as described by Afzal.19 These schisms actually granted the ‘alәma parties, both
Deobandi and Barelvi, even greater power, since the various political factions attempted
to co-opt them and thereby gain the confidence of the masses, just as the League had
done with the JUI (and, to a lesser extent, the AISC) in pre-Partition days. With the
support of the ‘alәma on the line, the country’s opening years were marked especially by
the debate over the role of Islam within the new political structure.
Thus the conflict over the constitution—to be Islamic or secular?—really picked up
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steam on the moment of the qayd-e-ә‘ažәm’s death. With the great man gone, a new
period in the young state’s history opened up, characterized by one Pakistani
constitutional historian as “a fierce competition for influence, wealth, power, and
prestige” between the various parties then engaged in constitution-making. Of course,
the constituent assembly (and those lobbying its members) were constantly dealing
with the tug-of-war between East Bengal and West Pakistan, the former home to the
majority of the country’s population and the latter to the vast majority of its territory as
well as its capital city. But two other issues likewise loomed large throughout the
decade from 1947 to 1956 as a constitution was being formulated: (1) the question of
implementing an Islamic state versus a secular one, and (2) the struggle by, among
others, religious leaders for “recognition of their claim to power and influence.”20 The
Deobandi and Barelvi religious leadership were at the forefront of the struggle over
these two issues, sometimes at odds (as in the latter issue) but often fighting side by side
as reluctant partners. The Barelvis tended to be particularly reluctant to work with
their Deobandi counterparts, whom they felt were being granted undue position despite
their (Barelvi) position as “representatives” of the “majority,” but circumstances
demanded joint action—and so their erstwhile nemeses were tolerated for the time
being. In any case, the death of Jinnah marked the beginning of this new phase, this
period of more conspicuously jostling for position and influence, of fighting over the
definition of “Pakistan.” Ironically, Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah, who might have held such a
power struggle in check, had laid the foundation of the now out-in-the-open political
contest—through his various (and often conflicting) pre-Partition promises to a wide
variety of (often conflicting) groups.
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In the beginning, both the secularists and the ‘alәma won separate battles,
maintaining a haze of uncertainty over the nature of the future Pakistani government.
Despite Jinnah’s personal and then lingering influence (he died on 11 September 1948),
at first the ‘alәma seemed to seize the upper hand. For starters, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani,
at the time probably the most powerful Deobandi ‘alym in the country, and to the ire of
many Barelvis a prominent member of the constituent assembly (on the Pakistan
Muslim League ticket), more or less personally drafted the “Objectives Resolution”—a
declaration meant to outline the “aims and objectives” of the consitution and thereby
formally lay its foundations. But since debate over the resolution was heated, both
Deobandi and Barelvi, however reluctantly, were forced to side one with the other. On
7 March 1949, Liaquat ‘Ali Khan introduced Shabbir Ahmad’s Objectives Resolution
before the constituent assembly. Interestingly, given the contents of the resolution, the
Prime Minister’s speech pointed out explicitly that the proposed system was designed
to eliminate “any danger of the establishment of a theocracy.” This assurance was likely
provided as comfort for the non-Muslim members of the constituent assembly, for next
Liaquat ‘Ali explained that, in Pakistan—and in part through government—“Muslims
shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in
accordance with the tachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur’an
and the sunnәt.

It is quite obvious that no non-Muslim should have any objection if the
Muslims are enabled to order their lives in accordance with the dictates
of their religion. You would also notice, Sir, that the state would be the
very negation of the ideals which prompted the demand of Pakistan, and
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it is these ideals which should be the corner-stone of the state which we
want to build. The state will create such conditions as are conducive to
the building up of a truly Islamic society, which means that the state will
have to play a positive part in this effort.21

To the ears of the Deobandi and Barelvi ‘alәma involved in the constitution-making
process (or following said progress), the Prime Minister’s words likely sounded like
sweet music—a fulfillment of Jinnah’s perceived promises to them and a culmination of
their efforts (and those of their forbears) to establish an Islamic state on the
subcontinent. Surely, when Liaquat ‘Ali Khan declared that “the state will have to play
a positive part in [the] effort” to build up “a truly Islamic society,” he meant the
institution of Islamic law and, thus, the elevation of the ‘alәma to their proper religiopolitical role. This was the spirit of the resolution, and it seemed Liaquat ‘Ali Khan
understood this.
According to the Objectives Resolution, sovereignty “over the entire universe”
belonged to “God Almighty alone”; insofar as the state of Pakistan possessed authority,
that authority was merely “delegated” from God “through [Pakistan’s] people for being
exercised within the limits prescribed by Him.” The “principles of democracy, freedom,
equality, tolerance, and social justice” were to be “fully observed”—but, importantly, “as
enunciated by Islam.” The resolution stressed that Muslims should be able to lead their
lives “in accordance with the teaching and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy
Quran and the sunnәt,” thereby implicitly hinting at a positive (i.e. actionary) role, as
Liaquat ‘Ali Khan had stated, for the state to play in this regard. Minority (i.e. nonMuslim) rights were to be protected and equality maintained “subject to law and public
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morality.” The Objectives Resolution made it clear that the guiding spirit of Pakistan—
its essence and core—was to be the spirit of Islam. Such concepts as “freedom” or
“justice” were to be affected through an “Islamic” medium. In this, both Deobandi and
Barelvi ‘alәma hoped for a restoration of their traditional role as influencial advisors to
the state, chief propagators of religion in the country, and interpreters of the law. The
resolution seemed to embody that original “promise of Pakistan,” enunciated by one
high-profile Deobandi leader as “a promise that on this land…a brotherhood would
rule[, believing] in ‘Allah’s rule on Allah’s land’[, considering] it a great honor…to
obey Allah and His Messenger… [We] would establish a society and a system of
government that would be based on the teachings of the Quran and the sunnәt.”22
But there were some who opposed the Objectives Resolution vehemently, holding
fast to promises they felt certain Jinnah had made to them regarding the state’s
secularism; “I certainly do not propose to hand over the field to Ulema,” he once
reportedly said—and yet the Objectives Resolution, at least in spirit, seemed to do just
that.23 Certain non-Muslim members of the consituent assembly wanted more debate
over the resolution, which they deemed too overtly Islamic. Its language must be toned
down, they argued, and proposed replacing specific words and phrases (those deemed
especially “Islamic” or exclusionary) with other, more broad-based terms—or excising
them altogether. A speech by one non-Muslim constituent assembly member, Birat
Chandra Mandal, made clear that no one was under any illusion as to the source of these
Islamocentric sections. “Sir, I hear that [the ‘alәma] are insisting on this principle of
Islam.” Jinnah, he reminded the assemblage, had “most unequivocally said that Pakistan
will be a secular state,” and had “never said that the principles of constitution will be
based on Islam.” Another non-Muslim assembly member, Bhupendra Kumar Datta,
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addressed his fellow lawmakers as well. “Sir, I feel—I have every reason to believe—
that were this Resolution to come before this House within the lifetime of the great
creator of Pakistan, [qayd-e-ә‘ažәm], it would not have come in its present shape.”
(Datta worried, too, that “justification” for a usurpation of power by a power-hungry
executive might be found “in this Preamble.”)24 What of Jinnah’s secular state, one in
which “religion would be a citizen’s private and personal matter”? Just as the religious
parties contended that the qayd-e-ә‘ažәm had made promises to them regarding the
establishment of Islamic government in Pakistan, these non-Muslim members—mostly
Hindus from East Bengal—had clung to what they had considered promises, from the
same source, of Pakistani state secularism. “We thought that religion and politics
would not be mixed up,” one member said in a speech before the assembly. “That was
the declaration of qayd-e-ә‘ažәm Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah in this House.” Several of the
assembly’s other non-Muslims made similar speeches from the house floor.
Meanwhile, Shabbir Ahmad and his supporters within the assembly held firm,
clamoring for adoption of the resolution.25 A large group of constituent assembly
members came out forcefully against all of the proposed amendments to the resolution
in its original form. Barelvi Hakim Ahmad of the JUP, though not an official
constituent assembly member, was on hand to lend support to the resolution, too.26
Pakistan was always going to be a Muslim state, the resolution’s supporters argued; this
was, after all, what millions of Muslims had fought for in the years leading up to
Partition. “Islam has never accepted the view that religion is a private affair between
man and his creator and as such has no bearing upon the social or political relations of
human beings,” said Shabbir Ahmad from the House floor.
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Some other religious systems may expound this theory and may,
incidentally, be too idealistic to possess a comprehensive and allembracing code of life. But Islam has no use for such false notions and its
teachings are in direct contradiction to them. The late qayd-e-ә‘ažәm
made the following observations in the letter he wrote to Gandhiji in
August 1944:

“The Qur’an is a complete code of life. It provides for all matters,
religious or social, civil or criminal, military or penal, economic or
commercial. It regulates every act, speech and movement from the
ceremonies of religion to those of daily life, from the salvation of the soul
to the health of the body; from the rights of all to those of such
individual, from the punishment here to that in the life to come.
Therefore, when I say that the Muslims are a nation, I have in my mind
all physical and metaphysical standards and values.”

Here, again, the idea of Islam as an all-encompassing politico-religious order, an idea
that undergirded the very founding of the dar ul’alwm at Deoband itself, is made further
evident. And by striving to incorporate that system into a national government (an
entity that, by its very nature, operated via monopoly, force, and blanket provision),
Shabbir Ahmad and his supporters were also advocating that such a comprehensive
system was to be enforced by the guns of government (i.e. not assume the form of, for
example, a voluntary association). Non-Muslims, Shabbir Ahmad argued on 9 March,
“cannot be trusted with the responsibility of framing the general policy of the state,
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[and of]…dealing with matters vital to its safeguard and integrity.”27 Such words
were, of course, a slap in the face of the Objectives Resolution’s non-Muslim opponents,
but this was Pakistan; this was what the Muslim freedom struggle had always been
about. Now that an Islamic state had been won, were the people to throw it all away?
What, then, had been the point of a political split with India at all?
In the end, under the leadership of Liaquat ‘Ali Khan (who had argued for a strong
state role in “establishing an Islamic order”),28 the motion to further review the
Objectives Resolution was defeated as each of the secularists’ proposed amendments was
voted down. Religion and politics were to be “mixed up” after all.29 The constituent
assembly passed the Deobandi-authored Objectives Resolution, outlining the
fundamental principles upon which the new constitution would be based, on 12 March.
All of the constituent assembly’s Muslim members (save one) “vociferously” supported
the resolution.30 The document’s presence would loom over the constituent assembly as
“the center-piece” of the constitutional debate, defining “both the state and idea of
Pakistan,” as one scholar has noted.31 As of the time of this writing, the resolution was
still in effect (see Article 2A of the current Pakistani constitution). Thus the first
constitutional battle between the secularists (or at least those wary of the
institutionalization of an “Islamic” system in government) and the ‘alәma-led theocrats
(under the leadership of Deobandi Shabbir Ahmad) ended in clear victory for the latter.
The situation was such that one modern Pakistani detractor of the clerical parties
lamented how “Jinnah’s secular Pakistan” had “drifted into the hands of his enemies.”32
In any case, as developments continued, things might have seemed, in the eyes of the
‘alәma (especially those of the Deobandi persuasion), to be going their way. The
constituent assembly appointed a Basic Principles Committee (which in turn organized
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several subcommittees) to formulate a report on “basic principles” undergirding the
future Pakistani constitution. Such an important task, the ‘alәma reasoned, should not
be undertaken without the advice and direction of the Islamic scholars; fresh off of their
Objectives Resolution victory, the ‘alәma took advantage of their powerful position to
press for increased influence. Some of the now-emboldened ‘alәma now demanded not
only that Pakistan withdraw from the British Commonwealth (after all, if Pakistan were
to be a true Islamic state, how could it owe any sort of fealty to a non-Muslim
sovereign?) but also that all non-Muslims be removed and henceforth banned from
important government posts. That the demands were taken seriously was evidenced by
the government’s taking “some steps” to at least partly meet the second demand. The
first, of course, was entirely in the hands of the constituent assembly and the
constitution they would create.33 Shabbir Ahmad Usmani in particular, and beginning
as early as February 1949,34 demanded the appointment of a committee of ‘alәma to
advise the constituent assembly as the new constitution was being crafted.35 Thus, at
the insistence of the Islamic scholars, the Basic Principles Committee created a
Teachings of Islam (talimat-e-yslamiәħ) board to advise the committee on matters from a
religious (Muslim) perspective (specifically, based on the Qur’an, the sunnәt, and the
principles of Islamic law).
Deobandi Shabbir Ahmad had gotten his way, yes—but the Barelvi leadership was
not so fortunate. When Abdul Hamid Badayuni demanded JUP representation on the
Basic Principles Committee, he was more or less ignored, never receiving an answer.36
In any case, five scholars were chosen to sit on the talimat-e-yslamiәħ’s board: Deobandi
mufti, relative (and right hand) of Shabbir Ahmad and fellow JUI stalwart Muhammad
Shafi; Muslim Leaguer and Islamic scholar Zafar Ahmad Ansari (whose leanings tended
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toward Deobandism); ‘Abdul Khaliq, a professor from East Bengal; Gunjranwali Shi’a
mufti Jafar Husain, who would later organize the Shi’a political party Tehrik-e-Nafaz-eFiqah-e-Jafaria (tәhrik-e-nәfaź-e-fyqħ-e-j’afәriәħ or TNFJ, meaning “Movement for the
Implementation of Shi’a Law,” founded in 1979) and be recognized as the leader of
Pakistan’s considerable Shi’a community; and Muhammad Hamidullah, the Osmania
University-educated doctor of philosophy from the princely state of Hyderabad. The
board was to be chaired by the aged ‘alym and sәyyid Sulaiman Nadvi, who had replaced
the famous Azamgarhi mwlana Shibli at the (Deobandi-leaning) dar ul’alwm Nadwatul
Ulama in Lucknow after Shibli’s 1914 death. (To illustrate the relationship between the
nәdwәt scholars and their Deobandi brethren: perusing the wares of a nәdwәt ‘alәma
bookshop not far from the dar ul’alwm at Deoband in 2012, the author was informed by
the store owner that the nәdwәt were, for all intents and purposes, aligned with their
brethren at the great Islamic university at Deoband; indeed, he insisted they were
Deobandis in all but name. “They are the same,” he assured me. Then he said,
pointedly: “The ones who are different are the Barelvis.” Several moments later he
added: “And Shi’a.”) Nadvi had been part of the Deobandi majority who had opposed
the creation of Pakistan, supporting instead the idea of a united India; this had been
reflected in his desire to change the name of the Urdu language to “Hindustani,” a term
more suggestive of the tongue’s joint Hindu-Muslim genesis. After Partition, Nadvi
had opted to remain in India, probably in part due to his old age, and was only coaxed
into coming to Pakistan after being offered a princely sum as a salary; even then, he
didn’t arrive until late 1950. It is clear, then, that the Deobandi school of thought and
its scholar-leaders (especially in the form of Muhammad Shafi and the board’s chair,
Sulaiman Nadvi) dominated the board of talimat-e-yslamiәħ, a fact that did not go
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unnoticed by Barelvi leaders; indeed, the latter could boast not a single obvious place at
that particular table, whatever the leanings of men like Dr. Muhammad Hamidullah or
Professor ‘Abdul Khaliq. Basic Principles Committee sessions, as well as those of its
subcommittees and the talimat-e-yslamiәħ board, were held in “complete secrecy.”
For its part, the Shabbir Ahmad-organized and Deobandi-dominated talimat-eyslamiәħ board produced several recommendations for the Basic Principles Committee.
The president of Pakistan, the board insisted, should be “elected” by the “learned and
pious representatives of the people” (i.e. not directly by the people themselves). This
was important, since in this context “president” was a term virtually interchangeable
with әmir, the head of state. This one suggestion, if adopted, may have granted the
‘alәma—naturally the most “learned and pious”—a strong hand on the reigns of power,
though the directive referred to the state’s duly elected legislative assembly. The board
also suggested that the president be advised by a shәri’at committee; the committee
should likewise function as an advisory unit for both the federal and provincial
legislatures. This was in keeping with the ‘alәma’s more traditional role as on-hand
religious advisors to the state (see Chapter 1). Pakistan’s legislative system should be
unicameral, with three major powers invested in the house of representatives: that of
declaring war (or concluding peace), of passing a national budget, and of removing, if
necessary, the president from office. The talimat-e-yslamiәħ board thus envisioned a
unicameral, presidential system led by an indirectly elected president and advised at
every level by the ‘alәma.37 The board duly turned in their recommendations to the
Basic Principles Committee.
When the committee submitted its interim report on 7 September 1950, both
Deobandi and Barelvi ‘alәma involved in one way or another in the process were,
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generally speaking, very disappointed, both by its contents as well as the general
reaction to it. The talimat-e-yslamiәħ board members, in particular, were “shocked” at
the report, as it “did not reflect any trace of the [their] recommendations.”38 All
around, the response from the religious leadership seemed to be that the interim report
was simply far too weak in terms of its Islamic provisions. While the report did seem to
favor a powerful executive, the committee had opted for a parliamentary system (i.e.
with a Prime Minister as head of government and a president as head of state) and a
bicameral legislature. The powerful әmir (or әmir-equivalent)-led system espoused by
many of the ‘alәma, exemplified in Moradabadi’s “Eleven Points,” and proposed (in the
form of a powerful head of state who could issue ordinances and even abrogate the
constitution) by the interim report was rejected almost immediately. Though at the
time the Governor-General (to be a temporary office) did possess sweeping powers left
over from the office of (British) viceroy, the propositions within the Basic Principles
Committee interim report were deemed “undemocratic and unpopular”—particularly its
suggestion that the head of state should wield the power to suspend some or all of the
constitution should circumstances dictate such a course.39 At this stage, then, the idea
was not to be entertained that such dictatorial powers might be wielded by the
president (or, if the Moradabadis among the ‘alәma had their way, әmir) of Pakistan.
The ‘alәma were further snubbed by the setting up of a federal court and two high
courts, formulated almost entirely after the Western model. Far from requiring a
degree in fyqħ or experience administering Islamic law, the criteria for membership on
either court level rested mainly on one’s service as a barrister, pleader, or district judge
(the latter combined with experience in the civil service). Years of education at a dar
ul’alwm, then, would mean next to nothing within the new judicial order.40 The interim
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report did propose the setting up of a board of Islamic scholars appointed by the head of
state to ensure that legislation on both the federal and provincial levels was in line with
the teachings of the Qur’an and the sunnәt. Despite this last, however, the report
seemed to signal to the “‘alәma parties” that secular “democracy” was to be the name of
the game; both Deobandi and Barelvi religious leaders dug in, prepared for another
political battle. At the same time, many East Bengalis opposed the report, too, arguing
that the proposed system failed to grant their majority population position the weight it
deserved (more on this later).
The reaction to the report from Islamic scholars and the East Bengalis caused it to
be withdrawan. The Basic Principles Committee immediately appointed yet another
subcommittee—this time with the express purpose of considering “proposals on the
Islamic character of the constitution.”41
Earlier, Shabbir Ahmad had convened a conference of ‘alәma at his own residence to
work out a plan for a governmental Ministry of Religious Affairs. According to the
plan, the Religious Affairs Minister “would be under the Head of the State and not
subject to ordinary votes of confidence in the legislature.” The Ministry would act as a
censor of all government activities, supervise government officials, and control the
country’s mosques, religious institutions, religious endowments, and Islamic courts—a
role that more or less mirrored that of the ‘alәma in most other “Muslim” governments
since the medieval era (see Chapter 1; of course, within the structure a modern,
centralized “total” state, such a role would necessarily carry with it considerably more
power). All the while, the Barelvi ‘alәma remained, in the words of Binder, “practically
oblivious of the new changes and pressures in Islam,” interested in “recognition rather
than power.”42 This author would argue that there were, in fact, plenty of Barelvi
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‘alәma anything but oblivious to the new changes—and very interested in power.
Indeed, “recognition” and power were two sides of the same coin to these self-appointed
spokesmen of the “majority.” It wasn’t just their idea that their tradition represented a
“historical continuity” (one that, they felt, the Deobandis and others had vainly sought
to usurp) that drove the Barelvi scholar-leaders; it was also the very fact that their longtime rivals, not representative of that tradition, were seizing the levers of state and
thereby threatening to displace them (the Barelvi ‘alәma) as the legitimate guardians of
South Asian Islam. Binder argues that as long as their place as the legitimate
successors within this “historical continuity” was recognized, the Barelvi ‘alәma seemed
far less interested in real politics than their Deobandi counterparts, but perhaps the
reality wasn’t that the Barelvis were less interested—just less organized and politically
experienced, and certainly less united. The Deobandis operated within the framework
of the JUI, an organization formulated after the JUH. Its leaders had been politically
active for decades and were far more experienced as political organizers. As such,
scholars and politicians of the Deobandi persuasion were able early to seize a
disproportionate degree of political power. It would be a mistake, however, to attribute
this to a Barelvi lack of interest in politics. For example, erstwhile AISC leader Jamaat
‘Ali Shah, together with the pir of Manki Sharif and mwlana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi,
around this time spearheaded a new movement, the tәhrik-e-nyfaz-e-shәri’at (“The
Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law”).43 As its name suggests, the
organization was designed to promote the implementation of shәri’at (as the Barelvis
interpreted it) in Pakistan. For his part, Jamaat ‘Ali felt that he had been promised by
Jinnah himself that such an implementation would take place with the establishment of
the new “Islamic” state. When that didn’t happen—and, perhaps worse, when the
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Deobandis seemed to be granted official patronage instead of the majority Barelvi
parties—Sunni leaders like the very aged Jamaat ‘Ali resumed their political
agitations.44 But unfortunately for them and their Barelvi colleagues, the Deobandi
‘alәma always seemed a step ahead of them.
Efforts by the Deobandi and, less successfully, the Barelvi religious leadership
toward the establishment of “true” Islamic government in Pakistan were not limited to
the halls of the constituent assembly and that body’s endeavor to formulate a
constitution. No, the JUI, the JUP, the JI, the Ahrars, and elements within the PML
each (separately) organized in-the-streets demonstrations to rally the country behind
their (similar but separate) points-of-view. The JUI, the JUP, and the JI in particular
organized shәri’at Days and shәri’at Weeks, observed across Pakistan, in protest over
the secularist drive for a Western, non-Islamic state—and, more importantly, in
demonstration of their demands for the implementation of Islamic law into the
political/judicial system. For example, the JUP’s Day of shәri’at was set for 7 May
1948; the occasion was “successfully celebrated” in urban centers across West Pakistan,
from Karachi and Quetta to Rawalpindi, Dera Ismael Khan, and Peshawar.45 The JI
organized a “Constitution Week” (14-21 November 1952), demanding “early
promulgation of an Islamic constitution.” The JUI hosted a massive conference in
Dhaka (attended by around fifty thousand ‘alәma and one hundred thousand others); the
gathering’s overarching demand was for an Islamic constitution.46 Even the Pakistan
Muslim League got into the game, at one point attempting to form a “shәri’at Group”
pushing for much the same thing; the effort, however, was short-lived. From 9-10
February 1949, the JUI hosted a conference in Dhaka (the party was actually
significantly better organized in East Bengal than in the country’s western wing); the
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meeting was an admonishment to Pakistan’s political leaders to adopt an Islamic
system—and a warning that “attempts to introduce an un-Islamic order would be
resisted.” Meanwhile, the JUP continued to hold up Moradabadi’s “Eleven Points” as
the best model for a future Pakistani political system. The JI, too, pushed for
Mawdudi’s own “Four Points”; these were the acknowledgement of (1) God as
sovereign, (2) shәri’at as the constitutional bedrock, (3) “un-Islamic” legislation as in
need of amending, and (4) shәri’at as the boundary for the national government’s
activities. The JI, too, propagated Mawdudi’s call for Pakistanis not to take an oath of
allegiance to the state “unless it became Islamic.”47 Though some shәri’at-inspired laws
were passed at the provincial level, they were typically not enforced. Still, Barelvi pride
was somewhat assuaged when, in Punjab, the Department of yslamiәt was created. This
branch of the provincial government included a six-member board of Islamic scholars
and a cohort of department lecturers (sent to educational institutions and prisons to
preach Islam). Many of those lecturers were Barelvi (including JUP president
Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri), and the department’s deputy secretary was a noted Barelvi
‘alym, too.48 In addition, the Deobandi and Barelvi parties exerted influence through
their virtual monopoly over the country’s (Sunni) mosques and religious schools.
Friday sermons focused on the need for an Islamic constitution, and copies of these
speeches were often sent to Jinnah or Liaquat ‘Ali Khan.49 Such street-level agitations
and the provincial legislation that sometimes resulted provided high visibility for their
cause, yes, but eventually the religious parties realized that the key to the
accomplishment of their goals lay in the constitution—and ensuring it was an Islamic
one. This was where their efforts should be concentrated.50
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In January 1951, about four months after the Basic Principles Committee had
submitted and then hastily withdrawan its interim report, a Deobandi-led meeting of
‘alәma was convened in Karachi, organized by the aforementioned Ihtisham ul-Haq
Thanawi. Thanawi, educated at the dar ul’alwm at Deoband as well as Punjab
University (and who once claimed not to have “participated in the local politics of [the
dar ul’alwm] during the era of [his] education,” nor ever to have taken “interest in
domestic politics”), had been a reluctant immigrant to Pakistan, only opting to come
after witnessing the mass killing that went along with the mass migration to and from
both countries.51 The scholars present were by no means limited to the Deobandi
school of thought; several other sects (including the JI in the person of Abul Ala
Mawdudi himself) were represented, too—and indeed, their number even included five
Barelvi pirs and ‘alәma. Of the latter, two were official JUP delegates, including Abdul
Hamid Badayuni. Deobandi sәyyid Sulaiman Nadvi (the aged head of the Basic
Principles Committee-appointed talimat-e-yslamiәħ board, who had recently arrived in
Pakistan in order to reinvigorate the JUI after the December 1949 death of Shabbir
Ahmad Usmani) presided over the gathering. The interim report had greatly worried
the ‘alәma. It was obvious that the secularists needed a lesson in Islamic government,
and so the meeting had been called. The juridical scholars and mәshayx present
hammered out a document later referred to as the “Twenty-Two Principles”: a list of
twenty-two core “principles of an Islamic state.” The “Twenty-Two Principles”
included a requirement that the head of state (the “President”) be a Muslim male, that
no law contradict the Qur’an and sunnәt, and that the state be directly involved in the
propagation of Islamic education. Pakistan should be a welfare state, its non-Muslim
citizens should be protected from discrimination (except, evidently, when it came to
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holding the state’s highest office), and the president should have the authority to
suspend the consitution (but could only then administer in his office with the help of an
[‘alәma-led] shwra. Perhaps most importantly, any ideas deemed destrutive to the core
principles of an Islamic state should be prohibited. The twenty-two principles listed by
the mixed-sect gathering in Karachi were often vague, but the heart of the issue was
that Pakistan be an explicitly, unambiguously, unequivocally Islamic state. Islam, as a
political system, must be woven into the very fabric of the political system, must be
more than just a “guiding force”—must be the very bedrock of the country’s political
structure. The state was to be a highly interventionist one: intervening in the market
according to Islamic principles of money, banking, trade, interest, and finance,
intervening in matters of “public” morality and immorality according to Islamic values
(i.e. promoting the positive role of the state in promoting virtue and eradicating vice),
and intervening as a taxer and redistributor according to Islamic ideals of equity and
justice.52 The 1951 Karachi meeting and the consensus-driven document that it
produced was more than a little astonishing; the “gathering of so many [‘alәma] with
such a variety of viewpoints,” wrote one Pakistani scholar, “was in itself an historic
event and the consensus they arrived at lent an unprecedented force to their
proposals.”53 After their formulation, the “Twenty-Two Principles” were handed over
to the Basic Principles Committee and were “duly noticed in…government circles.”54 It
may be argued that the creation of this document represented the high-point of
Deobandi-Barelvi cooperation, however lacking Barelvi representation might have been,
considering their “majority” status.
In December 1952, the Basic Principles Committee’s re-write was finally submitted.
This draft, referred to as the “Nazimuddin Report” (since Prime Minister Khwaja
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Nazimuddin—a Bengali career politician who had served as Governor-General after
Jinnah, replaced Liaquat ‘Ali Khan after his assassination, and was known for “his
religiosity and close contact with the [‘alәma]”55—helped formulate it and then
presented it personally to the constituent assembly), drew heavily from the Basic
Principles Committee’s do-over. And fortunately for the ‘alәma, with whom Khwaja
Nazimuddin and other members of the Basic Principles subcommittees had negotiated,
this time the committee seemed to have taken their input seriously, incorporating
aspects of some of the “Twenty-Two Principles” into their report. The reaction of Zafar
Ahmad Usmani of the JUI captures, perhaps, the general feeling among the Islamic
scholars; the Nazimuddin Report was, he said, “seventy-eight percent Islamic.”56
Among other things, the new constitutional blueprint granted the ‘alәma and religious
(Islamic) leadership significant sway within the country’s political framework. The
Objectives Resolution was to be the constitution’s preamble. The state was to take an
active role in “helping” Muslims live their lives in accordance with Qur’anic principles
and the sunnәt (“with due safeguards for sectarian interests”); what that “help” might
look like was demonstrated in some of the report’s other provisions—for mandatory
teaching of the Qur’an, for example, or prohibitions on alcohol consumption, or the
organization of a proper zәkat system. Perhaps most significant were the draft’s
“repugnancy clauses,” outlining a constitutional process for ensuring that all laws
remained within the bounds set by the Qur’an and the sunnәt (by setting up a board of
Islamic scholars, operating under the head of state, which could vet all new
legislation).57 Though the report opted for a parliamentary bicameral system, the head
of state was required to be a Muslim.
Just weeks later, in mid-January 1953, another ‘alәma gathering—much like the one
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in Karachi two years previously that had produced the Twenty-Two Principles—
occurred, this time in Lahore. Just as the Karachi conference had been organized to
weigh in on the Basic Principles Committee interim report, the Lahore conference was
organized to critique the Nazimuddin Report. Though this second draft was met with
far less criticism than the first from the religious quarter, there were nevertheless parts
that, in the eyes of the assembled scholars, required amending. Perhaps most
important, the conference proposed that the Supreme Court include five ‘alәma, not just
“regular” judges after the Western model. For JUP members Muhammad Ahmad
Qadiri and Abdul Hamid Badayuni, even this was not enough; they wanted to replace
the Supreme Court entirely with an “‘alәma board” that they hoped the Barelvis would
dominate. (Khwaja Nazimuddin did, in fact, suggest this last—an ‘alәma board to “rule
upon the repugnancy of legislation”—to the constituent assembly, but after weeks of
debate it was decided that only the Supreme Court should be vested with such
authority.)58 Indeed, the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry was more than a little conspicuous at
the Lahore conference, as the Barelvi ‘alәma present sought to gain “official” status for
their position as the religious leadership over the “majority” Sunnis (i.e. Barelvis). That
status, they insisted, and “their organization” (the JUP) should be recognized in the
Pakistani constitution itself. Of course, the Deobandis resisted this Barelvi attempt to
assert an allegedly superior authority.59 The meeting underscored the fragility of any
sort of joint Deobandi-Barelvi political action, and, unlike those of the previous multisect ‘alәma conference (which the Deobandis had organized and dominated), its
suggestions were mostly ignored. Besides, the January 1953 Lahore meeting of
scholars, in which the Deobandi-Barelvi rift was so evident, quickly degenerated less
into a discussion about the Nazimuddin Report and more into anti-Ahmadi agitation (on
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which more later).60 The meeting ended in failure. Once again, the Deobandi-Barelvi
dynamic had prevented the Islamic scholars and their supporters from mounting a
powerful lobby for the institution of an Islamic order. And despite the general support
of the ‘alәma for the Nazimuddin Report, the draft was received badly by many in the
Punjab, who felt that it gave undue power to the Bengalis at the expense of every other
unit in the country; “the country seemed to face a constitutional deadlock of great
magnitude,” wrote one Pakistani constitutional historian.61
On 21 September 1954, amidst continued opposition from both the non-Muslims in
the constituent assembly and the Pakistan National Congress (established in 1947 from
remnants of the Indian National Congress and made up almost entirely of East Bengali
Hindus), the re-submitted Basic Principles Committee report was adopted by the
constituent assembly—with all of its Islamic provisions. It was the latter to which the
assembly’s non-Muslims and Congress members had been opposed, after all; Hindu
members of the constituent assembly even boycotted the meeting at which the
constitution draft was adopted in protest of its overtly Islamic content.62 But the
religious parties had played a critical role in seeing this adoption occur—despite their
own disunity—as the constitution’s Islamic character was debated from October to
November 1953. Thus the ‘alәma politicians and their organizations had been pivotal in
not only shooting down the interim constitution (together with the East Bengali
opposition) but also in seeing the Nazimuddin Report become the official blueprint for
the law of the land.
Victory, however, was short-lived. Just days before the constitution report was
scheduled for consideration by the assembly as Pakistan’s new constitution, “tall, dapper
59-year-old” Malik Ghulam Muhammad—who’d been serving as Governor-General
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since Khwaja Nazimuddin had left the office in 1951 to take up the post of Prime
Minister—abruptly dissolved the constituent assembly, evidently unhappy at the
prospect of a new constitution that placed significant checks on the Governor-General’s
(i.e. his own) power.63 The move took place on 24 October 1954. Despite opposition to
the “constitutional coup” from some on the Supreme Court, the move stood when the
judiciary upheld the assembly’s dismissal in a split decision.
Most of the ‘alәma opposed Ghulam Muhammad’s action (which the Times in
London referred to as a “palace revolution”),64 and those close to the events tried to
prevent it when news of an impending dissolution leaked out just prior to its unfolding.
But their efforts were in vain. The JUI’s top leader described Ghulam Muhammad’s
move as “mischievous,” designed “to destroy the Islamic character of the constitution to
whatever extent it is.” Other Deobandi leaders, like Muhammad Shafi and Ihtisham ulHaq Thanawi, called the coup “a tragic deviation from the basic ideology of Pakistan.”
The JI general secretary similarly slammed the Governor-General, characterizing his
actions as “cheap and highly deceptive.”65 Perhaps it is not surprising, however, that
some Barelvi ‘alәma actually supported the assembly’s dissolution, given their
belligerence at the Lahore conference, their strong opposition to parts of the
Nazimuddin Report (particularly as it concerned the judiciary), and the failure of the
draft to recognize them in any way, shape, or form as the Sunni Muslims’ “official”
spiritual leadership. Indeed, Abdul Hamid Badayuni sent Ghulam Muhammad his
personal congratulations on the occasion of the constiuent assembly’s forced
disbanding.66 The most protest the JUP put up was at its annual conference on 9
October during which the party “expressed satisfaction over the progress in
constitution-making.” The Barelvi leadership wasn’t giving up on the idea of an Islamic
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state, of course; this was their goal, and their demand for a “totally Islamic constitution”
held firm. But it seems the Barelvi leadership hoped that, in beginning again, their
claim to represent the majority “Sunni” position stood more of a chance of being codified
into law than in it did in supporting any previous constitution report.67 As for the
military, Ghulam Muhammad had ensured its support when he offered key cabinet
positions to military leaders; Major-General Iskander Mirza became Minister of
Internal Affairs and General Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army,
was granted the office of Defense Minister. (Prime Minister Muhammad ‘Ali Bogra was
asked to stay on as head of the newly reconstituted cabinet, which he did.) Iskander
Mirza was particularly hostile to the Islamic scholars, warning the ‘alәma after the 1954
coup that there would be “trouble” if they continued to meddle around in politics.68 “We
can’t run wild on Islam,” he said. “It is Pakistan first and last.”69 For his part, Ghulam
Muhammad would justify the coup, marked by “troops pouring into the capital, armored
cars patrolling outside,” and a ban on public assemblies, by blaming the constituent
assembly itself.70 If not for its “internal strain, bickerings, and personal, sectional, and
provincial rivalries,” he insisted, he never would have been forced to such measures. A
new era in Pakistani politics had been born—one in which the country’s elected
representatives would play underdog to a bloated government bureaucracy and the
military.
Within a few days, Pakistan seemed to be on the verge of a full-scale military coup.
“Pakistan, the world’s fifth largest country, is in a bad way,” wrote newspaperman
Douglas Wilkie, at the time. “Its Government is in the melting pot, its Parliament
already dissolved and a state of emergency proclaimed, forbidding any assembly of more
than five persons.”71 Combined with a veritable revolt in East Bengal against federal
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authorities in Karachi, events seemed to be heating up. And though Wilkie’s
prognostication would ultimately come true, the real military coup wouldn’t come for
another four years. Indeed, by June 1955, five months after Ghulam Muhammad’s
dissolution of the first constituent assembly, a new one was elected led by a coalition
PML-United Front government. (The United Front was a Bengali party made up itself
of a coalition of parties determined to ensure that the eastern zone be allotted proper
representation in government.) The dominant United Front party was the Awami
League, but the organization also included a JUI-breakaway called the Nizam-e-Islam
Party (NIP), an independent political party created out of the East Bengali JUI during
that organization’s 1953-1954 falling out with the Pakistan Muslim League, and whose
name literally meant “The Implementation of an Islamic System Party.” The NIP had
been induced to join the Front when the NIP leadership became convinced that the
PML “had taken advantage” of their party “by misleading the people in the name of
Islam.”72 With the convening of a new assembly, the work of constitution-making
began again from August 1955.
The new assembly appointed a new committee to produce a draft constitution. After
years of effort, then, they were beginning all over again—the “work for an Islamic
constitution…to be done afresh.” Meanwhile, the ‘alәma continued to clamor for the
institution of an Islamic government. The mostly Deobandi NIP members of the
constituent assembly in particular pressed hard for the institution of an Islamic
constitution. Their demands became more vocal after the first draft of a constitution
formulated by the committee was presented in early November 1955—devoid of much
of the old drafts’ Islamic provisions (including the critical “repugnancy clause”). In
protest, NIP constituent assembly members boycotted the meeting in which the draft
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was presented. Both JUI and JI leaders met with Prime Minister Chaudhry Muhammad
‘Ali and Law Minister Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigar to lobby for their position and urge
the scrapping of the committee’s allegedly “un-Islamic” constitution.73 The Deobandi
JUI and Deobandi-leaning JI thus worked together in this regard, conspicuously absent
any (Barelvi) JUP assistance.
The (mostly Deobandi) ‘alәma demands resulted in the committee’s abandoning of
the constitution draft. Between November and December, that body worked on a new
draft—as the ‘alәma parties’ agitation for an Islamic constitution reached a new height.
“Hardly any day passed without a meeting being organized to voice the demand,” wrote
one Pakistani scholar. The JUI and JI, and separately the JUP, led the charge. From
19-25 December, the JUI observed “Constitution Week,” their demands enunciated in
public meetings and during sermons in thousands of mosques across the country. On
the occasion of the JI’s annual conference on 22 November in Karachi, the party
demanded specifically that not only should the Objectives Resolution and the Islamic
provisions from the old constitutional drafts be incorporated into the new one, but also
that the amendments formulated during the January 1953 ‘alәma conference be made
effective, too. The JI conference additionally warned the state’s leadership that a secular
constitution would tear Pakistan apart—that the only thing holding the eastern and
western zones together was Islam. To the Barelvis, the situation appeared as a second
chance to get the constitution of Pakistan right—meaning the document would
recognize them as the country’s Sunni majority and their leaders as the spiritual guides
of said majority. As such, a “Sunni” conference was held from 11-12 December in
Lahore, led by the JUP and dubbed the “All-Pakistani Sunni Conference,” a name
hailing back to the organization’s pre-Partition days as the All-India Sunni Conference.
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The Barelvi ‘alәma at the gathering produced a three-pointed resolution, demanding (1)
that the consitution be “Islamic” in “character,” (2) that the head of state “must be a
Muslim,” and (3) that Hanafi fyqħ be declared “state law.”74 Islamic state meant Islamic
state, not some pseudo-Islamic-Western fusion. The conference warned the
constitution-drafting committee that the Pakistani people would not accept a secular
constitution.75
The Barelvi conference ended about a month before a new draft of the proposed
constitution was presented (in January 1956) before the new constituent assembly for its
approval. As deliberations in that body were underway, yet another ‘alәma conference
took place in Dhaka—a mixed-sect affair like the previous assemblies in Karachi and
Lahore—on 8 February 1956. Participants included representatives from the Deobandi
JUI, the Barelvi JUP, the JI, and the NIP.76 The conference aimed to formulate
amendment proposals for the new constitution. Most of the proposals put forth by the
various parties assembled were adopted, and their resolutions presented to members of
the constituent assembly for consideration. When Prime Minister Choudhary
Muhammad ‘Ali finally introduced the draft constitution on 9 January 1956, several of
the provisions suggested by this conference had been incorporated into Pakistan’s
supreme governing document. Indeed, the new constitution draft (to the relief of many
of the ‘alәma) seemed to have met most of their long-fought-for demands, and was thus
“welcomed by the religious-political parties and their leaders.” Leaders of the JUI and
the JI generally praised the new constitution. The document fulfilled “the requirements
of Islam as well as democracy to a considerable extent,” said Mawdudi on the occasion,
while Ihtisham ul-Haq added that it was “commendable on the whole.” Such
sentiments, while mostly positive, obviously betrayed a sense that the constitution was
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far from perfect, however acceptable it might be. Still, it was “Islamic” enough. On the
other hand, the Barelvi leadership of the JUP demanded more; though the party sent a
twelve-man delegation to personally congratulate the Prime Minister on the draft, it
also sent a memorandum suggesting amendments, including a proposition that Arabic
be Pakistan’s official language, that a Religious Affairs Ministry be formed, and that an
‘alәma board to vet legislation according to its Islamic soundness be created.77 Once
again, the JUI and the JI seemed to be on the same page politically, while the Barelvi
JUP took a somewhat different approach.
Within days, however, the JUI and the JI, unwilling to be left out of amendment
negotiations, adopted the Barelvi call for still more constitutional alterations. Soon a
list of seventeen proposed amendments, formulated jointly by five different religious
parties (the JUI, the JI, the NIP, the JUP, and the West Pakistan Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis),
was produced, reiterated, and backed by a resolution passed during a massive ‘alәma
(and pir) conference in Dhaka on 8 February. The conference added some additional
amendments to those seventeen already proposed, including a demand that Pakistan’s
head of state be a Muslim, Pakistan’s official name be “the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,”
and East Bengal be officially called “East Pakistan.” Apart from this resolution, the
conference organized a committee (called the All-Parties Islamic Constitution
Committee) with the purpose of spearheading the organization and observance of
“Constitution Days” throughout the month of February.78
The assembly formally adopted the constitution on 29 February, and the GovernorGeneral granted his official consent on 2 March. Generally speaking, the constitution
was “welcomed” by the ‘alәma, at least “as a first step.”79 The Objectives Resolution
served as the document’s preamble. The constitution included a provision requiring
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that the head of state be “a Muslim and at least 40 years of age” (and a “he,” if the
gendered pronoun was to be literally interpreted), and it officially bestowed upon the
state the name suggested by the ‘alәma conference: the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
The state’s “directive principles” included the strengthening of “bonds of unity among
Muslim countries”; the taking of “steps” to “enable the Muslims of Pakistan individually
and collectively to order their lives in accordance with” the Qur’an and the sunnәt; and
the prevention of gambling, prostitution, the use of “injurious drugs,” and the
recreational drinking of “alcoholic liquor.” The constitution’s “Islamic Provisions”
required that the President establish an “organization for Islamic research and
instruction” that would “assist in the reconstruction of a Muslim society on a truly
Islamic basis” (a revivalist sentiment if ever there was one, with clear Waliullahi
undertones). The provisions also called on the President to appoint a commission
whose purpose was to proffer advice on how best to implement “Islamic law.” Most
important of the “Islamic Provisions,” perhaps, was article 198—the “repugnancy
clause,” which stated that no law could be enacted “which is repugnant to the
Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah...” Interestingly, this
last was to be applied to each sect according to its specific understanding of the term “Quran
and Sunnah.” The document tasked provincial government with the administration of
Islamic tax systems, including zәkat, as well as the overseeing of Islamic “charitable”
(i.e. mosque- and wәqf-centered) giving. The state, then, was to be an active, coercive
means of enforcing Islamic moral standards.
Exactly three weeks after the Governor-General granted his official consent, the
new constitution went into force—on 23 March, the same day, according to the
Gregorian calendar, upon which the pivotal Lahore Resolution had been passed sixteen
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years before.

Distractions from Constitution-Making.
Of course, the near-decade of Pakistan’s first go-around at constitution-making
didn’t occur in a vacuum; several events temporarily distracted the parties involved.
Often the Deobandi and Barelvi parties played an active role in the development of these
phenomena, at times seemingly united in purpose but virtually always separate in
organization and action. Besides the riots against Hindus and Sikhs in the Pakistani
Punjab (a reaction to similar riots targeting Muslims in Indian Punjab), there was the
fight over Kashmir (over which, though full-scale war was avoided, significant military
action on both sides did occur); the constant tug-of-war between Pakistan’s eastern and
western wings (including the Urdu-Bengali language controversy); the refugee problem
(twelve million people had, after all, migrated either to Pakistan or India at the time of
Partition, a phenomenon that some describe as “the largest transfer of population in
recorded history”);80 the death of the unifying figure of Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah; the
death of Pakistan’s official shix ul-yslam and Deobandi great Shabbir Ahmad Usmani;
violent anti-Ahmadi riots in Lahore and elswhere (resulting in the deaths of hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of Ahmadis and the ouster of a Prime Minister); and constitutionally
ambivalent changes in government (like the assassination of Liaquat ‘Ali Khan, the
removal of Khwaja Nazimuddin from office, and the “constitutional coup” of Ghulam
Muhammad) all combined to steal attention away from the process of formulating a
constitution.
Pakistan’s first war with India over Kashmir (1948) naturally “strained the internal
political situation,” as some of the country’s more militant generals argued with some of
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the country’s more pacifist politicians over what course of action should be pursued.81
With the British withdrawal, Jammu and Kashmir maharaja Hari Singh had failed to
declare his polity part of India or Pakistan, vainly hoping that the princely state might
remain independent. Since the majority of Kashmir’s population was Muslim (but
despite large Hindu, Sikh, and Buddhist minorities), the Pakistani government began
(unofficially) organizing local fighters and volunteers—with regular Pakistani soldiers
mixed in—mostly from the NWFP. Their mission: to invade Kashmir and possess it for
Pakistan. The princely state’s local defense forces gave way rather quickly to these
assailants from the west. This development quite naturally led Hari Singh to hastily
opt for union with India—which abruptly gave the Indian government the green light
to send troops to defend the state from its Pakistani invaders; Indian troops were
immediately airlifted into Kashmir, soon thereafter halting the Pakistani advance. By
the end of 1947, the invasion had mostly subsided, and over the following months
Indian troops won back much of the temporarily conquered territory, until a cease-fire
was called on 31 December 1948. Each side lost around one thousand five hundred
killed; Pakistan ended up with a chunk of western Kashmiri territory (now Azad—or
“free”—Kashmir) while India secured the rest, including the Srinigar valley.
Throughout the conflict, marked at home by “a contest of abuse in the Press and on
the radio and in political speeches,” the religious parties in Pakistan weighed in, too.82
Some Muslim leaders were offended by Liaquat ‘Ali Khan’s seemingly non-violent
strategy, interpreting it as weakness on his part—a weakness that reflected badly on
Pakistan as a nation and Muslims as a people.83 The Barelvis were particularly militant
in this regard, and the 1948 Kashmir War proved to be a stimulant for the JUP to shore
up its organization across West Pakistan. Partly at the insistence of Naimuddin
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Moradabadi and Mustapha Riza Khan, who together visited Lahore in March 1948, new
branches of the party were inaugurated across the country (though especially in the
Punjab) as the organization was tested with its first large-scale challenge of organizing
for a cause. (One of these was the Sindh and Karachi branch of the party, opened in
January 1949 and headed by one Abdul Hamid Badayuni). Led by their ‘alәma, the
Barelvis collected food and distributed it to military and volunteer forces in Kashmir,
provided other relief for jyhadis and refugees in the high mountain region, and strove to
“invoke the spirit of jyhad” within Pakistan’s military units stationed there. The JUP
additionally organized and observed a countrywide “Day of Kashmir” (15 April 1949)
and a “Day of Pakistan” (14 August 1950) to force attention onto the issue and their
demand for “a free and fair plebiscite.” (A U.N. commission had called for a plebiscite
soon after the original cease-fire, a future measure ostensibly agreed upon by both the
Indian and Pakistani governments. But negotiations broke down after this initial
“agreement,” and the Nehru regime, not eager to have Kashmir’s eighty-percentMuslim population vote between India and Pakistan, “[did his] best to delay
negotiations.” Eventually India rejected a plebiscite altogether, as Nehru declared,
“Kashmir must form part of India.”)84 A fәtwa was released, too, authored by JUP
president Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri and other noted “Sunni” scholars, declaring jyhad
in Kashmir.
But some other religious scholars, notably Abul Ala Mawdudi, had condemned the
use of the term “jyhad” in the case of the Kashmir War (since the national government
had “hypocritically” characterized the fight as a jyhad to the paramilitary fighters it
unofficially supported while officially observing a cease-fire with India; jyhad, Mawdudi
and others argued, must be declared openly by the government for it to be justified and
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correct),85 but the Barelvi fәtwa denounced such points-of-view. The fight for Kashmir,
they insisted, was absolutely a holy war for Islam.86 For his part, Mawdudi was thrown
in prison by the Pakistani government for alleged “sedition.” Meanwhile, many
Deobandis, too, supported or were active participants in the “sacred jyhad” in Kashmir.
They generally saw the intervention of “the non-Muslim world powers” in the form of
the United Nations as a “cunning” move to prevent the imminent takeover of Kashmir
by the mujahydin. The Deobandis tended to possess a more universal jyhadi mentality,
too; for example, Muhammad Rafi remembers, as a boy, playing only those games
“which could be useful in jyhad”—like horseback riding, the long jump, and the high
jump. (He even avoided hot water, either for ablution or bathing, as it might
declimatize him from conditions at some future front.) The Deobandi penchant for
macro-jyhad (as opposed to regional or local conflict) would gain added significance
later, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.87 Still, this Deobandi proclivity was
illustrated around this same time when JUI officials met with the leaders of several
other Muslim states—including Egypt (whose ambassador described the liberation of
Kashmir as “as dear as the freedom of the Nile”), Syria, and Saudi Arabia—to obtain
support over Kashmir.88
The refugee issue loomed large as well. Most of the more than six million refugees
(some say eight million)89 who flooded into Pakistan wound up in the Punjab; indeed,
the state’s population numbered around 1.7 million more than it had before the great
schism, and this unprecedented increase had to be dealt with if it wasn’t to spiral into a
serious law-and-order situation. Meanwhile, Karachi had been flooded with refugees
from Delhi—hundreds of thousands of them—and tensions in the city between its
original inhabitants and the newcoming influx ran high.90 There would be serious
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ramifications for this phenomenon in the future, as the mostly Barelvi, Urdu-speaking
refugees from north-central India (and, later, their children) clashed with local Sindhis
and the mostly Deobandi Pathans, the latter pouring into the city from the 1970s. To
combat these forces and ostensibly to protect their own rights, the Urdu-speakers
organized politically (about which more later), with serious (and often bloody)
consequences for the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry.
The “sudden” 11 September 1948 death of Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad ‘Ali
Jinnah (who’d long been keeping his debilitated condition—and terminal diagnosis—a
secret), opened a floodgate that naught but the qayd-e-ә‘ažәm’s towering personality
could have held strong (though historians can only speculate as to how long even that
might have lasted). As was touched upon previously, a furious jostling for power took
place almost immediately afterwards, as various parties and their leaders vied for
position. The religious parties were certainly not exempt from this power struggle.
Liaquat ‘Ali Khan, a close personal friend of Jinnah and one who had worked at the
qayd-e-ә‘ažәm’s side for years before Partition, commanded some respect as Prime
Minister (concurrent for years with other positions, including Minister of Defense, from
August 1947 to October 1951, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, from August 1947 to
December 1949). But on 16 October 1951, while addressing a meeting in a Rawalpindi
park, an Afghan assassin shot Liaqat ‘Ali twice in the chest. Though the killer’s motives
remain, many decades later, somewhat of a mystery, scholars speculate that it may have
had something to do with his “soft” solution to the Kashmir war—unpopular especially
among the religious parties—as well as his negotiations with Jawaharlal Nehru of India
over the resettlement and treatment of refugees and religious minorities in the two
countries. Evidently some of the ‘alәma even pointed to Liaqat ‘Ali Khan’s wife’s
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apparent reluctance to observe purdәħ.91 The assassin himself was reportedly a Pathan
“ultra-nationalist” and may have carried out the deed in the hope that a “united
Pakhtunistan” might result.92 The official report of the “Commission on the
Assassination of Mr. Liaquat ‘Ali Khan,” issued ten months after the killing, found only
that “it had not been possible definitely to decide whether the assassin…had acted as an
individual or as the agent of a conspiracy.”93 Whatever the true motive of the murderer,
the assassination of Pakistan’s first Prime Minister has been attributed—again, without
hard evidence—to such frustrations and differences in religious interpretation. If
nothing else, the tragic event may have shored up the position of the ‘alәma, whether or
not they were to blame at all—a sort of warning to those who would transgress the
order propagated by the Islamic scholars and their parties.
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani died in December 1949. The passing of the great ‘alym was
a blow for the Deobandi school’s position as the dominant one in government, as no
other Deobandi leader in Pakistan then commanded the sort of respect and adoration
that Shabbir Ahmad had. Of course, the Barelvi leadership naturally felt that one of
their own should assume the official mantle of shix ul-yslam; it was rumored that perhaps
xәwajәħ Muhammad Qamarruddin Sialvi (d. 1981 AD) would be given the nod in this
regard. JUP leaders were “confident,” in fact, that something like this would, in fact,
take place—that the “Sunni” ‘alәma might finally be given their due. Muhammad
Qamarruddin Sialvi, a Sufi of the Chishti order and descendent of the famous
nineteenth-century Sufi saint xәwajәħ Shamsuddin Sialvi (known as “Pir Sial,” of whose
xanәqaħ one admirer has written that “the number of those associated [with it]…is
countless and [they] are spread throughout the country of Pakistan”),94 had studied in
Ajmer at the Madrasa ‘Uthmaniyya Dar al-Khayr under mwlana Muinuddin Ajmeri (a
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scion of the Khairabadi family) and then in Sial Sharif under mwlana Muhammad Din
Budhwi, another Khairabadi luminary. (As previously mentioned, the Khairabadi
family, from whom xәwajәħ Qamaruddin Sialvi received his religious instruction and
training, possessed strong connections to the Barelvi movement.) During pre-Partition
days the xәwajәħ had defied British rule, and as a consequence had spent time in prison.
He had also served as a local Muslim League leader (in Sargodha) and been among
those Barelvi mәshayx who had traveled to the NWFP in 1947 to help win the province
for the League in the run-up to the critical Frontier Referendum. But unfortunately for
the JUP and Pakistan’s Barelvi ‘alәma, and perhaps out of the fear of sparking a lowlevel sectarian war, the government opted not to bestow the coveted shix ul-yslam title
upon anyone; the name, at least as it was officially granted by the Pakistani state, would
die with Shabbir Ahmad Usmani.95 This did not, however, stop the Barelvis from later
addressing xәwajәħ Muhammad Qamaruddin Sialvi as “shix ul-yslam” anyway, a title he
would hold on to for the rest of his life. For the Deobandis’ part, Sulaiman Nadvi (about
whom more later) played the role of respected Deobandi ‘alym in an attempt to replace
Shabbir Ahmad, thereby restoring some of the party’s “country-wide influence.”96 But
Nadvi himself passed away in 1953 AD. At that point the mantle, though not nearly as
powerful as the one shouldered by Shabbir Ahmad, would be taken up by his erstwhile
right hand, Muhammad Shafi.
Muhammad Shafi was only the latest in a long line of scholars and teachers in his
family, stretching back on his father’s side at least to the late 1700s AD; and from his
mother he inherited a lineage allegedly going back to the Prophet himself. His greatgreat grandfather Karimullah, who had completely memorized the Qur’an and was thus
afforded the title hafyž, had been the first to establish himself in Deoband, allegedly after
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being unjustly dealt with at his previous residence by his Hindu neighbors.
Karimullah’s son, Imam ‘Ali—known by all as mian ji, meaning “schoolmaster”—was a
scholar of much renown in Deoband, where, it has been written, “there was not a house
but he had a student therein.” Imam ‘Ali also increased the family’s land holdings,
subsequently dividing them up between his five sons, most of whom were able to secure
government posts. One son, Tahsin ‘Ali, was not so lucky, however; poor eyesight
negated any possibility that he would find the kind of employment enjoyed by his
brothers, and eventually he was forced to sell some of his land inheritance just to make
ends meet. Still, Tahsin ‘Ali loved to learn—and he loved to teach. He transformed his
home into a virtual schoolroom, instructing his two sons in the memorization of the
Qur’an, Urdu, Farsi, and mathematics. One of his sons, Muhammad Yasin—born a year
before the founding of the dar ul’alwm at Deoband—showed especially great promise,
and Tahsin ‘Ali decided that his home school wasn’t enough. He thus enrolled him in
the new Muhammad Qasim-inspired mәdrәsәħ, hoping that Muhammad Yasin might
gain a religious education in the Arabic language. At the dar ul’alwm, Muhammad
Yasin labored under some of the great founding Deobandi fathers, eventually learning
at the feet of the school’s first student and eventual leader, Mahmud Hasan himself.
Muhammad Yasin had three daughters and two sons; one of his sons died young,
leaving him one male heir: Muhammad Shafi, the future “Grand Mufti” of independent
Pakistan.97 As noted previously, Muhammad Shafi would join with his cousin, Shabbir
Ahmad Usmani, as a pro-Leaguer in the struggle for Pakistan. Now he was the man’s
political successor, opening up a new chapter in Deobandi politics.
On 18 May 1952, Pakistan Minister of Foreign Affairs and noted Ahmadi scholar
Muhammad Zafarullah Khan (d. 1985 AD) delivered a speech at Karachi’s Jahangir
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Park. The occasion, though public, had been organized by an association of Ahmadis—
members of perhaps the most generally deplored (and “heretical”) sect of Islam in South
Asia. Founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908 AD) of Qadiyan (and thus referred to
as the “Ahmadiyya” or “Qadiyyani” movement), the Ahmadis held that their version of
Islam was the one true variety, with Muhammad and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as true
prophets. The latter had claimed to be Muhammad reappeared—but also the Christian
savior, the Muslim mahdi, and even an incarnation of Krishna. (There is a split within
the Ahmadi community, dating back to 1914 AD and the post-Mirza Ghulam Ahmad
succession crisis, that revolves around the Ahmadi founder’s status—was he a prophet, a
messenger, or simply an inspired guide? A Lahore-based group, originally led by
Ahmad’s son, rejected Mirza Ghulam’s claims of prophethood, while the other group,
based at first in Qadian and then in Rabwah in the Punjab, continued to revere Ahmad
as a prophet). In any case, it was the Ahmadis’ alleged claim that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad
was a post-Muhammad prophet (this despite the generally held Muslim belief that
Muhammad was the “Seal” or “End” of the prophets [xәtәm-e-nәbәwwәt], meaning none
would come after him) that stoked the most ire among other Muslims. (There was also
a widespread belief, however unfounded, that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had been a British
agent and the Ahmadi movement a British-designed creation “for fulfilling their own
political ends.”)98 Then-Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin had reportedly attempted
to dissuade Zafarullah Khan, as a member of his cabinet, from speaking at a “sectional”
meeting, but the Foreign Affairs Minister was adamant that he attend. Amidst efforts
by anti-Ahmadi demonstrators to disrupt the meeting, Zafarullah Khan declared that
“Ahmadiyyat was a plant implanted by God himself, that this plant had taken root to
provide a guarantee for the preservation of Islam in fulfillment of the promise contained
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in the Qur’an, that if this plant were removed, Islam would no longer be a live religion
but would be like a dried-up tree having no demonstrable superiority over other
religions.” According to the official report of the Court of Inquiry, set up after the
violence that would ensue, this meeting—and these sentiments—“provided occasion for
riots in Karachi.”99 Within the socio-political context of 1953 AD Pakistan—food
shortages going on several years that “created want and unrest among the impoverished
masses,” economic controls by government that stifled business, and, according to
Pakistan visitor and erstwhile U.S. presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, “extremist
mullahs…[who] have fanned discontent for political ends”—perhaps it was just a
matter of time before a spark ignited the lake of gasoline.100 Incidentally, Chaudhri
Zafarullah Khan was no stranger to persecution from fellow Muslims—and even,
specifically, the Deobandi-leaning Majlis-e-Ahrar. As far back as December 1931 AD,
when he served as president of that year’s All-India Muslim League conference in Delhi,
the Congress-supporting Ahrars had agitated against him, reportedly creating
“disorderly scenes” outside of the League conference. A procession was held, black flags
were waved, anti-Ahmadi speeches were delivered at the Jama Masjid, and a “mob
prevented the League from assembling in accordance with its program.” The AIML
blamed the demonstrations on the Congress, who had “engineered” the agitation
“among uneducated Moslems.”101 Now, twenty-two years later, the same outfit—the
Majlis-e-Ahrar—was agitating against the same man. This time, however, there would
be blood.
Immediately the ‘alәma of the usually feuding sects—including both Deobandi and
Barelvi scholars—banded together to stamp out the Ahmadi “menace” once and for all,
forming the Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabawat (tehrik-e-tәhәffuž-e-xәtәm-e341

nәbәwwәt, or “Movement for the Safeguarding of the End of the Prophets”). The
organization was created to defend Muhammad’s place as the last of the prophets—and
to strike down all notions that any other prophet, including the “heretic” Mirza Ghulam
Ahmad, could have come after him. The Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabawat made
three official demands to the Pakistani government: (1) that Ahmadis be officially
declared a “non-Muslim minority,” (2) that Zafarullah Khan be removed from office
forthwith, and (3) that all other Ahmadis be fired from important government positions,
too. The three demands were officially presented at an All-Pakistan Muslim Parties
conference in Karachi in July. The conference appointed a committee, tasked to put
pressure on the government to meet their requests. With their demands formulated,
the mostly Barelvi and Deobandi Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabawat leadership
stood divided on how best to agitate for those demands to be met. One section of the
organization favored a constitutional approach and the avoidance of “direct measures”
(rast yqdam); one of those favoring such a legal approach was JUP leader “Abul Hasanat”
Qadiri. But the Ahrars, who had long been engaged, under the leadership of Deobandi
clerics like Habibur Rehman Ludhianvi, in anti-Ahmadi campaigning, and now at the
urging of great Deobandi scholar-leaders like Ataullah Shah Bukhari, went into action
mode, stirring the rest of the Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabawat to just such
“direct measures.” Mawdudi’s JI as well as the JUI did much the same. (Both the
Ahrars and the JUI had supported the Pakistan Muslim League in the 1951 AD
provincial elections in Punjab; the League won a majority of the available seats—and
some scholars speculate that perhaps it was this victory that emboldened the Ahrars and
others to now act on their long-held anti-Ahmadi sentiments.) Despite Qadiri’s
reservations, most of the JUP would come on board the Ahrar-, JUI-, and JI-inspired
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“direct measures” bandwagon, especially after numerous attempts to gain assurances
from Khwaja Nazimuddin, as well as provincial leaders, that their demands be met
ended in disappointment. The committee appointed by the All-Pakistan Muslim Parties
conference to “pressure” the government thus officially called for “direct measures,” and
furthermore threw down the gauntlet, so to speak, at the feet of the Prime Minister—in
the form of an ultimatum granting him one month to comply with the ‘alәma
demands.102 On 26 February 1953, nine months after Zafarullah Khan’s speech, at a
meeting over which Qadiri himself presided, the Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-eNabawat adopted “direct measures” as the movement’s official policy. Upon receiving
the news of the ‘alәma group’s decision, and guessing its intentions, the government
descended upon its leadership in full force, arresting many of its guiding lights,
including (perhaps ironically) Qadiri, Abdul Hamid Badayuni, and JUP vice-president
Abdul Ghafoor Hazarvi. Perhaps more than anything else, the arrests sparked violent
riots across the Punjab (and especially in its urban centers) throughout the month of
March. Martial law was imposed on Lahore from 6 March. Much Ahmadi property and
some of the group’s mosques were destroyed, and anywhere from two hundred to two
thousand Ahmadis lost their lives as targets of the rioters.103 The chaos was so
widespread and its perpetrators so determined that martial law didn’t end in Lahore
until mid-May. The government blamed the ‘alәma for the riots, and Qadiri’s own son,
mwlana Khalil Ahmad Qadiri, was among those sentenced to death by hanging.104 In
all, five ‘alәma were sentenced to death by martial law courts for their involvement in
the violence. (These sentences would be commuted later to life in prison; all of the
‘alәma thus convicted were subsequently released in 1955 AD.) Mawdudi was
sentenced to death, too, for his “connexion with the anti-Ahmadiya agitation in Punjab,”
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sparking protest in Karachi, where “most” shops remained closed in a demonstration of
solidarity with the JI chief. Protests were also held across the city; proclaimed one press
notice issued by Karachi chief commissioner A. T. Naqui, “Demonstrators at certain
places indulged in acts of hooliganism.” On 13 May, the death sentence on Mawdudi
was commuted to “14 years rigorous imprisonment.”105 The rapid communting of
Mawdudi’s, Khalil Ahmad’s, and the others’ sentences illustrates the perceived political
power of the ‘alәma-supporting religious element in Pakistani society, at least at the
time. (One reporter, writing fifteen years later, described the religious clerics’ power
thus: “The daily prayer meetings in more than 10,000 mosques provide [the ‘alәma]
with a political platform that overshadows any party machine.”)106 The anti-Ahmadi
riots of 1953 stand out as a rare example of joint Deobandi-Barelvi action.
It should be noted, however, that the anti-Ahmadi agitation was not launched
without reservation on the part of some of the Islamic scholars (like that of “Abul
Hasanat” Qadiri)—and even outright opposition, especially among a segment of the
Barelvi spiritual leadership. For example, after Naimuddin Moradabadi disciple
Muhammad Hussain Naeemi participated “very actively” in the agitation, the
administrators of the (Barelvi) mәdrәsәh in which he taught actually asked him to leave.
“You are in politics,” they argued, complaining that his focus had fallen outside the
bounds of religion—and demonstrating disagreement among a segment of Barelvis over
the methods adopted by the xәtәm-i-nәbәwwәt movement. On the contrary, Muhammad
Hussain countered, “involvement in xәtәm-i-nәbәwwәt is not a political matter, it is a
religious matter.” (This original accusation leveled against Muhammad Hussain—that
he was “in politics”—turned out to be undeniably true, as he continued to actively
participate in and support the JUP.) In the end Muhammad Hussain Naeemi left the
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seminary, only to found one of the most prominent Barelvi schools in all of Pakistan:
Jamia Naeema in Lahore. But his experience illustrates the disunity amongst the
Barelvi religious leadership over the events of 1953.107
Almost immediately after the riots had diminished, the Pakistani government
launched a formal inquiry into their root causes (as well as the effectiveness, or lack
thereof, of the state’s response). The Court of Inquiry’s (nearly four-hundred-page)
report, presented in April 1954 and entitled “Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted
under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953” (but
popularly known as the “Munir Report” after the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court
and president of the inquiry committee, Muhammad Munir), came down hard upon the
‘alәma, mincing no words in its condemnation of the clerics or of their varying and often
contradictory conceptions of an Islamic state. The report began by quoting Jinnah’s 11
August 1947 speech to the newly formed constituent assembly of Pakistan (“You may
belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the
State,” to cries of “Hear, hear!”). “We asked the ulama whether this conception of a State
was acceptable to them,” the report’s authors wrote, “and every one of them replied in
an unhesitating negative…” Since the passage of the Objectives Resolution, the Muslim
scholars contended, Jinnah’s “conception of a modern national State” had become
“obsolete.” But, the report asked bluntly, “[w]hat is then the Islamic State of which
everybody talks but nobody thinks?” The report lambasted the ‘alәma for being
“hopelessly disagreed among themselves” about even fundamental questions like “What
is a Muslim?” and “What is Islam?” Among other definitions, Deobandi mwlana Ahmad
‘Ali Lahori, head of the JUI in West Pakistan, defined a Muslim as “A person…[who]
believes (1) in the Qur’an and (2) what has been said by the prophet. Any person who
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possesses these two qualifications is entitled to be called a Muslim, without his being
required to believe in anything more or to do anything more.” The definition of Barelvi
and JUP head Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri differed in several respects: “He must believe
in the unity of God,” “He must believe in the prophet of Islam to be a true prophet, as
well as in all other prophets who have preceded him,” “He must believe in the Holy
Prophet of Islam as the last of the prophets,” “He must believe in the Qur’an as it was
revealed by God to the Holy Prophet of Islam,” and “He must believe in the resurrection
[qiamәt].” Interestingly, Qadiri failed to mention many of the criteria listed as
requirements for membership of both the JUP and the old AISC. Such demonstrations,
of course, implicitly underscored a complete incapacity on the scholars’ part to
formulate a workable framework for an Islamic state straddling the subcontinent and
composed of a diverse group of ethnicities, languages, and geographies; if a simple
definition of a “Muslim” could not be agreed upon, how could a constitution be
produced? “Keeping in view the several definitions given by the ulama,” the report’s
authors queried, “need we make any comment except that no two learned divines are
agreed on this fundamental?

If we attempt our own definition, as each learned divine has done, and
that definition differs from that given by all others, we unanimously go
out of the fold is Islam. And if we adopt the definition given by any one
of the ulama, we remain Muslims according to the view of that [‘alym],
but kafirs according to the definition of everyone else.
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The report further criticized the ‘alәma for their positions vis-à-vis apostasy—or, more
particularly, their “practically unanimous” position that within an Islamic state apostasy
deserves the death penalty. But who was an apostate? The Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry
was brought into sharp relief by the report’s findings in this regard:

According to this doctrine, Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan, if he has not
inherited his present religious beliefs but has voluntarily elected to be an
Ahmadi, must be put to death. And the same fate should befall Deobandis
and Wahhabis, including Maulana Muhammad Shafi Deobandi, Member,
Board of Talimat-e-Islami attached to the constituent assembly of
Pakistan, and Maulana Daud Ghaznavi, if Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyad
Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri, or Mirza Raza Ahmad Khan Barelvi, or any
one of the numerous ulama who are shown perched on every leaf of a
beautiful tree in the fatwa, Exhibit D. E. 14, were the head of such Islamic
State.
And if Maulana Muhammad Shafi Deobandi were the head of the State,
he would exclude those who have pronounced Deobandis as kafirs from
the pale of Islam and inflict on them the death penalty if they come
within the definition of murtad, namely, if they have changed and not
inherited their religious views.

Clearly, the conclusion of the report’s authors was far from complimentary to the
‘alәma, whether Deobandi, Barelvi, or of any other stripe. “The net result of all this,”
the report concluded, “is that neither Shias nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-e-Hadis
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nor Barelvis are Muslims, and any change from one view to the other must be
accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death, if the Government of the
State is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be kafirs.” Then:
“And it does not require much imagination to judge of the consequences of this doctrine,
when it is remembered that no two ulama have agreed before us as to the definition of a
Muslim.”108
Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to say that, after issuance of the Munir Report
(ever thereafter “an intellectual weapon in the hands of those who wanted to deride the
concept of an Islamic state”),109 the power of the ‘alәma to influence politics was never
quite the same again. Indeed, one Pakistani scholar would conclude just that:
“Squabbling over the constitutional status of the Ahmadis, the religious parties frittered
away much of the advantage they had gained since November 1950.”110 From this point
on, the issue of Pakistan as an Islamic state faded into the background, at least for a
time.
One of the other side effects hemorrhaged by the anti-Ahmadi riots was the
“bureaucratic-military coup” that booted Khwaja Nazimuddin out of office. The action
took place on 17 April 1953, and was probably brought on by the Prime Minister’s
decision, amidst tight financial circumstances, to cut the defense budge by one-third, a
move Pakistan’s military leaders were loathe to embrace. The Governor-General could
cite any number of issues plaguing the state under Khwaja Nazimuddin’s leadership as
justification for his decision, including the growing schism within the Pakistan Muslim
League between the party’s East Bengal and West Pakistan branches, the related
intensification of the Urdu-Bengali language issue (and, subsequently, the death in
Bengal of demonstrators at the hands of police)—and the violent anti-Ahmadi unrest
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then rocking Punjab.111 Invoking section 10 of the Government of India Act, Ghulam
Muhammad removed Nazimuddin and his cabinet from office, despite their initial
resistance. (Nazimuddin’s replacement: Muhammad ‘Ali Bogra, a Bengali like his
predecessor and a former Pakistani ambassador to Burma, Canada, and the United
States.) Of course, as aforementioned, just one-and-a-half years later Ghulam
Muhammad would be at it again, dissolving the consitutuent assembly before it could
adopt a constitution restricting his powers and forming a new, military-heavy cabinet.
By inciting, in various degrees, the 1953 riots, the ‘alәma parties had thus played a
significant role not only in the violence that followed, and not only in getting Khwaja
Nazimuddin dismissed as Prime Minister, but also in ushering in what would become
Pakistan’s long cycle of coups by the bureaucracy-military establishment.
The Ahmadi riots also gave the opponents of an Islamic constitution a chance to
launch an anti-‘alәma backlash. High-powered politicians like former PML president
and governor of East Bengal Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, new Punjab governor Piroz
Khan Noon, and NWFP chief minister Sardar Abdur Rashid launched a campaign for a
purely secular constitution. This was in line, they argued, with what Muhammad ‘Ali
Jinnah had envisioned for Pakistan in the first place. New Prime Minister Muhammad
‘Ali Bogra got into the game, too, almost immediately attempting to derail the passage
of any Islamic constitution by introducing an “interim constitution” devoid of the
Nazimuddin Report’s Islamic provisions. The JUI, in particular, came out strongly
against the Prime Minister’s move, and in a joint statement with the JI, the board of
talimat-e-yslamiәħ, and some constituent assembly members, characterized Bogra’s
efforts as a “clear deviation” from the legal path heretofore trod by the constituent
assembly. The JUI subsequently organized and hosted a conference, attended by a
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variety of religious parties; the gathering condemned the secular constitution in a joint
resolution on 28 September 1953, with support from a segment of PML members.
Under this intense pressure, then, Prime Minister Bogra’s “interim constitution” idea
was scrapped.112
The spirit of jyhad was inflamed again in 1953 during the Suez Canal crisis, when
Israel, Britain, and France squared off against Egypt for control over the great
waterway linking the Mediterranean with the Red Sea. According to one Deobandi
‘alym, “every child in Pakistan was eager to help the brotherly country of Egypt” as
events unfolded in the Middle East. The dar ul’alwm in Karachi actually chartered a
plane to transport students, “restless to take part in the jihad,” to Egypt. The school
additionally organized classes on “civil defense” and first aid with the jyhad in mind. But
Nasser quickly restricted Pakistanis’ travel to Egypt; Deobandis attributed this to the
Egyptian leader’s being stricken with “the Arab nationalism malady,” something with
which many Arab heads of state would be “afflicted.” The sad result of this spiritually
degraded leadership, reasoned Deobandi mufti Muhammad Rafi Usmani, was the
subsequent Arab loss of control over the Gulf of Aqaba, much of the Sinai desert, the
Golan Heights, and Jerusalem.113
Right from the start, representatives of the majority Bengali population, whose
people might have seemed quietly tucked away thousands of miles across India (and far
from Karachi) in East Bengal, found cause to worry that, despite their constiuents’
numbers, they would ultimately be left holding the proverbial short end of the stick.
This anxiety was only exacerbated by the seemingly ever-present Urdu-Bengali
language controversy. The constitutional deadlock between East Bengal and West
Pakistan was finally, if temporarily, overcome with the introduction of the “Muhammad
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‘Ali Formula” (having been introduced by Muhammad ‘Ali Bogra after becoming Prime
Minister). The “Formula,” placed before the constituent assembly in October 1953,
granted equal representation to each unit in the House of Units—thereby placating
those units in the west (particularly Punjab) who were demanding equal representation
within a federal system—but population-proportioned representation to each unit in the
House of the People. This last made the deal acceptable to the Bengalis, whose
population outnumbered that of all the other units combined. Thus in the upper house,
both Punjab and East Bengal were to enjoy ten votes, but in the lower house the latter
would have one hundred sixty-five seats to the former’s seventy-five. Both houses were
to enjoy equal powers (this had been another bone of contention), and in joint sessions
(where the more controversial issues were likely to end up) both zones would have the
same number of seats (one hundred seventy-five). As for the language issue, in May
1954 the constituent assembly adopted a measure declaring that Pakistan’s official
languages should be both Urdu and Bengali—but also that “the state should take all
measures for the development and growth of a [i.e. one] common national language”
(italics added). This measure could only be a temporary fix, of course, since it still
foresaw the adoption of a single national language at some point in the future. “It was
clear,” wrote one legal commentator, “from the day of its adoption that the formula
could satisy no one.”114 The ‘alәma and their parties were affected by the East-West
quarrel, too. The JUP was always far more active as an organized party in West
Pakistan, though plenty of “Sunnis” lived and labored politically in the eastern zone. To
facilitate the different positions and perceived needs of the Bengalis, the JUI actually
spawned a new party: the aforementioned NIP. (Even the Pakistan Muslim League had
split based on zone, the PML in the west and the Awami Muslim League, also called the
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“Awami League,” in Bengal; the latter would eventually lead the charge against
Pakistan’s central government that would result in the emergence of an independent
Bangladesh). Both Deobandis and Barelvis used the divergence between Pakistan’s two
wings to emphasize the need for an Islamic political framework. After all, they
reasoned, striving to unite East Bengal and West Pakistan—two geographical entities
separated not only by thousands of miles but also by ethnicity, language, culture,
political philosophy, and history—would be all but impossible via some secular
constitution. Only Islam—the one thing binding east and west—could hold the country
together. It was thus incumbent upon those formulating a constitution and those
leading the country to make sure that this one, single uniting force be fused into the
very fabric of the state. Without it, an eventual east-west schism was inevitable. As for
the language issue, some of the Islamic scholars suggested making Arabic the country’s
official national tongue, in part to avoid official preference of either Urdu or Bengali.

“Secularist” Patron of pirs: the Ayub Khan Years.
The JUI reaction to the new (1956) constitution was perhaps predictable, given
what had become the ‘alәma parties’ typical response to constitution drafts and reports.
In December of 1956, this group produced a set of proposed amendments to the
document. The ‘alәma hoped that, given the apparent flexibility of the new constitution,
they would be able to transform it into the “Islamic constitution” that had been their
goal from the beginning. But it soon became obvious that what Islamic provisions were
there had only been included to placate the Islamic scholars and their followers; “those
in power were not serious about implementing…the Islamic provisions of the
Constitution.” Iskander Mirza, who had earlier warned the ‘alәma to stay out of politics
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or face “trouble,” was particularly reluctant to acknowledge—let alone enforce—any of
the ‘alәma demands.115
Absent from the 1956 constitution, too, was any provision stipulating either joint or
separate electorates. This had, of course, been one of the most contentious communal
issues plaguing the political scene during pre-Partition days. Evidently the matter was
to be left up to future provincial and federal legislatures; the decision not to specify one
or the other was probably calculated to get the constitution passed, as the issue of
electorates was so divisive that partisans of one or the other system might have stalled
the constitution’s adoption. Now a decision regarding electorates had to be made. Most
of the ‘alәma took the position of Mawdudi: that separate electorates were absolutely
necessary in order to protect Muslims from Hindu political usurpation. After all, the
call for joint electorates had originated with the Hindus, and after independence it was
the Hindu parties who had carried on the demand within Pakistan. Mawdudi estimated
that in a joint electorate system, Hindus could control, either directly or indirectly, up
to one hundred forty-two of the East Pakistan assembly’s three hundred nine seats, as
opposed to the seventy allotted to them there under a separate electorates system. The
politically active Deobandi and Barelvi religious leadership came down in strong favor
of separate electorates. (For their part, the advocates of a joint electorates system
argued that, among other things, separate electorates would only engender
communalism.) The final decision was to be made in sessions of the East and West
Pakistan provincial assemblies, and then in the National Assembly.
In West Pakistan, the vote came down (August 1956) in favor of separate
electorates. But in East Pakistan—despite the efforts of a joint “emergency committee”
including delegates from the JUI, the JI, the JUP, as well as the PML, all dispatched to
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Dhaka to lobby for separate electorates—joint electorates won the day (early October).
This presented a somewhat delicate situation for the National Assembly, which was
scheduled to meet in Dhaka, too. Finally, the assembly adopted an unweildy Iskander
Mirza-formulated system, one that attempted to please all parties. Under Mirza’s plan,
the West was granted separate electorates and the East was granted joint electorates.
The system failed, of course, to address the ‘alәma’s primary concern: that Hindus in
East Pakistan would be able to manipulate a joint electorates system to the disadvantage
of the Muslim population. But in the end, the Islamic scholars and their parties were
defeated; joint electorates were adopted in both wings of the country in August 1957.
Having lost the electorates debate, the ‘alәma parties turned their focus on the
upcoming general elections. If they could no longer influence the parties in power (as
had been recently demonstrated in Dhaka), then they would contest them for real votes.
They would aim for direct power. Thus the JUI, the JUP, and the NIP (the latter in
alliance with the JI) all put forward their own candidates in the general elections.116
But none of these parties—or any of the others—ever got a chance to try their luck
in the elections; on 7 October 1956, Iskander Mirza, ever an enemy of the ‘alәmapoliticians (and politicians in general!) and eager to retain his position of power despite
the growing popularity of his political enemies, instituted Martial Law under General
Ayub Khan, dissolving both the federal and the provincial legislatures, dismissing their
respective ministries, and banning all political parties. To the ‘alәma, and especially those
of the Barelvi persuasion, Iskander Mirza was a panderer to the West, unappreciative of
the rich Muslim heritage and legacy. (Indeed, as one eyewitness remarked, “Iskander
Mirza’s pro-Americanism often embarrassed the Americans.”)117 Mirza envisioned a
Pakistan closely tied to the West, a prosperous, modern, secular state. On 27 October,
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however—three weeks after Iskander Mirza’s virtual government takeover—General
Ayub Khan carried out a bloodless military coup, removing Mirza (he was sent into
exile in Britain) and assuming for himself the responsibility of the state’s political head.
Pakistan’s inaugural constitution, “prepared,” in the words of one South Asian scholar,
“after tortuous labours of a succession of Prime Ministers and Presidents” over a period
of almost a decade, had lasted a mere two-and-a-half years.118 This “new” role for the
military seemed to fly in the face of Jinnah’s original vision for Pakistan; once, on 14
August 1947, the frail qayd-e-ә‘ažәm had approached two young military officers at a
reception in Karachi and reportedly admonished, “Never forget that you are servants of
the state. You do not make policy. It is we, the people’s representatives, who decide
how the country is to be run. Your job is only to obey the decisions of your civilian
masters.” (Ironically, one of the two officers being addressed was leftist Akbar Khan,
who, against this advice of Pakistan’s founder, would later become infamous as the
mastermind of the ultimately unsuccessful Soviet-backed “Rawalpindi Conspiracy” of
1951 to overthrow the government of Liaquat ‘Ali Khan).119
In the succinct words of Afzal, “The Martial Law regime of October 1956 was not
enthusiastic about religion.”120 Indeed, Ayub Khan assaulted the “Islamic” aspects of the
old constitution from a variety of angles. First, on 10 October he scratched out the
word “Islamic” altogether—that is, from the country’s official name (changing it from
the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” to the more succinct but far less religion-specific
“Republic of Pakistan”), then three days later disbanded the constitutionally mandated
commission that had been tasked with figuring out how to Islamize Pakistan’s current
legislation. The regime’s unfriendliness to the religious scholars was further
underscored when Muslim Leaguer and high-profile jurist Manzur Qadir (d. 1974 AD),
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Ayub Khan’s Foreign Minister from 1958-1962 (and a trusted advisor on domestic
affairs as well), embarked on a tour of the country to assess the reaction of the people to
the coup. Qadir identified Muslim sectarian division (“the existence of 72 sects among
the Muslims”) as the greatest hindrance to creating an “Islamic” constitution; he would
later head the committee to formulate the country’s new (1960) constitution himself.
(Qadir’s remark underscores the impact that the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic played—
and continues to play—in Pakistani politics, preventing as it does the nation’s two
largest sects from any hope of strong, united action.) Much like his Foreign Minister,
Ayub Khan saw the ‘alәma parties as not only lacking in cohesiveness but also as
advocates of a medieval system, one that failed to take into account the realities of the
modern age. “[If] being a Muslim meant going back to the world of 1,300 years ago,”
he remarked brazenly in January 1960 , “then [I am] not for being a Muslim.”121 Given
his positions vis-à-vis Islam and politics, Ayub Khan was widely regarded as a
“modernist”; in the Field Marshal’s view, Islam was “subject to the conditions of
contemporary nationhood.”122 Khan criticized the (mostly Deobandi) ‘alәma who had
opposed Pakistan during pre-Partition days but now sought to impose their version of
an Islamic order on everyone via an Islamic constitution of their creation—and this in a
nation they had once denied a chance for existence! He (perhaps correctly) saw the
(mostly Deobandi) ‘alәma as the most vociferous critics of government (and his
government, in particular); without their insidious influence, he reasoned, the people
would be happy. “[T]hey succeeded in converting optimistic and enthusiastic people
into a cynical and frustrated community,” he once said of the Islamic scholars.123
Foreign policy-wise, too, Ayub Khan was, like Iskander Mirza, more or less proWestern, though he was less conspicuous (some would say less gushing) than his
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predecessor.124 In any case, Ayub Khan’s political positions reinvigorated many of the
‘alәma in their ire against the secular state (and even united them for a time, as the
reader shall see).
On 2 March 1961, the regime put into effect the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance,
legislation that promised more freedom to women. In this, Ayub Khan was part of a
trend affecting several modernizing states within the Muslim world characterized by
heavy government legislative intervention vis-à-vis women and the family. Indeed,
many aspects of the ordinance merely reflected the suggestions, offered to the Pakistani
government during the previous decade, by a commission set up specifically to consider
reform in this area. In any case, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, in addition to
stipulating that a man could only take on a second wife with the permission of his first
(in the form of approval by an Arbitration Council), also required that, in the case of
divorce, the husband must first inform a local government representative, then wait
ninety days. In effect, the ordinance required ninety-day “notice” on divorces, during
which time an Arbitration Council would strive to reconcile the parties involved. Many
of the ‘alәma regarded this last—the “introduction of notice”—as contrary to the
procedure set forth in the Qur’an and sunnәt.125 Most of the country’s Islamic scholars
(but especially those of the Deobandi persuasion) opposed the ordinance vigorously; one
observer described the cleric-led campaign against Ayub as both “sustained” and strong
ever after.126 In response, the Ayub Khan regime confiscated publications promulgating
the opinions of the ‘alәma opposed to the ordinance and even imprisoned some of the
more vocal scholars involved in the debate.
Ayub Khan continued his opposition to an “Islamic” constitution by rejecting the
suggestions of the very Constitution Commission that he had created to formulate a
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new document. The commission (an eleven-person body from which, not surprisingly,
the ‘alәma had been conspicuously excluded) had interviewed almost six hundred
individuals and mailed close to twenty thousand questionnaires to people and
organizations of consequence across Pakistan. What the group discovered did not lend
support to Ayub Khan’s secularist, modernist aims. The vast majority of respondents
had indicated strongly that the overtly Islamic Objectives Resolution should be
incorporated into the new constitution. The same held true for the old constitution’s
Islamic provisions; these, too, should be included, according to most respondents. In its
presentation to the regime, and based on its findings, the commission even went one
step further, advising an active role for the state in regulating the training of Muslim
teachers and preachers “to enable them to present Islam to those of a Western way of
thinking.” The group also sided with the vast majority of the ‘alәma on the electorates
issue, supporting the call for a separate electorates system.127
On 8 June 1962, the new, Ayub Khan-created constitution of Pakistan (which had
been approved by the dictator in early May) came into effect. As previously mentioned,
the regime opted to ignore most of the recommendations of its own Constitution
Commission; the group’s suggestions were veritably absent within the new document.
Still, the constitution’s Islamic provisions were similar to those of the 1956 version.
The descriptive “Islamic” was not restored to Pakistan’s official name (“The State of
Pakistan shall be a Republic under the name of the Republic of Pakistan”), and Ayub
Khan had instituted a presidential (as opposed to parliamentary) system in which the
very powerful President (i.e. Ayub Khan) must be a Muslim. Indeed, one commentator
described Ayub Khan’s new constitution as leaving “almost impotent” his political
opposition, while making for “an impregnably strong executive.”128 The document’s
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preamble was indeed based on the Objectives Resolution, though it offered a
controversial watered-down version of the same. The government was charged with
the duty to assist Muslims in the day-to-day living of their faith, a repugnancy clause
was included, and teaching of the Qur’an and Islamic studies was made mandatory
(though only for Muslims). Furthermore, the government was to take an active (though
unspecified) role in eradicating (or at least “discouraging”) such un-Islamic evils as
gambling, prostitution, the consumption of alcohol, and usury, and the federal
government should be guided, on the foreign policy front, by a desire to strengthen ties
with and promote peace among the world’s Muslim nations. The document also
mandated the creation of two “Islamic” bodies: (1) the Advisory Council of Islamic
Ideology, meant to advise the government on both the Islamic soundness of legislation
as well as on how the state might more fully facilitate Muslims’ religious practice, and
whose members were to be directly appointed by the president; and (2) the Islamic
Research Institute. The latter, to become an object of much controversy, was tasked
with the undertaking of “Islamic research and instruction in Islam for the purpose of
assisting in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis.” The 1962
constitution would stand until the end of the Gregorian decade (specifically, March
1969, when martial law was again declared), then officially replaced by a new one in
1973.
The same day that Ayub Khan’s constitution went into effect (8 June), martial law
was lifted and Pakistan’s new National Assembly met for the first time. With the
Assembly’s adoption of the Political Parties Act in July, the JUI, JI, NIP, and others
(including the Khwaja Nazimuddin-led anti-Ayub Council Muslim League party, or
CML; after the lifting of Martial Law, the Pakistan Muslim League had split into two
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parties: the CML and the pro-Ayub Convention Muslim League) began agitating for
amendments to the 1962 constitution. Specifically, the aforementioned parties
demanded a restoration of the word “Islamic” to Pakistan’s official name, as well as a
restoration in full of the old constitution’s Islamic provisions. This pressure led Ayub
Khan to partially concede on some points; on 24 December 1963, the word “Islamic”
was finally restored. The old Islamic provisions were restored, too, however slightly
altered.129 But the religious parties, in particular those under Deobandi leadership or
influence, were not convinced that the Ayub Khan government was being genuine in its
concessions on the constitution’s Islamic nature. It was one thing to include Islamic
provisions, and quite another to actually enforce them. And the regime rejected most of
the suggestions proferred by the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology—a body it had
created by mandate of its very own constitution. Indeed, the Ayub Khan government’s
true colors were seemingly revealed when it jailed several Muslim scholars for
contesting the regime-run committee in charge of announcing the sighting of the new
moon (for Eid; the new moon marks the beginning of the month of Shawwal and the
commencement of the Eid holiday, after the month-long Ramadan fast); evidently the
committee had altered the date in order to help the President avoid being the subject of
a bad omen. In addition, Ayub Khan, whose lack of respect for most of the ‘alәma was
by now well established, seemed to support more Western-leaning modernist Islamists
(like Dr. Fazlur Rahman, whose work—in particular his 1966 book Islam—was the
subject of much controversy). The Islamic Research Institute, which his own
constitution had established, seemed bent on interpreting Islam through a distinctly
modernist lens, to the deep resentment of the ‘alәma (though, perhaps predictably,
embraced by many in academia in the West).130 That perceived lack of respect could be
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applied to some of Islam’s most revered figures, too; once, Ayub Khan’s government
portrayed the “rightly guided” caliphs via actual illustrations on national tevelsion—a
shocking innovation for many Muslims (to whom religious images were forbidden). To
top it off, the President sought (ultimately unsuccessfully) to meddle in Friday
sermons.131 All of this seemed to indicate that, whatever might have been included in
Pakistan’s new constitution, the regime was not serious about establishing an Islamic
order, and it certainly wasn’t interested in obtaining the opinions of the ‘alәma in that
regard. The scholars were thus shut out of their traditional role as influencial advisers
to the state—a role many of them felt they had fought for during the years leading up to
independence. All the while, Ayub Khan continued to consolidate his own position by
temporarily neutralizing one of his most dangerous critics, the aged and highly vocal
Bengali mwlana Bhashani (who, just months previously, had been “thundering about
blood and liberty, fair shares or secession”), by making him leader of a Pakistan
delegation to China—a journey that evidently had a transformationary effect upon the
man.132 Concurrently, Ayub attacked the religious and political legitimacy of the JI.
The Deobandi and Barelvi spiritual leadership often took strikingly different
positions during the Ayub Khan decade. Many JUP leaders actually supported the
regime, like some of their Sufi predecessors who had upheld a monarch’s rule to the
chagrin of the realm’s ‘alәma. Indeed, Ayub Khan was known to be especially close to
two Barelvi divines: the pir of Deval Sharif (West Pakistan) xәwajәħ ‘Abdul Majid and
the pir of Sarsina (East Pakistan) mwlana Abu Jafar Muhammad Saleh. Once, the former
pir was reported to have publicly implied, during a meeting of Muslim League members
at Manki Sharif, that Ayub Khan’s leadership had been sanctioned by God, and that
dramatically; after all, in a vision the pir of Deval Sharif had seen a “divine light” on the
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dictator’s forehead.133 Ayub Khan was known to consult with the pir frequently, often
stopping for a visit while out hunting in the countryside.134 Perhaps this was not
surprising, as the pir was reported to have once told Ayub Khan, “Every word you utter
is put in your mouth by God. You are His servant, and whatever you do is done on
God’s instructions.”135 Meanwhile, the pir of Sarsina, who had been a part of the Barelvi
deputation led by JUP leader Abdul Hamid Badayuni sent to lobby Khwaja Nazimuddin
against the Ahmadis in the early 1950s,136 likewise supported Ayub Khan and was
sometimes even referred to as “President Ayub Khan’s pir.”137 In November 1963 the
President inaugurated the first sessions of the All-Pakistan mәshaix Conference “to
mobilize [the JUP and other Barelvi mәshaix] in favor of his regime.” During the 19641965 elections, many of the Barelvi leadership supported Ayub Khan. (In this they were
joined by a small segment of JUI leaders, too, on account of the opposition’s undesirable
gender; Fatima Jinnah was, after all, a woman).138 Among the ‘alәma, Abdul Hamid
Badayuni was known to be especially supportive of the Ayub Khan government.
On the other hand, the Deobandis tended to gravitate towards a strong opposition
to the former Field Marshal’s regime. During the Ayub Khan years, the JUI was
veritably revived under mufti Mahmud. The catalyst? The regime’s attempts to
“modernize” Pakistan, elements of which the JUI found repugnant to Islam as they
interpreted it, mobilized support for the party against the Ayub Khan government. In
1962, both the NIP and the JI had come out strongly, and officially, in opposition to the
government in power. Indeed, these two Deobandi-leaning parties made up the leading
segment of the regime’s political opposition throughout the 1960s. In 1962, that
opposition came in the form of the National Democratic Front, in 1964 as the Combined
Opposition Parties, and in 1967 as the Pakistan Democratic Movement; in each of these
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alliances, the NIP and JI led the anti-Ayub charge. During the 1964-1965 (indirect)
elections, most of the Deobandi ‘alәma supported the seventy-one-year-old Fatima
Jinnah, sister of Pakistan’s deceased founder and considered by many to be the “Mother
of the Nation” (madәr-e-myllәt). Their support probably had less to do with Fatima
Jinnah’s specific platform (which revolved around a restoration of democracy and the
elimination of Ayub’s presidential system) than with her position as the chief opposition
figure contesting Ayub Khan for power. In their opposition to the regime, the Deobandi
scholars were joined by disenfranchised politicians (thousands of whom had been
disqualified by Ayub’s Elective Bodies Disqualification Order, or EBDO, from
participation in politics), East Pakistanis who felt ostracized by a “West Pakistani
soldier-President,” lawyers who opposed Ayub’s tight control over the judiciary,
Frontier Province inhabitants following Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in his quest for
Pathan autonomy (and thus his opposition to a single, West Pakistani unit), and
refugees who felt that their claims for property compensation had been ignored. Each of
these parties, in one way or another, resented Ayub Khan’s dictatorial position. He had,
after all, “EBDOed” around seven thousand of the country’s most influential (and
oppositional) politicians, had enacted the Press and Publications Ordinances to muzzle
the press, and had enacted the University Ordinance to keep students and faculty out of
politics (by threatening them with degree removal), among other actions.139
Even so, Ayub Khan won the election (which was widely believed to have been
rigged by the regime). Countrywide, 63.3% of the vote allegedly came down for Ayub
Khan, with 36.3% voting for Fatima Jinnah. The only Division won by Jinnah in the
western zone at all was Karachi, the stronghold of her base; much of Ayub’s success in
the rest of Sindh was attributed to the role of his loyalist Barelvi and landlord network.
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“Sind…was safe for Ayub as the pirs (spiritual guides) and mirs (landlords) could not
possibly defy the Government,” wrote one academic commentator a year later.140 In
East Pakistan, the “vote” was closer, but Ayub still eked out a victory. Some of his
supporters—including his son Gohar—stoked the flames of opposition by parading
through the more anti-Ayub neighborhoods of Karachi (again, Fatima’s Jinnah’s base of
support) with the alleged intention to “kill, burn, and loot”; at least thirty people died in
these post-election “Black Monday” clashes (and Gohar Ayub Khan himself was charged
with fatally shooting a man, though essentially nothing came of it as the “inquiry” was
“halted”).141 Still, the JUI didn’t openly oppose the regime until 1968, when the party
officially joined the opposition. One of the JUI’s leaders would later be seriously injured
in a police-instigated clash during a joint JUI-Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) gathering
in Lahore; government forces had charged attendees with batons, brutally beating
many. The JUI’s joint action with the socialist PPP vividly illustrates how overarching
the issue of the ruling government’s perceived hostility to a truly Islamic order was to
the Deobandi ‘alәma. To anyone who remembered the JUH’s joint struggle in concert
with the Hindus during pre-Partition days, however, against the British common
enemy, such action seemed to fall neatly within the Deobandi political tradition. In any
case, in response to the government’s harsh actions, the JUI carried out a protest
march—joined by several other, non-religious parties—demanding freedom from such
tyranny and the long-promised (at least in the eyes of many among the ‘alәma)
Islamization of Pakistan. During this period, leading Deobandi ‘alym mufti Mahmud
was particularly vocal in his criticism against the Ayub Khan regime.142 Mahmud was a
graduate of the dar ul’alwm at Deoband, and like most Deobandi ‘alәma had opposed the
call for Pakistan’s establishment, opting to cooperate instead with the JUH and the
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Indian National Congress. He had joined the JUI in 1956 on the occasion of a large
party conference, together with future NWFP JUI leader mwlana Ghulam Ghaus
Hazarvi, and (with Ghulam Ghaus) is generally considered the figure responsible for the
JUI’s transformation from a “purely religious movement” to a “political party.”143 (This
author would contend that the JUI was always political; what changed under the
leadership of Hazarvi and Mahmud was strategy. Whereas before the organization was
more of an influencer, it would now function as a political party in every sense of the
term, among other things directly fielding election cadidates. The Barelvi JUP would
undergo much the same transformation around the same time.) Both Hazarvi and
Mahmud served as JUI representatives within the National Assembly and the West
Pakistan provincial assembly during much of the Ayub Khan era. Such pronounced
differences, generally speaking, between the Barelvi and Deobandi spiritual leadership
in regards to politics during this period make statements like Qureshi’s, who wrote that
by the early 1960s “in the modern context sectarian differences have lost their
importance,” more than a little puzzling.144
Only once was Ayub Khan able to distract the oppositional (predominantly
Deobandi) ‘alәma enough to mostly suppress their dissent against his rule. This
distraction took the form, predictably, of a war—specifically, the September 1965
Kashmir War with India. Pakistanis and some Kashmiris had waited for more than a
decade for any sort of plebiscite (mandated, it will be remembered, after the first
Kashmir War by the United Nations) to settle the matter by popular vote. Throughout
that time, India had gradually but inexhorably tightened its grip on the region, more or
less “absorbing” it as a part of the Indian state, despite frequent bursts of militant
infiltration coming from the direction of Pakistan’s western zone. (Meanwhile, Indian
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government officials blamed just such infiltrations for the delay in solving the dispute.
“The threats of violence which have been [coming] from Pakistan must cease,” stated
the Indian representative to the UN Security Council in 1964. “Once better atmosphere
prevails, it would be possible—we are prepared to discuss with Pakistan all our
outstanding differences.”)145 The most flagrant Indian assault on Kashmir’s “disputed”
status, however, came in 1964 and early 1965, when India changed its constitution so as
to “make Kashmiri administration essentially the same” as other Indian units.146 The
move seemed to signal to many Pakistanis that India had decided to out-and-out ignore
the Pakistan government’s claim, throw out any UN mandates connected to it, and
simply seize Kashmir for itself once and for all.
As these events coincided with Pakistan’s elections and Ayub Khan’s campaign
against Fatima Jinnah, it makes sense that the President (with the help of his Foreign
Minister—one Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto) would throughout the contest stress Pakistan’s
struggle for Kashmir as a diversion from “democracy and Islamicity.”147 Along this
same tack, and in response to growing opposition at home (led to a considerable degree
by the JI and the NIP), Ayub Khan had launched a minor war with India over the Rann
of Kutch. (According to Ayub Khan’s son, Gohar Ayub Khan, speaking in 2005, his
father had purchased a “Secret Plan” to attack Pakistan from an Indian Army Brigadier
in 1965 for twenty thousand rupees; the purchase was later denied by an ex-Pakistan
Army chief).148 If the conflict was a power-consolidating ploy, it worked. Thousands of
Pakistanis, of both the Deobandi and Barelvi persuasion, were suddenly gripped with
Islamo-patriotic fervor. One recounting of events, from the pen of a well-known
Deobandi mufti, is illustrative in this regard:
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In 1964 or 1965, I had accompanied my father to Makkah to perform the
Hajj. One day, one Arab shopkeeper disclosed to me that war had begun
between Pakistan and India at [the] Rann of Kutch. I cannot describe
my feelings on hearing this news. When we returned home after Hajj,
the war was over. Every child recounted the brave feat of our
courageous armed forces and the faith-inspiring stories of Allah’s help.
The laughable episodes of the cowardice of the Indian forces were the
topic of every assembly. The Pakistan armed forces had routed the
enemy much before the volunteers [i.e. jyhadis] could participate.149

Absent from the memoir is any trace of enmity toward the Ayub Khan regime, or any
doubt about the Pakistani government’s righteousness. The writer, instead, is wrapped
up in the “faith-inspiring” struggle, and animosity is preserved for the unbelieving
“Indian forces.” The twenty-nine-year-old son of Muhammad Shafi even remembered
being “inspired” by the President’s 6 September speech to the nation—a speech that
included a recitation of the kәlymәħ and an admonition both to the military and “the
common man” to participate in jyhad. “Those who…heard his speech,” Shafi’s son
wrote, thirty years after Ayub Khan’s homily, “may be remembering its appeal even
today.” Though Pakistani volunteers were generally not permitted to fight at the front,
many received civil defense and first aid training. Deobandi mufti Muhammad Rafi
Usmani, who was teaching at the dar ul’alwm at Karachi at the time, remembers
watching the Pakistan Air Force planes zooming through the sky, “chasing the enemy
aircraft,” and described how spectators shed “tears of joy,” their “hearts full of prayers,”
caught up in the deep feelings of the moment.150 Briefly, then, Ayub Khan not only
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secured his own position but also brought Deobandi and Barelvi scholars and their
followers together, in a sense, against a common enemy.
Pakistan slightly outperformed India throughout the April and May fighting on the
Rann before a June cease-fire (and a promised arbitration between the two enemy states)
brought an end to armed combat. Meanwhile, however, an uprising had broken out in
Kashmir (almost certainly instigated by agents taking orders from the Ayub Khan
regime itself), prompting Indian troops to occupy strategic positions across the cease-fire
line (or CFL, later called the “Line of Control,” or LoC) in Pakistani territory. This was
in August. Ayub Khan’s response was to invade Jammu (1 September), which elicited a
counter-invasion of Pakistan by India. Some of the worst fighting took place on the
very outskirts of major cities like Lahore and Sialkot. The conflict was prevented from
escalating into an all-out war after a 23 September UN-proclaimed cease-fire made
possible by pressure from both Washington and Moscow. Throughout the conflict,
Ayub Khan worked hard to win the ‘alәma to his side. Verses of the Qur’an were
printed on the front page of newspapers, urging “believers” to fight.151 Long-time
nemesis Mawdudi even called for a jyhad in Kashmir (thus reverting his earlier position,
aforementioned), and after the 23 September cease-fire was invited onto Radio Pakistan
to “speak on jihad in peacetime.” The ‘alәma parties organized relief efforts for the
border areas most affected by the conflict, all the while hoping that now a plebscite
might be forthcoming.152 “There is a considerable reservoir of religious emotions,”
wrote one commentator shortly after the war, “that a Pakistan Government can draw
upon for purposes of national unity during a time of crisis.”153 In conducting the war,
Ayub was seen as possessing an “independent foreign policy” (however engineered by
Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto)—i.e. independent from the West. This sat well with most of the
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‘alәma. In addition, many ‘alәma looked on approvingly as other Muslim countries
(notably Turkey, Iran, and Indonesia) offered military and/or moral support for
Pakistan’s Kashmir fight (several Arab countries passed a joint resolution supporting
Pakistan, too).154 But with the war over and Ayub Khan’s status temporarily repaired
(he had fought the Indians despite pressure from the U.S. Government, and had won an
“election,” to boot), the government abruptly seemed less interested in placating the
religious scholars and their parties.
But after the January 1966 Tashkent Declaration, which officially ended the IndiaPakistan conflict (at least for the time-being), any renewed popularity that Ayub Khan
might have enjoyed began to wane. Many were greatly unsatisfied by the agreement’s
provisions; it seemed to some as a document of acquiescence on Pakistan’s part,
restoring as it did the 1949 cease-fire line combined with a comittment by both states
not to interfere in the internal affairs of one another. Was this not a surrender of the
original Kashmir claim? (One of Ayub Khan’s most powerful critics: Zulfiqar ‘Ali
Bhutto, his own very aggressive Foreign Minister; Bhutto would resign in June 1966.)
Disillusionment over the Declaration combined with a debilitating sickness that ailed
Ayub Khan from 1967 until the spring of 1968 (at one point the President was even
“unconscious for a time”); though he would continue to weild the powers of his office, he
was “never his old self again,” depending far more heavily on advisors of dubious ability
and qualifications. Allegations that the 1965 elections had been rigged by the
government, of widespread corruption within the regime and within Ayub Khan’s own
family (said to be worth tens of millions of dollars), and a perceived widening socioeconomic disparity between the super-rich and the poor likewise affected the President’s
popularity. Protests against the regime began to make noise again throughout the
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country, which the increasingly desperate Ayub Khan attempted to quash using brutal
force—resulting in the deaths of several students and an array of arrests amidst the
subsequent rioting.155 An (unsuccessful) attempt was made on the President’s life on a
foggy day in mid-November (on the same day, incidentally, that four Yemeni would-be
assassins tried to terminate the life of American President Richard Nixon, an early
example of “blowback” for U.S. government intervention in the Muslim world).156 Still,
Ayub had managed to consolidate his position so well that, even with this growing
surge of opposition, he remained more secure than not. By October 1967, the
President’s main opposition came in the form of the Pakistan Democratic Movement
(PDM), which included both the JI and the NIP; despite achieving “visible unity” after
five months of inter-party bickering, however, PDM leaders admitted they held “bleak
hope” of actually seizing the reigns of power from Ayub. The President “is entrenched
and secure,” the alliance conceded, with a wide base of support in the Army and across
sections of West Pakistan. The role of the opposition “under the present restrictions,”
said NIP head (and former Prime Minister) Chaudhri Muhammad ‘Ali, was to at least
“maintain the country’s conscience.”157 Despite the president’s perceived
“entrenchment,” however, it was clear that public opinion against the regime was
spreading.
By 1969, even the Barelvi spiritual and political leadership that had remained loyal
to the regime had ascertained the direction of the political winds. JUP leaders and their
supporters had spoken out strongly against the government’s interference in the “purely
religious matter” of the moon sighting for Eid (subsequently two Eids were celebrated
in 1967, one according to the regime’s schedule and the other according to that of the
‘alәma); when their criticism became too much to bear, the Ayub Khan government
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imprisoned five of the most vocal Islamic scholars, including the aforementioned Barelvi
acolyte of Naimuddin Moradabadi, Muhammad Hussain Naeemi. This, combined with a
general Barelvi sense that Ayub Khan had not delivered on the promises he had made to
them (regarding amendments to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance and the
enforcement of shәri’at, for example), caused the JUP to unhitch its wagon from the
regime’s sputtering train. Indeed, sensing that continued support of the Ayub
government would injure their status, as well as their continued claim to represent the
Sunni majority, the JUP joined the oppoisition to Ayub Khan—but only after purging
Abdul Hamid Badayuni (whose aforementioned support for the government was
characterized as “continued and unconditional”) from party leadership. (Two breakaway
groups resulted from this move: one led by Badayuni and another led by Faizal Hasan,
both of which actually released statements supporting Ayub Khan.)158 The move to rid
the upper echelons of the JUP of Abdul Hamid Badayuni was led by sayyid Abul Barakat
Ahmad, and accomplished on 5 January 1969.159 Thus the Ayub Khan government’s
continued rejection of ‘alәma demands for an Islamic state, plus external political
pressure from both religious and non-religious quarters across the country, combined to
briefly unite the positions, again, of the Deobandi and Barelvi parties, at least in terms
of their rejection of Ayub Khan and his government.
In January 1969, an alliance of eight parties—including both the JUI and the JI—
was formed under the name Democratic Action Committee. The organization’s
overarching goal was to effect the restoration of “democracy” by coordinating a “mass
movement” against the Ayub Khan regime. Within the Committee, JUI leader mufti
Mahmud continued to urge his fellow anti-Ayub agitators that any amendments to a
future Pakistani constitution should be based on the aforementioned and ‘alәma371

formulated “Twenty-Two Principles.”160 Whether motived by the Democratic Action
Committee or borne of local, “spontaneous” dissent, demonstrations sprung up all over
the country. In response, the flailing regime sent military units into Pakistan’s major
cities, including Lahore, Dhaka, Khulna, Karachi, and Peshawar, and imposed a curfew.
But these actions were largely ineffective, and especially in rural areas the people mostly
ignored the curfew. The next month (February), Ayub Khan, sensing a lack of
confidence in him even from some of his own generals, attempted the conciliatory route
aimed at the politicians, inviting the Democratic Action Committee to a round table
conference in Rawalpindi. There he agreed not only to the introduction of a new
constitution in the foreseeable future, but also not to stand for reelection in 1970. But
Ayub’s gamble didn’t pay off; on 25 March 1969, Martial Law was once again declared,
its chief administrator Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army General Agha
Muhammad Yahya Khan, and the 1962 constitution was officially abrogated. After the
subsequent resignation of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan became President of Pakistan,
vowing National Assembly elections (not of the indirect, Ayub Khan variety, but based
on adult franchise) and a new, Assembly-formualted constitution.
After the 1965 Kashmir War, opposition to the Ayub Khan regime seemed to be
colored less and less by Islamist tones and more and more by socialist ones. This, of
course, greatly concerned the ‘alәma on both sides of the Deobandi-Barelvi aisle, who
began to sense that perhaps the greater threat to the establishment of an Islamic order
in Pakistan wasn’t the waning dictatorial regime of Ayub Khan at all, nor the
President’s modernism—but a growing wave of socialist ideology. Indeed, much of the
opposition to the Ayub Khan regime had far less to do with Islam than with socioeconomic factors like poverty and food shortages. The ‘alәma had long blamed such
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things on the failure of government to institute an Islamic order, which, they theorized,
would put an end to such misery by instituting a God-inspired politico-economic
system. But the socialists were offering an alternate plan, one that was attached to
grand promises of prosperity, equality, justice—and an end to hunger and suffering at
the hands of greedy power-seekers. In addition, while the religious parties stressed
Islam as a unifying force, thereby underscoring an overarching “nationalism” and the
unity of Pakistan, the left appeared far more sympathetic to “ethnic and linguistic
setiments” and “socioeconomic cleavages” that the ‘alәma, generally speaking, seemed to
ignore altogether.161 It was with such promises on his lips that Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto left
the government to form the Pakistan People’s Party, promoting the image of Ayub
Khan as a symbol of inequality; the failure of the old PDM, with all of its pessimism, to
garner widespread popular support in West Pakistan thus set the stage for the PPP’s
rise, with its far more positive outlook and fantastic assurances based on “democratic
socialism.”162 By the time the round table conference in Rawalpindi between the
Democratic Action Committee and Ayub Khan had ended, the relevance of the former
had been eclipsed by the rising—and now clearly more powerful—(moderately socialist)
Awami League, based in the eastern zone, and the heavily socialist (even quasicommunist) Pakistan People’s Party, based in the western zone. Bhutto was, proclaimed
a somewhat adoring Western media, “Asia’s new champion of socialism.”
As such, the invective of the ‘alәma parties, while still aimed at the crumbling Ayub
Khan regime, turned against the leadership of the Awami League and the PPP—and the
socialist ideology that they espoused. Mawdudi was particularly irritated by the
aforementioned parties’ attempts at “mix[ing] Islam with leftist ideas.” On 27
February 1969, the ‘alәma of West Pakistan, representing both Deobandis and Barelvis,
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launched a campaign “to condemn socialism and communism.” The campaign’s
microphone was the mosque: indeed, “almost every mosque in the western province.”
This effort, not coincidentally, coincided with ‘aid ul-әżha (the lesser of the two Eid
holidays, celebrated in remembrance of the willingness of both Ibrahim and Ismail
[Abraham and Isaac] to submit to the will of God)—meaning that tens of millions of
Muslims would be attending the mәsjyd as part of the festival’s observance. Pakistan
had been established on the foundation of Islam, warned the ‘alәma of Rawalpindi
(where, just 24 hours before, Bhutto himself “received a rousing welcome”), but the
“socialists…would undo the fabric of Islamic law.”163 By 1969, the anti-Ayub campaign
of the ‘alәma had been overshadowed almost completely by the new conflict between the
religious scholar-jurists and the “militant leftists” and their “champion,” Bhutto. The
situation reached a breaking point in March, when even the Ayub Khan regime
“threatened firm action to suppress lawlessness” in reference to the newly emerged
rivalry. On the 14th, Mawdudi had reportedly admonished his followers to “silence the
tongue that utters the word socialism.” This was succeeded the next day by a failed
attempt to kidnap and murder aforementioned pro-Mao and pro-Bhutto NAP leader
mwlana Bhashani while the eighty-six-year-old was traveling by train from Lahore to
Karachi (though the old man was slightly injured, the attempt failed). The agitation
against Ayub Khan had resulted in at least one hundred fifty deaths between November
1968 and March 1969, and it was clear now that the regime’s days were numbered; the
‘alәma parties now vied with Bhutto and the leftists for political supremacy.164
When Ayub Khan resigned, ‘alәma party leaders called on the Awami League and
the PPP to “demobilize” now that their chief target—Ayub—had been defeated, an
admonition that Bhutto and Mujib failed to heed, of course. No longer cooperatively
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opposed to the now-defunct regime of Ayub Khan, parties like the JI on one side and the
Awami League and the PPP on the other hit the streets to campaign against one
another.165

Yahya Khan, the 1970 Elections, and the Birth of Bangladesh.
After the fall of the Ayub Khan administration in March of 1969, political activity
more or less ceased in Pakistan for about ten months. Martial law had been established.
This would last until early January 1970. It was during this short apolitical
interregnum that the Barelvi luminaries guiding the JUP, mwlana Abu’l Barakat sәyyid
Ahmad Qadiri at the helm, decided to focus on that party’s most pressing problem:
unity. For it was quite obvious to even the most unobservant party insider that, since
years—even decades—before Partition, the great ‘alәma and pirs who claimed to
represent the vast majority of Sunni Muslims had lacked not only the support of the
people, but also of one another. After the resumption of political activities (from 1
January 1970, with general elections secheduled for 5 October), the JUP made several
efforts to bring the party’s many apparently disparate parts together. This was
necessary in order to restore a government of the people—the majority of whom, they
insisted, certainly looked to them, their spiritual guides, for direction and leadership.
Just as the Deobandi JUI had done in the days leading up to Partition, and just as the
Deobandi-leaning JI was doing now, rival religious parties—better organized, more
determined, and far more unified—were hijacking the political process and threatening
to institute their apostate versions of Islam via the guns of government. For the sake of
the “eighty percent,” whose religious guardians they were, the “Sunnis” must demand the
representation they deserved. “Secularism” and “Socialism” and “Capitalism”—these
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were significant menaces, certainly. But always present, too, was the threat posed by
“rival religious sects” (especially if their political wings seemed to experience more
electoral success than that of the Barelvis). It was time to fix the problem and stand as
one.
All of this served as the backdrop to mwlana Abu’l Barakat sәyyid Ahmad Qadiri’s
call for a meeting in Lahore. The day was to be 25 January 1969. After some
discussion, the assembled religious scholars and dignitaries decided to form a thirteenmember committee to act as a sort of central coordinating organ for the various
scattered and disjointed JUP groups across the country. The committee met again ten
months later in Gujranwala (November) and then again in Lyallpur (December). Try as
they might, however, the Barelvis simply could not unite under a single, cohesive
platform, despite the recognized fact that such unity would be necessary “in order to
check the activities of Secularists, Socialists and rival religious sects” (italics added).
Barelvi leaders condemned the fragmentation that seemed to plague their party—but
this was typically followed by placing blame on one or another of their own members,
leading to further division. Perhaps another committee, another board, another “high
command,” composed of the “Presidents and [general secretaries] of every group” was
the answer. But such suggestions were never brought to fruition, and the original
committee remained the only one. Such a proposal was agreed upon at one January
1970 meeting of JUP officials at Sangla Hill, presided over by xәwajәħ Qamaruddin
Sialvi, only to be rejected by a faction led by mwlana Abdul Ghafoor Hazarvi. To make
matters worse, sahybzada qazi Muhammad Fazl-e-Rasul, president of the Hazarvi
faction of the West Pakistan JUP (the provincial branch of the JUP), who had been
appointed to that office a year before, stepped down from office; the reason he provided
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at the time of his resignation: the “other groups [within the JUP]” were “working for
their own interests and had damaged the unity among the Ahl-e-Sunnat.” The next
month Hazarvi himself resigned, too, though he was later “forced” to withdraw his
resignation. Meanwhile, yet another JUP faction, this one led by Mahmud Shah
Gujrati, functioned more or less on its own, only nominally tied to the greater party.
Despite all of the JUP leadership’s efforts, the party’s disunity appeared quite
insurmountable.166
*
Yahya’s regime superceded the civilian government bureaucracy more than any of
its predecessors, severely straining the unspoken bureaucracy-military partnership that
had marked previous administrations. But even with the military assuming such a
dominating role, in the words of one standard history, “Yahya Khan and his military
advisors proved no more capable of overcoming the nation’s problems than their
predecessors.”167 At least part of this lay in Yahya Khan’s dictatorial nature, one that
conflicted with the seemingly “democratic” demands of the opposition. All this did not
mean that the new state head wouldn’t try to solve Pakistan’s woes, however. On 28
November 1969, he announced his plan to see the country return to constitutional
government, a bone thrown to those who feared he might be a military dictator.
National Assembly general elections were fixed for 5 October 1970, later pushed back to
December; this would have major political consequences, as the “Bhola Cyclone”—the
deadliest tropical cyclone ever recorded—would strike East Pakistan in November,
killing as many as half a million people. (The Yahya regime’s handling of relief efforts
in East Pakistan was harshly criticized by Bengalis and likely contributed much to the
Awami League’s overwhelming electoral victory the next month.) Yahya’s announced
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plan was for the National Assembly, once elected, to have one hundred twenty days to
formulate a constitution; there would be no undue delay, no years-long squabbling over
the state’s ruling document. In addition, Yahya Khan promised the eventual institution
of a truly federal system, characterized by “maximum provincial autonomy,” almost
certainly an attempt to assuage nationalist Bengalis (and, specifically, the Awami
League), who had been pressing for their “Six Points” (see endnote) for several years
already.168 On the issue of taxation, however—one of the “Six Points” demanded that
the power to tax be vested only in the provinces, with the federal government then
entitled to a certain share—Yahya Khan put his foot down, claiming for the central
government the all-important taxation power. Not surprisingly, given his authoritarian
tendencies, Yahya vested in himself final authority to approve, or disapprove, the future
constitution as formulated by the National Assembly. This, in a nutshell, was the
Yahya plan for fulfilling the promises of Pakistan’s founding.
The JI, however tacitly at first, supported the Yahya Khan regime. Yahya had
vowed, after all, to destroy any party opposed to the “ideology of Pakistan”—a
politician’s phrase that allowed various parties to interpret its meaning through their
own particular lenses. For the JI, the “ideology of Pakistan” clearly meant an espousal
of the country’s Islamic identity. Just as importantly, though, the “ideology of Pakistan”
was interpreted as a hostile statement aimed at the leftist parties like the PPP and the
Awami League. The JI, then, essentially threw in with Yahya in order to cleanse
Pakistan of the greater evil of socialism/communism. To a lesser extent, the JI’s
support for the regime was also based on the “ideology of Pakistan” as an ideology of
unity—meaning that the policy demands of such traitors as provincial nationalists,
especially Bengali nationalists or, worse, would-be secessionists, should be stamped out.
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Thus, in the words of Nasr, “Political exigency had led Islamic constitutionalism into an
unholy alliance with the very regime it had fought against.”169 In this, the JI had
adopted the unified-state stance of the majority of Barelvi leaders, as opposed to the
more province-level outlook of the Deobandis. For their part, the JUI distanced itself
quickly from the JI, a rift that continues to the time of this writing. (Part and parcel to
this distance was the behavior of many among younger-generation JI members and
supporters, particularly those of university age; on the University of Karachi campus,
for example, those belonging to this latter category were mockingly referred to by some
students as “Disco mwlvis”—“modernly attired and beardless” members of the JI’s
student wing who liked pop music and had girlfriends, to boot, but who nonetheless
proscribed to the Jamaat’s religio-political philosophy.)170 Indeed, the schism would
play a major role in the development of the “Taliban” (about which more later).
But the JUI itself, like the JUP (though not quite to the same extent), was during
this period afflicted with division, and that division centered around the issue of
socialism. Some Deobandi leaders saw socialism as a potential vehicle for arriving at
the Islamic egalitarian ideal—though only a vehicle; Islam was, after all, a “complete way
of life” that needed no substitution, either by socialism or any other ideology. Those
calling for the Islamic parties to divert their attention to the destruction of socialism,
this faction argued, were merely “imperialist agents” working, whether knowingly or
not, for the Anglo-American establishment. Those arguing in this vein included JUI
leaders mufti Mahmud and mufti Hazarvi, who were instrumental in forging alliances
between their faction (the All-Pakistan JUI, the bigger faction of the two; hereafter, for
the sake of continuity, the author will continue to refer to this faction as the JUI) and
several left-leaning political parties. Other Deobandi scholars viewed socialism as a
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western philosophy that would only serve to steer Pakistan further from becoming an
Islamic state. The faction espousing this latter philosophy (the Markazi JUI [MJUI],
along with elements of the NIP) was perhaps led most prominently by Muhammad
Shafi and Zafar Ahmad Usmani, who in February 1970 both signed a juridical ruling
(along with one hundred eleven other ‘alәma, mostly Barelvis but including several Shi’a
clerics, too) flatly declaring socialism “apostasy” and its proponents unbelievers. The
MJUI at times worked with the JI in condemnation of both socialism and those
Deobandi clerics who had thrown in their lot with it. An August 1969 attempt to
reconcile the two factions succeeded only in getting each to agree not to malign the
other. The main party, led by mufti Mahmud, campaigned on a platform that included
both Islamic and welfarist/socialist thrusts. The former included a call for the
institution of the old “Twenty-Two Points” for an Islamic constitution, the exclusion
from the definition of “Muslim” of any who did not believe in the finality of the Prophet,
the requirement for the head of state to be a Sunni, the banning of non-Muslim
missionary efforts in Pakistan, and the institution of mandatory congregational
prayers.171 True to the traditional Deobandi opposition to imperialism—which, by now,
included the American variety (and mufti Mahmud, as aforementioned, was strongly
anti-American for this reason, condemning the U.S. Government’s interventions in the
Middle East)—the JUI’s manifesto called for an independent foreign policy, devoid of
alliances with western powers.172
Eight months after the announcement of his plan for elections and a new Pakistani
constitution, Yahya dissolved the “One Unit Plan” then in place for West Pakistan,
restoring its four original provinces to their former status. At the same time, the parity
system (under which East and West had enjoyed equal representation at the federal
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level) was discontinued in favor of a population-based system; under the latter
arrangement, former West Pakistan was allotted a total of one hundred thirty-eight
seats in the National Assembly, compared to the more populous East Pakistan’s one
hundred sixty-two.
The religious parties threw themselves forcefully into the elections of 1970—the
first “one person, one vote” elections in Pakistani history. The Muslim scholars of both
schools were convinced that, given the choice, the vast majority of Pakistanis would
elect candidates from the religious parties, pious and committed to Islam. Some of the
repressive laws that had been put in place under the Martial Law administration were
lifted or softened for the sake of the election; the press was mostly de-muzzled and a
relaxing of free speech and assembly restrictions occurred, too. As such, National
Assembly seat contestants and their parties campaigned hard to win voters—and
lambast their opponents. In this, the JUI and JUP (as well as the JI) were not nearly as
effective as their left-leaning opponents. In recognizably communist fashion, Zulfiqar
‘Ali Bhutto promised “bread, clothes, and a house” (rwti, kәpra, awr mәkan) for all
(simultaneously—and, some economists might say, contradictingly, pledging Pakistan
to a “thousand year war with India,” a point he tried to backtrack from a few months
later). His campaign and those of other PPP National Assembly hopefuls was focused
almost entirely on Pakistan’s western wing, with strong support in Punjab and Sindh.173
Meanwhile, the Awami League, based and focused almost exclusively in the eastern
zone, continued to dominate Bengali politics, riding the “Six Points” program with help
from the general Bengali perception that West Pakistan was indifferent to them. As
mentioned previously, this feeling was greatly exacerbated after the apparent failure of
the federal government, led mostly be West Pakistanis, to send sufficient aid to cyclone
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ravaged areas of Bengal. Even the National Awami Party (a “successor” to the old KK
movement of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan),174 with which the JUI would later form
coalition governments in the NWFP and Baluchistan (again, siding with a lesser evil in
the name of defeating the greater), ran on a platform of “socialism, democracy,
nationalization of industries, [and] a welfare state.”175 The campaigns of both the PPP
and the Awami League, as well as that of the smaller NAP, underscored both parties’
strategy of appealing first and foremost to the public’s socio-economic grievances (in the
West focusing on poverty and government corruption, in the East on poverty, EastWest financial disparities, and government negligence).
The ‘alәma parties (including the JI) failed to tap into such grievances, focusing
instead throughout the 1970 election campaign season (and as always) on the
Islamization of Pakistan as the panacea for the country’s many problems. Indeed, the
main thrust of the Barelvi and Deobandi religio-political organizations tended strongly,
as ever, towards the establishment of an Islamic order. Apart from Islamization, most
of the ‘alәma stressed opposition to provincial nationalist (and secessionist) movements,
as well as a resoration, in time, of “democracy” (by means of this last maintaining a
veneer of opposition to the regime). (It should be noted that a large faction of the JUI
supported greater autonomy—and even outright independence—for the Pathan
northwest, or “Pakhtunistan.”) The PPP’s economic “solutions,” insisted the JI, were
based on false premises; only “Islam” could serve as a “rememdy,” to Pakistan’s so-called
social justic issues. In East Pakistan, JI activists literally clashed with Awami League
workers and sympathizers; one member of the JI’s male student wing was killed in a
confrontation at Dhaka University, prompting Mawdudi to demand “that the [student
group] cleanse Pakistani universities of the left.” More died—on both sides—in other
382

clashes across the country’s far eastern province. Indeed, the JI’s activities, and in
particular the party’s observation of what it dubbed “Glory of Islam Day” (ywm-eshwkәt-e-yslam) on 30 May, brought the Deobandis and Barelvis, in the shape of their
respective political parties, together in another show of “separate unity.” JI members,
workers, and sympathizers celebrated “Glory of Islam Day” via demonstrations, parades
and marches, speeches, and protest rallies; their goal was to throw the spotlight onto
Islam as the most important political issue (as opposed to the left’s emphasis on
economics-related promises).
But to the JUI under mufti Mahmud (who by now had consolidated his power at the
top of the party structure by taking over the “Pashtun faction” of the JUI), the
celebration smacked of opportunism, and represented an attempt on Mawdudi’s part to
set himself up as a sort of religious head. In this the JI chief was usurping the
traditional role of the ‘alәma and thereby “monopolizing religious thought.” The JUI
thus opposed ywm-e-shwkәt-e-yslam and a schism ensued. The JUP, too, demonstrated
its opposition to the JI when it contested the party directly in forty-two National
Assembly seat races—effectively splitting the religious vote and more or less ensuring
PPP victory in those particular races.176 Meanwhile, the JUI put forward its own
candidates as well. It is interesting to note that while both the Deobandi JUI and the
Barelvi JUP opposed the JI, and for the same reason, no alliance between the two—even
in the name of advancing the cause of an Islamic constitution—ever took place. Rather,
they contested each other, especially in Punjab and Sindh. This only accomplished in
watering down the religious vote. The Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic had weakened the
religious parties’ political chances yet again.
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Perhaps it is not surprising that no united Deobandi-Barelvi effort took place during
the 1970 elections. Apart from their long-standing religious rivalry, the JUP in
particular could scarcely unite within itself. One segment of the Barelvi leadership even
sided with Bhutto’s PPP, remaining seemingly unmoved in their decision despite calls
(and even juridical rulings) condemning their position. After all of the failed attempts
over the previous months to bring the various factions within the party together, a
“grand meeting” of Barelvi ‘alәma was convened on 4 April in Lahore. Only one major
JUP faction—that of Mahmud Shah Gujrati—failed to attend. One of the key
stumbling blocks to achieving intra-party harmony was the seemingly perpetual state of
disagreement and mutual mistrust displayed by its several leaders. The Lahore meeting
took drastic steps to combat this, accepting or forcing the resignation of five key
officials (including party president Abdul Hamid Badayuni, who, though not personally
present, had wired his approbation both of the meeting and its decisions) within the
JUP. “After all these resignations,” wrote one JUP historian, “the differences of the
Sunni Ulama were bridged…” A twenty-five-person committee was appointed to act as
the party’s “executive supreme council.” Another committee, this one composed of six
members, was also appointed—with the task of composing an official JUP manifesto.
Combined with the JUP’s direct contestation of the elections later that year, this marked
the completion of the transformation of the JUP from quasi-politico-religious movement
to full-fledged religio-political party.
The JUP platform would highlight the “cause of Islam,” blaming the Ayub Khan
regime as well as the newly ascendant socialist parties for twisting the faith, at the same
time condemning “Regionalism” and those “threatening guerilla war” (these last two
referred especially to the separatism brewing in Pakistan’s eastern wing). One JUP
384

leader, Mahmud Ahmad Rizvi (the convener of the newly formed party central
committee) even suggested that the party form its own army to stamp out the threat of
would-be secessionists and/or advocates of guerilla war, though nothing official appears
to have come of it. JUP candidates demanded not only that shәri’at be strictly and
immediately instituted in Pakistan, but that ninety percent of the armed forces should
be comprised of “Sunnis.” The JUP promise: “As long as a single Sunni is alive, no
other ‘ism’ can establish its roots in Pakistan.” Like the JI and the JUI, the JUP focused
on placing Islam and the establishment of a truly Islamc government in Pakistan atop
the political pedestal, ahead of the PPP’s socio-economic emphases. As to the latter, the
long-overdue institution of an “Islamic” economic system, the JUP insisted, was the
answer to such problems.177 A mostly united front had been created behind the Barelvi
religious leadership, though it wouldn’t take more than a few months for some major
cracks in its foundation to appear.
Calls for Islam to remain the front-and-center issue on the political stage, emanating
from the JUI, the JI, and the JUP, went mostly unheeded. The religious parties’ own
divisions, not to mention their rivalries one with another, further eroded their ability to
contest the elections as major players. Indeed, during the election period there were
some who even proclaimed the “consummation” of the “process of political
secularization” trail-blazed by Sir sayyid Ahmad Khan; from now on, these
commentators asserted, “economic issues will determine the dynamics of politics”—not
questions of theology.178 And as aforementioned, cconomic issues certainly did
dominate the 1970 elections, pushing the issue of an Islamic state into the background,
despite JUI, JI, and JUP efforts to wrest it back into the spotlight. Another factor that
seemed to be contributing to the eventual seeming irrelevance of the ‘alәma parties may
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have been the couching, by virtually every party, of political terms in Islamic ones.
Party propaganda—and not just that of the ‘alәma parties, anymore—was marked by a
vaneer of “Muslimness,” of “the ideology of Pakistan.” This was perhaps most famously
demonstrated in Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto’s slogan for the PPP, first uttered in a political
speech four months after his resignation as Ayub Khan’s Foreign Minister: “Islam our
Faith, Democracy our Policy, Socialism our Economy.”179 In this vein, Bhutto called his
economic program “Islamic socialism.” “We [the PPP] would lay down our lives for
Islam,” Bhutto told a crowd in Rawalpindi in February 1969, at the same time
condemning “the rule of capitalists” and the super-rich.180 (Perhaps another, far more
consequential example of Bhutto’s political maneuverings vis-à-vis the “Islamic”
element of Pakistani society came in 1974, when his government declared Ahmadis to
be non-Muslims.) The ‘alәma thus no longer held a corner on the political market in
this regard. For many, the PPP’s allusions to Islam were genuine—simply the natural
result of their operating in Pakistan, a state borne of Muslim dreams. “The significance
of an Islamic state in Pakistan’s political culture,” wrote Pakistani scholar Sayyid A. S.
Pirzada, “is so dominating that even parties committed to a socialist way of life mention
an Islamic system of government in their manifestos.”181 To many among the ‘alәma,
however, the PPP and other socialist parties were merely cloaking their own genuinely
godless ideology in Islamic terms to fool the masses.
Even though the major rivalries evident during the 1970 general election season
revolved around socialism and its opponents, and East Pakistani autonomy and its
opponents, animosity between the Deobandi and Barelvi camps flared up considerably,
too. At a major JUP conference at Toba Tek Singh in June (a location selected to
counter the effect of another Toba Tek Singh conference, held earlier in March and led
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by erstwhile JUP head Mahmud Shah Gujrati; the earlier gathering, dubbing itself a
Farmer’s Conference, had been pro-PPP, condemning those who condemned socialism
and using hәdis to demonstrate support for communist China), the Deobandi JUI was
lambasted right along with “Socialism and Capitalism.” More than three thousand
‘alәma and mәshaix attended the Toba Tek conference, during which, M. Ahmad tells us,
“almost every speaker” opened his remarks with a scouring of both “Socialism and the
Congressite Ulama.” The Deobandis, maintained mwlana Arifullah Qadiri, were out to
destroy Pakistan once more—a country born desite their (the Deobandis’) best efforts to
prevent the Muslim state from coming into being in the first place. During the
conference’s final session, mwlana Muhammad Sharif Noori, after condemning Mawdudi
and the JI, took aim at two Deobandi heroes: sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli and his disciple
and friend Muhammad Ismail. sәyyid Ahmad and Muhammad Ismail, Noori said, were
British agents. JUP leader Mahmud Ahmad Riza blasted the JUI during his Friday
sermon at the same location, similarly lambasting mwlana Bhashani (head of the Awami
League)—seen as a socialist and a regionalist—and Bhutto. JUI ‘alәma were, Rizvi
argued, “the followers of Gandhi and Nehru” and thus did not truly have the best
interests of the ummәt in mind.182 Some of the Barelvi pirs used their significant social
and religious influence to sway—indeed, almost compel—disciples and murids to vote
according to their (the pirs’) dictates; xәwajәħ Qarauddin Sialvi, for example, threatened
with expulsion from the dәrgaħ any of his followers who failed to heed his political
counsel.183 During the election, Barelvi cadidates in the Punjab regularly spoke out
against other Islamic parties; in Sindh, though, candidates tended to avoid such
contention, focusing on the PPP instead. Thus Barelvi leaders were divided as to how
to confront socialism vis-a-vis the Deobandis, some opting to work “together” (or at
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least not to directly oppose one another, concentrating instead on Bhutto), others
directing their opposition towards the JUI, in the tradition of Ahmad Riza Khan—who
had been quite clear in regard to working with “bad” Muslims. Electoral opposition to
the JI would perhaps have been understandable, given that the JI was not, strictly
speaking, an ‘alәma party, but even the overarching joint goals of the JUI and the JUP
(specifically, for an unambiguously Islamic state, complete with an Islamic constitution
and a shәri’at-based judiciary) were not enough to cause the two groups to forge ahead
on a united platform. This was, perhaps, the greatest weakness of the ‘alәma parties in
pursuance of their electoral aims, and certainly the most significant political result of
the dynamic between the two schools of thought.
National Assembly elections were held on 7 December, with provincial elections
following closely on the tenth. The results spelled a staggering victory for the Awami
League in the eastern zone, where it won all but two seats in the National Assembly
(compared to none in the western zone). Still, this gave the party an actual majority in
Pakistan’s federal legislature, meaning it could legitimately form a government.
Meanwhile, the PPP dominated the results for Punjab and Sindh. For the Islamic
parties, the election represented an overwhelming dissapointment—even a disaster.
“The results of the 1970 National and Provincial Assembly elections,” wrote one
Pakistani scholar, “highlighted the inadequacy of Islam as the sole basis for political
legitimacy and support.”184 The only victory for the ‘alәma parties came in the NWFP
and Baluchistan, where the Deobandis through the JUI, in a coalition with the NAP,
were able to win pluralities. (Perhaps one JUI victory meant the most, however; in the
National Assembly’s Dera Ismail Khan constituency, mufti Mahmud beat out Zulfikar
‘Ali Bhutto himself.) All told, the JUI (operating in former West Pakistan only) won
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almost four percent of the total vote (3.98%), translating to seven National Assembly
seats. (This doesn’t include one seat won in East Pakistan by combined MJUI-NIP
efforts.)185 The JI (operating in both wings) won 6.03% of the total vote but just four
seats in the National Assembly. The JUP (campaigning mostly in the western wing)
obtained 3.94% of the vote total, plus seven National Assembly seats. The election
results, besides illustrating the relative weakness of the ‘alәma parties (failing as they
did to unite within a coalition), reveal, to an extent, the geography of the DeobandiBarelvi rivalry. In the NWFP and in Baluchistan, for example, the JUI won twenty-five
percent and twenty percent of the vote total, respectively, while the JUP scored zero
percent in both provinces. But in Sindh and Punjab, the JUP took home seven percent
and ten percent, respectively, almost double the JUI count in both provinces. Sindh and
Punjab were Barelvi areas, with a significant Deobandi minority mixed in, but in the
NWFP and Baluchistan, Deobandism clearly dominated. On the provincial level,
results were similarly proportioned; the JUI won four seats in the NWFP assembly and
three in the Baluchistan assembly, but only two in Punjab and none in Sindh, while the
JUP walked away with four seats in Punjab and seven in Sindh, but none in the NWFP
or Baluchistan.186
Things began to break down politically after the release of the 1970 election results.
Possessing a majority all on its own in the National Assembly, the Awami League under
shix Mujibur Rahman did indeed demand the right to form a government. Predictably,
Bhutto rejected this outright, and self-appointed mediator Yahya Khan was helpless to
bring the two to an accommodation. Bhutto further assured the impossibility of any
attempt at establishing civilian government when, in protest of the Awami League’s
perceived power grab, he announced that the PPP would not attend the National
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Assembly’s inaugural session. Of course, this would have effectively voided anything
the National Assembly might have attempted to do, prompting Yahya Khan—now in a
very delicate position—to dissolve his cabinet and postpone the sitting of the National
Assembly indefinitely. The move garnered an unsurprisingly hostile reception in
Pakistan’s eastern zone, where riots, demonstrations, and strikes combined with an
Awami League-led refusal by Bengalis either to pay their taxes or abide by Martial Law
restrictions. Their party had won fair and square—and now it was being pushed out of
power by petulant West Pakistanis. The JI, formerly a supporter of the regime,
temporarily broke with Yahya over the Awami League government issue,
understanding that Yahya’s non-compliance with the Bengalis likely meant more power
for Bhutto and the PPP—the greater enemy.187
Deobandi leaders tended to blame the gaping schism between East and West
Pakistanis on the “weakening of Islamic ties.” “The two wings,” wrote Muhammad Rafi,
“…became distant because the strong Islamic ties became weaker.” The subsequent
state of affairs made it easy for Pakistan’s—and Islam’s—“enemies” to take full
advantage of the situation. Bengali Hindu teachers, for example, were among those
blamed, as well as the ever-meddling Indian and and American governments. Of
course, provincial and linguistic differences played their parts, too, but these were mere
symptoms. What had brought on the “weaking of Islamic ties” in the first place?
Muhammad Rafi blamed the systematic emptying from “the Muslim mind” of “the spirit
of Muslim Nationhood.” Such Islam-centered nationhood had been fundamental to the
creation of Pakistan in the first place, but it had been corroded as the younger
generation confronted western culture and fashion, laziness, immorality, “nudeness,”
and “wasteful expenditure.” All took their toll, and politicans had predictably exploited
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the growing divisiness that naturally resulted in order to cultivate party spirit. This,
Muhammad Shafi’s son warned, would split the nation. (It was also why, as the reader
shall see, universities were among the first institutions targeted by the antisecessionists.) Like the JI, Deobandis in the Western zone were disappointed in the
“luxury-loving” Yahya Khan and his clumsy efforts at arbitration.188
Yahya Khan and Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto flew to Dhaka to attempt a negotiation with
Mujibur Rahman before things could get any worse. But this eleventh-hour move to fix
the situation quickly broke down, in part because West Pakistani troops were at the
same time being flown into Bengal complete with a contingency plan for militarily
taking over the province to enforce order by the barrel of the gun. (As early as March
1969, Ayub Khan had sent West Pakistani troops and tanks to East Pakistan “to deal
with internal unrest…”)189 In such an atmosphere, negotiations were useless, and on 25
March both Bhutto and Yahya flew back to the western zone. The next day, the
President banned the Awami League, made political activity illegal, and put back into
effect the old press, free speech, and assembly restrictions. Worst of all for the Bengalis,
the West Pakistani contingency plan went into immediate effect, targeting East
Pakistani universities, throwing up checkpoints, erecting roadblocks—and shooting
resisters. Mujibur Rahman himself was arrested and flown to Pakistan’s western wing
to stand trial for treason. Within days, a full-scale war of secession was underway; one
Major Ziaur Rahman proclaimed Bangladeshi independence from Chittagong, and a
government-in-exile was set up in Calcutta.190 To many of the ‘alәma, Yahya had
crossed an uncrossable line in pitting his Muslim army against fellow Muslims. It
seemed that that non-violent, diplomatic approach had been abandoned far too
abruptly—and that the suppression of the “rebellion” had been far too brutal. Whatever
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happened to seeking a political solution? Suddenly some among the religious leadership
were even missing Ayub Khan; he’d had his flaws, yes, but at least he’d been a
“powerful” and strong personality. Perhaps, they reasoned, old Ayub would have been
able to avoid armed conflict against fellow citizens through sheer force of character.191
Whatever Ayub Khan’s reaction might have been had he been in command, it was
Yahya Khan who was now calling the shots—and his crackdown was shockingly brutal,
producing something in the range of ten million refugees fleeing to India. Reports of
rape and mass murder proliferated. Images surfaced of dead bodies—civilians—
scattered along riverbanks or half-buried in the mud, of female corpses with their necks
tied to metal posts as if they’d been tortured to death. As the scale of the fighting
increased, local Bangladeshi forces (including some former Pakistani military units)
battled their erstwhile co-citizens from the western zone. “Islamic” imagery was used
by the Pakistani military both to justify its actions and to rally Pakistani soldiers;
passages from the Qur’an and admonitions from the sunnәt were “quoted copiously”
before the troops, while the memory of the great battles of the past—from Badr and
Uhud to the more recent mostly Deobandi stand against the British at Khyber—served
as a rallying cry.192 While the JUI played no role in support of the Yahya regime in
East Pakistan, the JI (which had broken with the JUI earlier over the “Glory of Islam
Day” scenario) and the JUP were granted “semiofficial role[s]” within the militaryimposed regime in Bengal, as was the Deobandi-leaning NIP. It should be remembered
that while the JUI had not really contested the 1970 elections in East Pakistan, the NIP,
JI, and JUP had lost big to the Awami League. Members of the aforementioned parties,
in the words of Haqqani, “formed peace committees throughout Pakistan’s eastern wing,
at district and even village levels. These parties functioned as the intelligence network
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of the Pakistan army…”193 The JI was an active supporter of the Pakistani army in its
mission to suppress the nationalist-secessionist ambitions of the Bengalis, the Mawdudiled party even calling the rebel Bengalis “the enemies of Islam.” (Supporters of the JI
and others whom the Western media derided as “right-wing religious fanatics” claimed
that it was the “socialist leaders” who were the real fanatics, inciting “urban upheaval”
and “partisanship” and causing “economic damage.” “It was Bhashani, the Maoist
leader,” five Muslim students reminded a British newspaper in late April 1969, “who
said that they were prepared to burn down the homes of those who would take part in
any elections. His supporters even broke into some Jamaat Islami [JI] offices and
desecrated the Qur’an. Is this not being fanatical?”)194 The JI sent delegations overseas
to lobby on Pakistan’s behalf in Europe and the across the Middle East. More
ominously, from March 1971 educated JI members along with members of the party’s
male student wing participated significantly as the core of al-badәri (“The Moon”), more
or less a paramilitary unit (some even say “death squad”) masquerading as a “volunteer
[rәzәkar] force,” put together by Pakistani military intelligence and responsible for the
murder and/or humiliation of an unknown number of Bengali “intellectuals, journalists,
student leaders and politicians” on regime-formulated hit lists.195 This was the first
example in Pakistan’s history of the government exploiting religion by creating militant
groups out of clerical parties in support of its agenda (though its activities vis-à-vis
Kashmir had come close); it certainly wouldn’t be the last, but it marked the beginning
of a new era in Pakistani government-Islamic party relationships. Another Pakistan
military-organized volunteer force, al-shәms (“The Sun”), though made up of a mishmash of individuals and groups, also included a number of Deobandi-leaning NIP
activists.196 According to one Deobandi source, the motivation behind their
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participation in the suppression of the “rebellion” was the entrance in the war of the
Indian state. Once India had picked sides, the conflict took on the color of jyhad.
Muhammad Rafi describes how the students and teachers at the Deobandi dar ul’alwm
Karachi were given rifle training; “the spirit of jyhad motivated every child and adult to
obtain training in warfare” in order to serve at the front. But before this “service” was
really possible on a mass scale, Yahya ordered “the shameful surrender.”197
December was the deciding month. In retaliation for Indian assistance to the
“rebels,” including Indian military movements along (and even across) the East
Pakistani border, Pakistan (on 3 December) attacked a number of military targets in
northern India. The next day India invaded East Pakistan by land, sea, and air. With
the fall of Dhaka to Indian might seemingly imminent, Pakistani forces surrendered to
India on the sixteenth (instantly transforming approximately one hundred thousand
soldiers into prisoners of war), and within twenty-four hours Indira Gandhi proclaimed
a (unilateral) cease-fire. Amidst the humiliating cry of angry demonstrators, Yahya
Khan stepped down on 20 December.198 Those ‘alәma who took part in the attempt to
suppress East Pakistani secessionist efforts remember this time as one in which “the
‘alәma and the students of [mәdrәsәħs] and volunteers of East Pakistan who had fought
with their lives for Pakistan were subjected to untold torture which outdid [Genghis]
Khan.” Meanwhile, Pakistan had been seemingly abandoned by its fellow Muslim
nations, which Deobandis, at least in part, blamed on the worldwide-ummәt-weakening
phenomenon of Arab nationalism.199 Both sides in the Bangladeshi War of
Independence had felt entirely justified in their separate struggles, and completely
victimized by the other. But it was the West Pakistanis who had to now live with
humiliation.
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Bhutto took the reigns of government in Yahya’s stead. The JI marked the PPP’s
assumption of power by observing a “Black Day” in Lahore (December 1971).200 This
Islam-focused opposition to the Bhutto regime was to be characteristic of the years to
come. “The loss of the eastern wing in 1971,” wrote Jalal, “was a watershed with a
transformative effect on the Pakistani psyche[,]…subverting the ‘two-nation’ theory”
and taking “a hefty toll on national pride” after “a humiliating military defeat by India.”
Jalal’s explanation for what happened next: “Unaccustomed to learning from history and
more comfortable with myths of an imagined past, Pakistanis were susceptible to the
Islamist charge that the ruling elite’s lack of religiosity had caused the country’s
disintegration.”201

Prelude to “Islamization”: 1971-1977.
With the 1970 elections, the departure of Bangladesh from the Pakistani polity, and
the takeover of Zulfikar ‘Ali Bhutto, the trend towards secularization—toward a marked
de-emphasis on Islam as the guiding force in Pakistani politics—appeared to be in full
swing, despite the best efforts of the Muslim scholars and divines. Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto,
who, unlike Ayub or Yahya, had barely reached adulthood when Pakistan was born,
represented a new generation of Pakistani leadership. The influence of the “old
guard”—those who had served for years in the civil service or army under the British
Raj—was waning, partly by attrition, while young forty-somethings like Bhutto, whose
worldviews were shaped less by the pre-Partition dream of a “Muslim homeland” in
South Asia and more by postcolonial nationalism, were increasingly taking center stage.
Bhutto himself had visions of a grand alliance of Asian and African nations, a
transcontinental zone he considered “a world of the proletariat.”202 He and others of his
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ilk thus fit into the secularist, left-leaning, and highly statist mould of many of the postcolonial world’s new leaders. It was a mould that neither the Deobandi nor Barelvi
religious leadership were willing to tolerate steering the Pakistani ship of state. And
like so many who have ridden to power on a wave of “democratic” promises, Bhutto
would ultimately depend on the guns of government to assure his ascendancy (utilizing
personal ties with the Army), not to mention his rule, where, like many “socialist”
leaders before him, he exhibited a “near-monopoly of decision-making power.”203 In
reference to the latter, one contemporary described Bhutto as a “populist-authoritarian
type of leader and a cosmetic democrat.”204 This was not the sort of political head that
the ‘alәma could trust to further along their goal of Islamic government—nor even of a
democratic restoration.
But the prognostications of the pundits predicting the supremacy of economic issues
(over religious ones) did not pan out, though Bhutto’s domestic program for Pakistan
did indeed stress the socio-political situation. In 1972 and again in 1976, the PPP
government took over all of the country’s banks and lending institutions, all of its
insurance companies, and scores of its industrial enterprises, effectively nationalizing
them. Despite all of this, and perhaps as a result of Pakistan’s geopolitical and selfidentifying reorientation after the traumatic 1971 loss of Bangladesh, Islam over the
next half-decade regained its dominant position within the framework of Pakistani
politics, culminating in the highly politicized Islam of the 1977 general elections; even
Bhutto (a wily politician who understood how to employ religion for political ends)
pushed forward a number of shәri’at-conforming laws (including the replacement of
Sunday with Friday as the weekly day off and bans on alcohol consumption, gambling,
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night clubs, pornography, and horse racing, though these were all last-ditch efforts
instituted in 1977 to win over the opposition).
It was during this period, too (1973), that Pakistan adopted a new Constitution (still
current, as of the time of this writing) pervaded with religious provisions. Martial Law
had been lifted in April 1972, after which the National Assembly had been restored.
Within that body, after the PPP, the most powerful political parties were the NAP and
the JUI. Once again, the National Assembly’s main task was to hammer out a
constitution; this represented Pakistan’s third major go-around in this regard, and like
previous attempts it was marked with tension and disagreement, especially between the
PPP on one side and the NAP-JUI on the other. But with previous constitution-making
efforts having laid the groundwork, a new document eventually emerged. On 31
December Pakistan’s third constitution was submitted in the National Assembly; it was
approved in April and went into effect on Independence Day: 14 August 1973.
Throughout the deliberations, political parties like the JUI, the JI, and the JUP stressed
their Islamic orthodoxy, while economic issues tended “to be manifested in the search
for a truly Islamic economy as well as for an Islamic polity…”205 Islam was again
recognized as the core of the nation’s identity, the single abiding force holding a polity
of disparate ethnicities, languages, and backgrounds together.
Part IX of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan contains the
document’s specifically Islamic provisions. With the exception of a brief preamble
confirming the “Holy Quran and the Sunnah” as the standard by which “all existing
laws” must be measured (“no law shall be enacted which is repugnant” to the injunctions
therein), Part IX pertains entirely to an official body within the Pakistani polity
identified as the Council of Islamic Ideology, though otherwise referred to simply as the
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Islamic Council (IC). Qualifications for appointment to the Council, made up of between
eight and twenty members, are broad; one member must be a woman, at least four must
have at least fifteen years of “Islamic research or instruction” under their belts, and at
least two must have been (or currently be) Supreme Court or High Court judges. Apart
from these specifics, the President may appoint anyone “having knowledge of the
principles and philosophy of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, or
understanding of the economic, political, legal or administrative problems of Pakistan.”
One other requirement: “so far as practicable various schools of thought” must be
represented within the IC, an obvious reference to the theological divisions plaguing the
ummәt in Pakistan, foremost among them the Deobandi-Barelvi split. A member could
serve on the Council for three years, barring resignation or eviction from the body by a
majority of the total membership.
The principal function of the IC has been to act as an advisory body on proposed law
(i.e. its adherence to Islamic injunctions), mainly to the Majlis-e-Shoora (mәjlys-e-shwra,
or Parliament) but also to the President, provincial assemblies, and provincial
governors. However, the IC is also charged with two additional functions. First, the IC
presents recommendations (to each of the bodies and offices aforementioned) “as to the
ways and means of enabling and encouraging Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives
individually and collectively in all respects in accordance with the principles and
concepts of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran and sunnәt.” Second, the IC must
prepare regular reports, to be discussed annually within both Houses and each
provincial assembly, recommending various Islamic injunctions that might be turned
into future legislation. The IC thus provides a high-level state role specifically for the
‘alәma. The competition between the various schools of Islam (primarily those of the
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Barelvi and Deobandi variety) was now on for control of this and other bodies within
the state apparatus.
During the 1970 elections, it had been generally assumed that the National Awami
Party—which performed well in the NWFP and Baluchistan—would hammer out some
sort of joint program with the PPP (which dominated Punjab and Sindh) after 1971;
they were both, after all, explicitly socialist parties. As it turned out, however, the
PPP’s Bhutto and NAP chief Wali Khan (son of aforementioned Khan Abdul Ghaffar
Khan) butted heads to such an extent that any sort of joint agreement quickly
transformed into more or less an impossibility. Indeed, the NAP joined the opposition,
and Wali Khan himself was elected Opposition Leader in the National Assembly. In
keeping with its long-held policy of siding with a lesser opponent in order to focus on a
greater one, the Deobandi JUI formed a coalition government in the NWFP and in
Baluchistan with the NAP in early April 1972.206 Addressing a crowd in Peshawar,
Wali Khan announced the formation of the NAP-JUI coalition and named JUI chief
mufti Mahmud the province’s Chief Minister. Any decision made by the PPP-controlled
central government-appointed provincial administration would, Wali Khan said, “not be
acceptable.”207 That same year, mufti Mahmud announced the official launch of alcohol
prohibition in the NWFP. The setting he chose was significant in that it hailed back—
much to the disapproval of the Barelvis—to the movement of sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli
(see Chapter 1), student of the Walliullahi tradition and renowned jyhadi of the early
nineteenth century. After the forces of sәyyid Ahmad had captured Peshawar in 1830,
his loyal companion Muhammad Ismail (whom the Barelvis would loathe as an out-andout “Wahhabi”) had stood before a crowd in the city. The date, on the Gregorian
calendar, was Sunday, 1 May. Facing the multitude, sәyyid Ahmad’s acolyte publicly
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declared alcohol a forbidden substance in the newly established Islamic state. Now, one
hundred forty-two years since that act, mufti Mahmud—likewise on Sunday, 1 May—
was making the very same declaration (even standing in the exact spot, as far as could
be ascertained).208 Here in the NWFP, at least, if not in the rest of the country, Islamic
law (as seen through a Deobandi lens) would be respected and established—a step
towards fulfilling sәyyid Ahmad’s original, and unrealized, dream. That mufti Mahmud’s
symbolism harked back to such a controversial figure—indeed, possibly the most
controversial figure—of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry could not have been missed by the
province’s (and Pakistan’s) Barelvi religious leadership.
But the Bhutto government remained strongly opposed to the NAP-JUI provincial
administrations. In late September 1973, an unidentified shooter attempted to
assassinate Abdul Wali Khan. The latter blamed the incident on the “[central]
Government and members of the Pakistan People’s Party.” The Bhutto regime,
through their ambassador in London (one Mumtaz Daultana) claimed “shock and
horror” at the alleged assassination attempt and blamed it instead on the peasants’
discontent with the NAP-JUI government’s seeming preference for “the local
entrenched landlord interests.”209 Each side thus took advantage of the murder attempt
to try to politically cripple the other. The PPP government was more successful later,
when it utilized the apparent discovery of “a massive cache of Soviet-made arms,”
ostensibly meant for Baluchistan, within the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad as a pretext for
completely dismantling the NAP-JUI government in that province.210 (Since 1973,
Pakistan’s Baluchistan province had been the scene of a hard-fought Baluchi war of
independence. The war would last for four years—and flare up from time to time
afterwards—until the independence movement was finally and brutally surpressed by
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the mostly Punjabi Pakistan Army.) In protest of Bhutto’s dramatic action, the NAPJUI government in the NWFP resigned, too. This move only strengthened Bhutto’s
immediate position, however, as the wily PPP head quickly replaced both province’s
governors with his own picks.211 Thus ended the JUI’s brief stint as co-ruling party in
Pakistan’s westernmost provinces, once more revealing Bhutto’s autocratic style of rule;
opposition was not to be tolerated, and power was to be strong in the center—despite
the state’s alleged federal structure (with residual powers left to the provinces)
mandated by the constitution. After the dissolution of the NAP-JUI governments in the
NWFP and Baluchistan, the Bhutto regime continued to harass opposition parties using
the state’s law enforcement agencies (together with enthusiastic PPP supporters). At
one NAP event in Rawalpindi several NAP members were killed by such action. The
response from the opposition, both to the Bhutto regime’s harassment as well as its
specific role in toppling the Baluchistan and NWFP governments (where the PPP had
lost badly), was to form an eight-party alliance: the United Democratic Front, which
included the JUI, the JI, and the JUP, as well as the Deobandi-leaning Khaksars.212 The
alliance’s goals were to “restore democracy, check dictatorship, and work for an Islamic
and parliamentary constitution, [as well as] the release of political prisoners.” For the
Barelvis and the Deobandis, the alliance represented another temporary partnership
with one another, once again borne of political expediency and characterized by
“separate unity.”
Despite the formation of the new alliance (indeed, perhaps because of it), the
harassment continued, forcing the Deobandi and Barelvi leadership, generally speaking,
to band together (though, as always, as separately as possible) against what was
perceived as a hostile, repressive, and anti-Islam regime. Meanwhile, the Bhutto
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government consolidated its power both from within and without. From within,
consolidation was achieved by purging the party of “the more leftist elements” in its
midst (most notably in 1974, when Bhutto “cleansed” his cabinet of such individuals), as
well as by the purging of almost fifteen hundred military officers whose loyalty was
deemed less than desirable. (One of the generals he did advance, over several more
senior personnel: Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, who became Army chief-of-staff in 1976,
replacing erstwhile director of the brutal 1971 West Pakistani crackdown in Bengal
General Tikka Khan.) In addition, Bhutto organized the Federal Security Force, a
militant entity that functioned outside of the military and ofttimes acted as a sort of
Praetorian Guard for Bhutto himself. From without, the PPP government secured its
position through media censorship, aggressive “policing,” and the harassment and
imprisonment (and even murder) of political enemies.213 Perhaps characteristic of his
transition from “democrat” to despot, Bhutto had campaigned throughout the 1970
elections for a parliamentary system of government—only to change his mind later
(conveninently when he himself was in power) in favor of a presidential one (with
Bhutto as president, of course). When he eventually lost the presidential system battle
after the National Assembly adopted a parliamentary order instead, Bhutto ensured via
provision that, even so, it would be near impossible for the legislature to remove the
Prime Minister (himself).214
When PPP co-founder and leading propagator of socialism Hayat Khan Sherpao was
assassinated in a bomb blast at Peshawar University (8 February 1975), the Bhutto
government’s action was swift; the NAP, immediately blamed for the incident, was
banned and its leaders arrested (including party head Wali Khan, as well as his son
Asfandyar Wali Khan—the latter accused of masterminding the murder). Though the
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accused were later acquitted, they remained in prison until Zia ul-Haq released them
three years later. Any other political party that the administration deemed a recipient of
aid from a foreign quarter was likewise banned.215 Several JI leaders were also harassed,
arrested, and imprisoned; one of the party chiefs, Nazir Ahmad—a National Assembly
member described by one scholar as the JI’s “most vociferous” representative in the
federal legislative body—was shot dead by government forces. “Never before,” wrote
Nasr, “had any Pakistani government gone so far to silence its opposition,” and this
under a supposedly democratic, civilian regime. Nasr goes on to mark the assassination
of Nazir Ahmad as “the beginning of the rapid radicalization” of the JI’s male student
wing, an indication of the role of government in the radicalization of religious parties.216
Indeed, together with the regime’s role in the formation and arming of so-called “death
squads” out of religious parties during the Bangladeshi war of independence, Bhutto’s
harassment and targeting of the religious parties during his presidential tenure initiated
a process of militant transformation among the religious parties, or at least among a
segment therein.

March 1977: “Zenith” of Islam’s “Politicization.”
The year 1977 was one of major significance in the history of Pakistan. “The
politicization of Islam,” wrote Esposito in the early 1980s, “reached its zenith in the
general [Pakistani] elections of March 1977.” When elections were first announced by
Bhutto in January, the anti-PPP parties leapt into action mode; this was their chance to
finally and democratically oust the strongman regime. Standing in opposition to the
ruling PPP government of Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto was a newly formed nine-party coalition
of political parties: the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Though the union included
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parties representating a variety of positions across the left-right political spectrum, its
platform seemed to revolve distinctly around the watchword “Islam.” Mosques and
religious seminaries—thousands of them—doubled as hubs of political activity. The
alliance advocated for the institution of the “System of the Prophet” (nyzam-e-mustafa),
meaning the establishment of a truly Islamic order after that founded by God through
Muhammad in the opening days of the Muslim era. This was the very reason Pakistan
had been created—and Islam was the only answer, as a unifying force, to the ethnic and
linguistic schisms plaguing the country. Bhutto was cast as anti-Islam, the ‘alәma and
other PNA members pointing to both his regime’s policies as well as his own personal
way of life as proof. The PPP government was corrupt and sick to the core, and the
remedy lay not in the political philosophies of the world (whether socialism or
capitalism) but in the just and egalitarian system God had instituted in Medina and
spelled out in the Qur’an and sunnәt. And like the old, pre-Partition Muslim League, the
PNA warned of “Islam in Danger!” Despite the philosophical differences between the
various parties constituting the PNA, then—economic, political, even religious—the
politically eclectic alliance’s “direction and leadership” undoubtably emanated from the
Islamic parties, namely the JUI, the JUP, and the JI.217 This was a rare testament to the
power the religious parties could have had acting jointly for some political purpose.
That same year the Barelvi JUP was instrumental in forming the Tehrik-e-Nizam-eMustafa (tәhrik-e-nyzam-e-mustafa, or “Movement of the System of the Prophet”), an
anti-Bhutto outfit. The organization would become a JUP front group after Zia ul-Haq
banned political parties in October 1979.
Meanwhile, the Deobandi JUI under mufti Mahmud campaigned passionately
against the Bhutto regime, especially in the western provinces, combating the PPP’s
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socialism with the publication of Mahmud’s own socialism kufәr he. This phrase—
meaning “Socialism is Disbelief”—had been the anti-Bhutto slogan of the JUI, the JI,
and the JUP years before, during the 1970 elections, when the rising star that was
Bhutto first appeared to threaten the religious parties’ success in West Pakistan. Now,
seven years later, the issue of atheistic socialism’s alleged takeover of the Pakistani
polity (including the widespread belief that the PPP represented a Marxist front party
with aims of instituting one-party Communist rule) remained a central one. mufti
Mahmud played a leading role within the PNA as an anti-Bhutto agitator and later was
appointed a member of the PNA delegation that met with Bhutto to attempt a
negotiation.218 The opposition parties pointed out that Bhutto’s promises of bread,
clothing, and shelter for all had failed miserably in their fulfillment; Bhutto had fallen
especially short when it came to land redistribution—another broken PPP promise.
Indeed, after India had successfully tested its first nuclear device (1974), Bhutto had
sworn that Pakistan would catch up with neighboring India even if Pakistanis were
forced to “eat grass” in the process.219 So much for bread!
But Bhutto refused to be sidelined either by the opposition’s defaming of his
economic record (he pointed to rising GDP and falling inflation rates) or by the PNA’s
appeals to Islam. Indeed, the opposition coalition’s pressure on the PPP forced the
ruling party to take a more “Islamic” stance in order to garner electoral support;
Bhutto’s party, previously an explicitly socialist entity, replaced the word “socialism”
with the more Islamic-sounding phrase musәwәt-e-muhәmmәd (“equality of
Muhammad”) in its literature. Meanwhile, the PPP’s opposition, most visibly in the
form of the PNA, asserted its own service to the Islam. Both sides promised that their
proposed version of government was the one most suited to ultimately bring about the
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realization of a truly Islamic order. Thus the heated elections of 1977 helped foment a
competition between the major political parties of Pakistan, both secular and religious,
over dedication to the religion of Allah. To offset the PNA’s number one platform
item—the institution of Islamic government in Pakistan—the PPP, too, vowed to work
for increased Islamization; it promised, for example, to make Friday the weekly holiday
in place of Sunday. It should be noted that while the JUP did form part of the PNA, this
was in no way representative of the vast majority of Barelvis, whose individual loyalties
fell on both sides of the political divide. Meanwhile, the Deobandis leaned heavily
against the PPP.
With the support of the upper class and the poorer classes (who, as always, rallied
behind Bhutto’s promises of bread, clothing, and shelter for all), however, and combined
with the PPP’s now well-established ability to politically co-opt religious symbolism,
Bhutto won an “impressive victory” in the March 1977 general elections. All told, the
ruling PPP had won an overwhelming one hundred fifty-five seats in the National
Assembly, compared to only thirty-six for the PNA. Sensing that the lopsided win was
likely to spark protest, Bhutto immediately banned political assemblies throughout the
country. He was right, of course; the PPP win did spark outrage among the regime’s
opposition. The government was charged with election fraud, and the PNA launched a
campaign of agitation, using the mosques as venues for anti-Bhutto political speeches as
well as staging grounds for rallies and marches. Specifically, the PNA demanded
another election. When Bhutto refused to hold such a do-over, demonstrations against
the government only increased in number and severity. Bhutto tried to assuage the
opposition by instituting a shәri’at-inspired ban on gambling, prostitution, and alcohol
(as was promised as part of his Islamic makeover during the campaign), but this only
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succeeded in throwing the spotlight on Islam and thereby strengthening the position of
the ‘alәma-directed PNA. Wrote Esposito, “Islam and Pakistan’s Islamic identity had
reemerged as the dominant theme in Pakistani politics in a manner and to a degree that
had not been seen since Pakistan’s establishment.”220 The situation deteriorated to such
an extent that in July Bhutto declared Martial Law. Then, on 5 July 1977, the Army
took over, proclaimed Martial Law itself, and forcefully placed all political leaders—
including the Prime Minister—in military custody.
Deobandis and Barelvis stood divided on the change in management. Zulfiqar ‘Ali
Bhutto would not come out of the regime-change situation alive.
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5 - ISLAMIZATION AND WAR:
Militarization of the Rivalry, 1977-2001

Even though he tried his best to steer it toward a secular democracy, Jinnah did not live long
enough to see it become one. Over the coming years, Pakistan took a very troubling turn. In a
matter of nine years, it became an “Islamic Republic,” and in a little over two decades, it had
essentially become a theocracy... The same extremist clerics who had opposed Jinnah and his
struggle for Pakistan gradually claimed ownership of the State. They formed political groups
that used religion to amass public support. Their demonstrations of street power, frequently
violent, meant that sectarian hatred and intolerance was the order of the day.
KASHIF CHAUDHRY, THE EXPRESS TRIBUNE, 19 SEPTEMBER 20111

ON PAGE 141 of Husain Haqqani’s Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (2005), the
author addresses Pakistan’s “sectarian issues” vis-à-vis the creation and political
evolution of the state.

Sectarian issues had played little part in the campaign for Pakistan’s creation
and Pakistan’s official census figures did not report sectarian identities of
Muslims in an effort to keep the lid on sectarian differences among
Muslims. The demand by Shiites, in the aftermath of the [1980] Zakat
controversy, for effective representation at higher levels of the state and
recognition of their sectarian interests laid the foundations of bitter
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Shiite-Sunni conflict, which later led to the creation of terrorist militias
within both sects. (Italics added)2

Here Haqqani lays out the generally accepted narrative of sectarianism in Pakistan,
defined within the context of the Shi’a-Sunni rivalry—and, importantly, denying any
significant role “sectarian issues” might have played in the struggles leading up to
Partition (an assertion at least partially debunked, it is hoped, earlier in this work). (If
“sectarian issues” were so insignificant, too, then why—pointed out in Haqqani’s very
next sentence—would the Pakistani state go to so much trouble to “keep a lid” on
them?) Developments that occurred during the rule of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq,
in particular, insists Haqqani, laid the groundwork for future Shi’a-Sunni conflict. This
is certainly true, but equally important (and perhaps more so) were similar
developments within the Sunni community itself, mostly between the minority
Deobandi and majority Barelvi sub-sects, each of which separately (and considerably)
outnumbered Pakistan’s Shi’a population. This Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry would erupt
into steady violence in the 1990s, 2000s, and into the 2010s—violence that would
sometimes mistakenly be attributed to the more publicized (at least internationally)
Shi’a-Sunni conflict. Indeed, it was in the period between 1979 and 1988—the years of
Zia ul-Haq’s regime—that Pakistan underwent a major socio-political “Islamization,” of
which the Deobandis, though significantly smaller in number, were able take advantage
far more efficiently than their Barelvi counterparts. Of course, this was no new
phenomenon to the politically minded Barelvi ‘alәma, who had often felt ignored by the
Pakistani state they and their theological forebears had helped create, in comparison to
their Deobandi rivals. And it was within the political framework of the Pakistani state
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that the formerly civil, if bitter, rivalry between Deobandis and Barelvis—once fought
via juridical rulings, public debates, and books, then via “all-India” Muslim
organizations within the context of pre-Partition independence politics, and now
represented by political parties vying for real money and real power—evolved into
something far more brutal in character.

Consolidating Power: Zia, Democracy, and the ‘alәma
Shortly after carrying out his coup, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq described his
actions as those of a concerned citizen, nothing more. Bhutto had been on the verge of
unleashing the Army on the opposition and executing or imprisoning its (the
opposition’s) leaders; this had to be stopped. (The Army’s name for Zia’s July 1977
military coup: Operation Fair Play.) Zia vowed that the 1973 constitution, currently
suspended, would be restored, and that free and fair elections would be held within
ninety days; political parties would be free both to file nominations and to carry out
their campaigns. The promise of elections was to the PNA’s liking, as the alliance fully
expected to assume the reigns of government now that the PPP flame had been
extinguished. But Zia’s promises quickly evaporated. The reason, insisted Pakistan’s
new dicatator, was the unexpected discovery by the regime of a wide range of abuses
perpetrated on the Pakistani people by the Bhutto government. There must be
accountability, Zia argued, before the state could move on. A flurry of “white papers”
was produced by the government, on topics ranging from Bhutto’s illegal utilization of
his Federal Security Force to the previous regime’s muzzling of the press. All of this
was used as a pretext for postponing elections. The fawning and multitudinous
reception that Bhutto received in Lahore (during a brief stint of freedom) convinced
410

many within the PNA that perhaps Zia was right after all—perhaps the PPP was still a
threat, a force with which to be reckoned yet. Suddenly, too, the PNA was far less sure
about its own electoral prospects.3 But Deobandi and PNA president mufti Mahmud
discounted the alleged “resurgence of support” for Bhutto and his erstwhile party; the
pro-PPP demonstrations, he said, were “all propaganda. Once you get to the top and
fall down you never come back. That’s the history of Pakistan.” The mufti further
asserted that rumors that the PNA was united “only in opposition to Mr Bhutto” (and
thus devoid of any coherent platform) were untrue—and being spread by “the Western
press and broadcasting media.” Still, the promised elections were pushed back again,
with the possibility of a PPP resurgence (and, subsequently, another East Pakistan
situation—in Baluchistan, for example) cited as Zia’s chief justification. Zia’s pushing
back of the elections, even if it was ostensibly to “clean up” the mess left by the previous
administration, was not greeted with favor by mufti Mahmud. Indeed, the Deobandi
mwlana delivered to the General a public ultimatum of sorts in early November,
declaring that unless elections were held “next March” (1978)—at this point Zia was
saying that even next November appeared unlikely—Pakistan “could be plunged into
chaos again.” Despite Zia’s assurances that the election postponements were justified,
mufti Mahmud did not understand why this should be so. At one point Zia told the
press that the PNA itself had requested the election delays, but mufti Mahmud
vehemently denied this allegation.4
Eventually elections were postponed indefinitely. Bhutto himself was sentenced to
death for his alleged role in the murder of a political opponent. In early March 1978,
Zia banned political activity (though not political parties, yet), promising elections the
next year. Ironically, given his white paper concerning Bhutto’s illegal manipulation of
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the press, the regime shut down several papers itself that same month, simultaneously
arresting around two hundred journalists. In April, despite pleas from international
leaders for the commuting of his sentence (but with the strong support of the JI), the
Zia government hanged Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto. In the meantime, Zia organized a quasicivilian government (two-thirds of which would be made up of PNA people, with the
remaining third direct Zia appointees); of the religious parties, the JI benefitted most
from this arrangement, scoring several cabinet positions. But this government was
dissolved in April 1979 as the PNA parties prepared for the upcoming elections.
Perhaps predictably, however, the promised 1979 national and provincial elections,
scheduled for November, never took place, though the regime did carry out non-party
local elections (during which PPP candidates ran under the pseudonym “Friends of the
People” [awami dwst]; the religious parties did much the same—the JUP continuing to
operate, for example, under the name of the anti-Bhutto organization it had created, the
tәhrik-e-nyzam-e-mustafa).5
Eventually (October 1979) Zia banned political parties altogether.
Both the Barelvi and Deobandi religious leadership were caught off guard by Zia’s
sudden takeover, and the continued breakdown of “democracy” that followed. On the
one hand, the General seemed little interested in restoring the old constitutional, party
system, a goal for which they had ostensibly been struggling when Zulfiqar ‘Ali had
been in charge. On the other, Zia had gotten rid of Bhutto, and also boasted a
reputation as a practicing, observant Muslim, one who retained the humility demanded
by his faith even in his own exalted politico-military position.6 Their confusion as to
how best to react characterized the ‘alәma parties’ relationship with the new regime in
general, as they strove to come to terms with a ruler seemingly far more amenable to
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the establishment of an Islamic state but also even more authoritatrian than his
predecessor—indeed, than any previous head of the Pakistani polity. Journalists and
some historians would later characterize the Zia regime, in black-and-white fashion, as
one that favored the religious parties, but this is only partly true, as shall be
demonstrated. In the end, Zia’s actions seemed indicative of a man in power who sought
to retain that power, however personally devoted he might have been to Islam.
*
mufti Mahmud died in 1980. His son, Fazlur Rehman, was subsequently elected JUI
general secretary, thus illustrating the dynastic, “family fiefdom” character of parties in
Pakistan—what Lodhi called “the primacy of personalism over organization” (and while
this phenomenon is more pronounced in organizations like the Bhutto-dominated PPP
or the Sharif-led Muslim League, the religious parties have also developed this attribute;
in another example, Fazlur Rehman would later nominate his own brother, mwlana
Attaur Rehman—already the JUI’s vice-president—to join the Gilani cabinet as
Minister of Tourism).7 In any case, it didn’t take long for the new party chief to find
himself behind bars for his opposition to the Zia regime. Early in February 1981, a
student dispute with bus drivers in Multan quickly ballooned into a countrywide antigovernment protest. For five days, students across Pakistan (but especially in Multan,
Lahore, Quetta, and Malakand) demonstrated—often violently—against the regime.
On 16 February the government arrested Fazlur Rehman, along with three other
political party heads, all of whom were partly blamed for the unrest. (The other
arrested leaders: Masrullah Khan of the Pakistan Democratic Party, former NAP head
Mehmud ‘Ali Kasuri of the surging Tehrik-e-Istiqlal Party, and M. A. Gohir of the
PPP). It seems that the student violence had presented Zia with a plausible chance to
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rid himself of opposition—a chance he readily seized. Only ten days earlier, after all,
Fazlur Rehman and the JUI, plus almost a dozen other parties, had formed an
opposition alliance (what would become the Movement for the Restoration of
Democracy, or MRD) demanding “an end to military rule and the holding of
parliamentary elections within three months.”8 Prominent among the MRD parties was
the PPP. The imprisoning of the opposition helped Zia stem any sudden MRD tide, but
the real event to cripple the latter’s efforts (at least for a couple years) was the hijacking
of a Pakistan International Airlines flight by the militant group Al-Zulfiqar—an outfit
led by Bhutto’s sons (Murtaza Bhutto and Shahnawaz Bhutto). Despite the indirect
nature of the “link” between Al-Zulfiqar and the MRD (and daughter Benazir Bhutto’s
own condemnation, while under house arrest, of the hijacking operation), the alliance
took a hit as mass declamation of the event forced the MRD to back down, at least for
the time being.
By 1983, though, the opposition was able to reassert itself. This was especially true
in Sindh (from the beginning the PPP’s base of support; the Bhuttos were, after all, an
aristocratic Sindhi family). The MRD sent people onto the streets to “court arrest,
Gandhi-style.” Among the organizers were the Barelvi pir of Hala (in Sindh) and his
sons, whose illustrious ancestor, Makhdoom Lutuf Allah (known as Makhdoom Nuh), a
Sufi saint of the Suhrawardy order and a “great scholar in Islamic traditions and laws,”
is remembered for courageously standing up to several tyrants of his own day.9 But the
demonstrations involved more than simply daring the police to make arrests. In a clash
with government forces near Moro (in west-central Sindh), the MRD claimed twelve
dead at the hands of Zia’s troops (“local reporters” would say five: two soldiers and three
civilians). Agitators burst the retaining wall holding the Indus River back from a
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national highway passing through Sindh, flooding the road with water and making it
virtually impassable. Government troops fired into a crowd of demonstrators in the
village of Khano Bula Khan (less than forty miles west of Hyderabad, in Sindh), killing
at least one.10
But by late August, the “revolt” against Zia’s Martial Law regime had stagnated
enough that the General felt secure in leaving the country altogether on a state visit to
Turkey. Still, the fires hadn’t been entirely squelched. Limited protests in Sindh
continued. Police broke up a march from the shrine of Z. A. Bhutto, only to be stoned
by demonstrators before the latter were scattered by rifle shot. In Hyderabad, several
hundred students burned Zia ul-Haq in effigy on a university soccer field. In Quetta, a
general strike was announced in which many of the city’s shops took part. During this
period, the JUI and the JUP were united insofar as their opposition to the regime was
concerned, though the latter’s opposition seems to have been less outright. By the end
of September, the MRD agitation had been ongoing for six weeks—most fervently in
Sindh, but with notable moments in Punjab and Baluchistan, too. But there were clear
signs that enthusiasm was beginning to wane. New support was needed, a fresh
infusion of passion and numbers. At this critical juncture, the Barelvi JUP promised to
“join in.” Meanwhile, Zia remained adamant that he would not negotiate with the MRD
until the agitation ceased completely. One headline of the time read: “Pakistan:
stalemate or fateful spark?”11 Had the regime and the MRD reached gridlock—or was
something about to catch fire?
Whatever their differences with the Zia government, it seemed that perceived
Indian aggression was often enough to ensure both Barelvi and Deobandi loyalty to the
regime, however temporary, just as it had in 1965 over Kashmir. After Indira Gandhi
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and her Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao voiced controversial statements regarding the
Sindh unrest, for example, JUP head mwlana Shah Ahmad Noorani—rather than
making a statement himself against India—urged the Zia regime to “lodge a strong
protest” against Pakistan’s eastern neighbor.12 This turning to Zia came despite Shah
Noorani’s general opposition to Zia ul-Haq. Indeed, the JUP under Noorani, as
aforementioned, supported the MRD, though—unlike the Deobandi JUI—that support
stopped just short of the JUP’s officially joining the alliance. (In typical Barelvi fashion,
the JUP organized its own civil disobediance campaign in another show of “separate
unity.”) After the broohaha over the Indian leaders’ Sindh-related comments had
passed, Shah Ahmad was back to publicly opposing the military government. Indeed,
Noorani held a press conference in late September 1983 to protest against the regime’s
“continuing censorship of the Pakistani press.” One of the items addressed at the
meeting, too, was the alleged cover-up by the government of the police massacre of
forty-five villagers who had been mourning the death of an anti-Zia demonstrator. The
allegation was made by PPP head (and widow of Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto) Nusrat Bhutto,
then dying of cancer in France, and was distributed in written form by Noorani
himself.13 Thus both the Deobandi JUI and the Barelvi JUP cooperated with the PPP
during this period, the JUI overtly via political alliance and the latter less directly, as in
settings such as the September 1983 Noorani press conference.
Amidst the MRD-piloted agitation, non-party elections to Pakistan’s local councils
in all four provinces took place (October). Zia had abolished the local government
system put in place by the Bhutto regime in 1979, replacing it with his own “local
bodies” scheme focusing on rural development. It was for these bodies that the elections
were organized.14 In Sindh, one observer dubbed these local contests “the bloodstained
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elections” as violence continued to rock the country. Another commentator described
the “[v]iolent agitation in Sind over the past two months” as resulting “in heavy loss of
life and damage to government and private property.”15 But the fact that Zia had held
local elections across Pakistan at all gave him “room to manoevre,” at least—a lifeline
amidst the storm of protest in which he found himself. Despite the agitation, Pakistan’s
news media (“under Government instructions,” of course) the day after the local
elections proclaimed, “Elections were held in [a] completely peaceful and disciplined
atmosphere. Turnout of the voters at the polling stations was quite satisfactory and up
to the mark.” This low-level chance for the masses to vote had bought Zia some time.
He would use it in an attempt to shore up his position—by trying to win over the
Barelvis.
After all, the Deobandi JUI was too far gone, officially allied as it was with the other
MRD parties. But the JUP had remained more ambivalent; perhaps it could be wooed.
(Zia’s enthusiasm for the JI, strong when he first came to power, had by now cooled
somewhat; perhaps he saw in the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic an opportunity to “divide
and conquer” by co-opting the less vociferous Ahl-e-Sunnat religious leadership.) The
same month that Zia allowed for local elections across Pakistan, then, he summoned the
JUP leadership to Rawalpindi for talks. Shah Ahmad Noorani led the party’s
delegation. The Barelvi party’s invitation appears to have been facilitated by a
sympathizer in the military, former NWFP governor (and future JUP general secretary,
then president) Lieutenant-General K. M. Azhar (d. 2006 AD), an Aligarh-educated
former Leaguer, present at the passing of the Lahore Resolution and veteran of both the
1948 Kashmir war with India and the Rann of Kuch operation against India in 1964 (as
well as the British campaign in Burma during World War II).16 Shah Ahmad arrived in
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Islamabad, from where he would travel to Rawalpindi, on 10 October.17 No one was
quite sure what the “talks” would entail, but the move proved to be a wry one on Zia’s
part; the JUP promptly withdrew its pledge to join the agitating MRD and called off its
own civil disobedience program.18 Indeed, Shah Ahmad had apparently met with the pir
of Hala in late September (probably after the “talks” with Zia were put on the table), and
observers wondered if the JUP had tried to dissuade the pir and his sons from their
political activities, further buoying up the wisdom of Zia’s move to reach out to the
Barelvi politico-religious leadership.19
The impact of the JUP-Zia meeting seems to have gone both ways, at least initially,
for it was in the very midst of the talks that the President abruptly informed a group of
Pakistani editors that he was “willing to advance the date of general elections by a year
if political conditions were favorable.” Of course, unfavorable “political conditions” was
a reference to the MRD-led agitation. Still, Zia’s announcement opened up the
possibility of general elections as early as March 1984. Meanwhile, the attempt at
conciliation with the JUP signaled Zia’s unwillingness to meet with the PPP leadership.
He hoped, it seems, that by reaching out to the “right-wing” Barelvi party he might
consolidate a base of support among the Sunni “majority,” especially against his PPP
rivals and their Deobandi allies in the JUI. Essentially, the JUP was to be used as a
pawn in the President’s constant battle with the late Z. A. Bhutto’s party. In just a few
days, then, Zia had allowed local elections, reached out to the Barelvi religio-political
leadership, and offered a more palatable timeline for elections. The President’s game
may have eventually dawned on Shah Ahmad, too, as the cleric later accused Zia and his
government of “misleading” the public “by circulating its own version of the [JUP-Zia]
meeting.”20 Indeed, in the end, Zia’s attempt to win over the Barelvis was only
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temporarily successful; within a year-and-a-half, the President, long an imprisoner of
political opponents, would be putting JUP leaders behind bars, too.
Elections for state head wouldn’t come until Zia was dead; to push such an election
back, in December 1984 the Pakistani dictator organized a “referendum”—one,
however, that never specifically asked the people whether or not they “wanted” Zia to
remain in charge. Zia used the results of the poll as a legitimizing tool to prop up his
own personal position “for another five years.”21 The long-promised general elections,
then, would only be for national and provincial legislative bodies. Even so, when those
elections finally came (late February 1985)—for the national and provincial
assemblies—the various leaders of the MRD parties were confined to house arrest by
the government. Shah Ahmad Noorani (though the JUP was still not officially part of
the Movement) was placed under house arrest, too. In protest, Barelvis across the
country wore black armbands as they attended Friday prayers. JUP vice-president
Shafi Abdullah admonished Barelvis to boycott the upcoming elections entirely, and his
call was “broadcast to the street through the mosque’s loudspeaker” despite Zia’s ban,
via martial law order, on all “political activity in a mosque.” Meanwhile, police waited
around the corner in vans, together with hordes of plainclothes officers—just in case the
agitation escalated into something more than loudspeakers and armbands. “This is not
an Islamic regime,” complained one Pakistani at the time. “A purposeless election is not
allowed in Islam. If the people are not taken into confidence, then it is anti-Islamic.”22
To further control the election, Zia banned not only all political parties but also
“loudhailers, processions and outdoor meetings,” translating into one of the quietest
contests in recent memory. The results of the 1985 “partyless” elections were summed
up succinctly by one reporter on the scene: “Despite the ban on political parties
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contesting the election, the successful candidates include a large number of members or
former members of parties wholly opposed to the Zia regime.” Meanwhile, the JI—the
“one party that had sided with General Zia in the past”—experienced a series of major
electoral losses. The contest’s big winners were the PPP and the Barelvi pir-led Muslim
League (headed by sayyid Shah Mardan Shah II, or “pir Pagaro,” head of the Hurs of
Sindh, who had previously been viewed as a Zia “lackey” and whose own pir father had
been hanged by the British for his opposition to their regime).23
*
In May 1988, Zia ul-Haq pulled off another “constitutional coup,” restoring his
former powers as Pakistan’s Chief Martial Law Administrator after dismissing the
government of Muhammad Khan Junejo and the national assembly. Zia cited
corruption within the Junejo government, as well as its failure to secure law and order
in Pakistan, as justification for his action. The CMLA promised a “caretaker cabinet”
within twenty-four hours; it took ten days, and was headed not by a Prime Minister but
by Zia himself. As per Zia’s own 1985 Constitution, upon dismissing the national
assembly an announcement of elections must be made within ninety days (though
whether this meant that elections must be held within ninety days, or merely an
announcement, was unclear). In any case, the situation did not present a rosy picture to
those who had been agitating for the restoration of “democracy.” As one observer noted
wryly, “The last time President Zia promised elections within 90 days was in 1977. He
held them 90 months later, but banned political parties from participating.” (The
acronym for Zia’s position as Chief Martial Law Administrator, too, was sarcastically
referred to by many as meaning “Cancel My Last Announcement.”) If Zia’s election
announcement was to be trusted, it would mean that he would need to reformulate a
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party for himself—a new Muslim League. (Some speculated that the dictator would
select rising star Nawaz Sharif as the re-tooled party head; Nawaz was Chief Minister of
the Punjab and popularly regarded as “a fixer,” controlling as he did Punjab’s police
force, its powerful landlords, and its beauracratic machine.) Meanwhile, the MRD
continued to lead the opposition (the alliance itself led, however weakly, by the PPP
under Benazir Bhutto) as it attempted to use the recent turn of events to its favor by
wooing “disgruntled” Muslim Leaguers, the JI, and even Junejo himself.24
Elections were set for 16 November, though they were to be “partyless” once more.
But whatever might have happened—whether Zia would have pushed elections back
indefinitely, as he was wont to do, or not—fate stepped in on 17 August 1988 (or
perhaps, as many speculate—like the subsequently organized official inquiry
committee—some other more sinister, and very human, force) when the CMLA’s C130B Hercules aircraft took a nosedive not long after taking off from little Bahawalpur
headed for Islamabad. The crash killed over thirty people, including Zia himself, as well
as the US Ambassador to Pakistan. Pakistan’s long-serving dictator was buried in
Islamabad two days later, with a million mourners crowding the city’s streets.
Though there were calls to push elections back, the provisional government under
interim president Ishaq Khan decided to hold them on the date previously set. In
addition, Zia’s requirement that they be “partyless” was dropped; political parties would
be permitted to organize and put forward their various candidates.

Zia’s “Islamization” Push.
Zia was determined to win over the ‘alәma and religious parties. As such, he
adopted the old PNA slogan, “System of the Prophet” (nyzam-e-mustafa), as his own.
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But this was easier said than done; after all, one need only remember the findings of the
Munir Report, which had underscored the virtual impossibility of instituting such a
system in Pakistan, divided as its Muslim community was between various sects (the
most prominent among them the Deobandis and the Barelvis, not to mention the Shi’a).
Which sect’s “System” would be adopted? Whose intepretation of the Prophet’s nyzam
would be implemented? From the very beginning (1977), one of Zia’s own cabinet
ministers, mwlana Kausar Niazi (d. 1994 AD), warned him of the dangers of such a
policy. A political opportunist, Niazi (known by many as “mwlana Whiskey” due to his
alleged habit of being either “drunk or surrounded by dancing girls”) was a former JI
member who in 1969 had quit the Jamaat to join the PPP (and eventually Bhutto’s
cabinet), before quitting that, too (in 1977) to unite with the ‘alәma-led opposition to his
erstwhile political master.25 While nyzam-e-mustafa might function as a highly effective
campaign slogan, the shrewd mwlana warned, its actual implementation would only
result in sectarianism.26 Should a Deobandi interpretation be implemented, this would
be unacceptable to the Barelvis, and vice-versa. Meanwhile, the Ahl-e-Hadis would
likely find fault with either, as would, certainly, Pakistan’s Shi’a population.
Whatever its future implications, the immediate opportunity for religious parties
and the ‘alәma to play a more significant role within the political structure of the
Pakistani state did appear to have increased considerably with the July ascension of
General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. Zia utilized the state to initiate a program of
“Islamization” throughout the country. “If one can bring back Islam in its purity, it
would be a good thing,” he told the BBC in April 1978.27 Pakistan’s new military
dictator seemed to view Islam in Pakistan as having been corrupted and in need of
purification, of restoration to its original form; this was an implicitly revivalist—and
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Deobandi—point of view. Zia introduced a wide variety of “Islamic” laws, governing
everything from business hours to television censorship to the wording of government
documents.28 But underneath the surface, perceptive observers might notice that the
Islamic frills of the new regime may have been just that—mere frills, veiling just
another run-of-the-mill military dictatorship. He remained, after all, Chief Martial Law
Administrator from July 1977 until December 1984 (retaining the position even after
assuming the office of President after the September 1978 departure of Fazal Elahi
Chaudhry). From December 1984, the General ruled as simply “President” of Pakistan,
but even this was accomplished via a questionable referendum (in which a negligible
percentage of the Pakistani population participated, with an overwhelming majority
voting in Zia’s favor). His presidential leadership would last from 1984 until his
mysterious death by plane crash in 1988.
A core facet of Zia’s Islamization program was his adorning of Pakistan’s judiciary
with the trappings of an Islamic system, one through which “the supremacy of Islamic
law” could be “established over the law of the land”—his words. To many among both
the Barelvi and Deobandi ‘alәma, of course, such a pronouncement was music to the
ears. The religious scholars, however, had learned to be skeptical when it came to the
promises of political leaders; Zia would have to prove himself by transforming his words
into action. Such doubts turned out to be prophetic—though many at the time failed to
realize this. Zia’s judiciary promise (and the “reforms” he enacted connected to it) was
merely for show, an attempt to placate his ‘alәma foes and reassure ‘alәma allies. These
trappings took the form, in 1978, of the “Shariat Appellat Bench,” one of which was
attached to each of the state’s four High Courts. Citizens were now free to appeal to
these shәri’at courts regarding the verdicts reached in the secular ones. In 1980, a
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“Federal Shariat Court” was established, too, with original jurisdiction to hear shәri’at
petitions (and to include up to three ‘alәma “having at least fifteen years experience in
Islamic law, research or instruction”). Even the Supreme Court was supplemented by a
five-person Shariat Appellate Bench, made up of three Supreme Court judges and two
others—the latter, significantly, selected from among the ‘alәma or the Federal Shariat
Court. All of this seemed transformational indeed, a major step towards the
establishment of a long-overdue Islamic state in South Asia. But even with Zia’s Shariat
Appellate Benches and his Federal Shariat Court, the Martial Law Administrator’s
incorporation of a shәri’at-based structure into Pakistan’s judiciary was a veneer,
nothing more. According to Article 203B of the Constitution, the Federal Shariat
Court’s jurisdiction did not include “the Constitution, Muslim Personal Law, any law
relating to the procedure of any Court or tribunal or…any fiscal law or any law relating
to the levy and collection of taxes and fees or banking or insurance practice and
procedure…” Islam’s all-encompassing nature, prominent in the Qur’an’s concern with
the seemingly mundance (to say nothing of the thematic scope of the sunnәt and
centuries of Islamic juridical tradition) has already been discussed; obviously this
constitutional provision significantly curtailed the jurisdiction of Zia’s so-called shәri’at
courts. In addition, the secular Supreme Court maintained its position as the highest
and “final court of appeal for all criminal cases,” and shәri’at court judges were made up
mostly of regular judges of the secular system anyway—i.e. not of the ‘alәma (the
constitution still mandated that Supreme Court and High Court judges possess
credentials and experience within the Western, British legal tradition). At the District
level, too, these new trappings were more or less a moot point, since district judges
could already try someone either according to civil or shәri’at law. Finally, the existence
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of a shәri’at system side-by-side the secular one was illusory in that “laws were decreed
as conforming to Islamic Shari’a, but no attempt was made to derive the legal system
directly from the Shari’a.” In other words, the shәri’at system was still an afterthought
that in no way either replaced the secular system or formed a new basis for a reformed
system; only when a law or decision was deemed anti-Islamic could a Shariat Bench
intervene. The Benches thus functioned only when a challenge to a law’s “Islamicness”
was raised. And perhaps most telling of all, Zia ensured that the decisions of his
regime’s military tribunals as well as his own “Regulation[s] and Order[s]” remained
above both the shәri’at and secular courts. The regime acted outside of, or at best above,
the law. Zia’s supposed “Islamic” judiciary reforms were thus mostly cosmetic, doing
little to functionally change the previous system.29
The same held true for many of his other “reforms.” For example, another major
part of the regime’s Islamization program was its institution, in October 1984, of a
“new” Law of Evidence (qanwn-e-shәhadәt). Through this law, Zia claimed to have
replaced the “un-Islamic” 1872 Law of Evidence (obviously on the books since the early
British Raj period) with “an Islamic law.” But the reality was that both laws were
functionally more or less identical; “[t]he only change,” wrote Kennedy, “was that the
1872 Law of Evidence had been declared to be Islamic” after all. The promulgation, in
February 1979, of the so-called hudwd ordinances, stand out as another example. There
were four such ordinances: a Prohibition Ordinance (chalking out punishments for
alcohol consumption and the use and/or possession of illegal drugs), a zyna Ordinance
(zyna means “adultery” and/or “fornication”; the ordinance established punishments for
sex-related offenses like adultery, rape, prostitution, sodomy, and kidnapping), a qәźәf
Ordinance (“for the wrongful imputation of zyna”; the ordinance laid out the punishment
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for those who wrongfully accused an innocent man or woman of adultery), and a
Property Ordinance (spelling out punishments for theft). Punishments ranged from
fines and imprisonment to whipping, “sourging” with “stripes,” and death-by-stoning.
But the hudwd ordinances, too, appear to have been implemented mainly for show, as
most every “crime” in the hudwd laws was already listed in Pakistan’s existant criminal
code (and many of the punishments were exact matches, too). Additionally, the more
severe punishments were rarely or never employed during Zia’s tenure, and the only two
“major sin” convictions passed during the entire period were ultimately overturned by
the Supreme Court anyway.30
Given the superficial nature of Zia’s reforms (however difficult it might have been to
initially perceive this), and keeping in mind the sectarian divisions extant among
Pakistan’s ‘alәma (remember the Munir Report), it is not surprising that reaction to
Zia’s reforms was mixed. The ‘alәma “interpreted each law in the light of their own
school of thought.” Some did not agree, for example, with the punishments the regime
had attached to various “crimes” in the hudwd ordinances.31 Others felt that the
government had usurped the role of the ‘alәma, while still others derided the continued
central position of the western judicial model.
Ostensibly for inspiration, spiritual guidance, and to aid in his implementation of
Islamization (but probably also to shore up a base of support), Zia ul-Haq seemed to
favor the JI. This organization, previously hailed as a mainstream Islamic party whose
principle platforms had included a respect for constitutional law, was actually
represented on Zia’s cabinet (as ministers of information and broadcasting, water,
power, and natural resources, and production). To spearhead the country’s Planning
Commission, Zia appointed the JI’s Khurshid Ahmad—with the express purpose of
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“Islamizing the economy.”32 JI representatives on Zia’s cabinet would resign in 1979,
but the party continued to mostly support the regime. (There were some within the
party, it should be noted—like Abdul Ghafoor Ahmad—who were vocal critics of the
Zia government.)33 Meanwhile, the government’s patronage allowed the JI’s student
wing, the Jamaat-e-Taliba, to virtually take over many of Pakistan’s universities,
intimidating professors and students alike—sometimes at gunpoint in classrooms.34
Later, government patronage was extended to both the Barelvi JUP as well as, later, the
Deobandi JUI. Some within the JUI approved of Zia for his Islamization efforts, while
others disapproved entirely. As a result, a split within the JUI developed that continues
to the time of this writing. Those who supported Zia were led by Sami ul-Haq (the JUIS), while those opposed to the regime followed Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F). The latter
might be considered the “original” party and Sami ul-Haq’s faction a “breakaway.” After
the schism, the JUI-F continued to enjoy its dominance in Pakistan’s western provinces,
while JUI-S influence was more or less restricted to a handful of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’s
districts.35
But where Zia enjoyed perhaps the most success in terms of Islamization was in
creating a culture of jyhad in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the
arrival of large amounts of American and Saudi cash that followed (of which more later).
He gradually replaced more “liberal” military officers with “conservative” ones of a more
traditionally Islamic background (mostly Deobandi-leaning), and changed the Army’s
motto from the more neutral, Jinnah-inspired “Unity, Faith and Discipline” to the
religious-sounding “Faith, Piety and Jihad.”36
But before delving into the Soviet invasion, a look toward Iran is in order.
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“Islamic Revolution”: Deobandi-Barelvi Response.
The arrival (on 1 February 1979), after a decade-and-a-half-long exile, of the aged
Ruhollah Khomeini in Tehran, to the welcoming shouts of hundreds of thousands of
Iranians celebrating in the streets, signaled the culmination of the Iranian revolution—
and the beginning of the Ayatollah’s “Islamic Revolution.” Over the next ten years,
Khomeini (as Supreme Leader) would establish a new government in Iran allegedly
based on the Shi’a version of Islam. But it was the revolution’s ability to topple a
Western-backed (indeed, Western-installed) regime—that of the Shah—that inspired
Muslims everywhere, and especially Shi’i, both to shake off the chains of neoimperialism and of Sunni oppression. The Shi’a and Sunni in Pakistan, too, would be
profoundly affected by these developments in neighboring Iran.
The “Islamic Revolution” to the west seemed to infuse a new sort of political energy
into Pakistan’s Shi’a population. When the Zia regime attempted to introduce an
ordinance dealing with zәkat and ‘ushәr (June 1980), for example, the Shi’i organized and
protested vigorously. The new scheme attempted to institute a state-run system for the
regulation and collection of zәkat and ‘ushәr. But unlike the Sunni, the Shi’a are not
required to pay ‘ushәr at all; they thus naturally rejected this ordinance. In addition, the
Shi’a objected to the zәkat law, as their version of Islam rejected the notion of a staterun zәkat system. Under pressure from this abruptly mobilized minority, Zia eventually
agreed to exempt Shi’i from the payment of both zәkat and ‘ushәr.37 Of course, such an
exemption only angered some of the ‘alәma and their followers among the various Sunni
sects, who watched with some trepidation as the political status of the Shi’a seemed to
be on the rise. Just the year before, after the introduction of the hudwd ordinances, the
Shi’a under aforementioned mufti Ja’far Husain had, in April 1979, established the tәhrik428

e-nyfaz-e-fyqh-e-j’afaria (“Movement for the Implementation of J’afari Law,” hereafter
TNFJ) in protest; the crimes and punishments as laid out in the ordinances did not line
up squarely with those prescribed by the Shi’a interpretation of Islamic law. Though
Ja’far Husain, appointed by Zia as the Shi’a representative on the constitutionally
mandated Council of Islamic Ideology, was himself more or less a moderate interested
in safeguarding Shi’a rights during the era of (Sunni-dominated) Islamization, the TNFJ
quickly took on a life of its own. In particular, it adopted the goal of the JUI, the JUP,
and the JI: the formulation of an Islamic constitution—but one, of course, that would be
distinctly Shi’a in character, “as expounded by Ayatollah Khomeini.” (This was ironic,
given that the organization had been founded in protest of Zia’s attempt to implement a
Sunni system upon them; now the TNFJ would struggle for the implementation of a
Shi’a system upon Pakistani Sunnis!)38 Many TNFJ members were trained directly by
Shi’a activists sent from Tehran for this purpose. By the early 1980s, too, the “most
militant force on Pakistan’s campuses” was the Iran-connected Shi’a student outfit
Imamia Students Organization (ISO), with its green-and-red flag and branches in every
province of Pakistan.39 (It was about this time that, it is alleged, Zia “threw the
resources of the state” behind the mostly Deobandi scholars and their organizations in a
bid to contain the newly invigorated Shi’a minority; significantly for the DeobandiBarelvi rivalry, it was not only the Shi’i who were forced to “mobilize” against the
growth of Deobandi power—including militant outfits—that followed, but the Barelvis
as well.)40 After the 1983 death of Ja’far Husain , the TNFJ’s leadership fell upon the
shoulders of the young NWFP-born ‘Arif Husayn al-Husayni (d. 1988 AD), an Irantrained disciple of the Ayatollah far more confrontational in his political approach than
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his predecessor had been. Such developments, inspired by the successful Iranian
Revolution, worried the Deobandi and Barelvi reigious leadership.
There were other happenings related to events in Iran that were likewise troubling
to the Sunni ‘alәma. Iranian literature friendly to Shi’a Islam seemed suddenly to be
flooding into Pakistan, and the success of the revolution seemed to inspire Muslims of
even the Sunni persuasion. If Sunnis were convinced to look upon a Shi’a revolution
with approbation and even admiration, could full-on conversion be far behind? The
Ayatollah Khomeini’s use of the term “Islamic Revolution” (rather than, say, “Shi’a
Revolution” or “Iranian Revolution”) irked many Deobandi and Barelvi scholars.
“Neither Oriental nor Occidental—Islamic and only Islamic,” went the Iranian slogan.
“Neither Shi’a nor Sunni—Islamic and only Islamic.” But how could a movement be an
“Islamic Revolution” if it wasn’t endorsed and led by the Sunni (i.e. the majority)?
Surely this was a Shi’a attempt at usurpation. The term drove deeper the wedge
between many Sunni ‘alәma and their Shi’a counterparts, the former resenting as they
did such a pan-Islamic interpretation of the Iranian Shah’s overthrow and the
establishment of a government under Khomeini. One of these resentful scholars, from
the Punjabi district of Sufi-founded Jhang, at the confluence of the Jhelum and Chenab
rivers, was named mwlana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi.41
*
Militant wings of Deobandi or Barelvi organizations, or of those parties which the
Deobandi or Barelvi religious leadership tended to support, were nothing new. Even
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s quasi-spiritualist KK movement, which leaned Deobandi,
had sprouted a militant outfit, organized by the “Frontier Gandhi’s” sons, Pashto poet
Abdul Ghani and his younger brother, Abdul Wali.42 Its name was the Zalmai Pakhtun,
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and it was ostensibly established for the “defence of the non-violent people.”
Meanwhile, the provincial Muslim League, supported by many Barelvis, organized an
armed wing of its own: the Ghazi Pakhtun.43 But these groups had been short-lived and
the actual violence they meted out had been negligible. It took the Iranian Revolution,
the politicization of the Shi’a, and the Sunni backlash (and, perhaps, a taste for blood
garnered in Kashmir and Bangladesh) to militarize the Pakistani ‘alәma. This would be
exacerbated later by Russian and American invasions of Afghanistan (and the Saudi
inroads into Pakistan that resulted), but that will come later. Perhaps it was just such
militarization that led JUI party workers and supporters in Jacobabad (home to several
thousand of Pakistan’s one million Hindus) to ransack and deface nine Hindu temples
there. The demonstration-turned-riot was a response to an Indian court’s decision to
authorize the operation of a Hindu temple in Uttar Pradesh on the site of a Muslim
mosque, a decision that had subsequently resulted in communal clashes in India—and
over a dozen dead, eliciting “great emotion” among the Muslims of Paksitan. Still, the
incident represented the first time such violence against a non-Muslim minority had
been exhibited in Pakistan since 1948.44 Perhaps something had changed.
In 1985, four members of the Deobandi JUI—Zia-ur-Rahman Faruqi, Eesar-ul-Haq
Qasmi, Azam Tariq, and, most importantly, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi—established what
would become a militant offshoot: the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP; originally the
group was called the Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba). Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the Sipah-eSahaba’s first leader, had been educated at the Jamia Khair-ul-Madaris in Multan, a
Deobandi institution founded under the patronage of JUI guiding light Ashraf ‘Ali
Thanawi. By his early twenties, when he worked as ymam and xәtib of a Deobandi
mәsjyd, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi had gained somewhat of a reputation in his native Jhang for
431

his passionate speeches, both against the Ahmadis as well as the Barelvis. As a JUI
member and a Deobandi, he had been an opponent of Ayub Khan (1969), active in the
xәtәm-e-nәbәwwәt movement (1974), and a staunch advocate of the “System of the
Prophet.” Later (after the Iranian revolution and the rise of the Shi’a “threat”), his proSәhabah (a term referring to the Companions of the Prophet) speeches likewise gained
notoriety. This was significant, since some Shi’a used the mockery of the Sәhabah as a
means to demean the Sunni version of Islam (it had been some of the Sәhabah, after all,
who, according to the Shi’a version of Islamic history, had usurped the caliphate from its
rightful heir, ‘Ali). With Jhang’s powerful and controlling landlords prescribing mostly
to Shi’ia Islam and its populace mostly to either the Deobandi or Barelvi Sunni version
of the faith, the sermons of Haq Nawaz in fervent praise of the Sәhabah took on special
meaning.45 Within the politically charged context of the Iranian Revolution and its
spillover effects in Pakistan, Jhangvi’s animosity towards the Shi’i took on even greater
connotations. Concerned that the Shi’a, prodded by the new regime in Iran, were
making excessive inroads in Pakistan, Haq Nawaz formed a committee, comprised of
two ‘alәma representatives from each major Sunni sect in the country (Deobandi,
Barelvi, and Ahl-e-Hadis ), with the express purpose of combating Shi’a Islam. This is
significant; far from being a militant Deobandi organ targeting Barelvi gatherings and
shrines, the SSP was originally formed as a joint effort between Deobandis and Barelvis
(plus the Ahl-e-Hadis ) in and around Jhang. Indeed, Haq Nawaz argued that
differences arising from the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry should, for the time being, be
buried—in order to fight a “great and most dangerous challenge”: the surging Shi’a.46
Jhangvi’s anti-Shi’a rhetoric, formerly couched in pro-Sәhabah terminology, now
became much more explicit. To his followers, Haq Nawaz had become a near432

redemptive figure. “Every Firaun [Pharaoh] will meet his Moosa [Moses],” wrote one
of Jhangvi’s disciples later, in an obituary. “Allah Ta’ala created a Moosa in this very
town [Jhang], to defeat the Shiite Firauns.” His following was passionate in their
faith—and in their certainty that not only were the Shi’i kufar (“unbelievers”), but “the
worst brand” of kafyr.47 For his open anti-Shi’a speeches, Haq Nawaz was arrested by
the local assistant superintendant of police, a man named Tariq Khosa. Khosa would
later testify (in September 2012) before a Senate Committee that he was called soon
after making the arrest by Zia ul-Haq himself concerning the matter; according to
Khosa, the President allegedly ordered that Jhangvi be released.48 Tariq Khosa’s
testimony demonstrates the Pakistani state’s continued use of religious elements,
including (perhaps in particular) those of a more militant nature, to patronize
sectarianism. Barelvis (and the Shi’i, for that matter) have long asserted that that
patronage has more often than not flowed the Deobandis’ way, a charge supported,
however circumstantially, by Zia’s actions following Jhangvi’s arrest. In any case, the
SSP was officially launched in 1985 with its original goals revolving around halting the
perceived Shi’a doctrinal (and political) onslaught. Its aims included (1) the revival of
the caliphate as instituted during the era of the rashydwn; (2) the declaration of Pakistan
as a Sunni state; (3) the observance by the state of holidays in commemoration of the
first four caliphs (marked on their respective death anniversaries); (4) action to curtail
Shi’a mourning processions commemorating Husain’s brutal murder at Karbala; (5)
restrictions on the Iranian Council Centres in Pakistan, claimed by the SSP to be front
organizations for the arming and training of Shi’a “agents” and preachers; (6) the death
penalty, or at least flogging and imprisonment, for “maligning verbally” the “revered
elders of Islam”; and (7) legislation declaring all Shi’i kufar.49 The SSP’s initial victories
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came not in any militant fashion but in the form of promises by Shi’a Muslims not to
mock the Prophet’s Companions. And though the group had begun ostensibly as a joint
Sunni effort, comprised of both Deobandis and Barelvis, among others, such intra-Sunni
unity was impossible to maintain. By 1987, it was shattered completely. In that year, in
Jhang, a brawl erupted between Barelvis and Deobandis that resulted in two Barelvi
deaths. The SSP, including Haq Nawaz himself, was implicated in the murders.
Jhangvi and most of his arrested associates were subsequently released; two spent three
years behind bars before being set free, too. During the interim, it appeared that the
Deobandis and Barelvis of the region had settled their differences.50 But this was to be
an illusory peace only.
On 22 February 1990, Jhangvi fell to an assassin’s bullet (actually six, to the chest)
in front of his house as he was leaving to attend the final daily prayer (‘ysha). Several
attempts had been made on his life before (the SSP blamed unspecified Shi’i on each
occasion), but all previous efforts had failed—until now. He would be succeeded as SSP
chief by his biographer and SSP co-founder Zia-ur Rehman Farooqi. The Ayatollah’s
“Islamic Revolution” had politicized the Shi’a and militarized the (mostly Deobandi)
Sunnis—with major consequences for the future of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry. Thus,
while the SSP was originally borne of the strongly anti-Shi’a sentiment of its founders
(particularly after the Iranian Revolution and “increasing Shia militancy in Pakistan”),51
its attacks (or at least those attributed to the group) were subsequently aimed just as
often (and, in the last two decades immiedately previous to this writing, perhaps more)
at Barelvi Sunnis. As of 2010, the violence had not abated, as gunmen from the SSP and
affiliated groups attacked Barelvis celebrating mwlyd in Faisalabad and Dera Ismail
Khan, prompting a retaliatory attack by the crowd on a Deobandi mәdrәsәħ;52 in July,
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scores of Barelvis were killed when an SSP bomb detonated in the Data Durbar shrine
in Lahore;53 and these are merely two incidents among many.
But even the SSP wasn’t militant enough for some within its ranks. As sectarian
tensions within Pakistan mounted (especially after Jhangvi’s own 1990 assassination),
three SSP members (Akram Lahori, Riaz Basra, and Malik Ishaquel), claiming to be
acting in fulfillment of the martyred Jhangvi’s original wishes, organized what would
become one of the country’s most deadly outfits. This was the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi—
“Jhangvi’s Army.” Meanwhile, the machinations of the state continued to play a role in
intensifying the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic; according to B. Rahman of the South Asia
Analysis Group (in a report issued by SAAG in July 2002), the Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate had been “inciting the [Deobandi] SSP and the [LeJ] to
counter [the] activities” of several Barelvi groups opposed to its (the ISID’s) strategic
objectives.54 How did the state, especially under the aegis of the ISID, become so
involved in patronizing these mostly Deobandi outfits? To answer this question, it may
be necessary to turn west, again—not to Iran, though, but to Afghanistan.

Soviet Invasion, US-Saudi Response, Deobandi-Barelvi Fallout.
Since its 1947 birth, Pakistan had always had somewhat strained relations with
Afghanistan. This is typically explained away as either a strategic issue or an ethnic
one. Strategically speaking, the partition of the subcontinent left Afghanistan caught in
the Cold War game, with India independent and leaning pro-Moscow and the very antiSoviet United States Government allied with Pakistan. Afghanistan had previously
enjoyed a mixed relationship with the USSR, but since 1946 had established “good
relations” with the Soviet Union; within the new context of the Washington-Moscow
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tug-of-war, however, would such relations pose a problem to the country’s security?
What about the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship? On the ethnic front, it is pointed
out that, with Pakistani independence, Afghanistan naturally repudiated the legally
ambiguous Durand Line—and demanded that the Pathan-dominated region of
Pakistan’s west and northwest be given the opportunity either to become part of
Afghanistan (thereby uniting the heretofore Durand-divided Pathan people) or to
become independent itself (as a free “Pakhtunistan,” as aforementioned). After all,
almost half of Afghanistan’s population was Pathan, for centuries the country’s largest
and most dominant ethnic group. Such explanations for the rocky AfghanistanPakistan relationship, while certainly important, fail to acknowledge a third aspect: the
Deobandi position. For it was the Deobandi position, speaking generally, that
dominated Pathan Afghanistan. Most Deobandis in India had been opposed to
Pakistan’s creation; is it not natural, then, that the same position might be taken by
Afghanistan’s leaders? The Deobandis had, by and large, supported the Pathan call for
autonomy or independence (something the Barelvis, generally speaking, would ardently
oppose for decades afterward); is it surprising that Afghan leaders would feel the same
way, too? Perhaps the “Deobandi position” should not be disregarded on this question.
(This is not, of course, meant to disregard the complexity of Afghanistan’s ethnolinguistic as well as religious makeup, which includes a strong contingency of Darispeaking Tajiks, Turkic-speaking Uzbeks, and Hazaras, not to mention Hanafi Sunnis of
many stripes, plus Jafari Shi’i, Ismaili Shi’i, and more.) In any case, the AfghanistanPakistan relationship was to experience significant developments in the decade after
1979: the year the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan.
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Ever since Partition, and especially after the United States Government began
cultivating ties with regimes (like Pakistan’s) ostensibly opposed to the expansion of the
Soviet Union’s circle of influence, Afghanistan, though officially neutral in
Washington’s and Moscow’s feud, had turned more and more to the Soviets for
support—a perhaps natural phenomenon, given the USSR’s proximity compared to the
USA’s geographical position on the far side of the globe. The Afghan and Soviet
governments signed trade agreements and peace treaties, and Moscow loaned large
sums of money to Kabul for a variety of projects. From 1965, the two states were
connected via regular flights from Kabul to Tashkent (later extended to Moscow). In
the mid-1950s, the Afghan government asked the U.S. Government for military
equipment; when it was turned down, it turned to the Soviet Union instead, and
Moscow was happy to comply. Along with these supplies, however, the Soviets sent
military and technical advisers by the thousands to the central Asian state, and
thousands of Afghans subsequently left for Russia to be trained, too. This all allowed
Afghanistan’s Prime Minister, Muhammad Daud, to stage a coup in 1973—made
possibly by Daud’s left-wing, mostly pro-Soviet supporters. As a result, the (unpopular)
monarchy was toppled and a republic established. But Afghanistan’s communists
weren’t satisfied. Just five years later, in April 1978, Daud himself was toppled (and
murdered) by the People’s Democratic Party—a Marxist outfit—and a new Afghan
government under Nur Muhammad Taraki was established. The country was renamed
the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Crucially (and unsurprising, given the new
regime’s political ideology), Nur Muhammad invited Soviet advisors to come to
Afghanistan and “assist” the new government “in all branches of government.” Just as
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crucially, the regime concluded a treaty with Moscow that December providing for
military and economic assistance.55
The coming of the Nur Muhammad regime brought with it particular challenges to
the country’s traditional Islamic religious leadership. Zaeef describes how, from the late
1970s, many students from Afghan mәdrәsәħs left to continue their studies in Pakistan
(especially after some of their teachers became vocal supporters of the Communists).
After the coup, though, many religious leaders and teachers (including, Zaeef writes,
“my instructor, and all the other scholars”) fled to Pakistan as well. “Sayyeds, Khans,
Maliks, and Mullahs were all being persecuted by the government.” Some were
imprisoned, others taken and never heard from again.56 Opposition to the regime grew.
The ethnic Tajiks and Hazaras were especially opposed to Nur Muhammad. The
situation was so unstable by March 1979 that the Soviets refused to send more military
aid to the Marxist regime in Kabul, despite the latter’s direct request, for fear of the
general Afghan reaction (that same month, citizens of the Soviet Union living in Herat
were slaughtered by mutinying Afghan troops, and the month before, the U.S.
Ambassador to Kabul, Adolph Dubs, was kidnapped by militants and killed during a
controversial rescue attempt).
But after Nur Muhammad Taraki was overthrown (and executed) in September
1979, replaced by his erstwhile Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, Moscow
reconsidered—and the Soviets, fearing the fall of a communist regime to the forces of
Islam (an “Islamic Revolution” was underway in next-door Iran, after all), not to
mention their wariness at Amin’s meetings with representatives in Kabul of the United
States Government, sent in a “Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan”
(LCSFA). The USSR’s troops (specifically, the Soviet Fortieth Army) crossed the
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Afghan border on 27 December 1979. In a week, around fifty thousand Soviet troops
were stationed in Afghanistan, from Kabul to Herat, from Mazar-e-Sharif to Kandahar
and Jalalabad. (At the war’s height, that number would skyrocket to around one
hundred forty thousand.)57 Before the year was out, Hafizullah Amin himself had been
killed (by Soviet commandos, no less), and Babrak Kamal, backed by Moscow, was
installed as head of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Over the course of 1980,
meanwhile, the anti-communist insurgency only grew. By now the governments of
Saudi Arabia and the United States—and, of course, Pakistan—were all involved in the
conflict, funneling cash and arms to the mujahydin. Despite Washington’s concerns
about Pakistan—its continued development of nuclear weapons, its involvement in the
drug trade, the ISID’s sponsorship of “Islamic fundamentalists,” and Zia’s own apparent
reluctance to re-institute representative government—the United States Government
gave billions in military and economic aid directly to Pakistan, too. In 1980,
Washington spearheaded a boycott of the Olympic Games, held in Moscow. One of the
Cold War’s most significant (and costly, in terms of human life) proxy wars was in full
swing, despite the fact that the details on the ground were more than a little blurry for
the major powers involved—and perhaps even insignificant in view of the conlict’s “big
picture.”
By mid-decade, the war in Afghanistan had displaced over five million Afghans.
Many fled to Iran. Most fled to Pakistan. Mikhail Gorbachev, newly minted head of
the USSR, increased troop levels in Afghanistan in order to bring about a quick end to
the war (a “surge” that the American government would mimic later in wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan)—but this merely resulted in the bloodiest year of the conflict up to that
time (1985). By that year, journalist Edward Mortimer was asking the question, “Can
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the Afghans find their Arafat?” The answer seemed far from certain. Hizb-e-Islami
leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar had lost credibility both in the west (where he was
generally viewed as “ferociously uncompromising”) as well as among fellow Afghans;
the reason for this latter phenomenon stemmed from the engineer’s apparent tendency
to direct his wrath “more against rival resistance groups than against the Russians.”
Erstwhile Kabul University philosophy professor Buhanuddin Rabbani, head of the
Jamiat Islami, failed to garner any real support among the Pathans, and the Jamiat’s
“rising star” of the resistance, the Persian-speaking Tajik Ahmad Shah Massoud,
likewise failed to command a Pathan following. The head of the Harakat-e-Inqilab-eIslami, mwlana Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, had the support of a broad coalition of
Pathan ‘alәma, mullahs, and students in southern and parts of eastern Afghanistan and
along Pakistan’s western border, but could not meaningfully reach out to the country’s
non-Pathan (not to mention non-Sunni) population.58 Afghanistan’s “mujahydin”
resistance was thus fractured along strongly ethnic and sectarian lines, with the Jamiat
Islami dominant in the north and west (among the non-Pathans), the Harakat-e-Inqilabe-Islami in the south and east, and the Hizb-e-Islami commanding pockets of support in
the north, east, and south. Meanwhile, in the center, some of the most dominant groups
were actually Shi’a.59 (It is perhaps interesting to note that Mortimer’s question is still
being posed by foreign interventionists today, years after the mysterious mullah Omar
probably came closest to establishing himself as an “Afghan Arafat” and the unpopular
Hamid Karzai was propped up by the U.S. Government as its own version of an Afghan
uniter.)
The Pathans formed “the core of the anti-Soviet struggle,” in the words of one
veteran journalist who covered the war from Afghanistan and Pakistan.60 The
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dominating position of the Deobandi school of thought among the Pathan (especially in
Pakistan but in Afghanistan, too) has already been discussed. In this, they were assisted
to a large extent by volunteers from Pakistan, mostly students, teachers, and
administrators from religious (and mostly Deobandi) seminaries. Indeed, the Deobandi
contribution to the Afghan war effort should not be overlooked. Not only did these
Deobandi fighters help turn the tide against the Russian occupiers, but it was here, too,
that the seeds of the future “Taliban” movement would be planted. The word țalyban
means, simply, “students” (the plural of țalyb, or “student”); by the thousands, then, these
religiously trained students were referred to by their less religious-minded brothers-inarms as țalyban. It was common, too, for the țalyban to fight side-by-side with their
mentors and teachers, the ‘alәma. For many of the Deobandi Pathans in northwestern
Pakistan, the contribution of Pakistani Pathans with the help of American and Saudi
financial and other support in the fight against communism in Afghanistan was a
phenomenon worthy of celebration, a noble act in the face of foreign tyranny.61 To
some Pakistani scholars in the west, however, the “blending of Saudi Wahabism with
the neo-Deobandi ideology…made for a witch’s brew of religious bigotry and sectarian
hatred.”62 A more accurate picture probably lies somewhere in between these two
extremes, as many ordinary Pathans of all ages sacrificed much to drive out a brutal
invading force in their own land—but were armed and militarized in the process,
setting the stage for more violent sectarian clashes (in which a minority participated) in
the future.
Many of the țalyban at the Deobandi dar ul’alwm in Karachi (probably the most
worthy Pakistani successor to the dar ul’alwm at Deoband, and the largest dar ul’alwm
in the country—far bigger than the “original,” in fact) would journey to Afghanistan
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during their school vacations to “participate in the jihad.” Many never returned, injured
or killed in battle. Many who did return did so wounded. mufti Muhammad Rafi
Usmani, the son of Muhammad Shafi, demonstrated this on again, off again
participation (not unlike seasonal volunteer work) in his own memoirs. In April 1988,
Muhammad Rafi left Karachi for Afghanistan’s Paktika province, where he took part in
a skirmish at Urghun. After that, he returned home—only to go again three-and-a-half
years later in August 1991, participating in a battle at Gardez. For these Deobandi
fighers, jyhad was a religious experience, a “faith reviving” phenomenon, bringing “back
to our minds the stories of the first generation of Islam.” Many of the mujahydin would
bathe (and even apply perfume) before going into battle, mindful of Sahih Muslim’s hәdis
in which the Prophet enjoins those preparing martyrs for burial not to wash either the
fallens’ clothes or their bodies. On the Day of Judgment, Muhammad promised, the
wounds “will be the color of blood but have the fragrance of musk.” In this same vein,
these Deobandi țalyban and ‘alәma saw the fight against the Soviets as more than a
struggle to evict Afghanistan of its Russian invaders; the jyhad (which one of the most
prominent Deobandi muftis in Pakistan has defined as “war against the infidels for the
sake of Allah”) was to be the “beginning point” of a more “universal jihad,” with fronts
in Tajikistan, Kashmir, Palestine, Bosnia, East Turkestan (or “Xinjiang”), Chechnya,
and elsewhere. Afghanistan was to be the great training ground where the mujahydin
could learn courage, could learn to overcome “fear of the battlefield,” in preparation for
the larger jyhad to come. This was all very revivalist in spirit, of course—very panIslamic in nature—and very Deobandi.63
Barelvis, on the other hand, generally did not actively involve themselves in the
Afghan conflict. Unlike its stance on Kashmir, where it had proclaimed jyhad and
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organized relief and preaching missions, the JUP did not support the jyhad in
Afghanistan. The Pathans (especially in Pakistan) were, after all, mostly Deobandis,
and the jyhad itself had been launched by Zia ul-Haq, a Deobandi-leaning dictator (or, at
worst, an out-and-out “Wahhabi”). Ahmad Riza Khan’s rules of conduct vis-à-vis “bad”
Muslims were thus followed and the war in Afghanistan failed to mobilize either the
Barelvi religious leadership or their base.
The vision of the Afghan țalyban for themselves was distinctly Deobandi, too, both
in its emphasis on reform and on its own importance vis-à-vis society at large. When
one prominent Afghan commander saw the dead bodies of young țalyban fighters laid
out before him, he addressed a țalyban commander, reportedly lamenting, “Fear God!
You should not sacrifice our young Taliban to the Russians.” We have no choice, came
the answer from the other, for the Russians cannot be allowed to stay—to which the
original speaker replied, “I don’t mean that we should not fight the jihad, but I am
concerned about the Taliban and the Ulema, for they are the spiritual heart of our
country….” His own fighters knew little of Islam, smoked hashish, and shaved their
beards; let them fight and die. “The Taliban have a greater role in society.”64
The memoirs of one Deobandi ‘alym demonstrate the broad, personal participation of
the Deobandi ‘alәma in the anti-communist jyhad. Listing the seventeen members of his
“caravan” traveling from Karachi to Multan to Dera Ismail Khan to Afghanistan’s
Paktika province, he identified three school administrators (from the dar ul’alwm in
Karachi), three principals or assistant principals (of the Jami Farooqiya in Karachi, the
mәdrәsәħ Ashrafiyah in Sukkur, and the Jamiat-ul Uloom al-Islamiya in Karachi), six
teachers (from the dar ul’alwm Karachi and the Jami Farooqiya), a chief administrator
for Pakistan’s official organization overseeing the country’s thousands of Deobandi
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mәdarys, a religious newspaper editor, one ymam and xәtib from a mosque in Karachi,
two administrators of the Harkat al-Jihad al-Islami in Karachi, and only one student. Of
course, students organized their own “caravans” to the front (often immediately upon
earning their degrees), but the ‘alym’s memoirs paint quite a different picture from that
delivered by many in the western media of evil “mullahs” conniving their students into
harm’s way while they themselves plot further mischief tucked safely away in their
mәdrәsәħs. Of the seventeen travelers, a full eleven were degree-holding mwlanas.
Their zeal, and that of their students, was inspired not only by fellow teachers and
administrators but also by veteran mujahydin who would visit the dar ul’alwm in Karachi
regularly to share their spiritual experiences as jyhadis.65
One famous Deobandi mujahyd was named Irshad Ahmed. In his early twenties he
had formed the Harkat ul-Jihad ul-Islami to facilitate the recruitment, transportation,
and supplying of Pakistani fighters on the Afghan front against the Russians. Irshad
Ahmed was killed several years later (1985) in battle. Among the other mujahydin killed
that night were six students from the dar ul’alwm in Karachi. It is interesting to note
that not one of these students was actually from Karachi; three were from Gilgit, one
from Iran, one from Afghanistan itself, and one from Burma. (The author experienced
this diversity firsthand at the Karachi seminary, where he met a Kashmiri refugee a
thousand miles from Kashmir, born and raised on the plains; a Karachi businessman
whose grandparents had fled far-away Uttar Pradesh in 1947; and the son of a Burmese
Indian run out of Southeast Asia by General Ne Win’s 1962 expulsion of all those of
Indian descent from that southeast Asian state—to name a few.) Thus the Deobandi
fighters who participated in the anti-communist jyhad in Afghanistan hailed from all
over the South Asian subcontinent and its fringes. Significantly, Irshad Ahmed’s
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Harkat ul-Jihad ul-Islami would later play a part in the militarization of the DeobandiBarelvi rivalry.66
The development prompted the U.S. Government to initiate its now-famous Stinger
missile program in 1986. The mujahydin now possessed the means to shoot down and
destroy the dreaded Soviet helicopter gunship. This was the turning point of the war;
Karmal was sacked and Muhammad Najibullah installed in his stead. But now the
violence was spilling over into Pakistan. In February 1987, for example, the mostly
non-Pathan Jamiat-e-Islami became the target of a bomb blast, set off in front of the
group’s Pakistan-based office south of Peshawar. A bus parked in front of the
recruitment center had exploded, killing eleven people (including several young
schoolchildren), injuring fifty more, and collapsing a nearby primary school and several
houses. After the bombing, dubbed “one of the worst bomb blasts in Pakistan,” locals
repeatedly fired at the Jamiat office—a foreshadowing, perhaps, of the Taliban-Northern
Alliance battles to come.67
For the “Islamists,” even in the midst of this violent scene, the goal was the
institution of Islamic law and the establishment of a truly Islamic state. Warlords
fought for territory—and the money and power that came with it—yes, but thousands
of mujahydin fought simply for the institution of an Islamic system after so many years
of atheistic communist regimes. One eyewitness to Afghan resistance to the Russians in
the south and southeast regions of the country (the heart of Pathan territory) described
how the first order of business in an area cleared of Soviet forces (even if the latter
continued to attack from afar) was the extension of an Islamic judicial system. Indeed,
even with continued Russian heavy artillery and assaults by air threatening a newly
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liberated region, “the courts were working well and started to settle disputes among the
communities.”68 The establishment of an Islamic state was underway.
The conceptualization of a “brotherhood” is one that resounds within Islam, of
course—but especially within Deobandism, a phenomenon hailing from the school’s
beginnings to the present day. One future high-ranking Taliban fighter, who claimed to
have stood not twenty feet from Muhammad Omar when the latter’s eye was ripped out
by “a shard of metal shrapnel” during a fight with the Russians, described the events
that followed the incident thus:

On that same night we held a marvelous party. The late Mullah Marjan
sang and we accompanied his sweet voice with percussion on whatever
we had to hand. I can remember the ghazal that Mullah Muhammad
Omar Akhund sang:
My illness is untreatable, oh, my flower-like friend
My life is difficult without you, my flower-like friend.
…May God be praised! What a brotherhood we had among the
mujahedeen! We weren’t concerned with the world or with our lives; our
intentions were pure and every one of us was ready to die as a martyr.
When I look back on the love and respect that we had for each other, it
sometimes seems like a dream.”69

For many of these fighters, the struggle against the Soviets and their allies, or the
“Jihad…against communism,” was one of the most elevated spirituality, with an
ultimate goal of unquestionable sanctity. “Many great battles were fought against the
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Russians and government forces,” remembered one Muslim fighter.70 Many would die,
and they would be forever hailed as martyrs. For the living, the only redemptive
political system was that of Islam. This was how peace could be won, however hardfought it might be. Over time, the mujahydin’s war of attrition wore away at the Soviet
occupiers, demoralizing the Russian troops and contributing significantly to virtual
Soviet bankruptcy. By 1988, peace accords had been signed between the governments
of Afghanistan, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Pakistan.
On 15 February 1989, Moscow announced that the last Soviet soldier had left
Afghanistan. One million Afghans (some say two million),71 as well as some thirteen
thousand Soviet troops, had been killed in the decade-long Soviet war in Afghanistan.

Proselytizing Deobandism: the Rise and Spread of the Tablighi Jama’at.
Muhammad Ilyas (d. 1944 AD), the founder of the Tablighi Jama’at, was trained in
the Deobandi tradition; indeed, he had been born into it. His father, Muhammad Ismail
(d. 1898 AD), was from the qәSbәħ of Jhanjana, and his mother from the qәSbәħ of
Kandhala, both “‘alәma towns” in which Deobandism had taken firm root. One of his
most influential teachers was his own older brother, Muhammad Yahya, a student of
Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (as a teenager, Ilyas himself reportedly developed a strong
bond with Rashid Ahmad, too). He had additionally studied, beginning in 1908, under
the direction of Mahmud Hasan (to whom he would later swear an oath of jyhad against
the British), and would become a disciple, too, of the eminent Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi while
completing his education at the dar ul’alwm at Deoband. After completing his studies
there, Muhammad Ilyas continued to train and teach at another Deobandi dar ul’alwm,
in nearby Saharanpur (from 1910 to 1917).
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But it was in the 1930s that Muhammad Ilyas really began his now-famous tablighi
efforts. The setting was Mewat, a region that straddles the modern-day Indian units of
Rajasthan and Haryana. Here he organized jәma’ats (or “assemblies”) assigned to
specific villages in the area with the explicit mission to preach Islam to Muslims viewed
as either weak in the faith or victims of Hindu or some other influence; this included, of
course, the Barelvis. The goal was revival (and numbers, as the British began during
this period to open up junior government posts to Indians apportioned by religion, and
Hindu groups like the Arya Samaj were reacting with “reconversion” campaigns
claiming success by the hundreds of thousands). Muhammad Ilyas’s gift was in
organization. Each jәma’at was tasked with reporting to the movement’s center in
Delhi (where its world headquarters remained even after Partition—and to the time of
this writing), and members were to differentiate themselves in deed, belief, and even
look from their Hindu neighbors. The accretion must stop, and the jәma’ats would use
the power of persuasion combined with strict discipline and a commitment to “motion”
(i.e. movement, as in from house to house and from place to place, preaching Islam) to
make sure that it did. It didn’t take long for enthusiasm for Muhammad Ilyas’s
organization to spread, especially to Delhi, where the proselytizing group became
popular among the city’s Muslim merchants. The organization was called the Tablighi
Jama’at (hereafter TJ).
After the 1944 death of Muhammad Ilyas, his son, Yusuf (d. 1965) took the reigns in
his stead. Unlike the JUH or, later, the JUI, both of which played an overtly political
role within the context of the pre-Partition struggle for independence and Pakistan, the
TJ began presenting itself during this period as a completely apolitical entity, especially
after 1947. (Within Islam this is, of course, arguably impossible, at least on a certain
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level; Yusuf here was simply keeping his organization at a distance from the specific
political webs of India and Pakistan, despite its overtly political end game.) The group
especially distanced itself from the JI (Muhammad Ilyas’s nephew, Muhammad
Zakariyya Kandhlawi, who had taught at the same Saharanpur dar ul’alwm and was
Yusuf’s father-in-law, wrote a fiery and influential diatribe against the JI in the early
1950s, for example).72 In any case, the TJ’s policy became one of political nonalignment, a position it ostensibly holds to the time of this writing (but which, as earlier
demonstrated, is practically impossible within the framework of Islam, and especially
Deobandi Islam; in the words of Sikand, despite the group’s “immediate focus” on
“reform of the individual,” the TJ “can hardly be said to be apolitical”).73 Under Yusuf,
the TJ completely transformed, from a local phenomenon with little influence beyond
north-central India to a worldwide organization. TJ jәma’ats were organized
throughout the subcontinent, in the Middle East, and in Western Europe, spreading as
well to the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asia. Throughout Yusuf’s tenure as TJ
head, the organization held major—and highly attended—conventions in India,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh, often counting a million or more attendees. Significantly,
too, the TJ under Yusuf expanded its mission to include preaching to non-Muslims, and
like the Christian missionaries of previous centuries the TJ proselytizers traveled far
and wide by whatever means they could manage. Muhammad Ilyas would perhaps have
preferred a comparison not to early Christians but to the first generations of Muslims,
who “traveled all the time, both on land and in the water…traveling and reciting the
Qur’an, traveling and offering salat, traveling and doing zykr” (again emphasizing the
necessity of “motion”).74 Yusuf died in 1965 in Lahore, having led the movement for
over twenty years.
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His successor, the quiet and reserved In’amul Hasan (d. 1995), had known Yusuf
since childhood (when they had been classmates) and had personally studied under both
Muhammad Zakariya Kandhlawi and Muhammad Ilyas himself. The expansion of the
organization that had taken place under Yusuf continued under In’amul—especially,
and significantly, within the Pakistani government, the Pakistani military, and the
Pakistani intelligence agencies. In 1990, prominent TJ member Javed Nasir became
head of the ISID, and during the Prime Ministership of Nawaz Sharif (whose own father
was an active member and generous financier of the TJ) the Pakistani government
patronized TJ members with significant government positions.75 TJ inroads in the
Army, which surged under Zia as the dictator tended to appoint Deobandi-leaning
officers into the armed forces, allowed members to preach to soldiers in the barracks.
Meanwhile, the organization’s worldwide spread gained a renewed vigor, especially
given Muslim grievances in Afghanistan, the central Asian states (including East
Turkestan), Russia, and the Middle East over foreign interventionism and domination.
After In’amul Hasan’s June 1995 death, the organization underwent some media
scrutiny when, in September, a large group of mostly Deobandi Army officers
(including a major-general, some brigadiers, and several colonels) attempted to oust
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. By 31 October, up to seven hundred officers were under
investigation “for possible complicity” in the failed coup attempt.76 All of the plot’s
participants were later linked to the TJ, raising fears that the organization had indeed
turned a political corner and now sought to take over governments in order to institute
an Islamic order. (Some were also shown to be members of the aforementioned
Deobandi militant group Harakat ul-Mujahidin, of which more later.)77 After In’amul
Hasan’s tenure as TJ head, the group was led by a shwra that was itself headed by two
450

leaders: Zubair ul-Hasan and Saad Kandhlawi. By now the TJ had grown especially
strong roots in the UK, where the group supported almost half (some six hundred or
more) of Britain’s mosques—and where the debate has become particularly heated;
Muslims in the UK are mostly of South Asian descent and are overwhelmingly divided
between the Deobandi and Barelvi sects. The situation of one twenty-one-year-old
Deobandi man may be indicative of the general situation, and illustrates the manner in
which the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry plays out amongst regular Muslims on a personal
level. The role of tabliG is also evident. Addressed to the muftis of the dar ul’alwm in
Deoband, the young man wrote the following:

i am very strong…follower of [the ‘alәma of Deoband] i am very much
influenced by them… but where i live here is large sect of brelvis [sic]
who follows ahmad rida khan [Ahmad Riza Khan] bidati...i know all the
brelvis are bidati. all ulemas of brelvis use dirty languages of our
respected ulema's they call em to be kafirs… one of my friend is also
brelvi he tells me not to follow deobandis they are kafirs, i ignore him
every time, he gives me proofs of kitaabs writen by ulema e deoband, like
our respected ulema, [mwlana Qasim Nanautawi], Rashid Ahmad
Gangohi… Last Time i Met Him Was When i was going to perform
jummah prayer… he was telling me not to go for prayer behind
deobandis, come here, with me in our [masjid], you will not have your
salah behind them, i ignored him…

In answer to the query (which went on to describe his proselytizing efforts vis-à-vis the
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Barelvi individual in question, and ask if such proselytizing was appropriate), the
Deobandi mufti advised the young man to “try [his] best to take [the Barelvi] to the
right path,” despite the Barelvis’ “abusing and blaspheming the elders of Deoband”—
which, it was explained, was done “out of ignorance” only. The mufti’s advice falls in
line with the behavior of the early scholars, who chose to carry out the struggle by
means of persuasion, not compulsion.78
By 2003, around one in twelve Muslims worldwide was a member or direct
supporter of the TJ, and the Deobandi group represented “the largest group of religious
proselytizers of any faith” on the planet,79 as well as “the largest Islamic movement in
the world today.”80 In 1998, thanks again to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (who, in
April, had engineered the removal of the President’s ability to sack a government,
thereby consolidating his own power), a prominent TJ member (but otherwise virtually
unknown figure, apart from his stint as an associate judge on the Supreme Court),
Muhammad Rafique Tarar, was appointed to the office of state head as Pakistan’s ninth
President.81 On the one hand, scholars have pointed to such appointments as evidence
of the TJ’s successful efforts to infiltrate governments like Pakistan’s. On the other, it
may be useful to remember that, with so many millions of TJ members and supporters,
the appointment or nomination of a TJer to some important government office did not
necessarily signal some secret tabliGi plan to take over the state.
One 2010 sociological study out of the University of Johannesburg found that the
TJ system was able to tap into Muslims’ “shared experiences and interrelations,” despite
cultural differences or geographical distance, thereby “inform[ing] identity” and
deriving “legitimate meaning”; the study’s prognostication concerning the group’s
future: “the success of the Tabligh Jamaat is not likely to wane.”82 The TJ’s explosive
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growth and success (including the conversion of many Barelvis to the Deobandi school
of thought) caused Barelvi scholars more than a little trepidation for the welfare of the
“Sunni majority.” (The same anxiety—though not for the Barelvi masses—might be
displayed by U.S. foreign policy “experts” like Washington, D.C.-based Center for
Security Policy vice president Alex Alexiev, who described the TJ’s
“15,000…missionaries reportedly active in the United States” as “a serious national
security problem.”)83 Barelvi ‘alәma and Western neo-conservatives alike found it
difficult to “attack” the TJ since Muhammad Ilyas’s organization eschewed any sort of
transparency; it published no financial reports, seemed to keep no official (or at least
public) membership records, appeared devoid of any formal structure, and even shied
away from the Internet.84 (This “shying away from the Internet” is a reference to the
TJ as an organization; individual members seemed to employ the World Wide Web
prolifically, uploading Islamic books, talks, videos, and blog posts.) Indeed, trying to
find any “official” information about the TJ proved a somewhat elusive endeavor, and as
a result scholars and other researchers were forced to rely on formal or informal
interviews directly with TJ “members.”
One major donor to the TJ: Saudi Arabia (and other Gulf states), adding fuel to the
Barelvi premise that Deobandism is nothing more than another strain of Wahhabism.
When Barelvi leaders in Uttar Pradesh complained to the Indian government about the
alleged Deobandi usurpation of tens of thousands of religious sites and institutions, they
explained that the steady, gradual seizure of Barelvi properties (as well as the
infiltration by Deobandi clerics of Indian government minority bodies) had been fueled
by Wahhabi “petro-dollars.”85 Meanwhile, the Deobandis cultivated links with Saudi
Arabia in Britain through the UK Islamic Mission, dubbed “the embodiment of the
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Riyadh-Islamabad axis.” The TJ also played a role in procuring Saudi cash for tabliGi
efforts in the United States, as the group worked through organizations like the Jama’at
ul-Fuqra, founded by the New York-based Deobandi shix Mubarek Gilani and funded by
both the TJ and wealthy Saudi contributors. The Barelvis attempted to counter these
highly bankrolled Deobandi efforts through their own World Islamic Mission (presided
over by none other than JUP head Shah Ahmad Noorani). In between these groups
stood men like Hyderabad-born Dr. Syed Pasha, whose Union of Muslim Organizations
was set up, at least in part, in an effort to “see [Deobandi and Barelvi] reconciled.”86

ISID Patronage: Growth of mәdarys Networks, Militant Outfits.
The autobiography of Taliban leader Abdul Salam Zaeef is seething with hatred for
the ISID, and though the focus of his work doesn’t lend itself to details in this regard, it
clearly fingers the Pakistani intelligence agency as a backer and manipulator of the
Taliban.87 In the early 1980s, for example, the ISID ran a special weapons training
program for Afghan mujahydin targeting Russian tanks and helicopters. In the end,
according to this Taliban source, the ISID betrayed their Afghan brothers in deference
to the Americans and their money. In any case, it was through the mechanism of the
state, especially that of its intelligence wing, that stimulus for the (mostly Deobandi)
mәdarys networks along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border was distributed. In the words
of Jalal, “State sponsorship of the Deobandis for strategic purposes upset the sectarian
balance in predominantly Barelvi Pakistan.”88 Not only did money collected via Zia’s
new zәkat bureaucracy find its way into the hands of mostly Deobandi groups and
parties, but some two billion dollars of U.S. Government covert “assistance” (combined
with an even larger sum from Saudi Arabia and various Gulf states) was funneled—
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through the Pakistani state intelligence wing—in large part to these same groups.89
This enormous inflow of mostly American and Saudi cash triggered a massive upsurge
in the construction and spread of new mәdarys. The Deobandi school, already old hat at
organizing large (even transnational) education networks, was thus provided the means
to spread its revivalist ideology across the country. Zia did little to prevent the
financial disparity between the Deobandi and Barelvi schools from growing, favoring as
he did (by this time, anyway) the Deobandis; after all, the General himself would
personally receive Muhammad Tayyib, head of the dar ul’alwm at Deoband, at the
airport every time the latter paid a visit to Pakistan.90 (As mentioned previously, the
Barelvis, under the JUP, had had their chance to curry favor with the Zia regime, but
had opted to form part of the opposition; had the party taken advantage of Zia’s offer—
and the state patronage that would have naturally flowed from it—might things have
been radically different vis-à-vis the subsequent mushrooming of Deobandi mәdarys and
militant outfits?) In any case, the ISID’s collaboration with Saudi intelligence, plus
Zia’s liberalizing of visa requirements for Islamic activists and missionaries, opened the
door for the introduction of a more austere version of Islam into Pakistan—one that
favored a Deobandi approach rather than a Barelvi one. Saudi Wahhabi preachers and
activists by the thousands entered Pakistan from the 1980s, operating up and down the
western border areas and in every major city.
The now-famous dar ul’alwm Haqqania in Akora Khattack (where almost all of the
Taliban’s senior leadership, including Mullah Omar, were educated) provides a general
example of how state patronage worked to promote incredible (and incredibly rapid)
growth within one Deobandi educational network. A former teacher from the dar
ul’alwm at Deoband founded the school in 1947.91 With the invasion of Afghanistan by
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the Russians, students from Haqqania (many of them Afghan) were caught up in the
jyhad against the USSR; indeed, one of the original fatawa calling for holy war in
Afghanistan originated from Haqqania. Soon money from the combined zәkat-U.S.
intelligence-Saudi intelligence pot was liberally dumped into the school, and hundreds
of sister schools were quickly constructed, mostly within the tribal regions bordering
Afghanistan—each school autonomous within its own local sphere but run as part of a
larger network from Haqqania. Since Zia’s time, the school’s network has continued to
mushroom, and today its funding still originates primarily from Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf states. The dramatic increase in the number of mәdarys, exemplified by the rise and
spread of the Haqqania network of schools, represented yet another victory of the
minority Deobandis over the majority Barelvis; by 1988—Zia’s final year as head of
state—Deobandi mәdarys outnumbered Barelvi mәdarys approximately 2.6 to 1, with
especially significant numerical advantages in the NWFP, Sindh, Baluchistan, Kashmir,
and the Northern Areas.92 Over the years, scholars of the Deobandi persuasion
continued to find positions in influential mosques (some formerly Barelvi) and religious
posts in government, out of proportion to the two groups’ relative populations. Barelvis
resented this and responded with organizations of their own, dedicated to “protecting”
Barelvi “articles of faith” (aqaid), “mosques,” money, and “rights.”93 These were the
express goals of perhaps the most important Barelvi reactionary political organization,
the Sunni Tehrik, founded in the early 1990s.
But ISID patronage didn’t end with the (mostly Deobandi) seminaries (and, it is
alleged, mosques; Sunni Tehrik head Sarwat Aijaz Qadiri, for example, claimed in 2010
that “thousands of mosques and madressahs across the country which belonged to
Barelvis were forcibly taken over by the Deobandis” during the Zia years—a
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phenomenon that would have bloody repurcussions from the 1990s when Barelvis
attempted to win them back).94 The intelligence organization adopted a number of
(mostly Deobandi) militant groups, too, which were subsequently used by the agency as
proxy armies, mostly in Kashmir but also against rival sects. Previously in this work,
Deobandi mujahyd Irshad Ahmed and his Harkat ul-Jihad ul-Islami were mentioned.
After Irshad’s 1985 death, his organization splintered into two groups. Fazlul Rehman
Khalil and mwlana Masood Kashmiri led one group, which they called Harkat ulMujahideen. But differences between Khalil and Kashmiri resulted in a further fracture,
dividing Harkat ul-Mujahideen into the Fazlul Rehman Khalil-led Harkat ulMujahideen (hereafter HuM) and the Masood Kashmiri-led Jamiat ul-Mujahideen
(hereafter JuM). Meanwhile, the second group to coalesce after Irshad Ahmed’s death,
organized by several Deobandi ‘alәma (including Muhammad Shafi’s son Muhammad
Rafi Usmani) from old Harkat-ul Mujahideen remnants in 1993, was renamed Harkat
ul-Ansar. The jyhad against the Soviets was largely transferred to the jyhad against the
Indians over Kashmir. The conflict intensified beginning in the late eighties and
throughout much of the nineties as Indian and Pakistani leaders hurled insults and
challenges at one another. In August 1994, for example, Pakistani Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto pledged her country’s support “always” to those “Kashmiris fighting
Indian rule.” The next day Indian Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao demanded that
Pakistan relinquish its hold on “Azad Kashmir” and turn it over to India immediately.
On Kashmir, Bhutto insisted, Pakistan had an “unfinished agenda,” which Rao threw
back by agreeing—“the one unfinished task,” he said, was for Pakistan to terminate its
“occupation” of western Kashmir and give it to India. Meanwhile, for years soldiers
from both countries continued to shoot at one another across the Line of Control on
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almost a daily basis, while “Islamic mercenaries” (members of mostly Deobandi and JI
groups—plus some Barelvi outfits, too—with backing from the ISID) constantly made
incursions into Indian-controlled Kashmir. “With you, without you, in spite of you,
Kashmir will remain an integral part of India,” Rao promised, even while the conflict
continued to sap India’s resources as the government’s troops were supplied by
helicopter high in the Himalayas (Pakistani soldiers and paramilitants, on the other
hand, made the trip to the front “by lorry and mule”).95 Rao’s use of the term “integral,”
echoing similar (and even more dubious) claims on Tibet by the Beijing regime,
demonstrated the Indian government’s intractability; gone were the days of possibility,
of hopes for a meaningful plebiscite, in the years immediately after Partition. Of course,
Rao’s comments were made just a year-and-a-half after the deadliest and most
destruction bomb blasts in the history of India (12 March 1993), when coordinated
attacks in Mumbai—that the Indian government alleged were linked both to the
Pakistani ISID as well as “Islamic groups” backed by the intelligence agency, among
others—left more than two hundred fifty dead and over seven hundred wounded. (The
blasts were evidently motivated, at least in large part, by the Hindu-led destruction of
Babri mәsjyd in Ayodhya.)
Meanwhile, Deobandism spread with the growth of its educational network—and
the help of Wahhabis from Saudi Arabia. Barelvi animosity towards “Saudi” Arabia
goes back as far as that kingdom’s founding (1932)—and even further, when the Saudis
were fighting for control of the peninsula against fellow Muslims. In his presidential
address on the occasion of the All-India Sunni Conference’s founding in Moradabad in
1925, for example, Jamaat ‘Ali Shah had commented on the political situation in Arabia
before condemning “the massacre of innocent Muslims” there “carried out by the
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descendents of King Saud.” He also took the opportunity to slam the major tenets of
Wahhabism, “fast spreading in India,” and the emergence of “other minor sects” within
the subcontinental Muslim community. (One of these “minor sects” was Deobandism.)
The house of Saud, of course, had long embraced Wahhabism—that school of Islam
with which the Barelvis had been bitterly opposed from the beginning, and which they
(the Barelvis) commonly associated (however erroneously) with their Deobandi
counterparts. A decade later (in 1935), at another AISC gathering in Badayun, Jamaat
‘Ali Shah again condemned Ibn Saud’s “policies in Arabia.”96 Since the early 1980s,
Barelvis had watched on, too, as the Saudis funded the proliferation of Deobandi and
Ahl-e-Sunnat mәdarys, concurrently bankrolling Deobandi militant outfits in Pakistan—
outfits that targeted Barelvis, among others. One 2003 study found that the JUI alone
ran more than sixty-five percent of all of Pakistan’s mәdarys.97
Thus, while the Deobandis “enjoyed increasing influence and state patronage during
the Afghan [jyhad],” as well as the seemingly endless beneficence of hopeful Wahhabis
from the Gulf, the Barelvis “remained sidelined during this period.”98 Such “sidelining,”
however, would garner a response.

Barelvi Response: Sunni Tehrik, Dawat-e-Islami, et alia.
The Sunni Tehreek, “an aggressive version of the Barelvi faith” mentioned
previously as a “Sunni” response to Deobandi dominance in government as well as the
perceived Deobandi capture of traditionally Barelvi mosques, was born in Karachi. The
organization would strive to amass a network of Barelvi groups throughout the country
to combat what it saw as “the armed madrassa followers”—the Deobandis.99 Founded
by one Muhammad Saleem Qadiri in 1990, the Sunni Tehrik is generally considered an
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“offshoot” of the JUP, and was (and is) funded by both foreign and in-country
contributors. At first, Karachi’s business-savvy Memon community helped finance the
outfit as it was initially getting off the ground; throughout the 1990s, too, money from
Baghdad helped buoy the Barelvi cause—an Iraqi attempt to counter the influence of
Saudi cash in Pakistan.100 (Thus we see the Deobandi-Barelvi conflict being co-opted by
foreign governments in their own rivalries.) As of this writing, the Sunni Tehrik enjoys
the general support of Barelvis across Pakistan.
The Sunni Tehrik’s initial mission was to win back the mosques it claimed had been
usurped by Deobandi clerics and their followers—“the battle over houses of God,” as
journalist Salman Siddiqui described it. (Interestingly, the Deobandis make the same
claim about the Barelvis. For example, prominent Karachi cleric mufti Naeem, head of
major Deobandi mәdrәsәħ Jamia Binoria, claimed to have “a list of 27 mosques such as
Jamia Noor where we [the Deobandis] can prove that it belongs to our people
belonging to the Deoband school of thought.” Meanwhile, Sunni Tehrik (hereafter ST)
chief Sarwat Aijaz Qadiri claimed that “thousands” of [Barelvi] mosques across
Pakistan had been taken over by the Deobandis during the Zia years.)101 The takeover,
the ST asserted, had been accomplished with the help of two Deobandi militant
organizations: the Lashkar-e-Taiba and, especially, the SSP.102 For its first twelve years
of existence (until the end of 2001), the Sunni Tehrik’s operations revolved around this
very specific goal, focused almost entirely on mosques in Sindh (mostly Karachi) and the
Punjab. The first Sunni Tehrik-Deobandi clash occurred in 1992 in Karachi, when
members of the Barelvi group attempted to take over the Noor mәsjyd (located off M. A.
Jinnah Road at Ranchor Lines). Deobandis insisted the mosque had always been
Deobandi—that it had been built, after all, by Shabbir Ahmad Usmani himself. But the
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Sunni Tehrik were adamant, and on 18 December—in its “first show of strength”—the
ST organized a massaive rally along M. A. Jinnah Road in protest of Deobandi
possession of the mosque.103 The rally turned ugly, and by the time it was over, dozens
had been injured, a number of vehicles burnt, and several killed. A few months later,
another ST attack occurred, this time targeting the Ibrahim Raza mosque in Karachi’s
Burmi Colony, resulting in more deaths and the mәsjyd ‘s sealing off by police. Between
1992 and 2002, a purported sixty-two mosques from all over Pakistan were wrested
from Deobandi possession by the Barelvi Sunni Tehrik.104
In May of 2001, ST founder Muhammad Saleem Qadiri was gunned down—along
with five others—in his car outside of his Saeedabad, Karachi home as he was leaving
for Friday prayers. The Deobandi SSP was blamed for the assassination, and a new
chapter in the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry was opened: that of targeted assassinations.
After the attack, the streets of the city were rocked with “murderous sectarian riots”—a
literal battle between Barelvis and Deobandis.105 Saleem Qadiri’s successor, Abbas
Qadiri, accused the Musharraf regime of “patronizing terrorists” and, significantly,
“standing between us and the murderers.” The ST’s new leader was, in effect, charging
the government of patronizing and protecting the Deobandis at the expense of the
Barelvi majority. “After Abbas Qadiri’s death, one thing is clear,” wrote Indian
journalist Praveen Swami, who covered the 2006 Nishtar Park blast mentioned at the
beginning of this work. “Someone, sooner or later, will seek to settle the Sunni
Tehreek’s unfinished business with his [Saleem Qadiri’s] murderers.”106 Once the
Deobandi-Barelvi back-and-forth had been one of juridical rulings and religious books;
now it was bullets, bombs, and ball bearings.
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Even the state’s 1992-1994 Army-led operation against the MQM possessed a
Deobandi-Barelvi layer of significance. The MQM, as previously mentioned, was
predominantly made up of Urdu-speaking Barelvis (originally immigrants from northcentral India who had arrived around the time of Partition) who not only lined up
against the local Sindhis but also against the perceived encroachment of mostly
Deobandi Pathans. The latter had been flooding into Karachi, and other cities, for years
on account of the unstable situation in Afghanistan. Wrote one observer in 1995, “War
has allowed a drugs and gun culture to spread across the [Afghanistan-Pakistan]
border, which is behind the virtual collapse of Karachi, the commercial capital.”
Meanwhile, Operation Clean-up was led by the Deobandi-leaning, Taliban-supporting
(and Pathan) Naseerullah Babar.107 In June the Army launched the operation, seizing
the MQM’s Azizabad headquarters within twenty-four hours and prompting the party
to quit the government a week later. Over the course of the next two years, thousands
died, disappeared, were kidnapped, or were injured in the Army action (and the MQM
response) in Karachi alone. By mid-1994, MQM leader Altaf Hussain (and others) had
been sentenced to almost thirty years in prison for the 1991 kidnapping and torture of
an Army major (this was the famous “Major Kaleem Case”); in 1998, however, the High
Court of Sindh found all of the accused not guilty, and the exhultant MQM described
the whole affair as “politically motivated.”108 The contest highlighted, too, the role of
the Afghan war in the militarization of the Deobandi and Barelvi outfits pitted against
one another.
The Barelvi religious leadership responded to the proselytizing success of the
Deobandi Tablighi Jama’at, too—and in no more obvious fashion than in the formation
of the Dawat-e-Islami. Founded in 1980 in Karachi by Muhammad Ilyas Qadiri, the
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Dawat-e-Islami billed itself as “a global non-political movement for the propagation of
Quran and Sunnah.”109 Perhaps as a reaction to the Tablighi Jama’at’s success at
organizing mega-conventions (including the Bangladeshi meeting referred to at the
beginning of this work, largely considered the largest Muslim gathering in the world
outside of the hәj), the Dawat-e-Islami organized its own conferences. These had to be
bigger than the Deobandi meetings, especially since the Barelvis’ foundational claim to
legitimacy was that they represented the majority, or “Sunni,” sect. As such, the Dawate-Islami’s Multan conference (as of this writing) claims that it—not the Tablighi
meeting outside of Dhaka—is the “world’s largest congregation of Muslims after the
hajj.”110 In the beginning, at least, the Tablighis were instructed to differentiate
themselves from their neighbors not only by means of their pious behavior but also in
dress; Dawat-e-Islami members do much the same, most characteristically (at least for
the men) by wearing a green turban, green being associated with the Prophet—and it is,
again, the Barelvi devotion to the Prophet that primarily drives the movement. In 2006,
the Dawat-e-Islami came under some fire after a stampede took place in one of its
women’s congregations; several women were critically injured—but the organizations
leaders refused to allow male medical workers to help them. According to at least one
report, “several women died because of the delay in providing medical assistance.”111 As
of the time of this writing, the Dawat-e-Islami world headquarters are situated adjacent
to a fairly well manicured plaza called Askari Park. Even so, most of the building’s
surroundings are marked not by greenery but by the narrow gullies and cramped
housing of lower-class Karachi. Spray-painted generously onto the walls and shopfronts of this and surrounding neighborhoods are the initials “ST”—the acronym for the
Sunni Tehrik; one shop declares, in thick black paint, “DOWN WITH USA.” To enter the
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Dawat-e-Islami’s central building one must walk down a side street that is little more
than an alley, green-turbaned pedestrians walking up and down its length, before
reaching the main gate. The gate is manned by four gun-toting guards and sports
cement road barriers, barbed wire, and a metal detector; the compound’s walls are high
and barbed, too. The whole presentation betrays the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry’s
relatively recent descent into militarism.
Even as regards the formation of overtly militant groups—as opposed to the ST,
which was more of a (sometimes thuggish) defense league—the Deobandis were not to
enjoy a monopoly over the Barelvis. The Ansar-ul Islam (AuI), for example, founded by
the Afghan pir Saifur Rehman (about whom more later), was formed in Khyber Agency
(in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) in 2004, primarily to fight against a
Deobandi group in the area led by mufti Munir Shakir called Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI).112
The Sunni Jihad Council (SJC) was active (as of this writing) in Kashmir (and a
supporter of another Barelvi group, Al-Barq) in response to Deobandi activities there.
“It is regrettable,” said SJC Supreme Commander Said ‘Ali Reza in 1999, “that some
people have tried to spread their false beliefs on the pretext of jihad in Kashmir.” That
Said ‘Ali was talking about Deobandis was made clear when he added, “They have even
torched shrines and tried to occupy mosques. This is a conspiracy against Muslims.
We know how to defend territorial as well as religious borders. God willing, Kashmir
will be freed by Sunni Jihad Council, because it is a representative platform for the majority of
Muslims.”113 This last was plainly a reiteration of the Barelvi claim to speak for South
Asia’s “Sunni majority.” Perhaps the point is that the oft-uttered Barelvi claim that
religious militancy (including the targeting of fellow Muslims) is solely a Deobandi
game should be taken with a grain of salt. It is undoubtably true that in the Deobandi464

Barelvi war in Pakistan from the 1980s to the present, the Deobandi outfits appear to
have far more blood on their collective hands—but the Barelvis have entered the game,
too. The oftentime violent methods of the Sunni Tehrik, the militancy of pir Saifur
Rehman’s outfit, and the Barelvi fighters in Kashmir (and, later, the religiously
motivated assassination of Salman Taseer by one of his Barelvi bodyguards, of which
more later) demonstrate that the contest is not by any means completely one-sided.
Other Barelvi organizations that might be considered responses to the perceived
Deobandi onslaught include the Nizam-e-Mustapha Party, founded by Hanif Tayyab
(former general secretary of the JUP’s Karachi branch, three-time National Assembly
member, and federal Minister with several different portfolios)114; the Jamaat Ahle
Sunnat, a religious organization of Barelvi leaders founded in Karachi in 1956—the very
one, in fact, that organizaed the mwlyd celebration at Nishtar Park in April 2006—that
sometimes dabbles in politics (as, in 2011, when it admonished its members not to offer
funeral prayers for murdered governor Salman Taseer);115 the Riza Academy, based in
Mumbai, a major propagator of Barelvi books and pamphlets and the organizer of the
August 2012 protest rally in Mumbai that ended with several dead and scores
wounded;116 the UK-based World Islamic Mission, founded in the early 1970s by
Mustapha Riza Khan’s xәlifәħ Qamaruzzaman Azmi (among others), and credited with
being the first international Barelvi missionary organization;117 and student groups like
the Hanif Tayyab-founded Anjuman Talaba-e-Islam, created in 1968.118

After Zia: Deobandi-Barelvi Politics, 1988-2001.
As aforementioned, Ishaq Khan opted to respect the 16 November 1988 date for
general elections set by Zia ul-Haq before the latter’s sudden death. By early October,
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then, four main groups had emerged as major electoral players: (1) the “hard-left” Left
and Democratic Front, a six-party alliance that was by far the weakest of the four; (2)
the PPP-led MRD (which included the Deobandi JUI); (3) the Muslim League (Fida
group)-led nine-party Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (yslami jәmhwri yttyhad, meaning “Islamic
Democratic Alliance,” hereafter IJI); and (4) the Muslim League (Junejo faction), allied
with the Tehrik-e-Istaqlal and the Barelvi JUP.119 Over the proceeding month, much
political jockeying and rearranging occurred, and with just a week to go before election
day two main rivals had emerged from this mileau as the contest’s frontrunners. First,
there was the Benazir Bhutto-led PPP (which had split with the MRD, including the
JUI, making the formerly imposing alliance largely insignificant, despite the fact that
the remaining parties had agreed to work together “loosely” in the elections); now the
PPP would stand on its own. Second, there was the Muslim League-led IJI, which
included the up-and-coming Punjabi Nawaz Sharif. The IJI reportedly made generous
use of “state patronage” to win over voters, forming, as it did, the caretaker
governments in Pakistan’s provinces (indeed, its very creation had been facilitated by
the head of the ISID itself, Hamid Gul, who later admitted to having arranged the
funneling of state money to the failing Mehran Bank in order to procure millions in
loans from the institution for the IJI—a revelation dubbed “Mehrangate”).120 One
member of the IJI: the JI, which had joined only on the condition that the Qur’an and
sunnәt be granted supremacy within the political order, among other demands.121
Meanwhile, a distant third contender was the Pakistan People’s Alliance (PPA), of
which the JUP was a part. Once again, the JUP had opted to “go it alone” rather than
join forces with other like-minded (in terms of constitutional hopes and dreams) parties.
Even the JI had sided with an alliance apart from either the JUI or the JUP. One other
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party that had emerged over the previous three years and was now contesting the
elections on its own as “potentially the most important of the smaller parties”: the
Sindh-based Mohajir Qaumi Movement, as aforementioned created to protect the
interests of the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs, or immigrants from India.122 The emergence
of the MQM is significant in the context of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, as the largely
Barelvi MQM was created in the first place in order to protect the Mohajirs from the
largely Deobandi Pathan influx into Sindh’s cities (and especially Karachi). The first
decade-and-a-half of the twenty-first century would see much bloodshed in clashes
between these two groups.
When the elections were over, the PPP had won a total of ninety-two seats in the
national assembly, far outdistancing anyone else (the IJI came in second with fifty-four).
And though results for the national assembly elections spelled a clear victory for the
PPP (and a “historic step for women,” according to the headlines, as Benazir Bhutto—
who was expected to claim her place as Prime Minister—would become not only the
first female leader of Pakistan but also of any other Muslim state), they also failed to
give Bhutto’s party an absolute majority in the nation’s highest legislative body. (This
set the stage for the decade-long tug-of-war between Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif that
would define Pakistani politics until the 1999 military coup of Pervez Musharraf.) In
Baluchistan, the JUI emerged as that province’s most dominant party, while in the
NWFP the IJI took eights seats, the PPP seven, the Pathan nationalist Awami National
Party three, and the JUI three. In Sindh, of course, the PPP dominated, with smaller
victories, too, for the three-year-old MQM in Karachi and Hyderabad. Even in the
Punjab, Bhutto’s party beat out the IJI, winning fifty-two to the latter’s forty-four
seats.123 The elections confirmed the Deobandi JUI’s continued significance in
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Pakistan’s western provinces (where it had obtained seven national assembly seats), and
additionally signaled the arrival of a strong, mostly Barelvi force with which to be
reckoned in the MQM. The latter party’s newfound political clout (after its winning
thirteen national assembly seats) even prompted President Ishaq Khan to meet with
party head Altaf Hussain to discuss issues relating to Pakistan’s future government.124
Meanwhile, the JUP won no seats at all.
The PPP’s dominance at the national elections was somewhat dimmed soon
thereafter by the IJI’s own dominance in Pakistan’s provincial elections, with Nawaz
Sharif’s alliance winning three out of four provinces (the JUI won eleven provincial
seats overall). Still, the People’s Party had won the national polls, and Bhutto fully
expected to be given the go-ahead to form a government. But JUI leaders, representing
what had now grown to become “the largest religious party” in Pakistan (as well as “the
fourth largest national party” overall), who suddenly found themselves facing the
possibility of a woman as Pakistan’s leader, opposed the idea. As previously mentioned,
the demand that the state’s head be a Muslim male had been a staple within the
constitutional blueprints created and proffered by both Deobandi and Barelvi scholars
for Pakistan, from pre-Partition onward. It should be noted, however, that this demand
seemed to refer to the head of state—i.e. the President—as opposed to the head of
government—i.e. the Prime Minister. But the Deobandi leadership vowed that, despite a
history of on-and-off cooperation with the PPP (especially during the Zia years), they
could not accept a female head of government (interesting, considering their
overwhelming support years before for Fatima Jinnah; might the issue have revolved
more around politics—or, at best, preference for a certain political system—than
religious doctrine?).125 When asked by journalist Karan Thapar about the JUI’s refusal
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to accept a woman-led administration, Benazir Bhutto underlined the ‘alәma’s
aforementioned lack of clarity, historically speaking, on the issue. “At times they have
said that they will not accept a woman as head of state,” she said, “but that they will
accept her as head of government. Now they are saying something different. But we
will…find out exactly what they mean.”126 Despite the JUI’s refusal, Bhutto’s most
pressing obstacle at the time was not the scholars’ repugnance to the idea of a female
Prime Minsiter, but President Ishaq Khan’s apparent reluctance to allow her to form a
government at all, especially amidst the protest of her rival Nawaz Sharif. Still, the
opposition of the ‘alәma was serious. By 26 November, the JUI had officially declared
that it was “ready to sit in opposition” to Bhutto and the PPP. Significantly, the MQM
made a similar pledge. Meanwhile, U.S. Ambassador Robert Oakley met with Bhutto in
late November, a clear indication that she enjoyed Washington’s support (a detail that
could not have been lost on the Deobandi ‘alәma in particular).127 Bhutto finally became
Prime Minister on 2 December.
Less than three months later, in late February 1989, a major gathering of ‘alәma—
reported as including more than two thousand scholars—took place in Rawalpindi. The
Barelvis and the Deobandis had once again come together in opposition to what was
perceived as an obvious and imminent threat to Pakistan’s Islamic character; wrote one
observer, “It is significant that all these sectarian groups which had been at loggerheads
on important religious issues have found a single platform against Miss Bhutto.” The
conference criticized Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (demanding the author’s
immediate extradition and execution, by hanging, in Pakistan), and accused the Bhutto
government of not taking proper measures to prevent the book’s publication. The
government was also berated for “encouraging obscenity” on state-funded television via
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“musical and dancing programmes.” Most importantly, though, the two thousand
‘alәma declared that Bhutto’s position as government head flew in the face of the Qur’an
and the sunnәt. They would, conference participants promised, “launch countrywide
agitation” in response to this state of affairs. The scholar-jurists also warned Bhutto not
to repeal any of the constitution’s Islamic provisions, particularly the eighth amendment
(dealing with, among other things, Islamic laws affecting the status of women). The
most vocal groups present: the Deobandi JUI (led by two senators: new dar ul’alwm
Haqqania head Sami ul-Haq and Qazi Abdul Latif), the Barelvi JUP (led by national
assembly member Abdul Sattar Niazi, the same who had been arrested in 1953 in
connection with the anti-Ahmadi riots in Lahore), and the JI. Each accused “Western
countries” of actively “patronizing” the newly organized Bhutto regime. (One
opposition leader, national assembly member Syeda Abida Hussain, perhaps said it best
when in August she wrote: “It has been her singular achievement that in the past eight
months Benazir Bhutto, while confirming her support abroad, has steadily lost good will
at home.”)128 In this context, Benazir represented the encroachment of a “Western”
value system on the “Islamic” one, a fear harbored by the ‘alәma since the days of the
British Raj and now, seemingly, coming to fruition. PPP leaders’ reaction to the ‘alәma
conference was to label the scholars and their parties “obscurantist elements” and
underscore their electoral mandate from “the people.”129
By June, at last some of those “obscurantist elements”—specifically, the JUI—had
allied with several former MRD members (including the ANP), plus a number of other
parties and the entire IJI to form a united opposition to the Bhutto government. But by
1990 President Ishaq Khan—described as “a cold, dispassionate bureaucrat with an
austere lifestyle”—fired Benazir Bhutto from the prime ministership anyway, amidst
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allegations of corruption (among other state woes), and as a result the PPP boycotted
the October general elections. This paved the way for the victory of Nawaz Sharif’s IJI.
The JUI, though it had been part of the opposition, ran separately, as did the JUP. The
Deobandi party won six National Assembly seats, the Barelvi party three. But the JUP
was at this point experiencing serious internal divisions, ultimately resulting in the
splitting of the party into multiple factions. One was led by mwlana Ahmad Shah
Noorani (called the JUP-N), another by Fazal Karim (the JUP-F); after the 2003 death
of Ahmad Shah, the JUI-N faded somewhat in the wake of a power vacuum and the
JUP-F emerged as the more powerful group. The effect of this split was to more or less
guarantee, at least as of the time of this writing, the future insignificance—on a national
level within the realm of electoral politics—of the Barelvi party from the early 1990s
onward. (For example, Fazal Karim, the very head of the JUP-F, would serve as a
National Assembly member—but on the PML-N ticket). The political pendulum swung
again in 1993, when national elections (characterized by heightened security and low
voter turnout) garnered Nawaz Sharif’s party more votes—but Benazir Bhutto’s more
seats. Just before the elections, too, the JI had lefft the IJI, winning a handful of
National Assembly seats as well as a couple NWFP provincial assembly seats on its
own; in order to maintain its purity, the JI had pledged from that year forward never
again to officially join any political alliance. The party had vociferously opposed
Benazir Bhutto, often protesting her policies in the streets; at one demonstration, police
shot and killed several JI members. Such oppressive measures, aimed at the political
opposition, contributed to Benazir’s waning popularity and eventual dismissal. But this
wasn’t enough for the JI, which demanded accountability—and, specifically, an
investigation into the corruption charges that had been leveled at her. Crucially, the JI
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demanded the investigation take place before new elections could be held, but this
demand was not met and elections were held anyway. The JI tried to stop them,
however; the party’s modus operandi was to stage sit-ins at voting sites—and perhaps the
low voter turnout that year was a direct result of JI efforts in this regard, combined
with an MQM elections boycott.130 Even so, the PPP eked out a win, and, having won
more National Assembly seats than Nawaz Sharif and his allies, formed a government
under Benazir Bhutto.
Perhaps as a means of currying favor with the Deobandi ‘alәma and their followers
(to the chagrin of the Barelvis, who tended to vote for Nawaz Sharif’s PML or for the
MQM), Benazir Bhutto’s government appointed Deobandi leader Fazlur Rehman as
Chairman of the foreign affairs committee in parliament—interesting and perhaps
enlightening, given the JUI chief’s anti-Western, pro-Taliban position. In any case,
Bhutto wouldn’t conclude this second term regularly, either; beset on all sides with
charges of corruption, as well as a host of other issues (including the use of brutal force
by the police under her administration, with no apparent effort to curb such official
violence), President Farooq Leghari dismissed the PPP government in early November
1996. In early February 1997, Nawaz Sharif’s PML won a landslide victory over the
PPP (the former obtaining an astounding one hundred fifty-five of the National
Assembly’s two hundred seven seats, compared to the PPP’s meager eighteen). The
Deobandi JUI won only two seats (both JUI-F victories; the JUI-S won zero) and its
Barelvi counterpart none. The latter, especially, seemed to have fallen far after its 1970
peak, when it had won more seats in Sindh than any other party except the PPP.

Post-Soviet Afghanistan and the Establishment of Taliban Rule.
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Though the Russians were gone, the Communist regime in Kabul lived on. But with
the USSR out of the way—the chief goal of American involvement in the war—U.S.
government cash began to dry up. This was a serious issue for many Afghan
commanders, whose funding depended on the U.S. taxpayer, as well as for thousands of
mujahydin foot soldiers, many of whom actually drew salaries, however irregular, as
members of one fighting force or another. Najibullah therefore developed a new
strategy: he would fill the void caused by disappearing dollars by buying off the various
commanders himself. Of course, he would need help. Where else to turn but the
Kremlin? Kabul’s venture was enthusiastically funded by the Soviet Union, and within
a short period of time—and to the dismay of the țalyban fighters and others—the very
commanders and their mujahydin who had kicked the Russians out had abruptly landed,
one degree removed, on the Russian payroll! The stratagem eroded alliances between
one-time allied commanders and turned entire armies previously engaged against
Najibullah into defenders of the Kabul regime. The ‘alәma and țalyban’s goal of an
Islamic government—and peace, in their eyes—seemed further away than ever. “The
Taliban had carried out many military operations against the Russians and had been one
of the most important pillars of the jihad,” one Taliban leader said of the period,
“sacrificing their lives and sustaining thousands of casualties, but we had been
betrayed.” In the end, “most” of the țalyban at this time returned home to continue with
their religious studies, resigned to their fate. Mullah Omar’s conversion of the țalyban’s
original Sangisar base into a mәdrәsәħ aptly embodies the movement’s retreat, however
reluctant, from the battlefield back to the seminary.131
Meanwhile, the chaotic scenario playing itself out in Afghanistan was too much for
the governments and intelligence agencies of the world to resist. Each saw an
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opportunity to pursue its own regional interests—and seized it. The USSR’s continued
meddling, vis-à-vis the Najibullah regime, has already been mentioned. Pakistan’s
government (and, more particularly, the ISID) backed Hekmatyar and his Hizb-e-Islami
(directly contributing, in the words of one commentator, to the destruction of “half of
Kabul”).132 As early as July 1989—just five months after the Soviet withdrawal—
Hekmatyar’s outfit (mostly Pathan) had slaughtered a group of Jamiat Islami
commanders (almost entirely non-Pathan), casting an ugly light on the shrinking
possibility of cooperation between Afghanistan’s various “mujahydin” parties.133
Meanwhile, Iran’s government, in a bid to out-influence the Saudis in the region,
supported Abdul ‘Ali Mazari’s Hazara Hizb-e-Wahdat (a Shi’a outfit), while the regime
in Riyadh backed the Ittihad-e-Islami of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (a Wahhabi group).
Through the eyes of the Pathan religious scholars and țalyban, traitorous commanders
raped the country from within while equally traitorous foreign regimes raped the
country from without. “[T]he idea of being ruled by westernized technocrats produces
a gut reaction among many Mujahidin,” wrote journalist Lieven from Peshawar.
“Revolt against this class has, after all, been an underlying theme of their holy war.
This has been in part a struggle of all those traditionalist forces—tribesmen and Islamic
clergy—excluded and impoverished over the past half century by the modernizing and
westernizing state.”134 The role of foreign governments in the Afghanistan mess was
especially underscored in 1992, when Kabul was captured from the Russia-backed
communist regime only to see the various warring factions turn on one another; one
observer reported, “As darkness fell yesterday [26 April], superpower weapons given in
another era thundered over Kabul.” The situation conjured up the “prospect of
permanent civil war.”135
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Seeing all of this destruction, this petty tug-of-war between great powers and
power-hungry warlords, what did the țalyban have to show for their years-long anticommunist jyhad that had costs thousands of lives and ravaged their homelands? Of a
truth, the situation could scarcely have appeared bleaker. The streets of Kabul were a
warzone, the government was plagued by infighting, and the entire country (especially
the southern half) was crawling with gangs: some mere bandits, others mujahydinturned-robbers-and-rapists. Travel meant risking one’s life, not to mention the
monetary cost involved. It is ironic that many of the țalyban who had returned from
Pakistani exile to fight Russians in Afghanistan now opted, long after the Russians had
been ousted, to leave Afghanistan—despite the risks of long-distance movement—for
refugee status in Pakistan once more. Meanwhile, for those who remained, the fighting
between the various mujahydin parties “became so intense that it was impossible to live a
normal life,” according to one Afghan commentator who experienced the commotion
firsthand. The period became known as twpәkiyan: “the time of the men with guns”—a
poignant title given that it describes circumstances after a war. One ymam at a small
mosque not far from Kandahar remembered, “Many of the people who went to the city
would come back with tales of anarchy and chaos, and often I heard artillery fire in the
distance. The stories made me feel uneasy; I remembered the jyhad and the sacrifices we
had made. It seemed that it had been for nothing, but I still remained patient and gave
the same advice to my congregation.” But the situation continued to deteriorate, until
regular Afghans were holding demonstrations against the mujahydin they had once so
esteemed; such protests often ended with the local commander firing into the crowds
with machine guns—or even with tanks. These demonstrations of public outrage often
took place, perhaps significantly, after Friday prayers.136 To the țalyban (many of whom
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were now full-fledged ‘alәma), these acts of defiance were nothing less than calls for the
establishment, finally, of Islamic government and the order, security, and peace that
such a regime would, God-willing, surely provide. The Russians, the Afghan
Communists, and now the traitorous “mujahydin” government had all failed; all ignored
the injunctions of God and the people had reaped the whirlwind as a result. Holy war
had been waged against the unbelievers—but this had not been enough. “The events
after victory [against the Soviets],” wrote one Deobandi ‘alym, “[teach] us that it is not
the known disbelieving enemy alone against whom we must wage jihad. Rather, we
must wage jihad against our own base soul…” It was this failure—failure to continue
from the lesser to the greater jyhad, from the physical fight against communist atheism
to the spiritual struggle for personal purity—that had deprived the ummәt of the “fruits”
of the anti-communist struggle.137 Just as spiritual corruption on the part of the
Muslims had led to their political downfall and misery in India from the later eighteenth
through the nineteenth centuries, sin and impiety now prevented Afghanistan from
taking its place as a proud and prosperous Islamic state. The road was thus paved for an
Islamic revivalist movement to offer a popular solution to Afghanistan’s political and
social ills.
When many of the țalyban regrouped in mid-1994, then, it was in response to the
law-and-order situation in the country. American-born writer Eric Margolis, an
eyewitness to post-war, pre-Taliban Afghanistan, described the scene. Along with the
deaths of between one and two million Afghans, villages “were razed in reprisals,
livestock slaughtered, ancient irrigation systems destroyed, and millions of mines, some
in the form of exploding toys, were scattered across Afghanistan.” Some of the worst
perpetrators were the leaders of the Northern Alliance, including Mohammed Fahim
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(erstwhile Afghan Communist Secret Police chief) and Rashid Dostam (an Uzbek
warlord). Their crimes included the “frightful massacres and the most abominable
crimes against real and fancied opponents, including flaying, impalement, burning and
burial alive, acid baths, freezing to death in refrigerators, as well as more conventional
tortures of electrocution, beatings, drownings, and the ripping out of eyes, beards, and
fingernails.” (It should be noted that these very same communist war criminals would,
ironically, later become allies to the U.S. Government in its post-September 11th fight
against the Taliban.) In addition, the hated Russians were still backing the Northern
Alliance (with help from Iran and India; the meddling of the Saudi and Pakistani
governments, too, has already been mentioned), and the Alliance’s traitorous leaders
had become “the nation’s leading drug kingpins,” to boot.138 Meanwhile the illegal
checkposts, the rapes, murders, kidnappings, and looting continued unabated. The
perpetrators of these crimes had to be punished. This, along with (indeed, via) the
institution of an Islamic order, would finally bring both justice and peace to
Afghanistan.
Thus, in response to the security situation, several dozen erstwhile țalyban got
together at a mosque in little Pashmol to come up with a plan. Something had to be
done. Over the coming weeks, the small Pashmol group was able to gather many more
to its cause—including mullah Muhammad Omar, though he was evidently reluctant at
first to take the reigns of leadership (it was only after he had conferred with “some of
the [Deobandi] Ulema” that the one-eyed cleric agreed to take command). Finally, in
late autumn, four to five dozen men gathered at the old Sangisar base-turned-mosque to
officially launch the rebooted movement. Significantly, the țalyban this time around
were to be organized the traditional Islamic way, just as Deobandi precursor sәyyid
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Ahmad of Rae Bareilly had done it, and just as the “Hindustani Fanatics” of Patna and
Sittana. There must be a spiritual leader, or ymam (in this case a scholar named Abdul
Samad) as well as a commander, or әmir; Muhammad Omar was sustained in the latter
position. All present swore on the Qur’an to stand by their әmir, “and to fight against
corruption and criminals.” “The shari’a would be our guiding law,” according to one
who was present at the gathering, “and would be implanted by us. We would prosecute
vice and foster virtue, and would stop those who were bleeding the land.”139
One of the first actions of these țalyban, so the story goes, involved a local
“governor” who had kidnapped and facilitated the rape of two teenage girls; some
commanders in the area had also kidnapped a boy, with the intent to sodomize him.
The țalyban apparently freed the girls and the boy, and the governor was hanged from
the barrel of a tank. In April 1996, Mullah Omar famously donned the Prophet’s mantle
in Kandahar and proclaimed himself “Commander of the Faithful.” All present swore
allegiance to him. The meeting bypassed the customary Pathan tribal structure (i.e. this
was no loya jirga), instead being organized along traditional Arab lines as a shwra, or
religious council, made up of ‘alәma. In this way, mullah Omar and his țalyban (hereafter
designated as Taliban, denoting their official and organized group status) could bypass
the tribal chiefs. This was significant, for, as Ahmed Rashid pointed out, “The Deobandi
tradition is opposed to tribal and feudal structure and the clan chiefs.”140 Thus even
here at the beginning—or, more accurately, especially here—the Taliban’s politicoreligious foundation in Deobandism is evident. Within weeks it would be even more
pronounced, as the Taliban’s manpower, initially numbering in the hundreds, was
augmented by the arrival of thousands upon thousands of students from Pakistani
(mostly Deobandi) mәdrәsәħs and dar ul’alwms. Indeed, the vast majority of these
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students’ erstwhile schools were operated by the Deobandi JUI (run separately by either
the Fazlur Rehman faction or Sami ul-Haq faction), their construction made possible by
Saudi and American cash during the days of the anti-Soviet jyhad and facilitated by the
Pakistani government through the military and the ISID.
The success of the Taliban was to fuel the increasing militancy and jyhadi zeal of at
least one strain of Deobandism, once again making Afghanistan a training ground for
future operations (often anti-Barelvi) in Pakistan. The Barelvis, meanwhile, had no
parallel theater in which to develop similar elements apart from its relatively minor
activities in Kashmir. But to the Deobandis following the events in Afghanistan, the
rise and initial successes of the Taliban, driven as they were by their faith in Islam and
the transformational effect it could have on Afghan affairs, was a phenomenon worth
celebrating. Here, perhaps, was the promise of true Islamic revival—a revival that
could subsequently spread throughout the Muslim world. “[T]he power that has
emerged as the Taliban,” wrote one high-level Deobandi cleric in Pakistan, “gives us
hope that the sacrifices offered in the [anti-communist] jyhad against disbelief would
bring their result. May Allah preserve the Taliban from every mischief of self and the
devil and from the conspiracies of the enemies of Islam, and may He make them worthy
of [the] renaissance of Islam.”141 It is interesting that this particular mufti, who had
himself taken part in the anti-Soviet jyhad, invoked God’s blessing first and foremost
that the Taliban would be preserved “from every mischief of self.” This had been the
mistake of the earlier mujahydin. Perhaps the Taliban would remember.
Not long after the Pashmol and Sangisar meetings, the Taliban won Kandahar
(1994). Immediately a new government was installed in the city and surrounding areas.
“The city was at peace,” one Taliban member remembers. “The old habits of keeping
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boys, adultery, looting, illegal checkpoints and the government of the gun were over.
An ordinary life was given back to the people, and they were satisfied for the first time
in years.” Of course, one of the first institutions established by the movement was an
Islamic judicial system.142 One American journalist, who was intimately aware of the
goings-on in Afghanistan at the time and whose warnings and prognostications about
Afghanistan had gone mostly unheeded (despite their uncanny accuracy) by his mostly
Western audience, described the peace the Taliban brought to a war-torn country thus:
“It was frontier justice at its harshest and most medieval, but Mullah Omar’s cure
worked, bringing peace and security to southern Afghanistan.”143 Indeed, it was the
Taliban’s very “strict Islamic agenda,” among other things, that gained the group
widespread popular support in the first place. One of the Taliban’s first acts to gain
recognition outside of Afghanistan was its freeing (in November 1994) of a Pakistani
trade convoy that had been hijacked by warlords near Kandahar. Deobandi-leaning
Pakistani Interior Minister Naseerullah Babar (d. 2011 AD), a retired two-star general
and Pathan member of the PPP who had experience dating back to the 1970s training
Afghan mujahydin (and who had led the aforementioned two-year anti-MQM operation
in Karachi called Operation Clean-up), expressed support for the Taliban, admitting “a
closeness” between the group’s goals and “our [Pakistani] perceptions.”144
By early 1996, the “student warriors” had “cut [a] swath through [its] Afghan
opposition” and sat perched on the edge of the country’s chief city. “Taleban, the
Islamic students’ army, is sitting on the outskirts of Kabul,” wrote one London Times
reporter in Islamabad, “with enough artillery, tanks, rockets and heavily armed men to
blow the Afghan capital to pieces, after sweeping across the country, defeating its
enemies and astounding neutral observers.”145 By late September the Taliban had won
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Kabul, too, driving out Ahmad Shah Massoud and establishing the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan.
The government that the Taliban set up in Kabul was “a bizarre combination of
ninth-century Islamic political and legal thought mixed up with the most backwards
and primitive customs of isolated Pashtun mountain tribesmen.” It was this
combination that differentiated the system that, say, the ‘alәma of the dar ul’alwm
Deoband or the dar ul’alwm Karachi might have instituted from that of the Taliban.
The latter was infused with local Pathan custom—most apparent, perhaps, in the
regime’s quick and often brutal forms of punishment, as well as its apparent aversion to
the education of women. Both of these—the Taliban’s harsh punishments and its lack of
“women’s rights”—could be explained, if not justified (in the context of twenty-firstcentury Western sensibilities, that is), as a reaction to Afghanistan’s recent war
experiences. Hadn’t the country been torn asunder by crime—robbery, looting, rapine,
murder—and hadn’t the Taliban, via admittedly severe “frontier justice,” mostly
eradicated these problems? Even the growth of the poppy seed had been mostly wiped
out, something at which later regimes (under the protection of the mighty U.S.
Government, no less) failed miserably. Surely an element of the Taliban’s harsh idea of
justice can be traced, too, to the exalted place enjoyed by both protection and revenge in
the Pathan tribal code—again, not a part of Islam itself, despite the faith’s shades of the
old Arab tribal code.146 And as for women’s rights, hadn’t it been the evil communists
who had attempted to destroy the fabric of Afghan society by striving to blur the
distinctions between the sexes, primarily through the education (or propagandizing) of
women? The Taliban’s reaction on both counts was to send no mixed messages. These
were sub-issues, anyway; the most important thing was that a truly Islamic government
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finally take the reigns of state in Afghanistan, and the Taliban, for all its provincial
“boorishness” and lack of urban grace, had at least accomplished this overarching goal
that had so long eluded the war-torn Central Asian country.
True to its Deobandi roots, the Taliban saw itself as merely the vanguard of a grand
Muslim liberation movement, with its sights set, crucially, by and large on communism
(i.e. not “Western” values, unless one includes communism itself in that category). This
was not a nationalist movement, neither Pathan nor Afghan per se, but the springboard
for Muslim repossession of all of Islam’s lands and peoples languishing under
foreign/infidel subjugation. Muslims had watched as one great Central Asian Muslim
city after another—from Samarkand to Bukhara—had fallen to the Soviets, only to be
“liberated” and placed under the thumb of yet another communist or socialist
government. For a while, it appeared that even Afghanistan had fallen, with Pakistan
next on the list. But the Taliban had ensured that the wave of oppression had stopped
at Afghanistan—and had pushed the communists out almost entirely, reversing the tide.
Outgunned, poorly armed Pathan tribesmen had defeated the world’s most powerful
land army. Couldn’t other Muslims do the same, in the spirit of the warriors of Badr?
Indeed, yes—and now it was time to reverse the wave and win back the Muslim world
for Muslims. (During the Afghan jyhad against the Soviets, Zia ul-Haq—perhaps
betraying Deobandi leanings—had reportedly planned to use the nascent Taliban
movement and its “foreign” helpers to liberate the Central Asian republics from their
communist regimes. He would not be the last foreign politician to entertain the idea of
using these “freedom fighters” as a proxy army, either.147)
As “a gesture of pan-Islamic solidarity,” then, the Taliban invited freedom fighters
from around the world to come to Afghanistan and train for just such an effort in
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specially designed camps set up for this purpose (as they were taught by the Pakistanis
and Americans during the anti-Soviet jyhad in Pakistan). Students and teachers alike
came from across the globe, but especially from the conquered “Muslim” states of
central Asia, both to experience Islamic solidarity and to prepare for their own freedom
struggles. Uighurs from East Turkestan (now “Xinjiang,” a Chinese term meaning,
tellingly, “New Frontier”) hoped to eventually rid their country of communist China’s
domination. Members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan sought to topple
“Central Asia’s most brutal and savage Communist dictatorship” (that of Islam
Karamov). Muslim Filipinos hoped to acquire the means necessary to defend Muslim
rights in their country, or at least establish a free Muslim base in the Phillipine south.
Chechens sought to wrest their homeland from Russian rule. Others—Thais, Bengalis,
Tajiks, Turkmens, and more—had similar, regional concerns. But the most populous
group were the Pakistanis, preparing to fight in Kashmir. Pakistan’s very government
(a U.S. Government ally) backed these last. For the most part, then, these volunteer
jydahis were not driven by some seething hatred for “the West”; their concerns were far
more local and/or regional, centered on the liberation of their own countries and
peoples, mostly from communist regimes. In early April 2001, a massive Deobandi
gathering at the village of Taro Jaba (near Peshawar) was organized by Fazlur Rehman
in celebration of the dar ul’alwm Deoband’s many achievements. According to some
sources, over a million people attended. Critically, the Deobandi assemblage declared
its support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as for all other Muslims fighting for
their identity or independence, anywhere else in the world. The two speeches (both
taped recordings) that reportedly garnered the most acclaim during the Taro Jaba
conference: one from Taliban head mullah Muhammad Omar, the other from mujahydin
483

leader and financier Osama bin Laden.148
The mostly anti-communist aims of the aforementioned groups—from the Taliban
to the Uighurs to the Chechens—fit in so neatly with the U.S. Government’s
interventionist foreign policy that some American policy-makers before September 11th
2001 even considered “using” these various benighted groups for their own regional
interests, just as they had the Afghan mujahydin during the 1980s. The Taliban were,
after all, both ardently anti-communist and passionately anti-Iran/anti-China, positions
that some elements within the U.S. Government found highly appealing. (This at least
partly explains how, until just four months before the September 11th attacks,
Washington actually provided clandestine—and even some overt—financial support to
the Taliban regime.)149 Wrote Pulitzer Prize-winning writer Steve Coll: “In history’s
long inventory of surprise attacks, September 11th is distinguished in part by the role
played by intelligence agencies and informal secret networks in the preceding
events.”150 It was within the context of the Soviet fall, of the “cleansing” of Afghanistan,
of the rise of the Taliban, and of the preparation of a wide range of “Muslim freedom
movements” for the reclamation of Muslim lands, then, that many Deobandis celebrated
the collapse of the World Trade Center at the hands of bin Laden’s Al-Qaida.
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EPILOGUE

Be warned, you are not prepared for Afghanistan!
ABDUL SALAM ZAEEF, 20091

To most Deobandis, the response of the Bush regime in Afghanistan to the Taliban’s
harboring of Osama bin Laden was repressive and brutal. Interestingly, for many
Barelvis—and many other Muslims, too, around the world—the initial US Government
response was a legitimate one, however frustrating—a justifiable reaction to a major
criminal act. The Barelvis, by and large, had neither supported the Afghan jyhad against
the Soviets in the 1980s nor the Taliban movement in the 1990s. As for the American
intrusion into Central Asia and Pakistan, the militant Deobandis had had it coming.
The Barelvis would actively campaign against the Taliban in Pakistan for years
afterward.
Meanwhile, Deobandis across the country protested Washington’s Afghan invasion.
After all, the Americans had teamed up with the Northern Alliance, many of whose
leaders had been pro-Soviet during the Russian occupation era. Indeed, men like
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General Muhammad Fahim and Rashid Dostum had been among that earlier conflicts’s
worst war criminals (not to mention their continued crimes against humanity after the
war had “ended”).2 These post-September 11th alliances with some of the most infamous
names connected to Afghanistan’s communist era fomented especial enmity among the
Deobandis of Afghanistan and Pakistan, whose blood had been spilt over the previous
decades against these very same individuals. To the Deobandis who had participated in
the 1980s jyhad, the American occupiers of Afghanistan were simply the Soviets
reincarnate. Perhaps Margolis’ description of the Soviet-American parallels clarifies
this attitude:

[The US Government-orchestrated] fixed elections [of 2004 and 2005]
underlined the unsettling similarities between the Soviet and American
occupation of Afghanistan. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979
citing internationalist duty and the need to fight Islamic terrorists.
Washington’s slogan was fighting terrorism and spreading democracy.
Both allied with the minority Tajiks and Uzbeks. Both were interested in
carving out a corridor to and from the Arabian Sea coast in Pakistan…
Both claimed they were fighting medievalist Islam, nation-building,
liberating women, and bringing the benefits of modern education and
democracy. Both claimed victory was just around the corner. …Suffice
it to say that once the US bested the USSR in the Cold War, and saw its
old enemy collapse, it lost little time in assuming the role and aggressive
behavior of the former Soviet Union…3
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It was clear to many Deobandis that the Americans—who had by now proven
themselves as interventionists and meddlers in the Muslim world for decades—were no
better than their Soviet predecessors in Afghan occupation. The Pathan/Deobandi
reaction to both invading forces had thus been consistent.
But as the war wore on, and it became evident that U.S. Government ambitions
extended beyond simply finding and punishing Osama bin Laden—as drone strikes
devastated villages in Pakistan, as American forces continued to occupy a Muslim
country, as a corrupt regime and its corrupt allies were propped up by Washington’s
guns, as Pakistan’s apparently weak-kneed leaders continued to bow to U.S. pressure,
and as the fruits of the invasion, including the militancy of the so-called “Pakistani
Taliban,” hit closer and closer to home—Barelvi opinion about the war changed. “By
2005,” wrote one journalist on the scene, “[the] consensus [was] that the US had taken
advantage of the 9/11 attacks to implement long-prepared plans to seize the Muslim
world’s energy wealth and establish new bases in its most strategic regions.”4 Whether
or not there was truth to this version of events, it was widely believed, and the Barelvi
religious leadership, while not supporting the Taliban, came to despise the United
States Government and its meddling ways.
In any case, the war would have a devastating effect on the Deobandi-Barelvi
rivalry, further militarizing the schism (and especially the Deobandi groups, who
happened to be the most operative along Pakistan’s border regions and within Pathan
Afghanistan). When jyhadis from Iraq came to Afghanistan to assist in the struggle
against perceived American neo-imperialism, they came armed with the knowledge
necessary to build roadside bombs, truck bombs, and suicide bomber vests—all devices
that were “previously unknown” in Afghanistan and Pakistan.5 Is it any wonder that
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Deobandi attacks on Barelvi processions or shrines from this period on were often
committed using just such devices? This was a new development in the rivalry, and it
had been brought on by the American war in Afghanistan. The rise of the “Pakistani
Taliban,” too, pitted what was considered a quasi-Deobandi force against the Pakistani
government, a conflict that the Barelvis utilized in order to demonstrate their own
reasonableness as compared to Deobandi “militarism” and “terrorism.” Here was an
opportunity to crush their long-time opponents—by branding them terrorists and using
the power of the state to finally bring them low. As such, Barelvi leaders railed against
“Pakistani Taliban” attacks on government forces as a Deobandi phenomenon, even as
many Deobandis wondered who, exactly, the “Pakistani Taliban” really were. “We
don’t know who they are,” one Deobandi Waziri physician told the author in 2012.
“They are foreigners.”6
*
In 2001, the focus of the Sunni Tehrik changed. The timing was not arbitrary, as it
was in that year that ST founder and director Muhammad Saleem Qadiri was
assassinated. Within months the organization became overtly political, organizing
itself as a full-fledged party and abruptly butting heads with Karachi’s heretofore most
dominant local party, the likewise Barelvi-dominated MQM. According to the ST itself,
between 2004 and 2006 alone some seventy-five of its members (one report calls them
“militants”) were killed in the politico-religious war that followed, the ST mostly
blaming the MQM and the Deobandis for its losses.7 These targeted killings soon
became mass killings—in particular with the execution of the deadly Nishtark Park
blast of April 2006. Now mass murder was the order of the day.
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This brings the reader, then, to the transformational event. Of course, it is perhaps
presumptuous of any historian to claim to have identified the “transformational” moment
in any years-long historical process, and there are, admittedly, many such
“transformational” points in time that one might justifiably point to as equally or more
important as regards the process at hand. In terms of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry and
the process of its militarization, one might point to the founding of the dar ul’alwm at
Deoband by Muhammad Qasim, or Ahmad Riza’s very specific 1902 juridical ruling
against Deobandism, or the formation of the JUH, or the organization of the AISC, or
the entrance of the JUI into Pakistani politics, or that of the JUP, or the phenomenon of
the Iranian Revolution, or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or that of Washington, or
even the American invasion of Iraq—these could all vie as candidates for the
transformational moment within the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry’s evolution from
theological schism to violent contest. However, the Nishtar Park bombing was the first
mass killing of Barelvis by Deobandis, and it did seem to initiate a string of similar mass
killings over the years that followed it, suggesting that the rivalry had moved into a
new era in its development. Let us look closely, then, at the Nishtar Park bombing, and
see if it cannot shed additional light on the topic at hand.

The Suicide of Muhammad Siddiq: 11 April 2006.
On the evening of 11 April 2006, a nondescript man made his way through a
shoulder-to-shoulder mass of Barelvi celebrants in Nishtar Park, Karachi, and
approached the rickety wooden stage upon which the multitude’s spiritual leaders were
seated. Seconds later the C-4 strapped to the man’s chest exploded, propelling
thousands of ball bearings at bullet-like speed in every direction. Within moments the
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gruesome remains of almost sixty dead were scattered among the splintered vestiges of
the stage, the carnage underscored by the moaning of approximately one hundred and
fifty wounded. The bomber was publicly identified more than a year later by Pakistani
authorities; he was a village-born twenty-one-year-old named Muhammad Siddiq.
Most international news organizations would, in knee-jerk fashion, immediately
report the incident within the now-familiar Sunni-Shi’a framework. Even without
explicitly stating that the attack had likely been perpetrated by a Shi’i fanatic, this was
the implicit message; several paragraphs devoted strictly to the event narrative would
generally be followed by the statement of a Shi’a leader (like, for example, ’allamәħ
Hassan Turabi, who was subsequently assassinated himself by a Sunni Bangladeshi
three months later), placing the one in the context of the other.
Only a few scraps of information, loosed piecemeal by the government and police of
Pakistan (admittedly dubious sources at best), exist concerning Muhammad Siddiq.
Problematizing matters, a specific context to the man (and, particularly, his April 11th
actions) has been pre-constructed before the historian has had a chance to assemble one
of his own. It is within a similar vein that Guha, in that Subalternist classic “Chandra’s
Death,” notes that a critical condition of historiography is “contextuality”—a framework
that directs the historian in terms of the text at hand.8 Guha’s concern lay with
“fragmentation,” those anecdotes “with no known context [that have] come down to us
simply as the residuum of a dismembered past.” Might the scattered snippets about
Muhammad Siddiq be approached the same way? Though contextuality has already
been provided, it just may turn out that the “torn fabric” to which this event has been
linked is the wrong one. Contextuality must therefore be restored, as far as is possible,
to the fragments available, then work from this potentially new vantage point. In the
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process, it is hoped, the meaning behind the suicide of Muhammad Siddiq might be
revealed.

I
Perhaps the discourse of space-time provides an appropriate starting place. Of all
the places Muhammad Siddiq might have selected in which to end his life (not to
mention those of many others) he chose Karachi’s Nishtar Park, and of all the times he
might have selected, he chose 11 April 2006—or, perhaps more correctly, the 12th of
Rabi I 1427. According to Sunnis the world over, the 12th of Rabi I is the anniversary of
the birth of the Prophet (what South Asian Muslims call mwlyd, as aforementioned). As
previously noted, the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry revolves in large part around the two
school’s separate understanding of the “traditional” South Asian Islamic “rituals.”
Foremost among them is mwlyd, and the controversy of the holiday goes back to the
very beginning, to some of the first anti-Deobandi rulings of Ahmad Riza Khan and his
disciples.
From the initial emergence of debate between Barelvi and Deobandi adherents over
doctrine in the late nineteenth century, it has been the sects’ relative stance on the
attributes of the Prophet Muhammad that have most widened the divide, as noted. The
ritual of the Barelvis has compounded this doctrinal difference, particularly as they
celebrate the birth of the Prophet. Indeed, mwlyd is often marked as of the time of this
writing by processions in the streets, massive gatherings, the recitation of religious
poetry, prize-giving, sweets-giving, prayers, and feasting (in Pakistan the date is
marked as a public holiday, typically complete with speeches by high government
officials at both the national and provincial levels—and even the screening of films with
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“morale-building themes” in place of the “usual movies”),9 much of which is considered
“innovation” by Sunnis of the Deobandi persuasion. Several deadly clashes between
Deobandi and Barelvi groups have taken place on this significant date of the Islamic
calendar.
It is no wonder, then, that on this date Muhammad Siddiq carried out his deadly
attack.

II
According to the bomb disposal squad dispatched to the grisly scene at Nishtar
Park, the explosive used in the violence was of “the same type” used in earlier attacks—
in particular, on the ‘Ali Raza Mosque (31 May 2004; 23 killed, 37 injured) and on the
Haideri Mosque (7 May 2004; 26 killed, 98 injured).10 Both of these previous attacks
had likewise taken place in Karachi. But explosive type and location weren’t the only
elements tying these blasts together; by November 2004, Karachi authorities had
identified both the Haideri11 and ‘Ali Raza12 mosque attacks as having been perpetrated
by aforementioned Deobandi organization Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, by this time officially
banned in Pakistan. On 15 June 2007, the Sindh Home Department issued a statement
identifying Muhammad Siddiq as the Nishtar Park bomber and one “said to have had
links with the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.”13 This brings us back to the question of location.
Why did Muhammad Siddiq and his co-conspirators select Nishtar Park as the place to
carry out their attack? At first glace this seems obvious; a massive Barelvi gathering
was taking place there, one that would include much of the sect’s leadership. But
digging deeper, it seems clear that, in fact, the location’s significance goes beyond this.
The similar attack on ‘Ali Raza Mosque—the one that the bomb disposal team had
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identified as having employed “the same type” of explosive—had taken place less than
fifteen hundred feet away, just across Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah Road near the intersection
of Madina and Zainabla Roads. The Haideri Mosque is located not much further down
M. A. Jinnah Road, placing all three easily within the southwestern quadrant of Karachi,
between Saddar and Jamshed (parts of Karachi described as possessing many “sensitive
areas” revolving almost entirely around mosques).14 Thus Nishtar Park seems not only
convenient for Lashkar-e-Jhangvi elements on account of its being the venue of a major
Barelvi gathering, but possesses additional significance as falling within the radius of
what was apparently the killers’ “turf.”
The consequence of the perpetrators’ selection of Nishtar Park probably doesn’t go
beyond this—but it might. For Abdur Rab Nishtar (d. 1958 AD), after whom the park
was named, represented much that the Deobandi school had once abhorred: he was an
active and high-ranking Muslim Leaguer, a graduate of the modernist Muslim
University at Aligarh, and, some years after Partition, served as President of the
Pakistan Muslim League.15 Whether Muhammad Siddiq and his co-conspirators had
any of this in mind when Nishtar Park was named as the fateful site for their deadly plot
one will likely never know.

III
With apparent ties to the LeJ (described as “the most dreaded sectarian terrorist
outfit in Pakistan”),16 it behooves one to ask the question: what exactly is the LeJ—and
how might a young man allegedly hailing from an obscure village in the far
northeastern hill district of Mansehra have wound up in the southern port city of
Karachi connected to it? In an attempt to answer this double interrogative, it may be
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necessary to examine the beginnings of the Deobandi-Barelvi conflict, in full swing
many decades before Muhammad Siddiq was even born. Of course, that is one of the
main purposes of the present work; the reader has been introduced to the religious
thought of Shah Waliullah and the revivalism that it inspired, the founding of the dar
ul’alwm at Deoband, the Barelvi counter-reformation, the fәtwa wars of the early 1900s,
the early (pre-Partition) political battles between the two schools in the form of the
JUH-Congress alliance and the AISC call for Pakistan, the further politicization of the
JUI and the JUP within Pakistani politics, and the emergence of militant wings of the
two schools from the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Already
discussed, too, has been the 1985 establishment of what would become the SSP by Haq
Nawaz Jhangvi and his companions and the emergence of its even more militant
offshoot, the LeJ. The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, or “Jhangvi’s Army,” targeted both Shi’a
Muslims and Barelvis. In one of the group’s earlier operations, LeJ members attacked a
congregation of Shi’i in Lahore while the latter were in the act of prayer, slaughtering
thirty; the event sparked a violent response, a “Shi’a mob” numbering in the thousands
smashing cars, setting fire to buildings (including a provincial courthouse), and
attempting to storm the Pakistani parliament.17 It was to this “Deobandi” group—one
that the ISID had been using for years to push its own political agenda—that
Muhammad Siddiq allegedly attached himself sometime prior to April 2006.
Whatever the stimulus for the now-violent nature of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry,
what had once been a schism among scholars had mutated over time into a bloody battle
between religious parties and their terrorist wings. The century-and-a-half
transformation of the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic had seemingly swept up Muhammad
Siddiq in its current.
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IV
Four of Muhammad Siddiq’s alleged co-conspirators were arraigned on 4 May 2009:
Sultan Mahmood (also known as “Saifullah”), mufti Zakir Hussain Siddiqui,
Rehmatullah, and Muhammad Amin (also known as “Khalid Shaheen”); the last of these
was exonerated several months later “for want of evidence.”18 By early September 2009,
the other three—“Saifullah,” Zakir, and Rehmatullah—had been indicted (FIR 71/06)
by an anti-terrorism court. Such courts, known as “ATFs,” had been established in 1997
shortly after PML-N won its landslide (even historic) electoral victory. The idea was
that the ATFs would deter would-be terrorists since they represented the “promise” of
“speedy justice, unencumbered by the procedural niceties of the regular court system.”19
Three others, identified by police as Amanullah (also called “mufti Ilyas”), Qari Abid
Iqbal, and Khalid (also known as “Abrar”), are thought to have been involved in
masterminding the Nishtar Park attack but, as of the time of this writing, remain at
large.20 mufti Ilyas almost certainly acted as the leader of the group, with mufti Zakir as
a chief lieutenant.
Sultan’s 2007 testimony to police (if it is to be believed), combined with the latter’s
follow-up investigation, revealed several details about Muhammad Siddiq’s time in
Karachi, and especially the final hours leading up to his suicide. According to Siddiq’s
brothers (Shafi and Shafiq), Muhammad Siddiq had been “sent” to Karachi by his
“friends” (though these are left unidentified). He would have been about sixteeen years
old at the time of his arrival in the big city. His (Siddiq’s) goal, according to his
brothers, had been to get a job in Karachi, then to save up, “enabling him to marry
soon.”21 A tantalizing yet ultimately unanswerable question spurred by this
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information: did Muhammad Siddiq know who he was going to marry—or at least who
he would like to marry? Did he have plans for a specific life in place that did not include
suicide and murder? Whatever the answer, Siddiq moved to Karachi around 2002,
where he soon obtained employment at a religious bookstore in Saddar (south of
Nishtar Park). Later, he traded his job in Saddar for a similar one at a religious
bookstore near prominent Deobandi university Jamia Binoria (northwest of Nishtar
Park). It is highly possible that Muhammad Siddiq, up to this point, was engaged in the
very pursuits his brothers claimed for him: earning money in the city in order to
establish himself for marriage. Still, his choices of employment—both peddlars of
Islamic literature—suggest at least a leaning towards religion. Jamia Binoria, too,
besides being a sizable Deobandi university, had been the site of several BarelviDeobandi clashes, including a 1999 incident involving a Sunni Tehrik procession that
engaged in stone-pelting against students of the university (though it is unclear who
“threw the first stone,” so to speak), escalating into the shooting deaths of at least two
individuals before police broke up the fight using batons and tear gas; perhaps not
incidentally, the clash took place during mwlyd celebrations.22
And then, for unknown reasons, Muhammad Siddiq abruptly left his place of
employment—and went to Afghanistan “to train in jihad.” Not surprisingly, this
decision would dramatically change the young man’s life, though just how dramatically
Siddiq may not have guessed. For it was in Afghanistan that Muhammad Siddiq met
Sultan. The two quickly became “close friends.” What Siddiq probably didn’t know, at
least at first, was that Sultan was a recruiter for Lashkar-e-Jhangvi whose task was to
“identify, prepare, and brainwash” suicide bomber prospects. When Muhammad Siddiq
returned to Karachi, he regained his job at the bookshop near Jamia Binoria, but Sultan
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returned with him. According to one of Siddiq’s friends (a co-worker at the bookshop),
Sultan would come to discuss “plans” with Muhammad Siddiq often. This continued
until that final fateful twenty-four hours, during which events passed, as far as the police
reports reveal, in the following sequence:

10 April

[Evening] Sultan and Qari Abid Iqbal arrive at the
bookshop outside Jamia Binoria. After a “discussion” with
Muhammad Siddiq, all three drive away.
Sultan, Qari, and Muhammad Siddiq arrive at House No. 2,
Islamia Colony, Pahari Wali Gali, Qasba Colony, Orangi
(Karachi). This is the house of Rehmatullah. mufti Ilyas is
there as well, presumably along with mufti Zakir and Khalid
(“Abrar”).

11 April

[Morning] The group eats at Rehmatullah’s house, after
which Muhammad Siddiq performs two voluntary prayers.
Muhammad Siddiq puts on an explosive jacket bearing
seven-eighths of a kilogram of explosives and three
thousand ball bearings.
[Late afternoon] Sultan and Khalid take Muhammad
Siddiq towards Nishtar Park via M. A. Jinnah Road. They
make the trip in a taxi, which stops on three separate
occasions at police checkpoints; each time it is allowed to
pass.
On or near Jinnah Road, the trio joins a rallying crowd on
its way to the mwlyd celebration.
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Sultan, Khalid, and Muhammad Siddiq remain at the gates
of the park (to avoid cameras), the former two “sheltering”
Muhammad Siddiq behind them.
mufti Zakir arrives at the park (on orders from mufti Ilyas)
to make sure his men are in position. Assured that all is in
place, mufti Zakir leaves.
The vehicle of Sunni Tehrik leader Abbas Qadiri enters the
park. Sultan and Khalid ask Muhammad Siddiq if he knows
who is in the car. Siddiq replies that he does.
[Just after sunset] Moments after Siddiq identifies Abbas
Qadiri’s vehicle, Sultan and Khalid leave Muhammad Siddiq
alone; their departure occurs just as the mәGryb prayer
begins.
The prayer ends. Muhammad Siddiq makes for the stage
and commits suicide.

IV
Mansehra is Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’s easternmost district, bordering (Indian)
Kashmir on its eastern edges yet only one hundred miles or so, as the crow flies, from
Afghanistan to the west. The district has long been a venue for militant training camps
(including at least thirteen “major” facilities responsible for the training of “thousands” of
fighters), mostly connected to operations across the LoC into Kashmir. After
September 11th 2001, such activities were ostensibly curtailed by the Pakistani
government, but by 2005—the year before the Nishtar Park blast—the camps appeared
to be humming again, and this time they were alleged to be providing soldiers both for
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the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as the usual fight in Kashmir.23 It should be
remembered that such agitation, particularly in Kashmir, was nothing new; seventy
years before any planes struck the World Trade Center, the Deobandi-led Kashmir
Movement (1931) was launched not far from here. Deobandi activists (in particular
mwlana Ahmed ‘Ali) collected thousands of rupees during this period in order to carry
out jyhad in Kashmir (Ahmed ‘Ali would become president of the West Pakistan JUI in
1956). “Hence,” writes Tahir Kamran, the “Deobandi penchant for jihad in Kashmir has
a historical context.”24
But in the years leading up to the suicide of Muhammad Siddiq, this atmosphere of
aggression in Mansehra was compounded by the Barelvi-Deobandi contest. Not far to
the west, in Khyber Agency, the doctrinal disputes between two clerics—mufti Munir
Shakir (Deobandi) and pir Saifur Rahman (Barelvi)—had escalated into violence (mostly
perpetrated by the former). Both employed the use of illegal FM radio stations to
spread their rival theologies and denounce the other (not unlike their debating,
pamphlet- and book-producing forbears; it would seem, however, that in this case mufti
Munir Shakir spent less time discussing doctrine and more denigrating pir Saifur
Rahman). Such operations were widespread, as the growth of pirated FM stations
across the north attested as of late 2006 (when there were an estimated eighty-eight),
including two stations in Muhammad Siddiq’s own Mansehra District.25 In fact, just
two weeks prior to the attack on the Barelvis gathered at Nishtar Park, approximately
twenty-five people (mostly Barelvi) were killed and twenty-five injured in gun battles
after Deobandis (followers of mufti Munir Shakir) laid siege to a Barelvi (a follower of
pir Saifur Rahman) in the Khyber Agency.26 The event may have been the last major
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clash between Deobandi and Barelvi to be contemplated by Muhammad Siddiq before he
himself contributed to the conflict.
The violent struggle for Afghanistan and, especially, Indian Kashmir, combined
with the ever-present Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, was thus almost certainly simply “part
of life” for Muhammad Siddiq from the time of his childhood—a state of affairs that
would, perhaps, have allowed for a level of desensitization to violent religious struggle,
whether against Indian or American soldiers or the followers of Barelvi clerics.

V
Muhammad Siddiq had at least three brothers. All were likewise named
Muhammad: Muhammad Shafi, Muhammad Shafiq (also identified as Shafiqur
Rahman),27 and Mohammed Rafiq. At least the first two (Shafi and Shafiq) maintained
their brother’s innocence and blamed the Sindh Home Department for falsely
implicating him in the Nishtar Park bombing case. A local paper, Mәhasyb (operating in
northeastern Pakistan), carried their appeal in mid-June 2007. The thrust of the
brothers’ petition, however, dealt not with Muhammad Siddiq but with their parents,
who had allegedly been taken by a “secret agency” to Karachi, where they were being
detained. “Our parents do not know anything about the Nishtar Park carnage,” Shafi
and Shafiq asserted, urging the president and Prime Minister of Pakistan to intervene
on their behalf.28
What is curious about the brothers’ appeal is the absence of the voice of Muhammad
Siddiq’s third brother, Rafiq. It was Rafiq, after all, who seems to have first gone
searching for his missing brother. On 25 May 2007, about a year and six weeks after
the Nishtar Park blast, Rafiq arrived in Karachi, according to his police statement.
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Rafiq went immediately to the small bookshop outside Jamia Binoria where his brother
had last been employed. Here he apparently met a man named Afzal—a friend of
Muhammad Siddiq’s. Rafiq asked Afzal where he might find his missing brother. Afzal
replied that he thought his brother might have been killed in the Nishtar Park blast.
Rafiq went straightway to the Soldier Bazaar police station, explained his situation, and
was shown a photo album of the carnage from 11 April; if his brother had been killed by
the blast, his remains would likely be visible inside. Sure enough, the album included a
photo of Muhammad Siddiq’s decapitated head, resting on a pillow; Rafiq recognized his
brother, despite the fact that a part of the latter’s face, blown off in the blast, was held in
place only by a piece of string.29 Rafiq’s DNA was subsequently tested at the Dr. A. Q.
Khan Lab in order to confirm his familial relationship to the alleged attacker. It appears
that Rafiq’s arrival at the Soldier Bazaar police station precipitated the Sindh Home
Department’s announcement, released just two weeks later, identifying Muhammad
Siddiq as the Nishtark Park bomber. Muhammad Siddiq’s head was handed over to
Rafiq. Rafiq opted not to carry the head home to Mansehra; “it would not be good for
the family,” he told police. He buried it instead at the Edhi graveyard “at Mochko”
(assumedly Mowach Goth).30 The graveyard, owned and operated by the Edhi
Foundation (a well-known non-profit social welfare program in Pakistan), had, as of
February 2010, acted as the final resting place for almost three thousand unidentified
bodies.31 The remains of Muhammad Siddiq are now numbered among them.
Muhammad Siddiq’s parents survived him, his father identified in June of 2007 as
one “Mr. Israel” and his mother as “Zewar Jan.” Both were taken into some sort of
government custody within days of Muhammad Siddiq’s identification as the Nishtar
Park assailant. The SAG’s allegation that the ISID had been inciting Deobandi groups
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to violence against Barelvi ones seems buoyed by the claim of Shafiq and Shafi that a
“secret agency” had taken their parents away—and further shored up by their claim that
they were being “threatened” over the phone. Evidently, too, an “anonymous caller” had
ordered them not to disclose the fact that their parents had been arrested from their
home village area.32
Muhammad Siddiq also had two sisters: Safia and Soba Jan.

VI
One newspaper headline succinctly summed up the likely target of Muhammad
Siddiq’s suicide attack: TOP LEADERSHIP OF THE SUNNI TEHRIK WIPED OUT. This was
no exaggeration; the dead included
- ST chief Muhammad Abbas Qadiri (whose car Muhammad Siddiq was
asked by his co-conspirators to identify when it entered the park, just
before the two left Siddiq on his own; Qadiri’s arrival was thus the signal
that the attack could move forward, implying that he was the primary
target);
- Iftikhar Ahmad Bhatti, a founding leader of the Sunni Tehrik;
- Ikram Qadiri, another Sunni Tehrik founder;
- Dr. Abdul Qadir Abbasi, a member of the Sunni Tehrik’s “legal aid
committee”;33
- and dozens of other Sunni Tehrik members.

Prominent figures from other Barelvi parties were likewise murdered in the incident,
including:
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- Muhammad Taqi, a former government official, former head of the JUP
in Karachi, and a member of the (Barelvi) Markazi Jamiat-e-Pakistan
party;
- Qari Mukhtar Qadiri, of the (Barelvi) dar ul’alwm Amjadia in Karachi;
- Muhammad Hanif Billo, a prominent businessman and president of the
Tehrik Awam Ahl-e-Sunnat, a Barelvi party;
- and Faridul Hasnain Kazmi of the Jama’at Ahl-e-Sunnat, a large Barelvi
religious organization; it was this group that had organized the Nishtar
Park mwlyd celebrations.

The statement released by the Sindh Home Department on 15 June 2007, however,
asserted that “the motive of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi behind committing this offence [the
Nishtar Park bombing] was to create unrest and a law and order situation in Sindh in
order to avenge the present government’s policy against religious extremism” (italics added).34
A brief glance at Muhammad Siddiq’s victim list makes it clear, however, that despite
what the Sindh Home Department might claim, this was almost certainly a clear-cut
case of Deobandi-Barelvi sectarianism, even if a side motive might have been served in
the process.

VII
Sometime between the old debating days of Ahmad Riza Khan and the carnage of
Nishtar Park, Deobandi-Barelvi articulations of power underwent a transformation.
Metcalf identifies an early Deobandi sense of әxlaq, or “civility characteristic of
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respectable people,” as a check on intolerance—preventing, for example, the Deobandis
in Muhammad Qasim’s day from denying others of being Muslim despite doctrinal and
ritual disagreements (though, admittedly, this did not seem to have applied to the
Shi’a).35 әxlaq was a foundational concept within Islam, and had been from the
beginning; according to one hәdis (narrated by Osama bin Sharik), the Prophet
explained that the “dearest” of all “Allah’s slaves” is the “One who has the best moral
character [әxlaq].” Another hәdis (narrated by Abdullah ibn Amr) presents the Prophet
explaining that “the most likeable person to me…who will be the nearest to me on the
Day of Judgment” is “he among you who has the best moral character [әxlaq].”36 For
those of the Sufi tradition, in particular, әxlaq was considered paramount; many Sufis
during the period of its genesis literally defined Sufism as әxlaq, including Abu alHusayn al-Nuri (d. 908) and Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Kattani (d. 838).37 An “EnglishHindustani” dictionary published in the 1880s (the formative period of both the Barelvi
and Deobandi movements) translated “morality” (defined as “the rule which teaches us
to live soberly and honestly”) as әxlaq.38 It is important to note that both the spiritual
masters of the Deobandi tradition and those recognized as the Barelvi guiding lights
were also practitioners of Sufism, though this is rarely acknowledged as far as the
Deobandis are concerned (certainly in comparison to their Barelvi counterparts).
Perhaps this buoys up Metcalf’s assertion that әxlaq may have played a significant role
in maintaining a semblance of tolerance (and preventing outright violence) between the
rival Sunni groups.
The formative periods of both the Barelvi and Deobandi movements took place
during the peak of British power on the subcontinent, thereby providing both sects with
some form of a common enemy. Neither group engaged in politics for itself but rather
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as subsumed parts of larger independence and/or nationalist efforts. Indeed, it wasn’t
until Deobandi and Barelvi groups entered politics within the framework of the
Pakistani state (and money and political power were on the line) that әxlaq appears to
have been knocked off of its pedestal. Concurrently with this development came the
dramatic increase, from the 1970s onwards, of a more Saudi version of Islam—one that
rejected Sufism and, perhaps along with it, the exalted place which that strain of the
faith reserved for әxlaq. Years of desensitization to war, fueled by Russian and
American (and Indian) incursions and funded by Pakistani, Saudi, and American (and
Indian) intelligence agencies, also doubtless played a role in removing the barrier to
certain social behaviors that had previously been thrown up by әxlaq.
The mushrooming of mәdarys in Pakistan brought about by government support
(“or exploitation,” in the words of Cohen, and it appears that the SAG would agree)—
from around two hundred fifty at the time of Partition to almost three thousand in 1987
to between ten and forty-five thousand by the mid-2000s—produced, perhaps not
surprisingly, a considerable surplus of Muslim scholars, clerics, and teachers, a
“religious lumpenproletariat” of mostly young men who may have found it difficult to
secure employment in the world outside the mәdrәsәħ.39 It isn’t unlikely that young
Muhammad Siddiq himself met this description—an erstwhile student in a Deobandi
mәdrәsәħ, a recent graduate perhaps, yet unable to secure meaningful employment
beyond a junior position at a bookshop. Devoid of a foreseeable future as a scholar and
well-versed in sectarian vitriol, Muhammad Siddiq may have been targeted as an ideal
recruit for the LeJ.
By the time Muhammad Siddiq approached Nishtar Park, minutes before his death,
әxlaq was likely the last thing on his mind.
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*
The Rivalry Continues.
The April 2006 Nishtar Park bombing—almost certainly a high-collateral
assassination effort targeting Abbas Qadiri—sparked outrage among Barelvis in
Karachi and across Pakistan. It also cast a negative light on Deobandism throughout
the country, buoyed up a year later by the Lal Masjid incident—during which
Deobandis seeking the enforcement of shәri’at in Islamabad refused to vacate a school
and mosque, resulting in the storming of the facility by government forces. Despite the
disavowal by Deobandi religious leaders of the Lal Masjid movement, the incident
exacerbated Barelvi fears of an increasingly militant Deobandism and seemed to
legitimize Barelvi claims of the same.
Barelvis had political cause to worry, too. Though the JUP had allied with other
Muslim political parties—finally; it had only taken half a century for such an alliance to
emerge—it had continued its decline in terms of national influence. The JUI, on the
other hand, had skyrocketed into prominence. Formed in the run-up to the 2002
general elections, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal Pakistan (or MMA) included both the
JUI and the JUP, as well as the JI, the Shi’a Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan, and the Jamiat
Ahl-e-Hadith. With the religious parties finally forming a united front, the MMA won
a large portion of the vote—indeed, the greatest electoral victory for the ‘alәma parties
since Pakistan’s birth. All told, the MMA obtained a whopping sixty-three seats in the
National Assembly. (The Barelvi-dominated MQM managed seventeen.) But of the
five parties that formed the alliance, the JUI emerged as by far the most powerful,
especially since JUI (F) candidates alone had garnered forty-one of the MMA’s sixtythree seats. This, coupled with the party’s twenty-nine provincial assembly seats in the
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NWFP (MMA seats in the province totaled forty-eight) propelled Fazlur Rehman to
the Leader of the Opposition position in 2004, a post he held until 2007.
But the MMA experienced a rapid drop in popularity after its declaration of “loyal
opposition” (as opposed to outright opposition) to the Musharraf regime, at a time when
Pervez Musharraf was losing supporters on all sides. The declaration was made despite
the MMA’s official stance against Pakistan’s participation in the U.S. Government-led
“War on Terror.” But by mid-2007, even the MMA could sense Musharraf’s impending
fall, issuing a call (together with the PPP and the PML-N) for the President’s
resignation. In November 2007, Musharraf declared a state of emergency, pushing
elections back “indefinitely.” For a time it seemed that the old pattern of military
dictators delaying elections, perfected by Zia ul-Haq, had returned to Pakistan. But a
few days later, and perhaps to Musharraf’s credit, elections were announced for January
2008 (later pushed back to February after the killing of Benazir Bhutto). Meanwhile,
the MMA broke up before the election took place (2008), and the JUI managed to win
only seven seats (compared to the JUP’s zero). The MQM garnered twenty-five seats.
The big players in the 2008 contest were the Pakistan People’s Party, now led by
Yousaf Raza Gillani (after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto earlier that year), and the
PML-N, led by Nisar Ali Khan—both outright opposition parties to the increasingly
unpopular Pervez Musharraf. Musharraf’s own Pakistan Muslim League (Qaid-eAzam) had come in a distant third. The religious parties, it seemed, had thrown away
their chance to be politically dominant.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Government-led war in Afghanistan continued to aggravate
the Deobandi-Barelvi schism. The Barelvis used the conflict, and the “terrorism” brand,
to continue its attack on Deobandism’s image. In 2009, Pakistani Foreign Minister and
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Barelvi Shah Mehmood Qureshi (who also happened to be the spiritual custodian of one
of Pakistan’s most significant shrines—that of Shah Rukn-e-Alam, in Multan) told a
large crowd gathered at the tomb, “The Sunni Tehreek has decided to activate itself
against Talibanisation in the country. A national consensus against terrorism is
emerging across the country.”40 Just days later, the Sunni Tehrik—in league with
several other Barelvi organizations including the JUP, the Jama’at Ahl-e-Sunnat, the
A’almi Tanzim Ahl-e-Sunnat, the Karawan-e-Islam, the Markazi Jama’at Ahl-e-Sunnat,
the Markazi JUP, and the Nizam-e-Mustapha Party—launched the Sunni Ittehad
Council (SIC), an explicitly anti-Taliban alliance. The JUP spoke out, too, against the
peace agreement that the Pakistani government had chalked out with the Tehrik-eNifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)—a “Pakistani Taliban” group—that paved the
way for the implementation of the TNSM’s version of shәri’at over the Malakand region
of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.41 The Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry was to be played out in the
context of the Taliban and international “terrorism.” Opined one Pakistani newspaper
around the same time that the SIC was born: “The Taliban are not the distant upholders
of true Islam in Kabul being pulverised by the Americans after 2001. They are militants
who use terror to subjugate communities, kill innocent Muslims through suicidebombing, and want to replace democracy with a despotic order.” Whatever the initial
Barelvi reaction to the American invasion to the west, the school’s proponents now
protested vociferously against it—and, more importantly, against the Taliban, too.
Once they might have been described as mere spectators. Not so now. In addition, the
Barelvi-dominated MQM joined the fray against the Deobandi-dominated Taliban. “A
highly disciplined political entity, the MQM has resolved to stand up to them,” the same
newspaper reported. “It may come to regard the Barelvi school of thought as its
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ideological base because most of its cadres are old followers of the great Barelvi leader,
Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani of the Jamiat-e Ulema-e Pakistan.”42
Even with the formation of the SIC and the MQM’s anti-Taliban declaration,
Barelvis and Deobandis temporarily united (at least in the old form of “separate unity”)
from around November 2010 to mid-2011 to rally against anti-blasphemy law reform.
This was, of course, typical of both schools, in light of similar “alliances” against
perceived government intrusion into the ‘alәma’s purview that had occurred from the
time of Pakistan’s birth. Anti-Taliban rhetoric from the Barelvi camp (most
conspicuously in the form of the JUP and the SIC, of which the former was a part)
noticeably died down during this period. “We had seen the Barelvis getting ready to
organize a campaign against the Taliban,” observed analyst Nasim Zehra, “but they got
sidetracked by the blasphemy issue and this was forgotten.”43 Of course, the Barelviinstigated assassination of Salman Taseer, mentioned previously, was tied up in the
matter. The JUP’s Fazal Karim did not mince words, stating plainly that the proposed
change in the laws were meant merely to placate Westerners; “We will not allow it,” he
said.44 At the same time, JUI-F senator mwlana Sherani opposed legislation dealing
with domestic violence, claiming that it was “not a major issue in Pakistan until
women’s rights groups appeared.” Passage of the law would “promote Western culture
in the Islamic state,” Fazlur Rehman said, and the JUI would fight it “tooth and nail.”45
Both the Barelvis and the Deobandis, too, strongly opposed U.S. Government drone
strikes in Pakistan.
As of this writing, the direct violence between Deobandi and Barelvi had not abated
either. In February 2010, gunmen from the SSP and affiliated groups attacked Barelvis
celebrating mwlyd in Faisalabad and Dera Ismail Khan, prompting a retaliatory attack
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by the crowd on a Deobandi mәdrәsәħ.46 In July of that year, scores of Barelvis were
killed—and much of the country outraged—when an SSP bomb detonated in the Data
Durbar shrine in Lahore.47 But that same month, local Barelvi leader and Dawat-eIslami activist Abdus Sattar justified the “severe beating” of a local father of five (a
forty-five-year old named Faryad) on the grounds that the man had committed
blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad; “Due to this indecent and blasphemous
utterance and adamance of the accused,” Abdus Sattar explained, “we [the residents of
the town of Marzi Pura neighborhood of Khanewal, northeast of Multan] decided to
teach him a lesson and thrash him.”48 The same justifcation would be used by Barelvi
leaders in early 2011, when Punjab governor Salman Taseer (who wanted to tone down
Pakistan’s anti-blasphmeny laws) was murdered by one of his Barelvi bodyguards, as
aforementioned; clerics subsequently forbade their followers from uttering funeral
prayers for the slain politician and hailed his murderer as a national hero. In late June
2011, perhaps as a Deobandi reaction to the joint SIC-MQM resolution to resist
Pakistan’s “Talibanization,” a “kill list” began circulating in Karachi targeting Dawat-eIslami head Muhammad Ilyas Qadiri, the heavily Barelvi MQM leadership, at least one
Shi’a cleric, and several anti-SSP police officers; those named, the list explained, had
insincerely labeled honest jyhadis “terrorists” while ignoring real criminals like thieves
and murderers.49 Dawat-e-Islami leaders had been targeted before, of course; indeed,
just four months before the list began circulating, thousands of “angry activists” from
the Barelvi proselytizing group had marched along Karachi’s streets, firing guns into
the air, burning tires, and forcing shops to close down and people to remain “confined to
their homes”—all in protest of the killing of a Barelvi ymam (and Dawat-e-Islami
member) on 19 February.50
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Barelvi mobilization had its consequences, too. The Pakistani government (in the
form, perhaps not surprisingly, of its largely Deobandi-leaning intelligence agencies)
began to publicly crack down on Barelvi activities in September of 2011 when military
authorities decided to “curtail the activities” of the Dawat-e-Islami (now claiming to be
active in almost seventy countries worldwide), particularly in reference to the Barelvi
organization’s missionary efforts within the ranks of the armed forces themselves. The
group was reported to have been so successful in gaining followers from within the
military that the Dawat-e-Islami’s “key source of funding,” by 2011, came from this
unique section of its membership (more than twenty million rupees were collected from
the Pakistan Air Force alone—and that just during the month of Ramadan/August).
Intelligence agencies warned the military that the Dawat’s “growing influence” would
have “serious implications,” despite the group’s official “apolitical” stance. Evidently,
some within the Pakistani government had been reassessing the influence of ostensibly
non-violent preaching groups like the Dawat-e-Islami ever since the assassination of
Salman Taseer. Indeed, the Barelvi bodyguard who had killed Taseer, a twenty-sixyear-old from Rawalpindi who had been working for the police since 2002, was himself
“believed to be a follower of Dawat-e-Islami.”51 During “interrogations,” the
bodyguard, Mumtaz Qadiri, even admitted that “Qadiri” was not actually his last
name—but that he had adopted it out of devotion to the Dawat-e-Islami founder,
Muhammad Ilyas Qadiri.52 He would later confess to having been inspired to carry out
the killing after listening to “the speeches of Hanif Qureshi,” a Barelvi cleric and Dawate-Islami leader.53 To many Barelvis, however, the government’s move to scrutinize the
Dawat-e-Islami was just another example (in a long train of abuses) of official patronage
reserved for Deobandis over the Barelvi majority; even police officials connected to the
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case, after all, had admitted that “no suspected militant out of the 150 arrested from the
suburbs of the capital belongs to this religious party [the Dawat-e-Islami].”54
*
It should be noted here, towards the end of this work, that, outside of clerical and
political circles (or militant jyhadi ones), the typical Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic is more
subdued, and varies generally from place to place. In much of India, for example, the
rivalry is mostly a scholarly one, barely manifested in the everyday lives of lay Muslims
of either stripe (of course, it flares up from time to time as a political issue when matters
of government largesse are concerned). The general feeling of the “everyday”
Deobandi or Barelvi (at least in the experience of the author, having “mixed and
mingled” with Deobandis and Barelvis at various levels on three continents over seven
years as of this writing) might best be summed up in the words of a Kashmiri refugee in
Lahore named Anjum. Anjum’s father had fled the cool valley of Srinagar amidst the
“massacres” that accompanied Partition and the initiation of Indian Government rule
there; thus Anjum had been born on the sweltering Punjabi plains. Asked what his
feelings were about the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, he explained, “I just want to follow
the Qur’an and the sunnәt. There are no sects in the Qur’an—all are one.” Rather than
shine a light on the schism, he had laid emphasis on the faith’s original purity as well as
its ideal of a unified ummәt. Pressed further, however, Anjum admitted cautiously,
“Some ‘alәma have added a few things to the religion that were not there in the
Prophet’s time. This is not good.” This was, of course, a clear reference to the Barelvi
scholars and pirs.
“So you are a Deobandi, then?” I asked.
“Yes,” he answered quietly, seemingly uncomfortable affirming that such a division
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existed within the ummәt at all. Most Kashmiri Muslims lean Deobandi, he informed
me. Thus Anjum’s inclination was one of toleration, despite his feelings—even strong
feelings—against the alleged “accretions” espoused by the Barelvis of the subcontinent.
His initial answer to the question of Deobandi-Barelvi animosity had been conciliatory.
“I would pray behind a Deobandi or a Barelvi,” he had assured me.55
On a visit to Junagadh in Gujarat, hundreds of miles away from Anjum in Lahore,
two Muslim men in their twenties who had previously approached the author and
initiated a conversation admitted that they did not belong to the same sect. “I am
Deobandi, he is Barelvi,” one of them said, motioning to the other. “But we are both
Muslims.” And best friends, at that.
Anjum’s attitude, like that of the Gujarati pair, seems generally representative, in
the author’s experience, of the vast majority of Indian Sunnis vis-à-vis their “Others”—
whether that Other carries a Deobandi or Barelvi distinction. Perhaps it has been so
since the schism first materialized in the late nineteenth century.
*
From the days of Islam’s first generation, divisions have plagued the faith—schisms
that were serious enough to bring about the bloody murder of caliphs and the
fragmenting of nations. In this sense, the Deobandi-Barelvi divide is nothing new. The
differences between the great schism of today and the ones of ages past are in large
degree tied up in the development, from the late nineteenth century, of the modern
“total state” and its underpinning political philosophy: statism. Among Western states,
at least, this development was occurring rapidly from the first few decades of the British
Raj period (i.e. post-1857), and the nationalist and/or separatist movements that grew
up in India were nurtured by these Western ideas of political organization and
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philosophy. Both Nehru’s INC and Jinnah’s AIML operated like formal British activist
organizations, and each sought to establish strong, “modern” states on the
subcontinent—the former advocating for a socialist system, the latter a republican one.
The JUH (born of a tradition that had already assumed the British educational model)
adopted these same forms, as did (to a lesser extent) the AISC. With the establishment
of Pakistan, both groups worked within the new, “modern” system fashioned after the
western model, first as “influencer” parties and later as full-fledged political parties.
Despite constitutions ostensibly meant to curb the activities of central and provincial
regimes (and despite Jinnah’s original dream of a truly federal system), the scope of the
(central) government (following the example of Western states) was assumed to be
virtually unbounded, and as such presidents and ministers and elected representatives
(and dictators) were free to craft legislation of broad scope, creating departments and
bureaucracies and agencies and offices touching upon almost all aspects of life. The
rulings of government were, of course, enforced by violence or the threat of violence.
At the same time, the government collected vast sums in taxes (of a wide variety),
borrowed more and more money to fund its activities (and expansion), and printed (from
the early 1970s, completely fiat) money when needed, increasing its scope (and ability
to, among other things, wage war) even more—and attracting thousands of partisans,
lobbyists, and activists.
This all-encompassing patronistic kind of system (i.e. the total state) engendered
competition between the Deobandi and Barelvi schools for money and power on a scale
never seen before on the subcontinent. True, religious scholars and pirs had been
granted salaries or land in the past by sultans and princes, but this had been a patron
relationship between a ruler and various individuals (indeed, a mere handful, relatively
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speaking). But the modern, near-total state essentially transformed the Deobandi and
Barelvi schools into enormous, religio-political lobby groups, each vying for a piece of
the colossal government “pie”—and the guns and patronage that such benefaction
brought with it; this was no association between a patron and a scholar but rather one of
massive government and massive interest group. (Looming at the edge of possibility,
too, was the notion of one or the other school actually taking over the reigns of the state
as direct controllers.) This contest over the “pie” combined with both direct
government manipulation of religious parties for militant ends (as in Kashmir and
Bangladesh) and prolongued, brutal persecution of religious parties (as during the Z. A.
Bhutto years) to initiate a militarization of said groups that would culminate from the
1980s onward. Thus, with the entrance of both sides into the “modern” (i.e. total)
political structure of the Pakistani state (and the contests for power and money inherent
therein), a phenomenon that had once been simply a doctrinal division between religious
schools had transformed into a fierce political rivalry between powerful religious
parties. Indeed, as the struggle for political power became the central focus of the
‘alәma parties as seemingly the only means of implementing an Islamic order, their
leaders came to regard their respective co-religionists “as landlords do their
constituencies, as political jagirs [fiefdoms],” in turn resulting in an emphasis by said
leaders on the differences between the various Sunni schools.56
At the same time, the concept of an “Islamic state” was shoved roughshod into the
modern, total-state structure, transforming the shәri’at system into one of allencompassing coercion and compulsion. To the ‘alәma (if not for the pirs, for whom the
issue is far more complex), the totalitarian doctrine that lies at the heart of “modern”
state ideology (specifically, to quote Mises, “that the rulers are wiser and loftier than
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their subjects and that they therefore know better what benefits those ruled than they
themselves”) seemed nicely suited to their own political philosophy. As an allencompassing social, political, and religious system, Islam (according to this ‘alәma-led
view) must be entrenched into the very bedrock of the state system, its injunctions
given the power of state legislation, and its enforcement backed up by the guns of
government. Past systems had allowed for such integration before, but the
decentralized nature of the old state, the traditional restrictions on its domain, and the
individual-to-individual character of ‘alәma-ruler patronage largely mitigated its effects.
The emergence of the modern “total state” presented a prize over which the ‘alәma
parties and their partisans would fight more intensely than before.
But the influence of the total state on the transformation of the Deobandi-Barelvi
rivalry didn’t end with the organization of the JUH or the JUI or the AISC, or with the
birth and development of Pakistan. Perhaps the most “total” total state yet seen in
human history, that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, invaded and occupied
Afghanistan in the 1980s, while other near-total states intervened, too—including the
Iranian, Indian, Saudi, American, and Pakistani governments, each projecting power
through proxy fighters and funding their efforts via mostly fiat printed or borrowed
cash (made especially possible after Nixon’s 1971 closure of the gold window, though in
progress for years). The effect of these foreign interventions on the rivalry in question
was immeasurable. The interventions armed and trained thousands of mujahydin, thus
militarizing a segment of the Deobandis. They funded the mushrooming of (mostly
Deobandi) mәdarys, stimulating later, reactionary growth among Barelvis in this same
sphere. They allowed for the centrally planned influx of thousands of Wahhabi
preachers from the Gulf. They stimulated the illegal drug trade. They stimulated the
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illegal gun trade. They inadvertently led to the birth of Barelvi reactionary outfits like
the Sunni Tehrik, and even of the MQM. They buoyed up Pakistani dictators. They
patronized one school at the expense of the other. Their interventions in other parts of
the Muslim world galvanized members of one school or the other (or both). They led
directly to the arrival of foreigners—Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens, others—trained in the
use of such weapons as the improvised explosive device and the suicide bomb jacket
(hitherto unheard of in Pakistan). In short they armed, funded, and provoked
Deobandis and Barelvis alike over the course of several decades.
Perhaps it is no wonder that the above-described, intervention-led transformation
came to characterize the Deobandis’ and Barelvis’ long-standing rivalry—already
politicized by the Pakistani state—with one another. Thus within the context of the
rise of total statism, to quote Eric Foner (writing about a different “tragic irony of
history”), “each side fought to defend a distinct vision of the good society, but each
vision was destroyed by the very struggle to preserve it.”57
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Glossary
әhl-e-sunnәt : denoting the “people [who follow] the sayings and deeds of Muhammad”
әmir : title of a military head or political leader, whose secular leadership was to be
augmented by the spiritual guidance of an ymam; often Romanized as “Amir” or
“Emir”
әmir ul-mwmynin : “Commander of the Faithful,” a title bestowed both upon protoDeobandi jyhadi Sayyid Ahmad of Raebareli and Deobandi-trained Taliban chief
mullah Muhammad Omar
‘alәma : pl.; see ‘alym
’allamәħ : one who is learned/educated
‘alym (plural: ‘alәma) : a religious scholar
bi’at : allegiance or fealty; a covenant between Sufi shix and disciple
but pәrәst : one who worships idols (but = “Buddha”)
but shykәn : one who destroys idols
byd’at : (forbidden) religious innovation
bynnwt : a South Asian martial art form
dәrgaħ : the burial site and shrine of a Sufi pir
dәrs-e-nyžami : the traditional curriculum featured in most South Asian Islamic
seminaries, developed after the decline of Muslim power by the scholars of Farangi
Mahall
dar ul’alwm : a “house of learning,” or a religious university, considered superior to a
mәdrәsәħ
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dar ul-hәrb : “house of war,” denoting a geographical area in which Muslims are not free
to practice their religion
dar ul-yfta : department within a seminary that issues juridical rulings, or fәtawa
dar ul-yslam : “house of Islam,” denoting a geographical area in which Muslims are free
to practice their religion
fәqir : a holy man
fәtawa : pl.; see fәtwa
fәtwa (plural: fәtawa) : a juridical ruling, typically composed by a mufti
fyqħ : Islamic law tradition (not unlike the western term “case law”)
gwrdwara : a Sikh temple and place of worship
hәj : the journey to Mecca mandated to all Muslims
haji : one who has completed the hәj
hәżrәt : a title of respect for one who is especially learned and pious
hәdis : a tradition of the Prophet related by someone who witnessed it firsthand; each
hәdis possesses a chain of authority indicating its trustworthiness or lack thereof
hәram : denoting something that is forbidden by Islamic law
hafyž : one who has memorized the Qur’an in its entirety
hyjrәt : migration, denoting a migration from a “house of war” to a “house of Islam,” as
the first Muslims did in leaving Mecca for Yathrib (Medina)
hysba : “verification,” denoting the concept of regulating an Islamic order, including the
moral behavior of its members
jәm’aiәt : organization or party
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jәm’aiәt ‘alәma-e-hynd : “Organization of Indian Islamic Scholars,” a Deobandidominated party that mostly supported the Indian National Congress and
“composite nationalism”
jәm’aiәt ul-әnsar : “Organization of Helpers,” organized by Mahmud Hasan and run by
Obaidullah Sindhi as a network of Deobandi students and alumni who might be
called upon to politically or otherwise support the Deobandi leadership in times of
need
jyhad : struggle, or “holy war,” either denoting an internal struggle for personal purity
or an external struggle against a physical enemy
jyziәħ : a tax on non-Muslims, ostensibly to pay their exemption from military service
kәlymәħ : the basic Muslims statement of faith (“There is no God but God and
Muhammad is his Prophet”)
kafyr (plural: kuffar) : an unbeliever
kufәr : unbelief
kuffar : pl.; see kafyr
mәdarys : pl.; see mәdrәsәħ
mәdrәsәħ (plural: mәdarys) : a religious seminary, larger than a simple mәktәb but a step
below a full-fledged dar ul’alwm
mәGryb : denoting the fourth of five daily prayers, undertaken just after sunset
mәjlys-e-shwra : an advisory council; in Pakistan: Parliament
mәktәb : an elementary-level religious seminary or school
mәnqwlat : denoting the traditional Islamic disciplines, including commentaries (tәfsir)
on the Qur’an, the apostolic traditions (hәdis), and jurisprudence (fyqħ)
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mәqwlat : denoting the rational disciplines, including instruction in grammar, logic,
philosophy, rhetoric, mathematics, and astronomy
mәsәlәħ ymkan-e-kәźb : the possibility that God can tell a lie
mәshayx : pl.; see shix
mәslәk : educational track
mәsjyd : mosque
mufti : one who is trained in fyqħ and fәtawa-writing
muhajyr : an immigrant; especially applied after 1947 AD to Urdu-speaking immigrants
from north-central India who settled in and around Karachi after Partition
muhajyrwn : “emigrants,” originally denoting those who emigrated from Mecca to
Medina with Muhammad, but today often applied to those who emigrated to
Pakistan (and particularly Karachi) from (mostly north-central) India during and
after Partition.
mujәddyd : a title conferred on one who is considered the “renewer” of the faith for a
given Hijri century
murid : the disciple of a shix
murshyd : a Sufi guide or teacher
musәwәt-e-muhәmmәd : “equality of Muhammad,” a term used by the PPP in place of the
word “socialism”
muttәhydәħ qwmiәt : “composite [or “united”] nationalism,” the idea that South Asian
Muslims could be (indeed, were) both “Indian” and “Muslim” at the same time
mwlyd : a term denoting the birthday of the Prophet
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mysәl : in the context of this work, one of several sovereign states within the Sikh
Confederacy (early to late eighteenth century AD/early twelfth to early thirteenth
century AH).
n’at : poetic composition praising the Prophet Muhammad
nәdwәt : denoting a group of Muslim scholars who established a religious school in
Lucknow and who considered themselves heirs to the Shah Waliullahi tradition
nwr-e-muhәmmәdi : the concept of Muhammad as pure light, or a “being with his own
natural light”
nyzam-e-mustafa : “system of the Prophet,” denoting an Islamic socio-political order
according to the revelations, teachings, and personal example of Muhammad
piGәmbәr : “messenger,” denoting the Prophet as God’s Messenger
purdәħ : the covering of women before the eyes of men
qәSbәħ : a “Muslim city,” typically a small town connected by patronage or familial ties
(at least at some point) to the royal court at Delhi
qayd-i-ә‘ažәm : “Great Leader,” a title reserved for Pakistani founder Muhammad ‘Ali
Jinnah
qari (plural: qurra) : a reciter of the Qur’an
qazi : a judge
qazi-e-mәmalyk : Chief Judge
qiamәt : the resurrection (of the dead). CHECK
qurra : pl.; see qari
rashydin (or rashydwn) : denoting the first four (or “rightly-guided”) caliphs after
Muhammad; often Romanized as “Rashidun”
Sәdәr ul-Sudwr : a title for the head of the Department of Religion
522

sәtyagrәhә : “soul-force,”
sәyyid : a descendent of the Prophet
shәhid : a martyr
shәri’at : Islamic law
shaħәnshaħ : “king of kings”
shix (plural: mәshayx) : a Sufi saint, or pir; can also denote, simply, “great man”
shuddhikәrәn : an ancient rite that came to symbolize the early 1900s AD Arya Samajist
effort to “reconvert” Muslims and others back to Hinduism and to prevent the
conversion of Hindus to either Islam or Christianity
shwra : a council
sunnәt : the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad
swәraj : freedom or independence
swrәt : a chapter in the Qur’an, often Romanized as “Surah”
sylsәla : chain of succession or authority that links back to the Prophet Muhammad
tәbliG : missionary work or proselytization
tәfsir : commentary on the Qur’an
tәjdid : renewal (of faith)
tәppa : a traditional form of song originally born in the Punjab but popular (particularly
in the 1800s and early 1900s AD) across north and central India, especially in
Bengal
țalyban : students, often referring specifically to students of religious seminaries; applied
later to the religious students and scholars who took over much of Afghanistan in
the early 1990s AD and Romanized as “Taliban”
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țybb : traditional (“Greek” or “Yunani”) medicine
twbәħ : repentance
ummәt : the worldwide Muslim community of the faithful
‘urs : death anniversary of a Sufi saint or pir
wәqf : a shәri’at-mandated religious endowment, typically in the form of money, land, or
infrastructure
wylayәt : spiritual (and sometimes temporal) authority of a pir over a specific
geographical area
xәlifәħ : “deputy,” often Romanized as “caliph”
xәtәm-i-nәbәwwәt : the finality of the Prophet—that Muhammad was the last, or “seal,”
of the prophets and there will be none to follow him
xanәqaħ : a pir- or shine-center
xuda-e-xydmәtgar : Deobandi-leaning quasi-spiritual political movement founded by
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan among the Pathans of India’s northwestern frontier that
generally supported the Indian National Congress; often referred to by the acronym
“KK”
xәwajәħ : an honorofic title meaning “Lord” or “Master”
xuțbәħ gaħ : a pulpit from which religious sermons are preached
xylafәt : “deputyship,” often Romanized as “caliphate”
ylm-e-Gaib : “knowledge of the unseen”
ymkan-e-nažir : “the possibility of an equal”
zәkat : a tax mandated by Islamic law
zәmindar : a landowner or landlord
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zykr : typically, a ritual form of “remembrance” of God, often performed via the
recitation of the names of God

źymi : non-Muslims living within the geographical boundaries of an Islamic state; often
Romanized as “dhimmi”
zyndabad : “long live,” commonly used in combination with “Islam” or “Pakistan,” in the
sense of “Long live Islam!” or “Long live Pakistan!”
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1828.” Libertarian Papers 2:21 (2010). Journal article.
“Tibet in the Limelight, Xinjiang in the Dark.” Eurorient 20:123-132 (2005). Journal
article.
“The Boston Massacre.” Encyclopedia of Oft-Altered, Oft-Misrepresented, and Generally
Misunderstood People, Events, and Ideas in American History (Syracuse:
TextbookCheck.com, 2012). Encyclopedia entry.
SKILLS
Languages:
Urdu (working proficiency, spoken and written)
Hindi (working proficiency, spoken and written)
Persian (limited working proficiency, written)
Tibetan (limited working proficiency, written)
Polish (working proficiency, spoken and written)
Computer:
Microsoft Office, Adobe graphic design suite, HTML, web design/implementation
AWARDS, FELLOWSHIPS & GRANTS
Maxwell Fellowship
(2010-2013)
Maxwell Teaching Assistantship
(2013)
Dean’s Summer Research Grant
(2012)
Bharati Memorial Grant
(2011)
Dean’s Summer Research Grant
(2011)
Maxwell Teaching Assistantship
(2011)
Multiple Awards of Merit, DoD
(2007)
Brigham Award
(1999)
Foreign Service Youth Award
(1995)

